239Cancellation authority runs right up to the moment the article ships.
CRS 24 — Congressional Research Service. May 14. Nonpartisan research arm of the Library of Congress, writing for Members handling this exact question. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Review of an Arms Sale to Israel: Issues for Congress,” IN12359, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12359.html Clopus
In May 2024, U.S. officials confirmed reports that the Biden Administration is "reviewing some near-term security assistance" for Israel and has paused a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs and 500-pound bombs based on concern about their potential use in the city of Rafah, Gaza. The Administration's action comes after inconclusive Israel-Hamas cease-fire negotiations and the subsequent launch of Israeli air and ground operations near Rafah, where an estimated 1.4 million Gazans have gathered, including 1.1 million people displaced by fighting elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. For weeks, U.S. officials reportedly had warned Israel not to proceed with major military operations in Rafah without adequately planning for civilian safety and welfare. President Joe Biden said on May 8 that he had "made it clear to Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] and the war cabinet, they're not going to get our support, if in fact they go on these population centers." He also said, "We're not walking away from Israel's security; we're walking away from Israel's ability to wage war in those areas."
Two days later, the Administration released its report to Congress under Section 2 of the National Security Memorandum-20 (NSM-20). The report concluded that "given Israel's significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL [International Humanitarian Law] obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm."
Congress appears divided over the President's weapons pause, with some lawmakers agreeing with the President's decision and others decrying it for what they call its effect on the "timely delivery of security assistance to Israel." Opponents of the pause in the House have reportedly planned a floor vote on the Israel Security Assistance Support Act (ISASA – see below).
Issues for Congress
Presidential Authority to Pause U.S. Weapons Sales
The President has a number of mechanisms to alter or end the sales of U.S.-origin defense articles. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 establish the statutory foundations governing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to foreign governments. The AECA prohibits the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles if the President finds that a recipient country has used such articles for unauthorized purposes. The AECA also stipulates that such countries would, absent a presidential waiver, be ineligible for future U.S. sales of defense articles until the President determines the violation has ceased and recipients assure violations will not recur. The law does not provide for such a waiver if Congress has adopted a joint resolution, which would be subject to presidential veto.
The executive branch also has wide-ranging authority to cancel an FMS transaction prior to the articles' delivery. The standard Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) terms and conditions permit the U.S. government, under "unusual and compelling circumstances, when the national interest of the U.S. requires," to "cancel or suspend all or part" of such a letter "at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles."
The U.S. government similarly has extensive authority to cancel or modify export licenses for U.S.-origin defense articles. Section 126.7 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) states that such licenses "may be revoked, suspended, or amended without prior notice whenever" the State Department "believes that" the recipient has violated "the terms of any U.S. Government export authorization." The Department may also take these actions if it deems them to be "in furtherance of world peace, the national security or the foreign policy of the United States, or is otherwise advisable."
In 2021, the Biden Administration paused certain weapons sales and transfers to Saudi Arabia, reportedly including transfers of air-to-ground munitions, based on concerns about the effect of Saudi military operations in Yemen on civilians and U.S. national security interests.
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel and Congressional Notification
President Biden's weapons pause has sparked some congressional concern over whether the Administration is obligating and notifying foreign assistance funding, such as Foreign Military Financing for Israel. Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in FMF for assistance to Israel and related expenses in the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. Such funds are available for obligation until September 30, 2025, and are required to have a spend plan within 15 days of enactment, outlined in Section 310 of Division A. Regular notification procedures apply, but the legislation includes a provision waiving the notification requirement for FMF funds if "the Secretary of State determines that to do so is in the national security interest of the United States." Congress monitors agency delay in making funds available for obligation or expenditure through the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA).
Possible Legislation
ISASA would prohibit FY2024 or earlier funds from being used to withhold defense items/services to Israel. It also would withhold funds from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the National Security Council until U.S. officials can certify that items withheld from Israel had been delivered. The bill also would require a monthly report to Congress providing a list of the defense articles and services provided to Israel since October 7, 2023. On May 13, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, "We are continuing to send military assistance, and we will ensure that Israel receives the full amount provided in the supplemental. We have paused a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs because we do not believe they should be dropped in densely populated cities. We are talking to the Israeli government about this."
240The authorization names the end user---anything else needs DDTC to sign again.
