3934. TURN. Partner militaries convert the hardware into repression---that’s the recruiting sergeant.
Walldorf 23 — William Walldorf. August 31. Senior fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Overreach in Africa: rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/ Clopus
Third, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the impact of U.S. assistance on coups and violence by local regimes that, in turn, aids terrorist recruitment. According to most experts, the reason for terrorist growth in Africa over the past two decades lies in the failure of autocratic regimes in the region to address the basic needs of their citizens. Recruitment by Islamist groups is “fueled more by hunger, desperation, governance failures, and repressive crackdowns than by fantasies of global Islamist jihad,” notes Herman Cohen, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs. 39 Herman J. Cohen, The Time is Right for a U.S. Pivot to Africa (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 18, 2021), https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/11/the-time-is-right-for-a-u-s-pivot-to-africa/. Eight of the governments in West Africa—most of whom partner with the U.S. on counterterrorism operations—rank near the bottom in recent worldwide governance indexes. 40 Joshua Meservey, Towards Salafism and Its Implications for Regional Terrorism (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, September 24, 2021), https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/sahelian-islams-shift-towards-salafism-and-its-implications-regional-terrorism. This has made these states fertile ground for jihadists, who recruit on “predatory state actions” and “install themselves as security providers and defenders of vulnerable populations,” according to regional experts. 41 Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 5–6. See also Perez, The Underestimated Insurgency, 20; Savell, The Costs United States’ Post-9/11 ‘Security Assistance,’ 24.
With its focus predominantly on direct force, U.S. counterterrorism in Africa inadvertently makes the regime-led violence that fuels terrorist recruitment like this worse, not better. Specifically, U.S. military training and assistance for counterterrorism has had the unintended consequence of enhancing authoritarian rule and repression against civilian populations in parts of Africa.
A recent study found that when foreign military leaders receive training from the United States, the probability of those leaders later carrying out military coups increases significantly. 42 Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 4 (July 2017): 542–57, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317713557. We see evidence of this across Africa with U.S. counterterrorism partners. In the last two years, U.S.-trained military leaders in West Africa have carried out or attempted at least eight coups. Included here are U.S. counterterrorism partner states Burkina-Faso, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania in West Africa. One of the leaders (Brigadier General Massou Salaou Barmou) of the July 2023 coup in Niger trained at Fort Benning, Georgia and the National Defense University in Washington, DC. 43 Nick Turse, “Niger Coup Leaders Joins Long Line of U.S.-trained Mutineers,” Intercept, July 27, 2023, https://theintercept.com/2023/07/27/niger-coup-leader-us-military/; Nick Turse, “How Many More Governments Will American-Trained Soldiers Overthrow?” Rolling Stone, February 25, 2023, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/west-africa-coup-american-trained-soldier-1234657139/. Michael M. Phillips, “In Africa, U.S.-Trained Militaries are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-u-s-trained-militaries-are-ousting-civilian-governments-in-coups-11649505601; Ted Galen Carpenter, “The U.S. Military is Training Third World Coup Leaders Again,” Cato Institute, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-military-training-third-world-coup-leaders-again; Ted Galen Carpenter, “The U.S. Military is Training Third World Coup Leaders Again,” Cato Institute, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-military-training-third-world-coup-leaders-again.
This tendency toward coups and repressions is unsurprising. A large body of work points to the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of training for counterterrorism and other purposes. “Despite committing vast amounts of resources toward foreign military training—including almost $15 billion to train over 2.3 million military students around the world between 1999 and 2016—the United States,” according to Renanah Miles Joyce, a professor at Brandeis University and former analyst at the Department of Defense, “has struggled to produce militaries that are either competent or liberal-minded, especially in weak and unstable states.” 44 Renanah Miles Joyce, “Rethinking How the United States Trains Foreign Militaries,” Lawfare, August 14, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-how-united-states-trains-foreign-militaries. On the failure of training to produce liberal norm diffusion, see Renanah Miles Joyce, “Soldiers’ Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 48–90; Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Is Human Rights Training Working with Foreign Militaries? No one Knows and That’s O.K.,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/is-human-rights-training-working-with-foreign-militaries-no-one-knows-and-thats-o-k/. See also Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 6 (November/December 2017): 111–120; Rachel Tecott, “Why America Can’t Build Allied Armies,” Foreign Affairs, August 26, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-26/why-america-cant-build-allied-armies. A core problem here is that interests favored by the United States (i.e., liberal norms, respect for civilian control) are often misaligned with the interests of the militaries that the U.S. trains (i.e., population control, institutional power). U.S.-trained militaries often absorb the skills training well but ignore the values training. Coups like those recently in West Africa sometimes follow. 45 Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” International Security 146, no. 4 (2018): 126–38.
