1833. Targeting fails without contact data---and the data is what conflict destroys.
Olu 26 — Olushayo Oluseun Olu, Robert Lubajo, Misaki Wayengera, et. al. January 29. World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa, Brazzaville, Congo. Makerere University, Kampala. University of St Andrews. One Health Outlook, “Beyond counting the numbers - focused outbreaks response strategies are needed to control the mpox outbreak in Africa,” vol. 8 Clopus
Third, inadequate contact identification and tracing efforts due to the diffused nature of the outbreak and inadequate resources continue to sustain and increase transmission risks in several localities [ 15 ]. Thus, we believe that the current contact per confirmed case ratios being reported by affected countries which range from 4 in Liberia [ 16 ] to 5 in Sierra Leone [ 17 ] are grossly underestimated and leaves several potentially infectious individuals in the community thereby increasing the disease transmission risks. Additionally, contact tracing efforts are sub-optimal at best with several contacts being either lost to follow up or not epidemiologically linked to the cases making the effective targeting of vaccination difficult.
1841. The annex is the whole instrument and it was still being written.
Evaborhene 26 — Nnaemeka Anthony Evaborhene. March 14. Prediagnosis Sierra Leone, Freetown. Globalization and Health, “Africa’s Critical Role in Shaping and Implementing the Pandemic Agreement’s PABS Annex in an Era of Fragmentation,” vol. 22 Clopus
In May 2025, Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) adopted the Pandemic Agreement at the World Health Assembly, concluding nearly three years of complex negotiations. Negotiated under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, the Agreement represents a landmark commitment to strengthening pandemic preparedness and response globally [ 1 ]. As noted by Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the WHO, its adoption is not only a triumph for public health and science, but also for multilateralism [ 1 ]. At a time when rising nationalism and shifting geopolitical dynamics threaten collective action [ 2 ], the Agreement signals renewed global resolve to address pandemic threats through cooperation and shared responsibility.
However, the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement is only one phase of the process. The treaty’s legitimacy and effectiveness hinge on the successful negotiation and adoption of its Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) annex by April 2026 under Article 12 [ 3 ]. This article reaffirms states’ sovereign rights over their biological resources while emphasizing the critical need to make pathogen samples and sequence information accessible for research and development. The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare deep inequities in access to medical countermeasures: while some regions secured early access to vaccines and diagnostics, countries in Africa faced long delays and devastating consequences. The PABS annex is thus represent the linchpin of the treaty’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
On 9 July 2025, WHO Member States convened the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) mandated to negotiate the annex. While procedural in form, the meeting marked a turning point. For African countries, the stakes could not be higher. The annex is the litmus test, whether the world can move beyond extractive norms toward a new architecture grounded in equity, sovereignty, and enforceable commitments.
1852. No consensus on the text---scope, benefit-sharing and governance are all open.
Li 26 — Qiu Li, Zhen Xu, Jing Wu, et. al. April 26. Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Beijing. National Pathogen Resource Center, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Institute of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, NOVA University of Lisbon. Biosafety and Health, “The PABS system under the pandemic agreement: Current status, controversies in negotiations, and future trends,” vol. 8 Clopus
The World Health Organization (WHO) Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system, established under Article 12 of the WHO Pandemic Agreement, aims to promote timely sharing of pathogen materials and sequence information with pandemic potential while ensuring fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Proposed in response to inequities exposed during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and limitations in existing arrangements, the PABS annex remains under negotiation within the Intergovernmental Working Group. This article analyses the institutional background, core design, and key areas of contention in the PABS system. It highlights three challenges: Defining key terms and scope, designing benefit-sharing and allocation mechanisms, and establishing operational and governance arrangements. It also proposes recommendations to strengthen clarity, feasibility, and institutional coherence for pandemic preparedness and response.
On 20 May 2025, the World Health Assembly (WHA), through resolution WHA78.1, adopted the World Health Organization Convention, Agreement or Other International Instrument on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (the Pandemic Agreement ), following more than three years of negotiations [1] . The Agreement establishes a set of principles, priorities, and objectives for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response, with the aim of ensuring equitable access to pandemic-related health products and strengthening collective capacity to prevent and respond to future pandemics in a more coordinated and effective manner.