CFR 123.9 — U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Current through August 2026. The licensing regulation DDTC administers under the Arms Export Control Act. Code of Federal Regulations, “22 CFR §123.9---Country of ultimate destination and approval of reexports or retransfers,” https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M/part-123/section-123.9 Clopus
( a ) The country designated as the country of ultimate destination on an application for an export license, or in an Electronic Export Information filing where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter, must be the country of ultimate end-use. The written approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls must be obtained before reselling, transferring, reexporting, retransferring, transshipping, or disposing of a defense article to any end-user, end-use, or destination other than as stated on the export license, or in the Electronic Export Information filing in cases where an exemption is claimed under this subchapter, except in accordance with the provisions of an exemption under this subchapter that explicitly authorizes the resell, transfer, reexport, retransfer, transshipment, or disposition of a defense article without such approval. Exporters must determine the specific end-user, end-use, and destination prior to submitting an application to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls or claiming an exemption under this subchapter.
Note to paragraph ( a ):
In making the aforementioned determination, a person is expected to review all readily available information, including information readily available to the public generally as well as information readily available from other parties to the transaction.
( b ) The exporter, U.S. or foreign, must inform the end-user and all consignees that the defense articles being exported are subject to U.S. export laws and regulations as follows:
( 1 ) The exporter must incorporate the following information as an integral part of the commercial invoice, whenever defense articles are to be shipped (exported in tangible form), retransferred (in tangible form), or reexported (in tangible form) pursuant to a license or other approval under this subchapter:
( i ) The country of ultimate destination;
( ii ) The end-user;
( iii ) The license or other approval number or exemption citation; and
( iv ) The following statement: “These items are controlled by the U.S. government and authorized for export only to the country of ultimate destination for use by the ultimate consignee or end-user(s) herein identified. They may not be resold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of, to any other country or to any person other than the authorized ultimate consignee or end-user(s), either in their original form or after being incorporated into other items, without first obtaining approval from the U.S. government or as otherwise authorized by U.S. law and regulations.”
241Suspension is physical---the weapons stayed in the United States.
Hawthorne 14 — Amy Hawthorne. October 16. Senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council, “What’s Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt? Part I,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-s-happening-with-suspended-military-aid-for-egypt-part-i/ Clopus
Last October, the Obama administration announced it was holding back four large-scale weapons systems purchased for Egypt, including 125 M1-A1 battle tank kits, twenty F-16 fighter jets, twenty Harpoon cruise missiles, and ten Apache attack helicopters. It made their delivery contingent upon “credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections.” This was a significant move, the first time a US administration had ever suspended any of the annual $1.3 billion military aid package. The administration lifted its hold on the Apaches, which are now on their way to Egypt , but the other weapons remain in storage in the United States, more than a year later.
The new aid policy, along with restrictions on military assistance enacted by Congress, sought to alter the bargain with Egypt from weapons in exchange for peace with Israel, to weapons in exchange for peace and democratic progress. This has of course angered Egypt, used to a steady flow of American weapons since the 1979 Peace Treaty regardless of its human rights record. On his first trip to the United States as president last month, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi complained about the suspension in a Charlie Rose interview . The Peace Treaty remains secure, but the policy has not advanced stated US democracy goals. During the past year, Egypt has slid back into authoritarian rule , experiencing one of the worst periods of repression in its modern history. This article discusses why the suspension has not been an effective democracy promotion lever; a forthcoming article will cover the status of the military aid on which Congress has imposed democracy conditions.
242The committees can stop a Nigerian case---and they did, on this one.
Martin 21 — Guy Martin. July 30. Journalist at defenceWeb, the African defence industry publication. defenceWeb, “United States stalling on AH-1 Cobra sale to Nigeria,” https://defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/united-states-stalling-on-ah-1-cobra-sale-to-nigeria/ Clopus
Nigeria is attempting to acquire a dozen AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters from the United States, but the sale is being held back by US lawmakers over Nigeria’s human rights record.
US officials and congressional aides told Foreign Policy that Nigeria is seeking to acquire 12 Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopters and associated equipment in a deal worth around $875 million, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has delayed approving the sale. It is not known if the requested sale covers new-built AH-1Z Vipers or second-hand AH-1W Super Cobras.
