Cards 1–14 of 652

1Advantage ONE is Insurgency:

2The drawdown changed nothing operational. The targeting layer stayed and the sorties keep flying.

Reuters 7-3 — Reuters. International news agency, reporting from a U.S. State Department-hosted press briefing following the African Chiefs of Defense Conference in Luanda, Angola. Military Times, “US withdrew forces from Nigeria after operation against ISIS, AFRICOM chief says,” https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/07/03/us-withdrew-forces-from-nigeria-after-operation-against-isis-africom-chief-says/ Clopus

The United States has withdrawn most of the forces it deployed for a recent operation against Islamic State militants in Nigeria and is now providing intelligence support at Abuja’s request, the head of U.S. Africa Command said.

In May, U.S. and Nigerian forces conducted military operations in northeastern Nigeria that killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, the second-in-command of ISIS globally.

That followed a U.S. strike on Christmas Day against the militants ordered by President Donald Trump, who said they had been targeting Christians in the African country.

Addressing a conference of African defense chiefs in Angola on Thursday, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson described May’s joint U.S.-Nigerian as a model for future security cooperation in Africa.

“We have withdrawn much of our forces that were just there for that operation, but are continuing the partnership that Nigeria has asked for to help continue with the intelligence sharing,” Anderson told journalists during a U.S. State Department-hosted briefing after the conference.

Anderson said the operation, in Nigeria’s Lake Chad Basin region, demonstrated Washington’s approach of providing specialized capabilities while allowing African partners to lead security operations.

He said cooperation with Nigeria had helped significantly degrade Islamic State’s leadership, adding that the impact had extended beyond West Africa because of the militant group’s international network.

The operation disrupted not only local commanders but also broader Islamic State communications and operations, he added.

“Nigeria has been very active since that operation in May,” Anderson said. “They continue to prosecute targets themselves.”

3Precision munitions are the capability---no US bombs, no sorties.

Martin 25 — Guy Martin. August 14. Defence journalist at defenceWeb, a South Africa-based defence and security publication covering African military procurement and operations. defenceWeb, “Nigeria requests $346 million worth of guided and unguided weapons from US,” https://defenceweb.co.za/african-news/nigeria-requests-346-million-worth-of-guided-and-unguided-weapons-from-us/ Clopus

Nigeria is looking to buy $346 million worth of munitions from the United States, including guided bombs and rockets, with the State Department approving the possible sale.

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on 13 August said it had notified Congress of the potential sale on Wednesday.

Nigeria has requested to buy 1 002 Mk 82 general purpose 500 lb (226 kg) bombs; 1 002 MXU-650 Air Foil Groups (AFGs) for 500 lb Paveway II GBU-12 bombs; 515 MXU-1006 AFGs for 250 lb (113 kg) Paveway II GBU-58 bombs; 1 517 MAU-169 or MAU-209 computer control group (CCG) for Paveway II GBU-12/GBU-58 bombs; 1 002 FMU-152 joint programmable fuzes; and 5 000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) all-up-rounds (AURs) (consisting of one each WGU-59/B guidance section; high-explosive warhead; and MK66-4 rocket motor).

Also included in the potential sale are FMU-139 joint programmable fuzes; bomb components, impulse cartridges, and high-explosive and practice rockets; and support.

“The proposed sale will improve Nigeria’s capability to meet current and future threats through operations against terrorist organisations and to counter illicit trafficking in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria will have no difficulty absorbing these munitions into its armed forces,” the DSCA said.

The principal contractors will be RTX Missiles and Defense, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and BAE Systems.

While not specifying which platforms the munitions are being acquired for, it is likely that they will be for the Nigerian Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano light combat/trainer aircraft acquired via US company Sierra Nevada Corporation. They have been heavily used to combat Boko Haram terrorists, bandits, and other security threats in Nigeria.

In August 2024, the Nigerian Super Tucano fleet logged 10 000 flying hours. At the time the Air Force said “since its induction in August 2021, the A-29 Super Tucano fleet has been involved in several decisive missions in the various operational theatres across the country. So far, over 8 500 hours flown on the fleet were dedicated to both day and night operational sorties against terrorists, bandits and other violent non-state actors threatening national peace. No doubt, the aircraft’s night and precision munitions delivery capability has undoubtedly enhanced NAF’s versatility, flexibility and lethality in all air operations.”

A Nigerian Air Force Super Tucano.