However, consensus has not yet been reached on the content of the annex to Article 12 of the Pandemic Agreement, which is intended to establish a multilateral Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system. Negotiations on the PABS annex remain ongoing. The annex is being developed under the auspices of an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG), which is responsible for drafting and coordinating discussions on its detailed provisions. The operational rules and implementation modalities of the PABS system will continue to be negotiated through subsequent intergovernmental processes.
Drawing on relevant legal, policy, and negotiating materials, including draft annex texts, World Health Organization (WHO) progress documents, and proposals submitted by Member States [2] , this study systematically examines the background, core architecture, and key challenges of the emerging PABS system. It further proposes analytical considerations and policy-oriented recommendations, with the aim of contributing to ongoing scholarly discussion and policy exploration surrounding the design and implementation of the PABS system.
1. Background and necessity of the PABS system
1.1. Addressing the global challenge of transboundary pandemics
Since the beginning of the 21 st century, the world has experienced a series of major infectious disease outbreaks, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), human infection with avian influenza A (H7N9), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), Ebola virus disease, Zika virus disease, and mpox [3] . Pandemics transcend national borders, and all countries may be affected either directly or indirectly, as pathogens can spread rapidly across regions without regard to territorial boundaries [4] . Experience from global outbreak responses has demonstrated that the sharing of pathogen samples and genetic sequence data among laboratories, governments, and pharmaceutical companies plays a critical role in epidemiological surveillance and in the development of vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics [5] .
In June 2024, the WHO released an updated scientific framework for pathogen prioritization, identifying priority pathogens [6] , prototype pathogens, and so-called “Disease X”, referring to an as-yet-unknown pathogen with the potential to cause a future public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) or pandemic [7] . Disease X is characterized by features such as high transmissibility, limited population immunity, the potential for cross-species transmission, and high pathogenicity, which together make its emergence and spread difficult to predict using existing pathogen-specific preparedness approaches [8] .
Against this background, the rationale for establishing the PABS system lies in creating a multilateral mechanism that enables the rapid, timely, and standardized sharing of pathogen materials and sequence information. By requiring such materials and data to be submitted to a coordinated PABS sequence database and laboratory network, the system aims to support cross-border surveillance, early warning, and variant monitoring, thereby strengthening global capacity to detect and respond to emerging threats and reducing the risk of uncontrolled epidemic or pandemic spread.
186The catastrophic event won't be recognized from the start---1918 looked mild in spring.
Lipsitch 17 — Marc Lipsitch. July 26. Professor of Epidemiology and Director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Health Security, “If a Global Catastrophic Biological Risk Materializes, at What Stage Will We Recognize It?,” vol. 15, no. 4 Clopus
G lobal catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs) do not come with warning labels declaring them as such. Admittedly, if smallpox virus were released at multiple points around the world simultaneously, or if whole cities started showing major upticks in mortality from a respiratory infection, the global community would have a clear indication that a catastrophic event was occurring and would react accordingly. But there are many other scenarios—perhaps more likely in the aggregate—in which the early stages of a globally catastrophic biological event (GCBE) are much harder to identify as such (I distinguish event from risk in the sense that a risk is a possibility something will happen, and an event is when that thing actually happens). Put another way: If in the next 50 years there is a single biological event that kills 100 million people, there is a good chance the magnitude of that event will not be recognized from the start. For concreteness, this brief comment will focus on infectious diseases of humans.
Biological Uncertainty
One reason we may not immediately identify a GCBE is the inherent unpredictability of biological systems. Current understanding is that the 1918 influenza pandemic appeared in the spring/summer as a mild illness that infected many but killed few. 1 , 2 After a lull in the summer, it returned in the fall in a far more lethal form. Whether this reflected a genetic change in the virus or other changes (such as increased circulation of bacteria that could cause secondary infections) remains unknown, but the fact is that with perfect information about the spring wave, public health officials would have been relatively unconcerned, yet by the fall the virus was rapidly causing arguably the greatest biological catastrophe of modern times.
187Extinction ends every generation after this one---that's the whole magnitude.