With foreign military sales, the US State Department notifies Congress through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee in advance of a formal notification. If committee members raise concerns about the proposed sale, the committees can freeze the sale until their concerns are addressed by the State Department.
According to Foreign Policy, the top Republican in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael McCaul, has signed off on the Cobra sale, but Senator Bob Menendez, chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Jim Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have apparently placed a hold on the proposed sale over concerns with Nigeria’s human rights record.
Quoting anonymous officials, Foreign Policy reported that the US State Department informed Congress of the intended sale in January. The deal involves 28 GE Aviation engines, 14 Honeywell navigation systems and 2 000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems laser-guided rockets.
In June this year Menendez told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “coups in Mali and Chad have undermined international counterterrorism and development efforts, and Nigeria requires a fundamental rethink of the framework of our overall engagement.”
In October last year he condemned the Nigerian government’s crackdown on protestors calling for an end to police brutality, saying, “I condemn the shooting of innocent civilians in Nigeria, and call for an immediate transparent investigation into the alleged actions of the military. I stand in solidarity with Nigerians who are peacefully calling for police reforms and an end to government corruption, and call on President Buhari to ensure security forces cease their violent crackdown on demonstrators. Civilian control of the military is a hallmark of a true democracy and the eyes of the world are now on Nigeria and President Buhari.”
Thousands of Nigerians protested nationwide for nearly two weeks last October, demanding an end to a police unit called the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), which they said was responsible for extortion and human rights abuses. The police disbanded SARS, but denied most accusations.
243The air campaign runs on US airframes and US precision munitions.
Martin 25 — Guy Martin. August 14. Journalist at defenceWeb, the African defence industry publication, reporting off the DSCA congressional notification. defenceWeb, “Nigeria requests $346 million worth of guided and unguided weapons from US,” https://defenceweb.co.za/african-news/nigeria-requests-346-million-worth-of-guided-and-unguided-weapons-from-us/ Clopus
Nigeria is looking to buy $346 million worth of munitions from the United States, including guided bombs and rockets, with the State Department approving the possible sale.
The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on 13 August said it had notified Congress of the potential sale on Wednesday.
Nigeria has requested to buy 1 002 Mk 82 general purpose 500 lb (226 kg) bombs; 1 002 MXU-650 Air Foil Groups (AFGs) for 500 lb Paveway II GBU-12 bombs; 515 MXU-1006 AFGs for 250 lb (113 kg) Paveway II GBU-58 bombs; 1 517 MAU-169 or MAU-209 computer control group (CCG) for Paveway II GBU-12/GBU-58 bombs; 1 002 FMU-152 joint programmable fuzes; and 5 000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) all-up-rounds (AURs) (consisting of one each WGU-59/B guidance section; high-explosive warhead; and MK66-4 rocket motor).
Also included in the potential sale are FMU-139 joint programmable fuzes; bomb components, impulse cartridges, and high-explosive and practice rockets; and support.
“The proposed sale will improve Nigeria’s capability to meet current and future threats through operations against terrorist organisations and to counter illicit trafficking in Nigeria and the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria will have no difficulty absorbing these munitions into its armed forces,” the DSCA said.
The principal contractors will be RTX Missiles and Defense, Lockheed Martin Corporation, and BAE Systems.
While not specifying which platforms the munitions are being acquired for, it is likely that they will be for the Nigerian Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano light combat/trainer aircraft acquired via US company Sierra Nevada Corporation. They have been heavily used to combat Boko Haram terrorists, bandits, and other security threats in Nigeria.
In August 2024, the Nigerian Super Tucano fleet logged 10 000 flying hours. At the time the Air Force said “since its induction in August 2021, the A-29 Super Tucano fleet has been involved in several decisive missions in the various operational theatres across the country. So far, over 8 500 hours flown on the fleet were dedicated to both day and night operational sorties against terrorists, bandits and other violent non-state actors threatening national peace. No doubt, the aircraft’s night and precision munitions delivery capability has undoubtedly enhanced NAF’s versatility, flexibility and lethality in all air operations.”
A Nigerian Air Force Super Tucano.
When Nigeria bought its 12 Super Tucanos, it also acquired GBU-12 and GBU-58 Paveway II guided bombs, Laser Guided Rockets including Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rounds; Mk 81 bombs; and 70 mm Hydra 70 unguided rockets.