When Nigeria bought its 12 Super Tucanos, it also acquired GBU-12 and GBU-58 Paveway II guided bombs, Laser Guided Rockets including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rounds; Mk 81 bombs; and 70 mm Hydra 70 unguided rockets.

The latest request for munitions could also indicate use on the Air Force’s dozen new AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters. Bell Textron was in March 2024 awarded a $455 million production contract, with work to be completed in July 2028. The Nigerian Air Force also has 24 M-346 combat/trainer aircraft on order from Leonardo.

Last month, Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar, said the Nigerian Air Force would acquire 49 state-of-the-art aircraft by the end of 2026. This figure includes three Airbus C295 transport aircraft; ten Leonardo AW109 Trekker helicopters; 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters; and 24 M-346s.

In the last two years the Air Force has received six Turkish Aerospace Industries T-129 ATAK helicopters; two AW109 Trekker helicopters; three Beechcraft King Air aircraft; and four Diamond 62 reconnaissance aircraft.

Strengthening the Nigerian Air Force comes amid continued pressure from Islamist terror groups and bandits. Abubakar this month said Nigeria’s military has killed 592 armed militia members in the northeastern sate of Borno in the past eight months, after stepping up air strikes in a region plagued by violence.

Abubakar said the Air Force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast. “This year, our air war is faster, sharper and more surgical,” Abubakar said. “We are taking out high-value targets, crippling logistics networks and dismantling cells that threaten peace in the northeast.”

He said Nigerian Air Force aircraft flew 798 combat sorties and logged over 1 500 operational flight hours under Operation Hadin Kai, Nigeria’s military’s counterinsurgency operation in the northeast.

According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Nigeria experienced an 18% increase in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups over the past year. Borno State in Nigeria’s North East Zone remains the epicentre of this violence and Nigeria accounts for 74% of all fatalities in the Lake Chad Basin region – a total of 3 982 deaths in the last year for the area.

Estimates are that Boko Haram commands some 1 500-2 000 fighters while Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) has between 4 000 and 7 000. Both Boko Haram and ISWA appear increasingly well organized and equipped, the ACSS said. Over the past year, ISWA overran 15 Nigerian military bases and, in a first, used night vision technology to launch attacks on these bases. It has also gained the operational expertise to deploy armed and surveillance drones, shifting the battlefield in the region.

4Airpower is the substitute. Ground troops die, so Abuja buys sorties, and the errors repeat.

Onuoha et al. 23 — Freedom Onuoha, Idris Mohammed, and Oluwole Ojewale. December 13. Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Coordinator of the Security, Violence and Conflict Research Group at the University of Nigeria. Conflict researcher in the Department of Mass Communication at Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto. ENACT Regional Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator for Central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies. Institute for Security Studies, “Nigeria’s military mistakes cost the country its civilians,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-military-mistakes-cost-the-country-its-civilians Clopus

Amid rising insecurity, Nigeria deploys its military forces and assets for multi-domain operations in the conflict hotspots. Eighty per cent of Nigeria’s military is deployed nationwide, mainly for routine police duty, under various code names and yielding mixed results.

Soldiers – especially ground troops – have died at the hands of the militants. This has led to the state investing in aerial combat. The country has expanded its collection of air assets to enhance its air, land, and sea operations. These include tethered and untethered drones, helicopters, and different aircraft types.

Many Nigerian soldiers – especially ground troops – have died at the hands of the militants

The deployment of these assets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as bombardments of forests where insurgents, terrorists, or bandits hide, have resulted in the death of some of these criminals. Others have surrendered to state forces.

In April 2022, a Nigerian airstrike reportedly killed over 70 Islamic State-affiliated fighters at Nigeria’s northern border with Niger. In August 2023, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) confirmed the air component of Operation Delta Safe and Operation Hadin Kai carried out successful air interdiction missions on some illegal refining sites and terrorist hideouts in the Niger Delta and North East regions. These are just some examples of many successful operations.

However, similar to last week’s tragedy in Tudun Biri, the military has made several deadly operational errors. On 17 January 2017, an NAF fighter jet accidentally bombed an internally displaced persons camp in Rann, Borno State, killing 112 and injuring 97. The public panel report on the incident set up by the Nigerian Defence Headquarters claimed the cause of the airstrike was a lack of appropriate marking of the area.

5The targeting intelligence isn’t there. Guided bombs find markets, not camps.