Millett 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. September 1. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, former Deputy Head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit at the United Nations. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” vol. 15, no. 4 Clopus
Human extinction would not only end the 7 billion lives in our current generation, but also cause the loss of all future generations to come. To calculate the humanitarian cost associated with such a catastrophe, one must therefore include the welfare of these future generations. While some have argued that future generations ought to be excluded or discounted when considering ethical actions, 50 most of the in-depth philosophical work around the topic has concluded that future generations should not be given less inherent value. 51-55 Therefore, for our calculations, we include future lives in our cost-effectiveness estimate. ****
The large number of future generations at stake mean that reducing existential risk even by a small amount may have very large expected value. The Earth is thought to be habitable for roughly another billion years; 56 our closest relative, homo erectus, lasted over 1.6 million years, 57 and the typical mammalian species also lasts on the order of 1 to 2 million years. 58 Following Matheny, 29 if we were to assume that humanity would otherwise maintain a global population of 10 billion for the next 1.6 million years, human extinction would jeopardize on the order of 1.6 × 10 16 life years.
188Up to one in a thousand this century---and the tools and the knowledge are both spreading.
Johnson 24 — Tess Johnson. February 8. Postdoctoral Researcher in Bioethics at the Ethox Centre, Nuffield Department of Population Health, University of Oxford. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, “For the Good of the Globe: Moral Reasons for States to Mitigate Global Catastrophic Biological Risks,” vol. 21 Clopus
Experts on GCBRs have estimated a chance of up to 1 in 1000 that humanity will become extinct from an artificial pandemic within the next century (Lewis 2020 ; Millett and Snyder-Beattie 2017 ). This is an example of only one potential GCBR, and we might therefore expect the risk of extinction from GCBRs as a whole to be greater. The data is based on extrapolations from historical data on experiments with creating or modifying pathogens. The situation for this GCBR and others that involve the use of biotechnologies, including biohacking and misuses of human genome editing may deteriorate in the future, as two changes occur (Lewis 2020 ). The first change is increasing technological availability: the tools needed to edit genomes, whether pathogen or human, are becoming more available and affordable, with benchtop DNA synthesizers available to buy online, and mail-order DNA sequences available for USD 100-300 for a small gene, even back in 2017. The second change is knowledge availability: knowledge concerning how to simultaneously increase the lethality, transmissibility, incubation time and drug-resistance of pathogens whilst reducing their detectability is set to improve as synthetic biology research and, in particular, gain-of-function research continues and is performed and published in freely or pay-for-access academic journals. (For instance, in 2012, the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity allowed the publication of studies that described the modification of H5N1 viruses to allow airborne transmission between ferrets (Burki 2018 ).) The same goes for knowledge surrounding the influence of particular human genes on our traits and how these might be used for personal gain (Ma, et al. 2017 ).
189Uncertainty cuts our way---less confidence in a low estimate raises the risk.
Millett 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. September 1. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, former Deputy Head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit at the United Nations. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” vol. 15, no. 4 Clopus
Each of our estimates rely to some extent on guesswork and remain highly uncertain. Technological breakthroughs in areas such as diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, as well as vastly improved surveillance, or even eventual space colonization, could reduce the chance of disease-related extinction by many orders of magnitude. Other breakthroughs such as highly distributed DNA synthesis or improved understanding of how to construct and modify diseases could increase or decrease the risks. Destabilizing political forces, the breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention, or warfare between major world powers could vastly increase the amount of investment in bioweapons and create the incentives to actively use knowledge and biotechnology in destructive ways. Each of these factors suggests that our wide estimates could still be many orders of magnitude off from the true risk in this century. But uncertainty is not cause for reassurance. In instances where the probability of a catastrophe is thought to be extremely low (eg, human extinction from bioweapons), greater uncertainty around the estimates will typically imply greater risk of the catastrophe, as we have reduced confidence that the risk is actually at a low level. 48
§§§
Given that our conservative models are based on historical data, they fail to account for the primary source of future risk: technological development that could radically democratize the ability to build advanced bioweapons. If the cost and required expertise of developing bioweapons falls far enough, the world might enter a phase where offensive capabilities dominate defensive ones. Some scholars, such as Martin Rees, think that humanity has about a 50% chance of going extinct due in large part to such technologies. 49 However, incorporating these intuitions and technological conjectures would mean relying on qualitative arguments that would be far more contentious than our conservative estimates. We therefore proceed to assess the cost-effectiveness on the basis of our conservative models, until superior models of the risk emerge.
190The historical record can't bound this---survival is biased evidence.