The latest request for munitions could also indicate use on the Air Force’s dozen new AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters. Bell Textron was in March 2024 awarded a $455 million production contract, with work to be completed in July 2028. The Nigerian Air Force also has 24 M-346 combat/trainer aircraft on order from Leonardo.
Last month, Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Hasan Abubakar, said the Nigerian Air Force would acquire 49 state-of-the-art aircraft by the end of 2026. This figure includes three Airbus C295 transport aircraft; ten Leonardo AW109 Trekker helicopters; 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters; and 24 M-346s.
In the last two years the Air Force has received six Turkish Aerospace Industries T-129 ATAK helicopters; two AW109 Trekker helicopters; three Beechcraft King Air aircraft; and four Diamond 62 reconnaissance aircraft.
Strengthening the Nigerian Air Force comes amid continued pressure from Islamist terror groups and bandits. Abubakar this month said Nigeria’s military has killed 592 armed militia members in the northeastern sate of Borno in the past eight months, after stepping up air strikes in a region plagued by violence.
Abubakar said the Air Force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast. “This year, our air war is faster, sharper and more surgical,” Abubakar said. “We are taking out high-value targets, crippling logistics networks and dismantling cells that threaten peace in the northeast.”
He said Nigerian Air Force aircraft flew 798 combat sorties and logged over 1 500 operational flight hours under Operation Hadin Kai, Nigeria’s military’s counterinsurgency operation in the northeast.
According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), Nigeria experienced an 18% increase in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups over the past year. Borno State in Nigeria’s North East Zone remains the epicentre of this violence and Nigeria accounts for 74% of all fatalities in the Lake Chad Basin region – a total of 3 982 deaths in the last year for the area.
244State’s own page---light attack and ISR, personnel and sustainment, all US.
State PM 25 — U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. January 20. The bureau that administers Foreign Military Sales and export licensing, describing its own Nigeria portfolio. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Nigeria,” https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-nigeria Clopus
For more than 50 years, the United States and Nigeria have enjoyed a strong security partnership and friendship. The U.S.-Nigeria relationship is among the most important in sub-Saharan Africa, given Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most populous country, largest economy, and our shared democratic values. The United States works closely with Nigeria, both bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) , the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh/ISIS , and the African Union . Our joint efforts are focused on increasing cooperation on maritime and border security, military professionalization, counterterrorism efforts against Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, defense trade, and strengthening governance of the security sector.
The Department of State provides Nigeria with one of the highest International Military Education and Training (IMET) allocations in sub-Saharan Africa, with approximately $5 million obligated from FY 2019 –2023.. Nigeria is also a partner in the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP) and has benefited from approximately $500,000 since FY 2016 to support instructor and curriculum development at Nigerian military schools. From FY 2016-FY 2020, $1.8 million was obligated for Nigeria in Foreign Military Financing to support maritime security, military professionalization, and counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria is an active member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and has benefitted over $8 million worth of training, equipment, and advisory support for counterterrorism efforts between FY 2019-FY 2023.
The United States has $590 million in active government-to-government sales cases with Nigeria under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. Recent and significant sales include the 2017 sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft worth $497 million to support Nigerian military operations against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa. The case included special training on International Humanitarian Law, including an Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) program designed to provide institutional and technical training to the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) in order to mitigate the risk of civilian harm incidents. In August of last year, Nigeria delivered the first payment for 12 AH-1Z Attack Helicopters worth a total of $997 million. The FMS case includes an additional$25 million of funding allocated for the Nigeria’s AGI program, which continues to train the AFN on developing targeting processes that are legally compliant with International Humanitarian Law; The light attack and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities Nigeria is developing will involve more than just airplanes; Nigeria will have the trained personnel and sustainment infrastructure to ensure a robust capability for the aircrafts’ full-service lifetime.
In FY 2018-22, the United States also authorized the permanent export of over $53 million in defense articles to Nigeria via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process. The top three categories of defense exports to Nigeria were Fire Control, Laser, Imaging, and Guidance Equipment; Firearms and Related Articles; and Guns and Armament.
Building on the AGI program, the Department of State has obligated $941,000 in Peacekeeping Operations Funds (PKO) since 2021 for advisory services to the AFN to enhance accountability and justice by developing systems and practices on civilian harm mitigation.
In 2011 and 2015 Nigeria received $15 million in defense articles granted under the Excess Defense Articles program, to include 24 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and two Hamilton-class U.S. Coast Guard high endurance cutters – the USCGC Chase and USCGC Gallatin – which entered service in the Nigerian Navy as Thunder and Okpabana in 2011 and 2014, respectively.
In 2016, the United States and Nigeria signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to exchange common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Since 2000, the United States has had a Status of Forces Agreement with Nigeria establishing the legal framework under which U.S. military personnel may operate when present in Nigeria.
245The authority is pre-delivery---and the notified munitions are still on order.
CRS 24 — Congressional Research Service. May 14. Nonpartisan research arm of the Library of Congress, writing for Members handling this exact question. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Review of an Arms Sale to Israel: Issues for Congress,” IN12359, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12359.html Clopus
In May 2024, U.S. officials confirmed reports that the Biden Administration is "reviewing some near-term security assistance" for Israel and has paused a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs and 500-pound bombs based on concern about their potential use in the city of Rafah, Gaza. The Administration's action comes after inconclusive Israel-Hamas cease-fire negotiations and the subsequent launch of Israeli air and ground operations near Rafah, where an estimated 1.4 million Gazans have gathered, including 1.1 million people displaced by fighting elsewhere in the Gaza Strip. For weeks, U.S. officials reportedly had warned Israel not to proceed with major military operations in Rafah without adequately planning for civilian safety and welfare. President Joe Biden said on May 8 that he had "made it clear to Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] and the war cabinet, they're not going to get our support, if in fact they go on these population centers." He also said, "We're not walking away from Israel's security; we're walking away from Israel's ability to wage war in those areas."
Two days later, the Administration released its report to Congress under Section 2 of the National Security Memorandum-20 (NSM-20). The report concluded that "given Israel's significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL [International Humanitarian Law] obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm."
Congress appears divided over the President's weapons pause, with some lawmakers agreeing with the President's decision and others decrying it for what they call its effect on the "timely delivery of security assistance to Israel." Opponents of the pause in the House have reportedly planned a floor vote on the Israel Security Assistance Support Act (ISASA – see below).
Issues for Congress
Presidential Authority to Pause U.S. Weapons Sales
The President has a number of mechanisms to alter or end the sales of U.S.-origin defense articles. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 establish the statutory foundations governing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to foreign governments. The AECA prohibits the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles if the President finds that a recipient country has used such articles for unauthorized purposes. The AECA also stipulates that such countries would, absent a presidential waiver, be ineligible for future U.S. sales of defense articles until the President determines the violation has ceased and recipients assure violations will not recur. The law does not provide for such a waiver if Congress has adopted a joint resolution, which would be subject to presidential veto.
The executive branch also has wide-ranging authority to cancel an FMS transaction prior to the articles' delivery. The standard Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) terms and conditions permit the U.S. government, under "unusual and compelling circumstances, when the national interest of the U.S. requires," to "cancel or suspend all or part" of such a letter "at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles."
The U.S. government similarly has extensive authority to cancel or modify export licenses for U.S.-origin defense articles. Section 126.7 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) states that such licenses "may be revoked, suspended, or amended without prior notice whenever" the State Department "believes that" the recipient has violated "the terms of any U.S. Government export authorization." The Department may also take these actions if it deems them to be "in furtherance of world peace, the national security or the foreign policy of the United States, or is otherwise advisable."
In 2021, the Biden Administration paused certain weapons sales and transfers to Saudi Arabia, reportedly including transfers of air-to-ground munitions, based on concerns about the effect of Saudi military operations in Yemen on civilians and U.S. national security interests.
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel and Congressional Notification
President Biden's weapons pause has sparked some congressional concern over whether the Administration is obligating and notifying foreign assistance funding, such as Foreign Military Financing for Israel. Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in FMF for assistance to Israel and related expenses in the Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act. Such funds are available for obligation until September 30, 2025, and are required to have a spend plan within 15 days of enactment, outlined in Section 310 of Division A. Regular notification procedures apply, but the legislation includes a provision waiving the notification requirement for FMF funds if "the Secretary of State determines that to do so is in the national security interest of the United States." Congress monitors agency delay in making funds available for obligation or expenditure through the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA).