Warner 26 — Lesley Anne Warner. April 22. Africa security analyst and columnist covering African security affairs for World Politics Review. World Politics Review, “Nigeria’s Airpower-Centric Counterinsurgency Is Costing Civilian Lives,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nigeria-boko-haram-iswap-jilli-civilian-casualties/ Clopus the free portion of a paywalled article---the cut ends where the paywall does

On the evening of April 11, Nigerian military airstrikes hit a market in the northeastern village of Jilli, located near the epicenter of the country’s two-decadelong jihadist insurgency, killing as many as 200 civilians. While defending the choice of target as a terrorist enclave and logistics hub, the Nigerian Air Force subsequently announced it was dispatching a fact-finding mission to assess the extent of possible civilian casualties.

The Jilli market bombing is the latest in a series of government airstrikes over the past decade that have killed civilians, underscoring the Nigerian military’s continued challenges with intelligence , target identification and air-ground integration. Between 2017 and 2024, more than 500 civilians were killed in such attacks, both in the northeast against the two jihadist insurgencies operating there—Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—as well as in the northwest against armed criminal groups that the government generally refers to as “bandits.” In January 2017, an airstrike hit a camp for internally displaced persons in Rann . Another strike in December 2023 struck a religious gathering in Kaduna .

Recognizing that civilian deaths boost extremist recruitment, the Nigerian Air Force unveiled a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) action plan in May 2025 and inaugurated a dedicated CHMR Board two months later in July. The Jilli airstrike makes it clear that a gap remains between this emphasis on civilian harm mitigation and operational practice.

6Their own service filed the admission---the document exists because the population is being lost.

PRNigeria 25 — PRNigeria. May 20. Abuja-based Nigerian news agency specialising in security and defence reporting. PRNigeria News, “NAF Unveils Framework to Safeguard Civilians in Military Operation,” https://prnigeria.com/2025/05/20/naf-unveils-civilian-harm/ Clopus

The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has launched its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP), a first-of-its-kind framework in the history of Nigeria’s Armed Forces.

This move aimed at strengthening civil-military relations and embedding humanitarian considerations into military operations.

The initiative, unveiled on Monday during the Nigerian Air Force’s 61st Anniversary seminar in Abuja, signals a new era of accountability and restraint in air operations, especially in asymmetrical conflict zones where civilian safety remains a critical concern.

Speaking at the event, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar, described the CHMRAP as a bold and visionary policy.

“This policy framework is designed to guide our efforts in reducing the scale and impact of harm to civilians during air operations. It formalises our operational values of precision, accountability, and restraint,” he stated.

Air Marshal Abubakar noted that the initiative reflects the Air Force’s unwavering commitment to democratic governance, human rights, and rule of law.

“The NAF remains firmly apolitical and deeply committed to the rule of law, transparency, and respect for fundamental human rights,” he said. “This action plan is our pledge to continue earning the trust of the Nigerian people by conducting our operations with compassion, responsibility, and respect for human life.”

7Every strike recruits---grievance is the raw material and governance is the constraint.

Owolade 25 — Femi Owolade. December 27. Legal historian and Research Associate at Sheffield Hallam University. Al Jazeera, “US air strikes won’t fix Nigeria’s security crisis but could make it worse,” https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/12/27/us-air-strikes-wont-fix-nigerias-security-crisis-but-could-make-it-worse Clopus

But beneath the spectacle of military action lies a sobering reality: Bombing campaigns of this nature are unlikely to improve Nigeria’s security or help stabilise the conflict-racked country. On the contrary, the strikes risk misrepresenting the conflict and distracting from the deeper structural crisis that is driving violence.

The first problem with the strikes is their lack of strategic logic. The initial strikes were launched in Sokoto in northwest Nigeria, a region that has experienced intense turmoil over the past decade. But this violence is not primarily driven by an ideological insurgency linked to ISIL, and no known ISIL-linked groups are operating in the region. Instead, security concerns in this region are rooted in banditry , the collapse of rural economies, and competition for land. Armed groups here are fragmented and motivated largely by profit.

The Christmas Day strikes appear to have focused on a relatively new ideological armed group called Lakurawa, though its profile and any connection to ISIL are yet to be fully established.

The ideological armed groups with the strongest presence in northern Nigeria are Boko Haram and the ISIL-affiliate in West Africa Province (ISWAP). The centre of these groups’ activity remains hundreds of kilometres from Sokoto, in the northeast of Nigeria – the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa – where insurgency has a long history. This begs the question: Why strike the northwest first? The logic is unclear.