Manheim 18 — David Manheim. November 29. Independent researcher and decision-theory analyst, Ph.D. in policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School. Health Security, “Questioning Estimates of Natural Pandemic Risk,” vol. 16, no. 6 Clopus
B ostrom is concerned with risks that are far larger than those included in most discussions of biosecurity, but the same probabilistic argument has been used to discuss natural pandemics. 2-6 The argument for the rarity of natural global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs) can be formulated to use the fact of human survival as evidence (in a Bayesian sense) to provide a revised estimate about the probability of natural pandemics. Those interested in mitigating extreme tail risk, such as Jebari, 7 also assert that natural pandemics are less worrying than other risks, with implications for research agendas and funding targeted at mitigating these extreme risks. By outlining the analysis more exactly, we can see several ways in which this argument is prone to overstatement and provide preliminary work needed for further analysis.
Bayesian analyses are those in which a model relating the probabilities, evidence, and prior beliefs is specified, and then evidence is gathered in order to revise, or “update,” the prior belief. An updated estimate, or “posterior probability,” can then be computed via the use of Bayes’s theorem.
Bostrom's quote notes that humanity's survival itself is the evidence, and, given some prior belief about the likelihood of a humanity-exterminating natural pandemic event, we can use the evidence to update our estimate of the likelihood. This analysis requires a probability model that includes both the evidence and the various probabilities in question. As Laskey notes, when there is “uncertainty about a model's structure,” 8 an analysis must account for this. Thus, Ord outlines how model uncertainty in analyses of large-scale risks reduces our confidence in the estimate. 9
Next, an analysis involving risks to humanity must deal with the idea of anthropic bias, introduced by Bostrom, 10 where the fact that someone is asking the question is itself relevant to the probability, because the existence of the observer is a precondition. For example, it might be claimed that evolution of intelligence is likely because it occurred on Earth, the only planet extensively investigated. This ignores that the evidence requires an observer and is therefore biased in a statistical sense. Anthropic shadows exist when an anthropic bias leads to a situation in which “the frequencies of catastrophes that destroy or are otherwise incompatible with the existence of observers are systematically underestimated.” 11 (p0000)
Bostrom's analysis concludes that, even after accounting for model uncertainty and anthropic bias, the risk of natural GCBRs is still low. A fuller analysis, one which accounts for the nature of the historical evidence and the type of model uncertainties that exist, shows why this conclusion is premature.
Defining the Risk
To build a Bayesian model as discussed above, it is necessary to identify what qualifies as a GCBR. Yassif suggests GCBRs “could permanently alter the trajectory of human civilization in a way that would undermine its long-term potential or, in the most extreme case, threaten its survival.” 12 (p000) Our argument requires further restricting the definition to events caused by a naturally occurring pathogen. This definition is sufficiently broad, but because the ways in which a naturally occurring biological event could alter the trajectory of humankind are manifold, it is difficult to capture analytically.
For example, the Spanish flu of 1918 was too small in magnitude to directly alter the course of human civilization. Despite this, it has been argued that the death toll due to the flu, combined with the fact that US President Wilson and others were incapacitated by influenza before and during the 1918 Paris peace conference, led to a peace deal which itself may have contributed to the outbreak of World War II. 13 Such indirect effects are historically important but outside the scope of an epidemiologic analysis. For this reason, we confine the present model to direct effects of a disease.
According to experts surveyed by Sandberg and Bostrom, natural pandemics were thought to be twice as likely as nuclear war to kill 1 million people, but only half as likely to kill 1 billion. 14 This type of expert elicitation is limited, 9 , 15 but only the latter case is even plausibly sufficient to directly affect the course of civilization. Our model will therefore address the question of the probability that a naturally occurring disease kills or otherwise incapacitates more than 1 billion people. This narrower question is still quite complex, since a natural GCBR, as defined, requires not only a sufficiently virulent disease, but also specific exposure levels and/or response failures.
191The only defense that survives being wrong is finding it early.
Lipsitch 17 — Marc Lipsitch. July 26. Professor of Epidemiology and Director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. Health Security, “If a Global Catastrophic Biological Risk Materializes, at What Stage Will We Recognize It?,” vol. 15, no. 4 Clopus
2. Improving systems and methods to gather, process, interpret, and share information for outbreaks fast and accurately will speed the resolution of data uncertainty, so that resources can be more knowledgeably allocated to counter the most threatening risks. These include but are not limited to enhancing global surveillance for illness in humans and animals, building systems for rapid sharing of data and interpretations of data that can be used by decision makers, and methodological work to improve the quality and quantity of data available and to improve its interpretation.