Possible Legislation
ISASA would prohibit FY2024 or earlier funds from being used to withhold defense items/services to Israel. It also would withhold funds from the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the National Security Council until U.S. officials can certify that items withheld from Israel had been delivered. The bill also would require a monthly report to Congress providing a list of the defense articles and services provided to Israel since October 7, 2023. On May 13, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said, "We are continuing to send military assistance, and we will ensure that Israel receives the full amount provided in the supplemental. We have paused a shipment of 2,000-pound bombs because we do not believe they should be dropped in densely populated cities. We are talking to the Israeli government about this."
246The withheld systems were still on hold---sitting in storage, indefinitely.
Hawthorne 14 — Amy Hawthorne. October 16. Senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council, “What’s Happening with Suspended Military Aid for Egypt? Part I,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-s-happening-with-suspended-military-aid-for-egypt-part-i/ Clopus
The tanks, F-16s, and missiles suspended last October are still on hold. If the administration doesn’t want to take action any time soon, the weapons could sit in storage for a while longer. Ultimately, the United States could decide to redirect them to other uses, although such a step would be rare. There is a constituency inside the administration and Congress, however, that wants to phase out the traditional big-ticket weapons and focus the FMF program more on counter-terrorism and capacity-building. The suspension has chipped away at a longstanding argument against such a change—that the uninterrupted flow of these weapons is required to protect US security interests. Over the past year, Egypt has continued to provide expedited approval for overflights of its territory, head-of-the-line privileges for US Navy warships to traverse the Suez Canal (the special surcharge paid by the United States surely helps), and counter-terrorism cooperation. Egypt’s relations with Israel are the best in recent memory. Thus, this experience could nudge open the door to a long-overdue, politically arduous restructuring of the aid package.
247Ammunition and ordnance are arms transfers---so is the service sold beside them.
WMEAT 21 — U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. December. The government's own arms-transfer accounting, published under the statutory mandate in 22 U.S.C. 2593b. State Department, "Sources, Data, and Methods of WMEAT 2021," https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/WMEAT-2021-Sources-Data-and-Methods_508.pdf Clopus
Arms transfers (arms imports and exports) represent the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter, or cash) of military equipment and related services, including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use, as well as related services. Among the items included are tactical guided missiles and rockets, military aircraft, naval vessels, armored and non-armored military vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, artillery, infantry weapons, small arms, ammunition, other ordnance, parachutes, and uniforms. In principle, dual use equipment, which can have application in both military and civilian sectors, is included when its primary mission is identified as military. The building of defense production facilities and licensing fees paid as royalties for the production of military equipment, as well as equipment delivery, maintenance, operating, and training services, are included when they are contained in military transfer agreements. Military services such as training, supply, operations, equipment maintenance or repair, technical 20 assistance, and construction are included where data are available. Excluded are foodstuffs, medical equipment, petroleum products, and other supplies.
20 Services appear to constitute a growing and double-digit albeit uncertain percentage of the total value of global arms transfers. The services component of arms transfers seems particularly large in conjunction with transfers of technically sophisticated and complex equipment, especially to less developed countries.
248'Conventional arms transfers' is Congress's own phrase---and it spans the whole trade.
AECA 26 — Arms Export Control Act §1, codified at 22 U.S.C. §2751. Statute governing all U.S. arms exports; policy paragraphs added by Pub. L. 94-329 and Pub. L. 95-384. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, "22 U.S. Code §2751," https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2751&num=0&edition=prelim Clopus
It shall be the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world community to bring about arrangements for reducing the international trade in implements of war and to lessen the danger of outbreak of regional conflict and the burdens of armaments. United States programs for or procedures governing the export, sale, and grant of defense articles and defense services to foreign countries and international organizations shall be administered in a manner which will carry out this policy.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to initiate multilateral discussions for the purpose of reaching agreements among the principal arms suppliers and arms purchasers and other countries with respect to the control of the international trade in armaments. It is further the sense of Congress that the President should work actively with all nations to check and control the international sale and distribution of conventional weapons of death and destruction and to encourage regional arms control arrangements. In furtherance of this policy, the President should undertake a concerted effort to convene an international conference of major arms-supplying and arms-purchasing nations which shall consider measures to limit conventional arms transfers in the interest of international peace and stability.
It is the sense of the Congress that the aggregate value of defense articles and defense services-
(1) which are sold under section 2761 or section 2762 of this title ; or
(2) which are licensed or approved for export under section 2778 of this title to, for the use, or for benefit of the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country or international organization under a commercial sales contract;
in any fiscal year should not exceed current levels.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President maintain adherence to a policy of restraint in conventional arms transfers and that, in implementing this policy worldwide, a balanced approach should be taken and full regard given to the security interests of the United States in all regions of the world and that particular attention should be paid to controlling the flow of conventional arms to the nations of the developing world. To this end, the President is encouraged to continue discussions with other arms suppliers in order to restrain the flow of conventional arms to less developed countries.
249A defense service is every repair, test and training package sold with the weapon.
AECA 14 — Arms Export Control Act §47, codified at 22 U.S.C. §2794. Definitions section of the governing arms-export statute, as amended by Pub. L. 113-276 §207. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, "22 U.S. Code §2794 - Definitions," https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2794&num=0&edition=prelim Clopus
(4) "defense service", except as provided in paragraph (7) of this section, means, with respect to a sale or transfer by the United States under the authority of this chapter or any other foreign assistance or sales program of the United States, any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information (as defined in section 2403(e) of this title ), used for the purposes of making military sales, but does not include design and construction services under section 2769 of this title ;
(5) "training" includes formal or informal instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, or contractors (including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice to foreign military units and forces;
250Policy reaches any transfer of US arms---whatever agency moves it.
NSM-18 23 — Joseph R. Biden Jr. February 23. President of the United States; National Security Memorandum 18 is the operative statement of U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy scope. The White House, "Memorandum on United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/02/23/memorandum-on-united-states-conventional-arms-transfer-policy/ Clopus
Sec. 2. United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy Scope and Objectives. This policy applies to decisions on whether to authorize the transfer of United States arms to a foreign user, including certain items on the Commerce Control List, the transfer of defense articles, related technical data, and defense services, regardless of the authority or United States Government department or agency under which the transfer would occur.
251The executive runs arms transfers and arms sales as a single enterprise.
Trump 26 — Donald J. Trump. February 6. President of the United States. Federal Register, "Establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy," Executive Order 14383, 91 FR 6497, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/11/2026-02814/establishing-an-america-first-arms-transfer-strategy Clopus
American-manufactured military equipment is the best in the world, resulting in American dominance across international defense exports. It is critical that the United States fully use this comparative advantage in arms transfers as both a tool of foreign policy and a tool to expand domestic production and transfer.
To maintain our military dominance and technological superiority, the time has come to establish, implement, and execute an America First Arms Transfer Strategy. As the first strategy of its kind, it will ensure that future arms sales prioritize American interests by using foreign purchases and capital to build American production and capacity. This strategy will advance a technologically superior, ready, and resilient national security industrial enterprise. It will strengthen the United States defense industrial base to ensure it has the capacity to support our military and our allies and partners, especially as we increase burden-sharing.
Sec. 2
Policy.
It is the policy of the United States to intentionally use arms transfers as a tool of American foreign policy and to expand strategically relevant industrial production capacity in the United States by:
(a) establishing an America First Arms Transfer Strategy that provides clear direction and implementation guidance to arms transfer stakeholders; and
(b) streamlining processes across executive departments and agencies (agencies) to strengthen effectiveness and create efficiencies in our defense sales enterprise.
252A defense article is the data and the forging---not just the finished weapon.
ITAR 120.31 — International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §120.31. State Department rules implementing the Arms Export Control Act. Code of Federal Regulations, "22 CFR §120.31 - Defense article," https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M/part-120/subpart-C/section-120.31 Clopus
§ 120.31 Defense article.
( a ) Defense article means any item or technical data designated in § 121.1 of this subchapter and includes:
( 1 ) Technical data recorded or stored in any physical form, models, mockups or other items that reveal technical data directly relating to items designated in § 121.1 of this subchapter ; and
( 2 ) Forgings, castings, and other unfinished products, such as extrusions and machined bodies, that have reached a stage in manufacturing where they are clearly identifiable by mechanical properties, material composition, geometry, or function as defense articles.