Equally concerning is the uncertainty surrounding casualties. So far, we have no authoritative figures. Some social media accounts claim there were no human casualties, suggesting the bombs fell on empty targets. Security analyst Brant Philip posted on his social media platform X: “According to a private source familiar with the US operation against the Islamic State in Nigeria, several strikes were launched, but most of the individuals and groups targeted were missed, and the actual damage inflicted remains mostly unknown.”

Nigerian news platform Arise TV reported on X that locals confirmed the incident caused widespread panic; according to its correspondent, at least one of the attacks happened in a district that had not suffered from violence before. They also noted that the full impact of the attack, including whether there were civilian casualties, is yet to be determined.

Other social media accounts have circulated images alleging civilian casualties, though these claims remain unverified. In a context where information warfare operates alongside armed conflict, speculation often travels faster than facts. The lack of transparent data on casualties from the US government risks deepening mistrust among communities already wary of foreign military involvement.

Symbolism also matters. The attack took place on Christmas Day, a detail that carries emotive and political significance. For many Muslims in northern Nigeria, the timing risks being interpreted as an act of supporting a broader narrative of a Western “crusade” against the Muslim community.

Even more sensitive is the location of the strikes: Sokoto. Historically, it is the spiritual seat of the 19th-century Sokoto Caliphate, a centre of Islamic authority and expansion revered by Nigerian Muslims. Bombing such a symbolic centre risks inflaming anti-US sentiment, deepening religious suspicion, and giving hardline propagandists fertile ground to exploit. Rather than weakening alleged ISIL influence, the strikes could inadvertently energise recruitment and amplify grievance narratives.

If air strikes cannot solve Nigeria’s security crisis, what can?

The answer lies not in foreign military intervention. Nigeria’s conflicts are symptoms of deeper governance failures: Weakened security, corruption, and the absence of the state in rural communities. In the northwest, where banditry thrives, residents often negotiate with armed groups not because they sympathise with them, but because the state is largely absent to provide them with security and basic services. In the northeast, where Boko Haram emerged, years of government neglect, heavy-handed security tactics, and economic exclusion created fertile ground for insurgency.

The most sustainable security response must therefore be multi-layered. It requires investment in community-based policing, dialogue, and pathways for deradicalisation. It demands a state presence that protects rather than punishes. It means prioritising intelligence gathering, strengthening local authorities, and restoring trust between citizens and government institutions.

The US strikes may generate headlines and satisfy a domestic audience, but on the ground in Nigeria, they risk doing little more than empowering hardline messaging and deepening resentment.

8ISWAP sells protection from the state. Bombing can’t dislodge a parallel authority.

Samuel 25 — Malik Samuel. July 24. Senior researcher at Good Governance Africa specialising in the Lake Chad Basin insurgency, reporting from Maiduguri on interviews with former ISWAP officials and residents of ISWAP-held territory. The New Humanitarian, “When rebels rule: ISWAP’s formula for winning support in Nigeria’s northeast,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/07/24/when-rebels-rule-iswap-formula-winning-support-nigeria-northeast-tax-control Clopus

Darayib represents a more flexible and arbitrary form of taxation, often applied when additional funds are required beyond what zakat and haraji can provide. This is paid by everyone residing on the islands, including the ISWAP leadership. The amount levied is at the discretion of ISWAP, but can reach $4.8 million.

Unlike zakat and haraji , which have classical Islamic justifications, darayib has been a source of internal dissent. While zakat provides a predictable revenue stream, darayib gives ISWAP financial flexibility to fund major operations or urgent expenditures such as weapons procurement or medical supplies.

Clerics and former officials have faced a backlash for criticising ISWAP’s leadership over its repeated imposition of darayib – up to three times a year – in clear violation of guidance from ISIS-central.

Interviewees said most of the darayib revenue comes from herders because there are many of them on the islands, owning hundreds of thousands of cattle. According to these sources, ISWAP charges a flat rate of $12 per animal. There are reportedly at least 1,000 herders on the islands alone, from Gamboru Ngala to Tumbum Gini, with some herders having as many as 2,000 cattle, although 400 would be a rough average.

With no fixed rates or codified standards, the amounts imposed are left to the discretion of leaders, creating opportunities for abuse and corruption. This has led to tensions within ISWAP’s ranks, particularly between clerics – who feel religiously obliged to speak out – and commanders seeking to maximise revenue.