3. Efforts to predict the nature of GCBR, and even to create ordered lists of potential ones, are essential; our preparedness will be best for those threats we have already considered and understood, as has been done in the past for deliberate biological threats. 20
4. At the same time, efforts to prepare for such risks should constantly emphasize the value of countermeasures that can be effective even if predictions are wrong—if we have a globally catastrophic outbreak of an unknown pathogen, or (as in all influenza pandemics to date) we fail to detect the ancestors of the pandemic virus and know there is a pandemic only after it is under way. 21 This means that prediction-reliant investments—development and stockpiling of vaccines against known threats, culling of animals infected with viruses judged to be high risk—should be balanced by investments that could pay dividends under many scenarios, predictable or not. 22 These include the development of universal influenza vaccines (which may protect against any new pandemic strain), investments in public health infrastructure and health systems to facilitate rapid response to any outbreak, development of vaccine platforms and technologies to speed development of vaccines to unknown pathogens, and improvements in information systems, data-sharing platforms, and methods for interpreting data in outbreaks.
192Predicted refusal is not inability---it indicts the agent, not the requirement.
Estlund 11 — David Estlund. Professor of philosophy at Brown University, writing the article that frames this dispute for the field. Philosophy & Public Affairs, “Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy,” vol. 39, no. 3, p. 207-237 Clopus quoted from the author’s final draft, hosted by Yale Law School
1 is such that this will continue. I will not be engaging in this kind of dispute about what is or is not in human nature. Rather, I will argue against the constraint itself. It is important to acknowledge that the term “human nature” can be used to refer to other things about humans, such as their biological needs or their tendency to age. I am using the term in the narrower way I have indicated. However, disputes about whether political philosophy properly respects human nature are not normally about issues like our need for oxygen or our tendency to age. What political philosopher puts these aside? Traditionally, the disputes are very often about allegedly characteristic human structures of motivation, and especially about partiality and selfishness. I am engaging this traditional and central line of dispute about the relevance of human nature to political philosophy. To keep things simple, I will grant for the sake of argument that it is in the nature of humans to be more selfish and partial than socialist or egalitarian (or whatever other) theory would need them to be. I deny, however, that this refutes any such normative political theories. Far from taking a stand on the content of human nature, it would be open to me to deny that there is such a thing as human nature at all. But I will grant it for the sake of argument. Some have suggested that philosophical 2 criticism is often in one or the other of two categories: “Oh yeah?” or “So what?” When a political theory is alleged to violate the bounds of human nature, many have responded with “Oh yeah?” My response, by contrast, is “So what?” The appeal to human nature suggests something more than merely making claims about how people will act or are likely to act. The suggestion seems to be that there are, in addition, forces at 3 work. But let’s consider the weaker claim first, that people (simply) won’t act as the theory requires. In addition to the example of socialist or egalitarian theory, it might be held against a theory requiring significant civic virtue that, for example, people will never do that. It’s hard to see how this is an objection. It would not surprise any of us if people will never be very good or if societies will never be very just. But that very thought requires reference to a standard not met. To show
(supposing that one can show it) that a standard will not be met might count against people’s behavior rather than against the standard. Of course, it may be that the thought embodied in such a complaint is that if people won’t do it, or if we can know in advance that they won’t, then maybe this is because they can’t. Then, if “ought” implies “can,” that would refute the theory. If people can’t do it, then they are not required, and the theory that says they are required is thereby refuted. “Ought” implies “can” is a formula that stands for a number of separable ideas. I want to grant, for the sake of argument, that some version of it could refute a theory of justice. So let’s say that if a theory says that a society would be unjust unless it met certain conditions, then that theory of justice 4 would be false if the society lacked the ability to meet those conditions. This is debatable, but even if we grant it, there is no basis for supposing that what people won’t do is something they cannot do. People and societies fail to do things they should and could do (even do easily) all the time. If it could be shown that a society lacks the ability to meet a theory’s requirements, then I will grant for the sake of argument that the theory would be defeated. But knowing that society will never do certain things is a long way from having any basis for thinking that it lacks the ability. Here is an important point to keep in mind, if only in the background. For present purposes, when we ask ourselves whether a person can do something, we should not be assuming that causal determinism prevents it. If every event, including every action, is necessitated by causal antecedents, showing that nothing is ever required other than what we actually do, then the issue about justice and human nature isn’t of any further interest. This would not be the view that requirements of justice must stay within the bounds of human nature, but the view that they must stay within the bounds of what people and societies actually do. I will be assuming that either determinism is not true or (what seems more likely) that people can often do other than what they actually do even if determinism is true. For example, it might be that a person can do something only so long as they would tend to succeed if they were to try and not give up. That counterfactual situation might obtain even if it is not possible that they try. For example, it is causally guaranteed that Joe, being so uncaring, will never
try to help his neighbor. Still, if he were to try, he would tend to succeed, so it is not as if he can’t help her. This sort of view is “compatibilist,” in that it claims, compatibly with causal determinism, that people can often do other than what they actually do. (And if they can, then they might be required to.) A second important background point concerns oppressive threats and incentives. What people can bring themselves to do is very often relative to an environment of threats and incentives. In many cases, what look like motivational incapacities—whether they are morally unfortunate or not—can be overcome by structuring those threats and incentives. In a subset of cases that require inducement, only oppressive threats and incentives would be effective. (I do not assume that coercion, which law normally involves, is always oppressive and wrong.) Even where the initial motivations are themselves shortfalls from what is necessary for justice (such as weakness of will or willing vice), obviously not just any inducement, however oppressive, would be morally permitted. Many inducements would often only substitute one injustice for another. Nor, however, does the fact that the oppressive inducement should be forgone somehow erase the injustice of the behavior that will result. Just because we shouldn’t amputate the hands of thieves to eradicate theft (supposing it would) doesn’t mean that the theft itself is permissible or that a society rife with it is just. Similarly, just because we shouldn’t incarcerate and “reeducate” people who perpetuate bigotry (supposing that would work) doesn’t mean that resulting high levels of bigotry are compatible with a just society. So, returning to the main thread, suppose that “ought” implies “can.” Plainly, “ought” does not imply “will” (unless people can only do what they will do, a possibility we are putting aside). So, putting the same points the other way around, “can’t do” is requirement-blocking, but “won’t do” is not.
193Serialized, itemized, delivered---a bomb is not a policy statement.
Martin 25 — Guy Martin. August 14. Journalist at defenceWeb, the African defence industry publication, reporting off the DSCA congressional notification. defenceWeb, “Nigeria requests $346 million worth of guided and unguided weapons from US,” https://defenceweb.co.za/african-news/nigeria-requests-346-million-worth-of-guided-and-unguided-weapons-from-us/ Clopus
Nigeria is looking to buy $346 million worth of munitions from the United States, including guided bombs and rockets, with the State Department approving the possible sale.
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on 13 August said it had notified Congress of the potential sale on Wednesday.
Nigeria has requested to buy 1 002 Mk 82 general purpose 500 lb (226 kg) bombs; 1 002 MXU-650 Air Foil Groups (AFGs) for 500 lb Paveway II GBU-12 bombs; 515 MXU-1006 AFGs for 250 lb (113 kg) Paveway II GBU-58 bombs; 1 517 MAU-169 or MAU-209 computer control group (CCG) for Paveway II GBU-12/GBU-58 bombs; 1 002 FMU-152 joint programmable fuzes; and 5 000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) all-up-rounds (AURs) (consisting of one each WGU-59/B guidance section; high-explosive warhead; and MK66-4 rocket motor).
Also included in the potential sale are FMU-139 joint programmable fuzes; bomb components, impulse cartridges, and high-explosive and practice rockets; and support.
“The proposed sale will improve Nigeria’s capability to meet current and future threats through operations against terrorist organisations and to counter illicit trafficking in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria will have no difficulty absorbing these munitions into its armed forces,” the DSCA said.
The principal contractors will be RTX Missiles and Defense, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and BAE Systems.
While not specifying which platforms the munitions are being acquired for, it is likely that they will be for the Nigerian Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano light combat/trainer aircraft acquired via US company Sierra Nevada Corporation. They have been heavily used to combat Boko Haram terrorists, bandits, and other security threats in Nigeria.
In August 2024, the Nigerian Super Tucano fleet logged 10 000 flying hours. At the time the Air Force said “since its induction in August 2021, the A-29 Super Tucano fleet has been involved in several decisive missions in the various operational theatres across the country. So far, over 8 500 hours flown on the fleet were dedicated to both day and night operational sorties against terrorists, bandits and other violent non-state actors threatening national peace. No doubt, the aircraft’s night and precision munitions delivery capability has undoubtedly enhanced NAF’s versatility, flexibility and lethality in all air operations.”
A Nigerian Air Force Super Tucano.
When Nigeria bought its 12 Super Tucanos, it also acquired GBU-12 and GBU-58 Paveway II guided bombs, Laser Guided Rockets including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rounds; Mk 81 bombs; and 70 mm Hydra 70 unguided rockets.
The latest request for munitions could also indicate use on the Air Force’s dozen new AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters. Bell Textron was in March 2024 awarded a $455 million production contract, with work to be completed in July 2028. The Nigerian Air Force also has 24 M-346 combat/trainer aircraft on order from Leonardo.
Last month, Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar, said the Nigerian Air Force would acquire 49 state-of-the-art aircraft by the end of 2026. This figure includes three Airbus C295 transport aircraft; ten Leonardo AW109 Trekker helicopters; 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters; and 24 M-346s.
In the last two years the Air Force has received six Turkish Aerospace Industries T-129 ATAK helicopters; two AW109 Trekker helicopters; three Beechcraft King Air aircraft; and four Diamond 62 reconnaissance aircraft.
Strengthening the Nigerian Air Force comes amid continued pressure from Islamist terror groups and bandits. Abubakar this month said Nigeria’s military has killed 592 armed militia members in the northeastern sate of Borno in the past eight months, after stepping up air strikes in a region plagued by violence.
Abubakar said the Air Force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast. “This year, our air war is faster, sharper and more surgical,” Abubakar said. “We are taking out high-value targets, crippling logistics networks and dismantling cells that threaten peace in the northeast.”
He said Nigerian Air Force aircraft flew 798 combat sorties and logged over 1 500 operational flight hours under Operation Hadin Kai, Nigeria’s military’s counterinsurgency operation in the northeast.
According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Nigeria experienced an 18% increase in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups over the past year. Borno State in Nigeria’s North East Zone remains the epicentre of this violence and Nigeria accounts for 74% of all fatalities in the Lake Chad Basin region – a total of 3 982 deaths in the last year for the area.
194One authority designates the list and licenses every export---commercial included.
AECA 38 — United States Congress. June 30, 1976. Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, the authority every U.S. arms export licence issues under. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, “22 U.S. Code §2778---Control of arms exports and imports,” https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2778&num=0&edition=prelim Clopus
(1) In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and services. The President is authorized to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.
(2) Decisions on issuing export licenses under this section shall take into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.
(3) In exercising the authorities conferred by this section, the President may require that any defense article or defense service be sold under this chapter as a condition of its eligibility for export, and may require that persons engaged in the negotiation for the export of defense articles and services keep the President fully and currently informed of the progress and future prospects of such negotiations.
(b) Registration and licensing requirements for manufacturers, exporters, or importers of designated defense articles and defense services
(1)(A)(i) As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every person (other than an officer or employee of the United States Government acting in an official capacity) who engages in the business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing any defense articles or defense services designated by the President under subsection (a)(1) shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section, and shall pay a registration fee which shall be prescribed by such regulations. Such regulations shall prohibit the return to the United States for sale in the United States (other than for the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies or for any State or local law enforcement agency) of any military firearms or ammunition of United States manufacture furnished to foreign governments by the United States under this chapter or any other foreign assistance or sales program of the United States, whether or not enhanced in value or improved in condition in a foreign country. This prohibition shall not extend to similar firearms that have been so substantially transformed as to become, in effect, articles of foreign manufacture.
195Nigeria’s hardware is government-to-government---the commercial line is tiny.
State PM 25 — U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. January 20. The bureau that administers Foreign Military Sales and export licensing, describing its own Nigeria portfolio. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Nigeria,” https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-nigeria Clopus
For more than 50 years, the United States and Nigeria have enjoyed a strong security partnership and friendship. The U.S.-Nigeria relationship is among the most important in sub-Saharan Africa, given Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and our shared democratic values. The United States works closely with Nigeria, both bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) , the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS , and the African Union . Our joint efforts are focused on increasing cooperation on maritime and border security, military professionalization, counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, defense trade, and strengthening governance of the security sector.