In the aftermath of these coups, violence against civilians often soars and terrorist recruitment increases. Mali is a leading example in West Africa. U.S.-trained military leaders took power there in 2020 and more civilians were killed in Mali in every quarter of 2022 than in any previous calendar year. Indeed, fatalities from violence against civilians were seven times higher in 2022 than in 2021. Aided by Russian Wagner forces, much of this violence has come at the hands of the regime. 46 “Malian Military Junta Scuttled Security Partnerships While Militant Violence Surges,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 27, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-military-junta-scuttles-security-partnerships-while-militant-violence-surges/#:~:text=Civilians%20have%20borne%20the%20brunt,in%202022%20than%20in%202021; Sam Mednick, “Violence Soars in Mali in the Year after Russians Arrive,” Associated Press, January 14, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/politics-mali-government-russia-violence-10ba966bceb2dc732cb170b16258e5a6. Wagner forces target civilians at uniquely high rates in Africa, accounting for 40 percent of civilian deaths in Mali in 2022.
Terrorist groups have benefitted from the increased violence. Fueled by new recruitment around regime violence against civilians, militant Islamist attacks have increased a staggering seventy percent in Mali since the 2020 coup. 47 “Debunking the Malian Junta’s Claims,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, April 12, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/debunking-the-malian-juntas-claims/. In short, U.S. military training has arguably (and, again, inadvertently) exacerbated the problem of Islamic terrorism in Mali and other places across Africa.
Fourth, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the extent to which the misuse of U.S. security assistance by local partners fuels terrorist recruitment. Authoritarian regimes in Africa sometimes siphon U.S. security assistance away from counterterrorism to civilian control and repression. 48 Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 1; Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Preventing Extremism, 8. A 2023 study found that in Somalia, U.S.-armed and trained contingents of Somali soldiers are regularly diverted from counterterrorism operations by the Somali government to domestic “law enforcement” objectives, like personal protection of political elites, roadblock policing, and attacks on political opponents. 49 Soyemi, Making Crisis Inevitable, 7. These kinds of activities aid terrorist recruitment.
The fact that African partners misuse U.S. security assistance for domestic repression is not surprising given what the academic literature shows about client-patron relationships around counterterrorism assistance in Africa (and other places). In short, clients (i.e., U.S. aid recipients) typically resist patron (i.e., U.S.) demands to use aid for patron-designated goals (i.e., fighting terrorists). For reasons of pride, protecting their sovereignty, the socio-cultural structure of militaries, and/or the immediate needs of the regime, clients often deflect aid toward things like regime stability operations that can be especially inhumane. 50 Denis M. Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army: The Dissonant Relationship Between Mali and Its International Partners,” International Affairs 95, no. 2 (1995): 405–22; Niagale Bagayoko, “Explaining the Failure of Internationally-supported Defence and Security Reforms in Sahelian States,” Conflict, Security & Development 22, no. 3 (2022): 243–69; Patricia L. Sullivan, “Lethal Aid and Human Security: The Effects of US Security Assistance on Civilian Harm in Low-and-Middle-Income Countries,” Conflict Management and Peace Studies 40, no. 5 (February 2023 online), https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942231155161. States with weak institutional controls (like autocratic regimes) more often use aid for domestic repression and regime stability. Not surprisingly, several studies have shown that U.S. security assistance worldwide in the post–Cold War period has been at best ineffective (thus, wasteful) and, at worst, has inadvertently fueled conflict and repression. 51 Stephen Wats et al., Building Security in Africa (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2400/RR2447/RAND_RR2447.pdf; Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint”; Patricia L. Sullivan, “Do No Harm: US Aid to Africa and Civilian Security,” Political Violence at a Glance, May 8, 2023, https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2023/05/08/do-no-harm-us-aid-to-africa-and-civilian-security/.
West Africa offers good examples of this problem. Chad is “an important U.S. partner in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel region,” according to the State Department. In recent years, Chad has received sizable amounts of U.S. military assistance and arms (over $2 million in arms sales and about $4 million in security assistance in 2021/2022). 52 U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy: Chad,” May 16, 2022, 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_AF_Chad_Public.pdf; Olivier Guiryanan, “Counterterrorism Assistance to Chad for the Sahel: The Price the People Pay,” Just Security, September 2, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/72199/counterterrorism-assistance-to-chad-for-the-sahel-the-price-the-people-pay/; “United States Security Cooperation,” Center for International Policy, https://securityassistance.org/map/. In October 2022, the Chadian government massacred 128 pro-democracy protestors. Though not known definitively, U.S. weapons may very well have been used in the massacre.
According to regional expert Alex Thurston, U.S. policymakers tend to look the other way when it comes to incidents such as the massacre in Chad out of fear that the United States could lose influence to other great powers. 53 Alex Thurston, An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy (Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, November 2, 2022): 7–10, https://quincyinst.org/report/an-alternative-approach-to-u-s-sahel-policy/#executive-summary. Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 13. U.S. General Stephen Townsend recently said that U.S. security assistance to West Africa allows the United States to “exploit relationship gaps” in its competition with Russia and China. 54 Cited in Thurston, An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy, 22. Regardless, past and present U.S. security assistance might be making matters worse when it comes to terrorism in Chad.
Burkina-Faso offers another example. In the name of “fighting terrorism,” the authoritarian government there used past U.S. military assistance to repress the Fulani minority to shore up regime strength. In December 2022, for instance, a Burkinabe militia went house to house in one village and massacred 80 Fulani civilians. 55 “Burkina Faso: Perpetrators of Nouna Killings Must Face Justice,” Amnesty International, January 10, 2023, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/01/burkina-faso-perpetrators-of-nouna-killings-must-face-justice/. The Fulani have no natural ties to Islamist terrorist organizations. Regardless, security forces have “a green light to kill anyone they want, without any consequences,” according to one expert. 56 Savell, The Costs of United States’ Post-9/11 ‘Security Assistance’, 17.
This violence (inadvertently aided again by U.S. arms) against the Fulani has backfired. Many Fulani are joining ranks with Islamist groups like JNIM to oppose the Burkinabe regime. Terrorism has soared in Burkina-Faso in recent years. In 2022, Burkina-Faso and Mali accounted for seventy-three percent of terrorism deaths in West Africa. In Burkina-Faso alone, that number had increased by fifty percent from the prior year. 57 James Courtright, “Ethnic Killings by West African Armies are Undermining Regional Security,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/07/mali-burkina-faso-fulani-ethnic-killings-by-west-african-armies-are-undermining-regional-security/; Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index, 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism (Sydney, AU: March 2023), 2, https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/.
Overall, while U.S. military assistance is not the main cause of terrorism in Burkina Faso and other places, it is an unintended contributing factor that is making matters worse, not better. 58 For an excellent study, see Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson, Less is More: A New Strategy for U.S. Security Assistance to Africa (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 21, 2023), https://globalaffairs.org/research/report/less-more-new-strategy-us-security-assistance-africa. Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 4–8; Savel, The Costs of United States’ Post-9/11 ‘Security Assistance’, 4–5, 18–24; Thurston, An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy, 13–15. Many note that the heavily militarized U.S. approach to counterterrorism also discourages governments from shifting attention to peacemaking and governance/services reforms.
3945. Their own defence minister---no country shoots itself to peace.
Musa 26 — Gen. Christopher Musa (Rtd). July 9. Nigeria’s Minister of Defence and former Chief of Defence Staff, quoted in Erizia Rubyjeana. Arise News, “Musa: Counterterrorism Requires Military And Dialogue Working Together,” https://www.arise.tv/musa-counterterrorism-requires-military-and-dialogue-working-together/ Clopus
Musa described asymmetric warfare as one of the most complex forms of conflict because terrorists often hide among the civilian population, making it difficult for security forces to identify legitimate targets. “Asymmetric warfare is a very, very difficult operation, because the enemy is within, the enemy is just that individual that you think is your citizen, or is your brother, or is your uncle, that you are protecting, is the one that could help me.”
According to him, experiences from other countries demonstrate that defeating insurgency requires patience and a balanced strategy rather than military force alone. “If you see worldwide, anywhere there’s asymmetric warfare, it takes a very long while before those things are coming.”
Using Turkey’s decades-long battle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as an example, Musa said countries confronting insurgencies eventually succeed by combining security operations with dialogue. “In Turkey, they’ve been dealing with the PKK for over 40 years. It is just of recent, they are beginning together, and because they had to use the kinetic and the non kinetic.”
The defence chief stressed that no nation had ever achieved lasting peace solely through military action. “No country can shoot itself to peace.”
3951. Mishaps aren’t bad luck---they’re the fusion problem, and they eat combat proficiency.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The frequency of airstrike mishaps in Nigeria has raised serious concerns regarding the country's airpower capabilities and operational effectiveness. The successful execution of airstrikes in combat situations demands a high level of technical expertise and precision. While some unintended civilian casualties could be deemed understandable if the intended target is hit, it is a much graver operational failure when an airstrike completely misses its mark and causes indiscriminate harm elsewhere (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5). The loss of civilian lives through failure to take adequate precautions in targeting, or through disproportionate military response is against international laws of armed combat.
Nigeria’s recurring pattern of airstrike mishaps reflects operational deficiencies or ineptitude, particularly in its counterinsurgency efforts. These mishaps not only tarnish the reputation of the Nigerian military but also significantly impact its combat proficiency (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 6, 7). Consequently, they undermine the military's overall effectiveness and pose a major challenge to the country's counterinsurgency endeavours (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 2). There is a need to recognise that accurate intelligence is crucial for the success of airstrikes; it informs target selection, timing, and execution. When intelligence is flawed, airstrikes can miss their intended targets, hitting civilian areas or friendly forces instead. These failures can result from inadequate reconnaissance, faulty data analysis, or communication breakdowns within the military hierarchy. Mutch and Afzal (Citation2023) describe these mishaps as a case of an ‘innocent mistake.’ However, this perspective overlooks the systemic issues within military intelligence operations. Intelligence failures often reflect deeper problems in the planning and execution stages of military operations. For instance, if intelligence reports are based on outdated or incomplete information, the likelihood of an airstrike hitting the wrong target increases. Similarly, if there is a failure in communication between intelligence analysts and military commanders, the airstrike may proceed based on incorrect or misunderstood data. These deficiencies in intelligence, in conjunction with military errors, are significant factors contributing to civilian harm resulting from airstrikes conducted for counterinsurgency operations.
A review of the literature and the analysis in indicate that NAF airstrike mishaps have impacted civilians in the three sub-regions of northern Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (Citation2023a) reported that several civilians were killed by NAF airstrikes intended for bandits or members of the Islamist group Boko Haram but instead hit civilians. SB Morgen Intel (Citation2023) added that since 2017, over 300 people have died in airstrikes by NAF targeting terrorists. shows that in the past decade, at least 450 civilians in 18 communities have been killed by accidental NAF airstrikes. However, casualty numbers vary across sources, suggesting that the actual toll might be higher due to unreported incidents in remote areas (Isamotu, Citation2023). Analysis of the regional distribution of harm to civilians provides additional insight into the incidents spanning from 2014 to 2024.
In the northeast region, six reported incidents affected civilians, along with one accidental strike on a military convoy. On February 28, 2014, a military plane mistakenly bombed the village of Daglun community during an offensive against Boko Haram, resulting in the death of 20 civilians, most of whom were elderly (BBC News, Citation2014). Despite an extensive military ground operations aimed at eradicating Boko Haram, the government aircraft dropped four bombs, killing Daglun civilians while they slept (Ali Ndume, cited in BBC News, Citation2014). According to Human Rights Watch (Citation2023a), a similar military mishap occurred two weeks later in the village of Kayamla, resulting in the deaths of ten civilians. Following the Daglun and Kayamla airstrikes, Human Rights Watch stated that the NAF rarely acknowledges mistakes and does not provide justice or accountability to the families of the victims (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a).
Three years after the Daglun and Kayamla incidents, a NAF airstrike struck an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Rann, resulting in the deaths of at least 53 displaced persons. The death toll may have been as high as 115, with over 100 people injured (Isamotu, Citation2023). Although there was no clearly designated displacement camp in Rann, numerous tents for displaced individuals were spread out among the residential structures at the two locations that were affected. These tents could be seen clearly from the air, leading to inquiries about how such an incident could have taken place (Isamotu, Citation2023). Other reported accidental NAF strikes in the region include those in Gajigana and Kwatar Daban Masara, which led to the deaths of 13 and 20 civilians, respectively. Additionally, 30 soldiers were killed in Mainok by a NAF fighter jet that hit the wrong coordinates while targeting Boko Haram insurgents (SBM Intel, Citation2023). In Buwari village, Yobe State, NAF airstrikes killed nine farmers (Isamotu, Citation2023). The NAF initially denied involvement in the incidents but later acknowledged the possibility of civilian casualties. This pattern of denial in the aftermath of airstrike mishaps is consistent with the NAF's response to previous incidents in the northeast region.
In the northwest region, the military campaign's focus shifted from combating insurgency to banditry. On 25 December 2024, 10 civilians were killed by NAF accidental airstrikes in Gidan Sama and Rumtuwa communities in the Silame local government area of Sokoto state (Punch, Citation2024). Eleven individuals were killed in the Ajia community, Birnin Magaji, due to NAF airstrike accidents (Isamotu, Citation2023). Two civilians were killed, and 13 others were wounded in Kunkunni Village, Safana, Katsina State, by a NAF fighter jet strike (SBM Intel, Citation2023). Also, the Mutunji attack was responsible for 60 deaths (Isamotu, Citation2023) and the Tudun Biri incident resulted in 120 civilian deaths, as well as 66 injuries. Similarly, while Tudun Biri residents were gathered to celebrate Maulud, commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, a military drone misinterpreted their movements as suspicious during a routine counterterrorism operation, leading to an airstrike on the civilians. Survivors of these attacks, such as 37-year-old Idris Dahiru, describe the loss of as many as 30 family members, highlighting the human toll of these catastrophic incidents (Odeniyi, Citation2023).
The northcentral region has experienced mishaps from NAF airstrikes similar to other regions. In Genu town, Niger State, a bombing by the NAF Alpha jet resulted in the deaths of several wedding guests (SBM Intel, Citation2023). In the Kuregba community of Shiroro Local Government Area, at least six children were killed by a NAF airstrike (SBM Intel, Citation2023). Additionally, 18 individuals, including vigilantes and residents in the Galkogo community, lost their lives following an inadvertent action by a NAF aircraft; 8,000 people were displaced because of the incident. In Kwaki Village, Shiroro L.G.A., a woman was also killed in a NAF airstrike (Isamotu, Citation2023). The Rukubi airstrike incidents that killed 40 individuals, mainly Fulani pastoralists was another tragic incident (SBM Intel, Citation2023). The recurring incidents in Niger State were linked to miscommunication between the NAF and local security forces, highlighting the need for better coordination in such operations.
One case serves as an example of the economic hardships that compound the tragic deaths for victims of these mishaps. Okotta Samiala tragically lost 11 of his siblings in the NAF airstrike in Rukubi. He recounted that his siblings were bombed while unloading their cattle, which had been confiscated by the Benue State Livestock Guards (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b). Samiala’s family had taken a loan to reclaim their impounded cattle, leaving him responsible for providing for the remaining family members amidst the devastating losses. He expressed concerns about repaying the cattle loan, particularly given the challenging circumstances prevailing in the country. Samiala's story serves as a stark reminder of the far-reaching impact of NAF airstrike incidents on civilians in the northcentral region. Overall, this narrative underlines the urgent need for the NAF to implement effective measures to minimise civilian casualties during air operations and to address the fundamental human rights issues faced by the victims and their families.