“This [ darayib ] was supposed to be a once-a-year levy on the people, only when there was a need,” a former ISWAP cleric, who was expelled by the group, told The New Humanitarian. “ISWAP has turned it into a recurring practice, collecting it annually and even multiple times within the same year.”

Asking not to be named for security reasons, he said that nine other clerics were chased out of the islands in 2024 for voicing a similar criticism of the darayib .

“The clerics brought the attention of the leadership to what they saw as an error in the interpretation and administration of darayib ,” he noted. “It is only supposed to be collected during periods of cash shortages, and not more than once a year, regardless of the need or emergency.”

Another former senior cleric recounted a meeting – prior to the expulsions – in which ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi allegedly acknowledged the tax collection contradicted guidance by ISIS-central.

Nevertheless, according to the cleric, al-Barnawi tried to justify the measure. “The Islamic State in Iraq and Sham [Syria] doesn’t understand the realities we face here in West Africa,” he reportedly said. “Their recommendation to collect darayib only once a year reflects their own political context and what works for them.”

Al-Barnawi regarded it as a matter of survival and was willing to defy ISIS-central on that point.

“‘If we limit collection to once a year, we risk not having enough funds to supply our soldiers with medicines, fuel and other essentials needed to sustain the war’,” the cleric remembered him saying. “‘Disobeying ISIS on this matter and remaining strong is better than obeying and losing everything’.”

How extensive is ISWAP’s influence?

Most economic activities supporting ISWAP are run by civilians. But all business activities are regulated by the group. Traders need ISWAP’s permission to bring goods into its territories. Even fighters engaging in trade during their spare time must obtain clearance to purchase goods outside the controlled areas.

Goods often come from neighbouring Niger, but also from other parts of Nigeria, including Kano, Kaduna, and Lagos. ISWAP uses trusted intermediaries to source essential items like spare parts and medical supplies, offering premium prices to encourage external traders to work with them despite the risks.

In terms of governance, former members of the group, including those in positions of authority, said ISWAP’s territorial administration is largely confined to Nigeria, particularly Borno State.

Its Lake Chad Basin dawla is based within Nigerian territory, though its operational activities span across borders. Attacks in Cameroon and Niger are part of ISWAP’s regional jihadist campaign, but civilians in those areas are usually advised to relocate if they wish to live under ISWAP’s governance.

Neighbouring countries, however, are critical to ISWAP’s supply chain. Goods, fighters, and external support flow through Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. These corridors are essential for the arrival of foreign fighters and trainers, especially from Central and North Africa, linking ISWAP to broader transnational jihadist networks.

How difficult is life under ISWAP?

Life under ISWAP is fraught with contradictions. While basic services are provided, civilians have no say in how they are governed. Those who dare to question the group risk severe punishment, including imprisonment and death. The semblance of order and protection often masks systemic oppression, with the threat of violence hanging over the civilian population.

For many residents, compliance is less about ideological affinity and more about pragmatic survival, as ISWAP offers some protection from rival armed groups, bandits, and often abusive state security forces.

ISWAP’s governance strategy represents one of the greatest challenges to Nigerian state authority in the Lake Chad Basin. By embedding itself within local communities through service delivery, economic regulation, and religious legitimacy, ISWAP transforms from a mere militant group into a parallel governing authority.

Its ability to provide security, mediate disputes, and regulate local economies has allowed it to entrench itself deeply into the daily lives of civilians, fostering a degree of dependence that is difficult to dislodge through military operations alone.

The Nigerian government and its military allies – particularly the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) – have primarily responded through military operations, including airstrikes, raids, and ground offensives. While these efforts have degraded ISWAP’s fighting capacity in certain areas, they have failed to present a credible alternative form of governance to communities living under ISWAP control.

This failure allows ISWAP to maintain a degree of legitimacy and operate an economy that, while illicit, meets the basic needs of those it governs.

Moreover, ISWAP’s governance model, by offering order and protection from both criminal groups and predatory elements of the state, poses a long-term strategic threat. The combination of religious legitimacy, security provision, and economic integration makes ISWAP’s influence durable.

Displacing ISWAP, therefore, will require more than military victories: It will require the Nigerian state and its international partners to provide reliable security, a fair system of justice, functional services, and accountable local governance.

Without a shift in strategy to combine military efforts with governance and development initiatives, ISWAP’s political savvy will continue to make it a formidable actor in the Lake Chad Basin insurgency.

9The vacuum travels. Russia’s men arrive wherever a state cracks, and they stabilize nothing.