The Department of State provides Nigeria with one of the highest International Military Education and Training (IMET) allocations in sub-Saharan Africa, with approximately $5 million obligated from FY 2019 –2023.. Nigeria is also a partner in the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP) and has benefited from approximately $500,000 since FY 2016 to support instructor and curriculum development at Nigerian military schools. From FY 2016-FY 2020, $1.8 million was obligated for Nigeria in Foreign Military Financing to support maritime security, military professionalization, and counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria is an active member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and has benefitted over $8 million worth of training, equipment, and advisory support for counterterrorism efforts between FY 2019-FY 2023.
The United States has $590 million in active government-to-government sales cases with Nigeria under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Recent and significant sales include the 2017 sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft worth $497 million to support Nigerian military operations against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa. The case included special training on International Humanitarian Law, including an Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) program designed to provide institutional and technical training to the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) in order to mitigate the risk of civilian harm incidents. In August of last year, Nigeria delivered the first payment for 12 AH-1Z Attack Helicopters worth a total of $997 million. The FMS case includes an additional$25 million of funding allocated for the Nigeria’s AGI program, which continues to train the AFN on developing targeting processes that are legally compliant with International Humanitarian Law; The light attack and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities Nigeria is developing will involve more than just airplanes; Nigeria will have the trained personnel and sustainment infrastructure to ensure a robust capability for the aircrafts’ full-service lifetime.
In FY 2018-22, the United States also authorized the permanent export of over $53 million in defense articles to Nigeria via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process. The top three categories of defense exports to Nigeria were Fire Control, Laser, Imaging, and Guidance Equipment; Firearms and Related Articles; and Guns and Armament.
Building on the AGI program, the Department of State has obligated $941,000 in Peacekeeping Operations Funds (PKO) since 2021 for advisory services to the AFN to enhance accountability and justice by developing systems and practices on civilian harm mitigation.
In 2011 and 2015 Nigeria received $15 million in defense articles granted under the Excess Defense Articles program, to include 24 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and two Hamilton-class U.S. Coast Guard high endurance cutters – the USCGC Chase and USCGC Gallatin – which entered service in the Nigerian Navy as Thunder and Okpabana in 2011 and 2014, respectively.
In 2016, the United States and Nigeria signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to exchange common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Since 2000, the United States has had a Status of Forces Agreement with Nigeria establishing the legal framework under which U.S. military personnel may operate when present in Nigeria.
196Their own rule says the migrated items give no critical military advantage.
BIS 20 — Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce. January 23. The bureau that wrote the rule moving firearms off the Munitions List, explaining its own criteria. Federal Register, “Control of Firearms, Guns, Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the United States Munitions List (USML),” https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/23/2020-00573/control-of-firearms-guns-ammunition-and-related-articles-the-president-determines-no-longer-warrant Clopus
( 83 FR 24166 ) (referred to henceforth as the “Commerce May 24 rule”) in conjunction with a Department of State proposed rule to revise Categories I, II, and III of the USML (referred to henceforth as the “State May 24 rule”). The Department of Commerce is issuing this final rule that describes how articles the President determines no longer warrant control under USML Category I—Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns; Category II—Guns and Armament; and Category III—Ammunition/Ordnance will be controlled on the CCL of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and is being published in conjunction with a final rule on Categories I, II, and III from the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), completing the initial review of the USML that began in 2011 and making conforming changes to the EAR to control these items on the Commerce Control List (CCL).
The changes described in this final rule and in the State Department's companion final rule on Categories I, II, and III of the USML are based on a thorough interagency review of those categories, after which the Department of State concluded that the items added to the CCL in this final rule do not provide a critical military or intelligence advantage to the United States and, in the case of firearms, do not have an inherently military function. The Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce have, therefore, determined that the EAR is the appropriate source of authority to control these firearms, ammunition, and other articles previously controlled under Categories I-III of the USML. There is a significant worldwide market for items in connection with civil and recreational activities such as hunting, marksmanship, competitive shooting, and other non-military activities.
This final rule does not deregulate the transferred items. BIS will require authorization to export or reexport to any country a firearm or other weapon that is being moved from the USML to the CCL by this final rule, including releases of related technology and software to foreign persons in the United States. Rather than decontrolling firearms and other items, in publishing this final rule, BIS, working with the Departments of Defense and State, is continuing to ensure that appropriate regulatory oversight will be exercised over exports, reexports, and transfers (in- country) of these items while reducing the procedural burdens and costs of export compliance on the U.S. firearms industry and allowing the U.S. Government to make better use of its export control resources.