The NAF's counterinsurgency airstrikes have frequently killed civilians from alleged indiscriminate use of force, intelligence lapses, insufficient training, lack of discipline, and poor civil–military relations. NAF has consistently refuted involvement in the occurrence of civilian casualties or described culpability as accidents. The lack of transparency in the investigation process and the failure to make reports of investigation public hinder the pursuit of justice and accountability. Worse still, despite the mistakes’ recurrence, victims have had little recourse to legal redress, even as NAF actions constitute grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b).
3962. Aerial bombardment is incompatible with the mission---and ISWAP provokes it on purpose.
SWI 26 — Small Wars & Insurgencies. Peer-reviewed journal of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare studies. Small Wars & Insurgencies, “Operation Lafiya Dole and the paradox of peace by force: rethinking counterinsurgency and human security in Northeast Nigeria,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2026.2652435 Clopus
Additionally, aerial bombardment has emerged as a particularly acute source of civilian harm and illustrates the incompatibility of force-intensive tactics with human security imperatives in asymmetric conflict. The 2017 airstrike on the Rann Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camp, resulting in between 53 and 115 civilian deaths and over 100 injuries,Footnote89 and the 2023 Tudun Biri drone strike, which killed approximately 120 civilians, including Muslim worshippers, underscore persistent failures in intelligence accuracy, target discrimination, and operational restraint.Footnote90 Empirical evidence compiled by Ogbozor indicates that Nigerian Air Force operations were responsible for at least 450 civilian deaths between 2014 and 2024, with 136 occurring during the OPLD phase and more than 265 thereafter.Footnote91 Within the UNDP framework, these deaths cannot be dismissed as collateral damage; they signify structural deficiencies in doctrine and practice that prioritize military expediency over civilian protection.
The human security consequences of such violence extend beyond immediate physical harm. Civilian casualties and fear of indiscriminate attacks generate displacement, disrupt social cohesion, and weaken community resilience. These effects directly compromise individuals’ ability to sustain livelihoods, access basic services, and participate in everyday social life, linking civilian harm to broader livelihood and food insecurity outcomes. In this sense, violations of freedom from fear cascade into violations of freedom from want, reinforcing multidimensional insecurity.
SIT explains how these human security failures feed back into conflict dynamics. Boko Haram ISWAP have deliberately employed indirect tactics designed to provoke excessive state responses, thereby fracturing state – civilian relations. As Park argues, this dynamic renders the conflict increasingly “intractable”, as tactical battlefield successes fail to translate into political legitimacy or strategic resolution.Footnote92 The blurred distinction between combatants and non-combatants further complicates civilian protection, undermining the central counterinsurgency objective of winning civilian trust and cooperation.Footnote93
3973. Nothing constrains the next strike---the notification is silent on the record.
HRW 25 — Human Rights Watch. August 19. International nongovernmental human rights investigation and advocacy organization. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
Security concerns across Nigeria are real and widespread. In the Northwest, violent raids, killings, and kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs continue to destabilize communities. In the Northeast, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram and its splinter factions continue their brutal insurgency against the government while terrorizing civilians and committing abuses. In the Southeast, separatist armed groups routinely terrorize and attack communities and kill residents.
However, in responding to these threats, Nigerian security forces have been repeatedly implicated in serious rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and conflict-related abuses. The US State Department documented many of these abuses in its own 2024 Human Rights Report on Nigeria , released just last week. Military airstrikes have also repeatedly resulted in the deaths of people mistakenly identified as threats, without accountability. Despite ongoing calls for justice, meaningful reform remains absent.
3981. The unique American contribution is intelligence---the partner already has the operational capability.
Ripples 7-2 — Ripples Nigeria. July 2. Nigerian independent news organization, reporting remarks by General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Commander of US Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa. Ripples Nigeria, “US Scales down military presence in Nigeria, maintains counterterrorism intelligence cooperation,” https://www.ripplesnigeria.com/us-scales-down-military-presence-in-nigeria-maintains-counterterrorism-intelligence-cooperation/ Clopus
The US Air Force commander praised Nigeria’s military capacity, describing the country as one of America’s strongest security partners in Africa. He noted that intelligence cooperation between both countries had produced one of the most significant counterterrorism successes against ISIS in recent months.
According to Anderson, the collaboration combined Nigeria’s operational capabilities with specialised US intelligence support, ultimately resulting in the elimination of the terrorist group’s second-in-command.
“I think the partnership that we’ve shown recently with Nigeria, where Nigeria’s a very capable and large country — it’s got a strong economy; it’s got a large, educated population; it’s got a very capable military.
“But there are things that we have learned in the counterterrorist fight over several years that we were able to assist and integrate with them to help them with their intelligence and help with the intelligence sharing that eventually led to a cooperative effort to where we were able to bring some unique capabilities that the U.S. brings and be able to prosecute together the number two leader within the ISIS or Daesh organization who is responsible for much of their global operations, their global media, and their recruiting”, he said.
He stressed that future US engagement in Africa would increasingly focus on providing specialised capabilities that enable partner nations to lead security operations themselves, rather than relying on prolonged foreign troop deployments.
“So I think as we go forward, that is an example of how we’re looking at engaging with partners to help them be more effective by only bringing unique U.S. capabilities that allow the partner to be effective in these fights,” he said.
3992. The model is intelligence fusion---that’s what made the strike work, and the plan doesn’t touch it.
Murali 26 — Miruthulani Murali. July 30. Research intern at the Counter Terrorism Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. MP-IDSA, “US–Nigeria Counter-Terror Cooperation,” https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/us-nigeria-counter-terror-cooperation Clopus
The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) on 16 May 2026 stated that in a joint campaign with Nigerian forces in north-eastern Nigeria, Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, head of ISIS global operations, along with other senior ISIS terrorists, were killed. [i] Leveraging US intelligence capabilities, the largely Nigeria-led ground forces benefitted from American advanced surveillance, intelligence analysis and joint planning. AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson had earlier in January 2026 posited that this kind of collaboration could be a model for future security cooperation in Africa. [ii]
This new approach has proven particularly effective in the Lake Chad basin, where violent extremist organisations make full use of the treacherous terrain and porous international borders to carry out their attacks. In these operational environments, intelligence fusion and coordinated planning help improve situational awareness, strengthen operational decision-making, and enhance partner-state capacity-building without requiring a longer or prolonged foreign military deployment. Taken together, these developments suggest that intelligence has evolved from providing a supporting role into a key operational imperative in contemporary counter-terrorism cooperation.
4001. Expansion tracks overstretch, embezzled procurement and a collapsed regional task force.
Soufan 25 — The Soufan Center. May 21. Nonprofit global security research center founded by former FBI supervisory special agent Ali Soufan. The Soufan Center, “The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast,” https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-may-21/ Clopus
The Nigerian military is now deployed across two-thirds of the country, stretched thin by the simultaneous threats of jihadist insurgency, criminal groups, and communal violence. Moreover, the merging of ideological extremism with economic motives and criminality in Nigeria makes it increasingly difficult to identify perpetrators or respond effectively. The military remains overstretched, underfunded, and hampered by internal dysfunction. Embezzlement of arms procurement funds, poor troop welfare, and logistical sabotage have weakened its ability to retain land or respond effectively. As a result, security is often outsourced to local vigilante groups and criminal actors, further undermining stability.
International military cooperation across the Lake Chad Basin has also deteriorated. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 – following its 2023 coup – has compromised intelligence sharing efforts and disrupted joint military operations across porous borders. Chad also threatened to exit the alliance in 2024, highlighting the challenges in maintaining this alliance. Moreover, strained diplomatic relations between Abuja and Niamey following Niger’s transition to junta-leadership have created operational vacuums along the Niger-Nigeria border. The collapse of their joint military presence has been exploited by jihadist and criminal groups.
A lull in fighting between ISWAP and Boko Haram may have enabled ISWAP to co-opt fighters and establish dominance. In addition, scores of foreign fighters – often more ideologically rigid and militarily proficient – have joined ISWAP in the Bosso region – adjacent to Borno and in close proximity to the Nigeria-Niger border – strengthening their operations. Their presence, combined with kinetic drone capabilities, could support expansion southward. Southern Nigeria is the country’s economic powerhouse, and its penetration would expose densely populated towns and cities to risk. ISWAP’s significance in the IS global network – evidenced by hosting the Islamic State’s Maktab al-Furqan (West Africa office) – could significantly advance the strategic objectives of the Islamic State core if they continue on this path. Moreover, in Nigeria’s northwest, the steady rise of the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) -linked Lakurawa group with origins in Mali and Niger – designated a terrorist organization by Abuja in 2024 – evidences the impacts of militant spillover as terrorist networks strengthen across porous borders.
The effects of Boko Haram’s 16-year insurgency – aggravated by periods of violent confrontations with ISWAP – have reverberated beyond northeastern Nigeria. In the country’s agrarian so-called “Middle Belt” – notably Benue, Plateau, and Delta states – there has been a spike in violent attacks by nomadic Fulani Muslim pastoralists against Christian farming communities. Since 2019, the clashes have claimed more than 500 lives in the region and displaced over 2.2 million people, according to SBM Intelligence. There have been over 156 fatalities in these regions last month alone. While these disputes are rooted in long-standing competition over land and resources, climate change and drought, combined with the security vacuum created by the ongoing jihadist insurgency, have exacerbated violence between the communities. Both groups fleeing the terrorist threat have moved southward into concentrated areas, compounding herder-farmer confrontations in an already complex security landscape.
4012. Where the state is absent, someone else governs---munitions don’t reach that.
Hendrix 26 — Steven E. Hendrix. June 14. Former senior U.S. diplomat and development official who worked in Nigeria on strategy addressing Boko Haram and insecurity in the Middle Belt and southeast, former USAID senior coordinator for foreign assistance at the U.S. Department of State. Lawfare, “Nigeria’s Fragmented Security Crisis,” https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/nigeria-s-fragmented-security-crisis Clopus
At the center of Nigeria’s evolving security environment are questions of state capacity and legitimacy.
In many of the areas most affected by violence, the state’s presence is limited, uneven, or contested. Security forces are stretched across multiple fronts, judicial systems lack reach and resources, and local governance structures often struggle to manage disputes effectively or to command public trust. Where institutions are absent or ineffective, alternative systems of authority emerge. In parts of the Middle Belt, for example, communities increasingly rely on self-defense militias because formal institutions have failed to provide security.
Equally important is the question of legitimacy. Where communities perceive the state as distant, biased, or ineffective, they are less likely to rely on formal institutions, and more likely to turn to local militias, vigilante groups, or informal power structures for protection and dispute resolution. This dynamic complicates security responses, as efforts to reassert control may be viewed not as protection but as imposition. These governance and legitimacy deficits complicate not only Nigeria’s domestic response but also the effectiveness of external security assistance strategies.
A more effective response would begin with conceptual clarity about the nature of the problem itself. Nigeria is not facing a single security problem, but a system of interconnected and differentiated forms of violence. This recognition does not provide an immediate solution. It does, however, clarify the limitations of existing approaches and the need for more tailored responses that reflect the specific drivers of each type of conflict.
Military force will remain necessary in certain contexts , particularly where organized armed groups pose immediate threats to civilian populations. But it must be complemented by efforts that address the underlying conditions that sustain violence, including strengthening local governance, improving access to justice, and expanding economic opportunity.
Nigeria retains important institutional strengths and significant social resilience, but those capacities remain uneven across regions, and levels of government and resilience alone will not be sufficient. A security environment that has fundamentally changed requires a corresponding shift in how it is understood. Without that shift, policy will continue to lag behind reality—misidentifying the problem, misapplying the tools, and ultimately falling short of the stability it seeks to achieve.
4021. The partnership’s lesson is partner-led ground ops on outside intelligence.
Murali 26 — Miruthulani Murali. July 30. Research intern at the Counter Terrorism Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. MP-IDSA, “US–Nigeria Counter-Terror Cooperation,” https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/us-nigeria-counter-terror-cooperation Clopus
The US–Nigeria counter-terrorism cooperation, with positive operational outcomes, offers lessons for developing resilient, sustainable counter-terrorism partnerships across the Lake Chad Basin and the wider African security landscape. The experience underscores the value of intelligence sharing, partner-led ground operations, targeted military aid, and long-term capacity-building in countering evolving terrorist threats, rather than depending on protracted overseas military deployments, which are politically costly and logistically unsustainable.
The capacity of regional partners to oversee operations with outside intelligence support will become more crucial as terrorist groups in the area continue to modify their strategies and take advantage of ungoverned areas. In this sense, the 2026 campaign might serve as a model rather than a conclusion; if institutionalised through a multilateral framework like the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, it could provide a more resilient paradigm for regional security cooperation in Africa.
4032. Their intelligence is the bottleneck---distrust, rivalry, and saboteurs inside the chain.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
Nonetheless, Nigeria faces significant barriers to practical and tactical intelligence. Ikelegbe and Umukoro (Citation2016) point to technological deficiencies, such as limited access to satellite imagery and real-time communication systems, which impair intelligence accuracy and responsiveness. Ochonu (Citation2020) documents difficulties in HUMINT acquisition, including community distrust, insurgent intimidation, and the complexity of Nigeria's diverse cultural landscape. Inter-agency rivalry among the military, DSS, and police exacerbates inefficiencies in intelligence processing, according to Alli (Citation2019), reducing its tactical utility. Meanwhile, insurgent groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP have adapted with counterintelligence tactics, such as misinformation and encrypted communication, often outpacing government responses (Ewi & Salifu, Citation2017).
More broadly, the Nigerian military faces technical challenges in logistics, intelligence, and command, which limit its capacity to maintain control over counterinsurgency operations (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 15). Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign has exhibited significant command and intelligence failures, attributed to technical and operational issues, including corruption within the military hierarchy (Okoli et al., Citation2024). Also, funds intended for counterinsurgency logistics are sometimes mismanaged, creating operational deficits due to a patronage system that exists within the military and the possibility of double agents and saboteurs compromising tactical intelligence (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 15). These factors, in addition to a lack of cooperation with local communities, limit the efficiency of counterinsurgency operations.
In addition to intelligence deficiencies, the Nigerian military has faced strong criticism for frequently employing indiscriminate bombing and shelling in densely populated areas, resulting in serious civilian harm (Amnesty International, Citation2018). Counterinsurgency operations have been marred by errors that have caused significant civilian casualties, stemming from indiscriminate use of force, inadequate training and discipline, and strained civil–military relations. The emergence of drones as an integral aspect of military airpower has transformed modern warfare. While drone-fired airstrikes are intended to hit targets with high precision, some have missed, causing civilian or other unintended damages, highlighting the human cost of modern warfare (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 6), The timeline of NAF airstrike errors, locations, reasons provided by the military, and the number of civilian casualties is detailed in .
4043. Escalating our military role is what writes the recruiting narrative---and it invites the coup.
Cavanna 26 — Thomas Cavanna. February 26. Former non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Modern Diplomacy, “Washington’s buildup in Nigeria could ensnare the U.S. in a protracted conflict,” https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/26/washingtons-buildup-in-nigeria-could-ensnare-the-u-s-in-a-protracted-conflict/ Clopus
The expansion of Washington’s “Christian genocide” rhetoric may antagonize local communities, incentivizing them to stop cooperating with Nigeria’s authorities . It could also destabilize a country of 240 million people, split roughly in half between Muslims (56%) and Christians ( 43% ).
Combined with the Trump administration’s bombastic and divisive rhetoric, an increase in U.S. military operations may bolster jihadists’ narrative and recruitment .
Washington’s interference may weaken the legitimacy of Nigeria’s democratic regime, increasing its vulnerability to a military coup, as recently occurred in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and other African countries unable to provide security and contain foreign interference .
4051. NON-UNIQUE. Order books are at records and they’re raising guidance.
Lockheed 26 — Lockheed Martin Corporation. July 23. The largest U.S. defense contractor by revenue and the prime on the Paveway and Air Foil Group lines in the Nigeria case. Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin Reports Second Quarter 2026 Financial Results,” https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2026-07-23-Lockheed-Martin-Reports-Second-Quarter-2026-Financial-Results Clopus
BETHESDA, Md. , July 23, 2026 / PRNewswire / -- Lockheed Martin Corporation (NYSE: LMT) today reported second quarter 2026 sales of $20.1 billion, compared to $18.2 billion in the second quarter of 2025. Net earnings in the second quarter of 2026 were $1.8 billion, or $7.94 per share, compared to $342 million, or $1.46 per share, including $1.6 billion of program losses and $169 million of other charges, in the second quarter of 2025. Cash from operations was $3.2 billion in the second quarter of 2026, compared to $201 million in the second quarter of 2025. Free cash flow was $2.9 billion in the second quarter of 2026, compared to $(150) million in the second quarter of 2025.
"We delivered strong second‑quarter performance, with over $20 billion in sales – a year‑over‑year increase of 11% – free cash flow of $2.9 billion, and $65 billion of new orders, which takes our backlog to a record $230 billion. This continued performance reflects more than just increased customer demand – it is evidence that our 21st Century Security ® strategy, and its focus on integration, partnerships and operational excellence is working, resulting in increased business, and advancing the security needs of our nation and allies. We are delivering on our strategy, achieving a higher trajectory for our business and giving us confidence to raise our full year financial guidance. We now anticipate accelerated year‑over‑year sales growth of approximately 8%, driving 28% higher segment operating profit, and increased free cash flow, now projected to be over $7 billion," said Lockheed Martin Chairman, President and CEO Jim Taiclet.
"These results are powered by consistent performance on the commitments we've made and by our investments to support the missions our customers will face next. Over the quarter, we took a major step forward in transforming munitions production, putting the framework agreements we announced earlier this year into action by signing a $35 billion multi-year contract with the Missile Defense Agency for THAAD. We continue to innovate at the speed our customers' missions demand, taking our Sanctum counter-drone system from concept to successful live fire testing in just 45 days by combining a battle manager, radar, launcher, and combat-proven missile into one engagement chain. And, we are investing strategically to strengthen global defense manufacturing capabilities through our collaboration with General Motors Defense in the U.S. and our agreement with Rheinmetall to co-produce ATACMS in Europe."
4062. NO LINK. Check the denominator---one African account can’t move a book that size.
State 26 — Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. March 16. Bureau of the U.S. Department of State responsible for arms transfer and defense trade policy. U.S. Department of State, “Fiscal Year 2025 U.S. Arms Transfers and Defense Trade,” https://www.state.gov/releases/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/2026/03/fiscal-year-2025-u-s-arms-transfers-and-defense-trade Clopus
The United States regards arms transfers and defense trade as important foreign policy tools as well as necessary for strengthening national security. For this reason, the United States conducts arms transfers, in accordance with the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, through a strategic focus that takes into consideration many factors. Economic security, political dynamics, nonproliferation, and technology security reflect some of the factors worthy of review. Determining the appropriate provision of military equipment and the licensing of direct commercial sales of defense articles and services to U.S. allies and partners must serve American national security objectives first and must not disadvantage the U.S. warfighter. Given the multi-year implementation timeframes for many arms transfers and defense trade cases, the Department reports three-year rolling averages, in addition to annual figures. Each proposed transfer is carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act and related legislation, policy, and guidance. Major defense transfers and sales are also subject to Congressional notification and review.
Total Sales:
In FY 2025 the number for total sales, both government to government Foreign Military Sales, and exports licensed via Direct Commercial Sales was $331.18 billion . This represents a 3.92 percent increase over the FY 2024 figure of $318.70 billion.
Foreign Military Sales:
In FY 2025 the total value of transferred defense articles and services and security cooperation activities conducted under the Foreign Military Sales system was $104.38 billion . This represents an 11.47 percent decrease , down from $117.85 billion in FY 2024. In FY 2025, we oversaw 16,098 FMS cases with an open case value of over $934 billion.
The $104.38 billion figure for the FY 2025 includes $75.90 billion in arms sales funded by U.S. allies and partner nations; $17.92 billion funded through the Title 22 Foreign Military Financing program; and $10.56 billion funded through Department of Defense Building Partner Capacity programs and certain Department of State programs funded under the Foreign Assistance Act.
The three-year rolling average value for transferred defense articles and services and security cooperation activities conducted under the Foreign Military Sales system was for FY 2023 – FY 2025 was $101.04 billion. This represents a 20.90 percent increase from $83.57 billion for FY 2022 – FY 2024.