Ronc 26 — Nadina Ronc. July 1. Independent geopolitical and security analyst specialising in Russian influence operations in Africa. Elcano Royal Institute, “Russia’s new security order in the Sahel and its Euro-Atlantic implications,” https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/russias-new-security-order-in-the-sahel-and-its-euro-atlantic-implications/ Clopus

Similar dynamics are observable in Madagascar, where the October 2025 military coup was followed by closer security ties with Moscow and Russian military-technical assistance. [2] Whenever there are political crises in African countries, Russian takes the opportunity to offer military support, and elite partnerships, in exchange for strategic access and resource agreements.

Russia’s primary goals are regime preservation and territorial control, not promoting good governance or inclusion. Civilian protection is secondary. In the short term this strategy bolsters embattled juntas on the battlefield. But, over time, patterns of abuse, lack of accountability and violence fuel public resentment, facilitate recruitment by jihadist groups and erode trust in governmental institutions.

The Kidal events in late April 2026 exposed the fragility of the Malian junta’s gains. Tuareg rebels (FLA), allied with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel branch, reportedly used FPV drones against the Malian army and Africa Corps, took over Kidal and forced Russian troops to leave a city that Wagner had helped the junta capture in late 2023. [3] Due to Africa Corps’ constant presence near key areas, especially those rich in resources, the rest of the country is left vulnerable to jihadist groups.

10Nuclear terrorism. Deterrence fails on the actor that wants the retaliation.

NASEM 24 — National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Consensus study report of the National Academies’ Committee on Nuclear Terrorism, chapter 3, “New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks.” The National Academies Press, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction,” doi: 10.17226/27215 Clopus

Principles of deterrence are less likely to dissuade millenarian groups. This is because deterrence works best for adversaries that seek to maximize their chances of survivability and therefore seek to minimize the risk of massive retaliation. But many millenarian groups may actively court retaliation in the hope of sparking a broader war ( Stern 2004 ).

In sum, when it comes to relying on deterrence for managing the nuclear terrorism threat, state-sponsored groups are more likely to be deterred than non-state-sponsored groups. However, it is also true that these kinds of non-state-sponsored groups are less likely to have access to nuclear weapons and materials. They are also unlikely to possess the expertise and operational capabilities to carry out a successful nuclear terrorist attack. Nonetheless, access and capability can change over time. If information becomes more available online, fissile and radiological materials proliferate without adequate security safeguards, and efforts to recruit insiders increase, more terrorist groups may be able to acquire the means to engage in nuclear terrorism.

11US--Russia war. Africa is the launchpad---proxies pin down NATO when the shooting starts.

Albanese 25 — Michael Albanese. July 25. Special Projects Lead for Picogrid, based in Kyiv, previously with the Atlantic Council and the Center for European Policy Analysis. Center for European Policy Analysis, “Putin Building African Springboard for War on West,” https://cepa.org/article/putin-building-african-springboard-for-war-on-west/ Clopus

US officials have warned that Russia may soon begin coordinating its war efforts with China in an attempt to open multiple theaters of conflict — forcing the US and its allies to split their attention, stretch resources, and confront crises across the globe.

This concern has been echoed by Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe. He warned the alliance must prepare for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and the Pacific, highlighting the possibility that Moscow and Beijing may coordinate campaigns as early as 2027.

This is why Putin has refused to scale down Russia’s Africa footprint, even as it faces staggering battlefield losses in Ukraine. As the Kremlin prepares for a broader confrontation with NATO, Africa is being readied to serve as a launchpad for asymmetric operations, proxy escalation, and logistical disruption.

From the Sahel to the Mediterranean, Russian proxy forces could attack European interests or pin down NATO assets in the event of open war. It is no accident that the countries now flooded with Russian arms and military advisers sit on maritime chokepoints and energy corridors critical to European stability.

12Extinction. Engineered agents combine traits evolution can’t, and the omnicidal actors are non-state.

Millett and Snyder-Beattie 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. July/August. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, PhD, former head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Clopus

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths, 1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone. 2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population, 3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time. 4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens. 5 , 6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island. 7 , 8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). 9

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu, 10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population. 11 , 12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics. 13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective. 18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well. 19-21

Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes. 22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology. 23 , 24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention. 25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI, 26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII. 27

Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction. 28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released” (quoted in ref. 29 ) . Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons. 30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows. 31 , 32

13The United States federal government should substantially reduce arms transfers from the United States to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

14Advantage TWO is Coups: