15The plot was real---and the region is still losing governments.
Daba 26 — Daba Finance. February 4. Abidjan-based African markets and business news service. allAfrica, “West Africa: Nigeria Says Soldiers Plotted Coup, Raising Fresh Fears in West Africa,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202602050015.html Clopus
Nigeria has acknowledged for the first time that a group of soldiers plotted to overthrow President Bola Tinubu, an admission that underscores renewed concerns about military intervention in civilian politics across West Africa.
The plan, uncovered in October, would have ended nearly 30 years of uninterrupted civilian rule in Africa's largest democracy. Authorities said the plot was stopped before it reached an advanced stage. At least 16 officers, including a brigadier general and a colonel, were arrested and are expected to appear before a military tribunal.
An internal report described the threat as "clear and immediate," warning that inaction could have had serious consequences for national stability. Officials have not disclosed how close the plotters came to key political targets.
The attempted coup comes amid a resurgence of military takeovers in the region. In recent years, soldiers have seized power in several West African states, reversing decades of democratic gains. Since the Nigerian plot was foiled, there has been an attempted power grab in Benin and a successful takeover in Guinea-Bissau.
16Arms imports are the tipping point---they hand a grieved army the means to act.
Fitzsimmons 24 — Darby Fitzsimmons. December 23. Senior at Indiana University’s O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs; thesis models SIPRI arms-transfer volume against the Colpus Coup Dataset. O’Neill School Undergraduate Thesis Blog, “From Aid to Instability: How Foreign Arms Empower Coup d’Etats in Sub-Saharan Africa,” https://blogs.iu.edu/cari/2024/12/23/from-aid-to-instability-how-foreign-arms-empower-coup-detats-in-sub-saharan-africa/ Clopus
Sub-Saharan Africa is no stranger to military coups. Between 1980 and 2019, the region experienced 117 coup attempts, the most of any world region. While much has been written about the causes of coups – such as economic hardship, political instability, and weak institutions – one factor remains underexplored: the role of foreign arms transfers. My research addresses this gap, showing how the influx of heavy weaponry increases the risk of coups, especially in countries already facing political and economic vulnerabilities.
Key Findings
To explore the relationship between arms transfers and coup risk, I used data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on arms transfers and the Colpus Coup Dataset on coup events from 1980 to 2019. Instead of using a simple dollar amount, SIPRI uses the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) measurement, which quantifies arms transfer volume based on production cost. Essentially, it’s not a simple dollar measurement, but looks at the utility of weapons overall.
Using Poisson regression, I modeled how arms imports influence coup risk, controlling for variables like GDP growth, youth unemployment, and military expenditures. I also incorporated lagged variables to assess the delayed effects of arms imports.
I identified two key findings:
First, arms imports increase coup risk over time: For every $1 million increase in arms imports, the risk of a coup rises by about 0.3% over time (see figure 1). While this may seem small, it becomes significant when considering that many countries receive millions in arms annually.
Figure 1: Increase in Coup Risk per Million Dollar Increase in TIV
Second, arms amplify existing vulnerabilities: Arms transfers do not create the conditions for a coup but instead provide the military with the means to respond quickly to political unrest. In nations already grappling with slow economic growth, high youth unemployment, or weak institutions, arms imports give the military the ability to act decisively, turning unrest into a coup.
Case Study: Nigeria
Nigeria’s experience provides a clear example of how arms imports can contribute to instability. In 1990, Nigeria imported $18 million in heavy weaponry, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. According to my model, this corresponds with an increased likelihood of a coup in 1993 by 6.3% compared to a world in which no arms were imported in 1990. In 1992, the country imported $58 million in arms, correlating to a 19.14% increase in coup likelihood in 1993.
Nigeria did, in fact, experience a coup in 1993. While it’s difficult to gauge how much of a role arms transfers played in this, my analysis suggests that while political discontent and economic hardship were motivating factors, the availability of foreign arms may have allowed the military to act on these grievances. The 1993 coup disrupted Nigeria’s path toward democracy and set back its economic development – one of many examples of how crucial it is to understand the mechanisms behind coups in order to prevent them.
Policy Implications
My research challenges the assumption that arms exports stabilize fragile nations. Instead, arms often act as a “tipping point,” enabling military takeovers in already unstable countries. Policymakers must reconsider the logic behind arms exports, especially to countries with weak institutions or struggling economies.
17Capability itself is power---outside equipment concentrates it until civilian control can't hold.
Trenkov-Wermuth 26 — Calin Trenkov-Wermuth and Alexander Noyes. February. Former principal security governance advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace, coauthor of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine. Fellow at the Brookings Institution, coauthor of War at Arm’s Length: How America Can Build Effective Partners Through Military Assistance. Journal of Democracy, “African Coups and the Elite-Forces Trap,” https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/african-coups-and-the-elite-forces-trap/ Clopus
That all changed on 7 December 2025, when elements of Benin’s special forces launched a violent but ultimately failed coup attempt in Cotonou, the capital city. Members of the Special Forces Group (GFS) seized the national television station, attempted to detain President Patrice Talon, and took senior military officials hostage. At least one civilian was killed before loyalist forces — aided by Nigerian airstrikes and a surprisingly rapid ECOWAS intervention — restored civilian control.
Ultimately, the coup attempt collapsed within hours. But its failure should not obscure its significance. Benin’s experience exposes a widespread vulnerability now spreading across coastal West Africa — one tied directly to how states, often with U.S. support, have chosen to fight terrorism by supporting elite units without enough attention also paid to defense reform and the governance of security. At stake is not only security effectiveness, but the survival of civilian rule and democratic accountability in a region where both are already under severe strain.
This is the elite-forces trap. And a shift in Washington’s approach can help to counter terrorism effectively while helping to lower coup risk.
Tactical Success, Strategic Risk
Benin’s security environment has deteriorated rapidly over the last few years. Starting in 2019, with a noticeable increase in activity in 2021, Jihadist groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State began pushing south from Burkina Faso, exploiting porous borders and weak rural governance. Attacks in northern Benin in early 2025 killed civilians and soldiers alike, threatening trade corridors and exposing the limits of the country’s traditional security posture.
The response followed a familiar pattern. Benin invested heavily in elite counterterrorism units designed for speed, mobility, and high-intensity operations. The GFS became the spearhead of this effort, deployed to the north and tasked with the most demanding missions. International partners, including the United States, reinforced this approach, prioritizing training, equipment, and operational advising for units capable of delivering rapid results, while focusing too little on the broader institutional defense capabilities that allow for such units to be both effective and professional.
From a tactical perspective, the strategy worked. Elite units responded faster, hit harder, and reassured both domestic audiences and foreign partners. But counterterrorism built for speed carries a hidden cost.
Over time, elite units absorb not just resources but prestige. They bear the highest operational tempo and casualties, develop strong internal cohesion, and come to see themselves as the state’s primary guarantors of security. This concentration of capability and identity is not inherently destabilizing — but in weak or eroding democracies, it accelerates the breakdown of civilian oversight and lowers the barriers to military intervention in politics.
Elite units do not need to be overtly politicized to become political. Capability itself is power. Benin’s reliance on elite units amid weak defense institutions produced uneven power, informal influence, and a perception among some forces that they could act independently of civilian authority.
When Politics Reaches the Barracks
In Benin, military dynamics collided with rising political tension. In October 2025, the electoral commission disqualified the leading opposition candidate from the 2026 presidential race. A month later, parliament approved a constitutional amendment extending the presidential term from five to seven years. Though term limits formally remained, these moves fueled concerns about clear democratic backsliding and elite entrenchment.
Inside the armed forces, frustration was already mounting. Troops deployed in the north faced repeated jihadist attacks and mounting losses. Officers privately questioned whether political leaders were matching security rhetoric with resources and strategy. Lt. Col. Pascal Tigri, identified as the coup’s ringleader, had long-standing ties to elite units and was known to be openly critical of the administration’s handling of security.
When the coup plotters appeared on national television, their language echoed a now-familiar regional script: accusations of corruption, poor governance, and neglect of soldiers fighting on the front lines. After failing to seize the president, they took senior generals hostage — an apparent attempt to force negotiations by exploiting a temporary absence of top military leadership.
This was not a spontaneous mutiny. It was a calculated coup attempt by an elite unit that thought it had the leverage and capability to overthrow the head of state and strongarm other branches of the military.
An Alarming Regional Pattern
Benin’s experience fits squarely within a broader West African pattern. In Mali, the coups of 2020 and 2021 were led by officers from combat-hardened units trained and supported by foreign partners. In Burkina Faso , junior officers drawn from counterterrorism formations toppled two governments in 2022 amid battlefield frustration and political paralysis.
Guinea followed the same trajectory in 2021, when special-forces officers who had been fast-tracked and publicly celebrated by the government seized power themselves. In Niger , the 2023 coup was likewise spearheaded by the presidential guard — one of the country’s most professional and well-resourced units.
In each case, elite units accumulated operational autonomy, cohesion, and political confidence long before they intervened. The result has been not only repeated coups, but the steady hollowing out of democratic institutions, as militaries becomes arbiters of political outcomes rather than subordinates to elected authority. The trigger was rarely ideology. It was a perceived collapse of civilian legitimacy combined with the belief that elite military actors could act where politicians could not.
18It's the mix that does it---equipment without institutions leaves power insulated from civilians.
Trenkov-Wermuth 26 — Calin Trenkov-Wermuth and Alexander Noyes. February. Former principal security governance advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace, coauthor of The Future of the Security Sector in Ukraine. Fellow at the Brookings Institution, coauthor of War at Arm’s Length: How America Can Build Effective Partners Through Military Assistance. Journal of Democracy, “African Coups and the Elite-Forces Trap,” https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/african-coups-and-the-elite-forces-trap/ Clopus
The lesson here is not militaries should abandon elite units. Counterterrorism without tactical capability is fantasy. The problem is the types of military assistance and support that Washington and its international partners have chosen to prioritize.
U.S. security assistance to Benin has been limited compared to what some of its neighbors receive. Yet for more than a decade, U.S. security assistance to the region has emphasized access, speed, and elite performance — often through special-forces partnerships , expeditionary tactical advising and equipment, and short-term operational gains. Defense institutions, civilian oversight, and military governance have received far less attention, funding, and political backing.
This imbalance quietly reshapes civil–military relations. As elite formations grow in prominence, conventional forces stagnate. Ministries of defense remain weak. Personnel systems, promotion boards, and disciplinary mechanisms fail to keep pace with operational realities. Power within the armed forces becomes unevenly distributed, informal, and increasingly insulated from civilian control.
Under those conditions, coup risk — especially at the hands of tactically proficient elite units — goes up.
19Nigeria is the anchor---it was the one state everybody assumed was immune.
Daba 26 — Daba Finance. February 4. Abidjan-based African markets and business news service. allAfrica, “West Africa: Nigeria Says Soldiers Plotted Coup, Raising Fresh Fears in West Africa,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202602050015.html Clopus
While the Nigerian case is said to have been driven by internal grievances within the armed forces, its mere existence has raised alarm in a country seen as a regional anchor.
Key Takeaways
Nigeria's admission is significant not because the coup succeeded, but because it was attempted at all. For decades, Nigeria was viewed as largely insulated from the wave of military takeovers affecting parts of West and Central Africa. That assumption now looks weaker. Across the region, similar pressures are at play. Disputed elections, constitutional changes that entrench incumbents, weak service delivery, and limited economic opportunities have eroded trust in civilian rule. At the same time, high youth unemployment has created a pool of frustration that can be exploited by ambitious officers. The pattern echoes earlier decades, when coups were justified by claims of corruption and misrule. What is different today is the lack of consistent regional punishment. Recent juntas have faced sanctions, but many have consolidated power with limited long-term cost. For Nigeria, the episode is a reminder that democratic stability cannot be taken for granted. For West Africa, it signals that the region's "coup belt" may still be expanding, with even its largest and most influential state no longer immune.
20There's no referee left---what replaced it lines up behind rival patrons.
Ndiaye 24 — Babacar Ndiaye. September 19. Senior Fellow at the Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies, former Principal Political Affairs Officer at ECOWAS and transnational organised crime prevention expert at UNODC West and Central Africa. The Defence Horizon Journal, “A Shift Of The Collective Security Architecture In West Africa,” https://tdhj.org/blog/post/collective-security-west-africa-ecowas/ Clopus
The three countries subsequently withdrew from ECOWAS on January 26, 2024, citing ‘illegal and inhumane ’ sanctions, invasion threats, and a lack of anti-terrorism support. On July 7, 2024, they further announced the establishment of a Confederation. It is worth noting that Russia immediately applauded the three-junta initiative and offered its official recognition. Thus far, Russia is the only country extending official recognition of this ECOWAS breakaway alliance.[7] Predictions including the demise of the G5FC, a five Central Sahel nations anti-terrorism military force backed by France and the EU, fragmentation of international effort to combat terrorism and rampant transitional organised crime soon materialised. The anticipated weakening of ECOWAS as a regional security provider and the loss of credibility or agency as a peace mediator also occurred.
The butterfly effect of successive coups and establishing the AES will cause a complete upheaval in strategic alliances, with far-reaching yet unpredictable consequences. The region, previously a secure community with mutual trust and solidarity, now faces the emergence of two antagonistic security blocs with ideological and political divides. This results in increased mistrust, an arms race, a stark divide between democratic and autocratic regimes, and alignment with global ideological conflicts, notably between NATO and Russia. These changes risk creating severe interstate conflict risks, democratic backsliding, disruption of economic integration, and exacerbation of security and humanitarian crises, including transnational crime and climate-related issues, impacting migration flows.
21Interstate war---the split runs on the NATO/Russia line and both blocs are arming.
Ndiaye 24 — Babacar Ndiaye. September 19. Senior Fellow at the Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies, former Principal Political Affairs Officer at ECOWAS and transnational organised crime prevention expert at UNODC West and Central Africa. The Defence Horizon Journal, “A Shift Of The Collective Security Architecture In West Africa,” https://tdhj.org/blog/post/collective-security-west-africa-ecowas/ Clopus
The establishment of the AES by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger implies a significant shift from a unified security and defence community in West Africa to a region polarised along ideological lines. This polarisation reflects the broader geopolitical struggle between NATO and Russia,[38] with democratic regimes on one side and illiberal regimes on the other. The AES’s formation challenges the existing regional collective security mechanisms under ECOWAS, with implications akin to NATO’s Article 5, mandating mutual defence among the member states. Therefore, creating the AES not only leads to auto-Balkanisation of the region but also represents a major challenge for ECOWAS. This alliance now perceives ECOWAS’s collective security mechanism as a strategic threat. If the provisions of the AES pact become operational, it would further complicate the security environment and undermine ECOWAS’s peace and security architecture.
This polarisation is intensified by the scramble for Africa’s critical natural resources, geopolitical influence, and the inflow of arms, exacerbating the risk of interstate conflict. The resulting tensions, such as those between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso or Niger and Benin, erode trust and hinder the necessary economic and security cooperation from combating transnational threats like terrorism and organised crime. In addition to several cross-border incidents, the heads of state of the three juntas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger never miss an opportunity to use very hostile rhetoric against the regional bloc and its member states, the AU, or the so-called Western countries whilst praising Russia as their “reliable and sincere partner”, and thus also mobilising their population along the same line. In Burkina Faso, the head of the ruling junta has once again accused Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in a speech delivered on July 11, 2024, of wanting to destabilise his country. He also criticised Cotonou, Benin, reiterating that his neighbour was hosting two French bases.[39] The situation is best encapsulated in a headline from a well-known weekly: “ECOWAS — AES: The War of Blocs.”[40]
22Sahel uranium is the prolif pathway---Iran's bidding, and a junta answers to nobody.
SightLine 25 — SightLine U3O8. November. Uranium-sector news service; the underlying reporting is Le Monde’s, sourced to multiple French government and security officials. SightLine U3O8, “The possible sale of 1,000 metric tons of Nigerien uranium to Russia is alarming France,” https://sightlineu3o8.com/2025/11/the-possible-sale-of-1000-metric-tons-of-nigerien-uranium-to-russia-is-alarming-france/ Clopus syndicated from Le Monde---confirm against the original before reading
Since 2024, Nigerien authorities who face financial difficulties have sought to sell the uranium stockpile at Arlit. Iran and China expressed interest, but negotiations moved furthest with Russia. On July 28, Rosatom and Niger’s energy ministry signed “a memorandum of mutual understanding” on cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector.
Contacted by Le Monde , the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) declined to comment on the issue. Its director general, Rafael Grossi, visited Niger on March 12, including a stop at the Arlit mine. Although he cited his desire to welcome “transparency and cooperation,” the trip was mainly devoted to the future of Somaïr’s 1,400 metric tons of uranium stock and to the question of a potential buyer.
Grossi’s goal at the time was to dissuade Nigerien authorities from selling to Iran, which is suspected of wanting to use it to revive its uranium enrichment program and military nuclear capabilities. For the IAEA, Niger’s decision to sell the stock to Russia could thus be seen as the lesser evil – a way to prevent or at least to secure against proliferation risks.
23Backsliding is the war variable---narrow coalitions make foreign war cheap and useful.
Ko 25 — Jeremy Ko. December. Researcher at the Centre for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich. Social Science Quarterly, “The Peace Penalty of Backsliding: Autocratization and Interstate Conflict Worldwide (1970–2023),” vol. 106 no. 7 Clopus published abstract only
This study examines how autocratization—through democratic backsliding or authoritarian deepening—alters the conditions under which states engage in interstate conflict. Drawing on selectorate theory, it argues that as leaders dismantle institutional checks and consolidate power, the winning coalition (W) supporting them narrows relative to the selectorate (S). Smaller coalitions heighten leaders’ dependence on elites and weaken accountability to the broader public, reducing the domestic costs of war while increasing its strategic value for political survival.
A global analysis of 155 countries (1970–2023) measures autocratization as 5-year declines in the V-Dem democracy index and assesses their association with subsequent war risk.
The results show that declines in democratic quality significantly raise the probability of interstate conflict, with sharper drops producing stronger effects across models. Comparative evidence from Russia and Israel illustrates the mechanism: shrinking coalitions under Putin and Netanyahu reinforced reliance on narrow elite networks, turning external conflict into a means of domestic power consolidation.
These findings reveal a “peace penalty” of autocratization—magnifies incentives for leaders in launching interstate war. Future research should disaggregate these dynamics to examine how autocratization shapes conflict initiation, escalation, and strategy across varying institutional contexts.
24Advantage THREE is Pandemics:
25The campaign uproots families and closes access---and it's crossing borders.
UNHCR 7-3 — United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. July 3. The UN Refugee Agency, mandated to protect and assist forcibly displaced people. UNHCR, “UNHCR warns Lake Chad Basin at tipping point as violence and displacement surge,” https://www.unhcr.org/us/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-warns-lake-chad-basin-tipping-point-violence-and-displacement-surge Clopus
GENEVA – UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is alarmed that escalating violence across the Lake Chad Basin is driving a sharp increase in forced displacement and insecurity, threatening to reverse recent fragile stabilization across the region.
Across the Lake Chad Basin, incorporating swathes of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, more than 3.5 million people are forcibly displaced, while 8.2 million require humanitarian assistance. The security situation has recently deteriorated sharply, with recorded incidents rising by 80 per cent between January 2024 and April 2026.
Between September 2025 and May 2026 alone, nearly 1,800 security incidents and more than 5,700 fatalities were recorded across the Basin. These incidents include attacks on civilians, killings, kidnappings, explosions, clashes between armed actors and raids on villages.
Borno State in northeast Nigeria remains the epicentre of the crisis. Repeated attacks by non-state armed groups, military operations and insecurity along roads and displacement routes are uprooting families and severely limiting humanitarian access. The ripple effects extend beyond the northeast, as displacement, insecurity and competition over scarce resources increasingly spill into other regions, including the northwest and the so-called middle belt, deepening fragilities. Since January 2026, more than 77,500 people have been displaced across the four countries, including over 16,000 refugees who fled attacks in northeast Nigeria and recently crossed into Niger’s Diffa region, where UNHCR and partners are helping identify urgent needs, register new arrivals, monitor protection risks and provide life-saving assistance.
Violence is increasingly having cross-border consequences, with attacks in one country rapidly triggering displacement in another. In Cameroon’s Far North, persistent attacks, abductions and village-level violence continue to drive chronic insecurity and new displacement. In Chad’s Lac Province, recurrent attacks and military operations have displaced some 60,000 people; a state of emergency was declared in May following an attack on military installations. Displaced people and returnees are now particularly exposed in areas with limited protection services and few safe options to move.
Civilians are bearing the brunt of the crisis. Recent protection monitoring across affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin shows that one in five households report that they no longer feel safe in their own community, reflecting the extent to which insecurity prevails.
Women and girls face rising risks of violence, while specialized services remain critically under-resourced. The number of people who know survivors of violence has reportedly increased to 27 per cent so far in 2026, from 19 per cent in 2025, indicating a worsening protection environment amid significant underreporting, as survivors rely on strained family and community support networks.
Children are especially exposed. Around half of the children in the most affected areas are out of school, rising to more than 78 per cent in Chad’s Lac Province. Regular protection monitoring shows that one in four people report the presence of separated or unaccompanied children in their communities, rising to one in three in Cameroon’s Far North. Single-parent households, older people and those with disabilities also face heightened risks as repeated displacement erodes already limited support networks.
Local and national authorities across the region continue to play a vital role in keeping asylum space open and supporting communities under pressure. UNHCR is working with them across all four countries to assist people fleeing violence, monitor risks, support new arrivals and ensure families can access documentation, assistance, and, where conditions allow, pathways to return, reintegration and recovery.
However, the response is struggling to keep pace with the scale of the needs. UNHCR and partners urgently need $29 million through December 2026 to sustain operations, maintain critical protection and assistance in high-risk areas, and support government-led regional stabilization efforts.
Without timely and flexible support, protection gaps will widen, displacement will continue to spread across borders, and the risk of a more entrenched regional crisis will increase. The trajectory remains deeply concerning, but it is still reversible with sustained support now.
26The net that has to catch it is thinning---hospitals ceased, no lab, outbreaks unchecked.
OCHA 25 — United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. April 24. The UN body that coordinates humanitarian response, reporting with humanitarian partners in the field. OCHA, “Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) states - Situation Report, 24 April 2025,” https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/nigeria/nigeria-borno-adamawa-and-yobe-bay-states-situation-report-24-april-2025 Clopus
Operations at the Ngala General Hospital, the nutrition stabilisation centre, and three PHCs in Ngala LGA have ceased following the recent exit of FHI 360. Although FHI 360 officially handed over these facilities to the Ngala Local Government Council, service delivery has been halted due to the lack of qualified health personnel to sustain operations. This has created critical gaps in the delivery of essential services, limiting access to vital health and nutrition services for vulnerable conflict-affected people.
In Dikwa, only the General Hospital and one PHC, currently supported by the NHF, remain fully operational. The recent closure of six PHCs managed by INTERSOS has left the remaining PHCs struggling with increased patient numbers, with one reporting a 300 per cent surge in outpatient consultations in February. The most common medical conditions reported are acute respiratory infections, malaria, and acute diarrhoeal diseases. Nutrition services have also been severely impacted by the closure of eight OTP sites previously managed by Mercy Corps and INTERSOS, leading to a 63 per cent increase in SAM cases in February 2025. The NHF-supported stabilisation centre at Dikwa General Hospital admitted 68 children with SAM and medical complications in February. Admissions are expected to increase with the onset of the lean season. Dikwa LGA was severely affected by flooding in 2024, which devastated farmlands and likely worsened food security and nutritional outcomes.
The situation is the same in Yobe State, where the disruptions of humanitarian operations have impacted the delivery of health services for 45,000 people across 13 LGAs. Education services for 15,000 children across eight LGAs, protection services for 20,000 people across 12 LGAs, water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) services for 15,000 people across six LGAs, early recovery, and livelihood services for 35,000 people across six LGAs, food security services for 117,000 people in 14 LGAs, and multi-purpose cash assistance for 6,000 people across six LGAs have similarly been adversely impacted.
OCHA to scale down its presence in Nigeria due to funding cuts
On 10 April, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Tom Fletcher, announced that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) will draw down its presence in Nigeria due to funding cuts. OCHA will transition from a country office to a humanitarian advisory team (HAT) by the beginning of 2026.
Multiple disease outbreaks deepen humanitarian crisis in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe The humanitarian crisis in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe continues to deteriorate, as they grapple with multiple disease outbreaks posing severe public health challenges. In Adamawa State, the outbreak of five diseases, including cholera, measles, cerebrospinal meningitis (CSM), diphtheria, and pertussis, is exacerbating the humanitarian situation. By the end of March, 55 cholera cases and three deaths had been reported, with the highest numbers reported in Jada LGAs. Measles has affected 275 people, leading to eight deaths across 18 LGAs. Cerebrospinal meningitis (CSM) has impacted 74 people, causing 18 deaths across eight LGAs.
With four disease outbreaks reported, Yobe State is also facing significant health challenges. A suspected measles outbreak affected 634 people across 17 LGAs between January and March 2025. By the end of March, 105 cases were confirmed, with Damaturu reporting the highest number of cases. Alarmingly, 65 per cent of the cases are children aged nine months to five years. Only 22 per cent had received at least one dose of the measles-containing vaccine (MCV). Additionally, a resurgence of vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (VDPV2) has been reported in the State. Additionally, a diphtheria outbreak has affected 248 people, leading to nine deaths across 15 LGAs, with Bade and Nguru LGAs reporting the highest numbers of cases, mostly among unvaccinated people. Furthermore, CSM has affected 102 people, causing 13 deaths across eight LGAs.
Borno State is also facing considerable health challenges. By the end of March, CSM had affected 91 people, resulting in 11 deaths. A total of 170 Diphtheria cases with 2 fatalities were recorded. The State is also experiencing a measles outbreak that has affected 402 people, causing 9 deaths. Moreover, 136 suspected cases of acute flaccid paralysis were reported with no deaths.
On 12 March, the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) warned of an imminent meningitis outbreak across Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, and other northern states of Nigeria due to the current heatwave. The agency warned that meningitis, an inflammation of the protective membranes covering the brain and spinal cord, poses a significant health threat, particularly in north-east Nigeria. This area is part of the "meningitis belt,” across sub-Saharan Africa, and is prone to frequent outbreaks.
The humanitarian response in these states has been severely hampered by funding cuts, inadequate logistics, and limited infection control measures. Health partners and Government officials are actively engaging communities, conducting case searches and investigations, orienting healthcare workers, decontaminating affected areas, collecting samples, and supplying necessary medicines and vaccines to contain the spread of these diseases. However, the lack of a molecular laboratory, limited mapping and testing of water points, insufficient case search, and a high percentage of unvaccinated children due to low immunization compliance and difficult access to health services due to insecurity have exacerbated the spread of diseases.
27Surveillance can't function there---facilities destroyed, populations unreachable, polio circulated undetected for years.
Wiesen 22 — Eric Wiesen, Raymond Dankoli, Melton Musa, et. al. May 7. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta. World Health Organization, Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria. National Stop Transmission of Polio, Abuja, Nigeria. Conflict and Health, “Conducting public health surveillance in areas of armed conflict and restricted population access: a qualitative case study of polio surveillance in conflict-affected areas of Borno State, Nigeria,” vol. 16 Clopus
Sensitive poliovirus surveillance is a key component of the effort to eradicate polio because it allows the program to rapidly detect and respond to any cases of polio to stop the transmission [ 4 ]. The poliovirus surveillance system is centered primarily on active surveillance for any case of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) in children with laboratory testing of fecal specimens for poliovirus. Conducting this surveillance well requires a comprehensive network of district surveillance officers and health facility surveillance focal persons to quickly detect, report, and investigate AFP cases as they occur [ 4 ]. This network requires participation by public and private health care providers and is often augmented with support from partners such as the World Health Organization (WHO). There are a set of performance indicators that track the functioning and sensitivity of typical AFP surveillance systems. However, in areas of armed conflict these surveillance systems are challenged.
Challenges in surveillance in armed conflicts
The ability to conduct sensitive surveillance is substantially curtailed in situations of insecurity and inaccessibility due to armed conflict [ 5 ]. Without full access to the population for vaccination and surveillance, poliovirus can circulate undetected. For example, an outbreak of polio in South Sudan was detected in 2008, which, based on poliovirus genomic sequencing analysis, 1 [ 7 ], represented three years of undetected transmission due to ongoing conflict in that country [ 8 ]. Disruptions to both vaccination and surveillance have led to polio outbreaks and delayed detection in Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well [ 9 ].
Context in Borno State, Nigeria
This complex problem, which can have far-reaching implications, is exemplified in the northern Nigeria State of Borno where wild poliovirus (WPV) was detected in 2016 and linked to transmission of lineages last detected in 2011, representing five years of undetected transmission due to the ongoing conflict in the state [ 10 ]. For over a decade Northeast Nigeria, and particularly Borno state, has been plagued by ongoing attacks by Boko Haram and offshoot terrorist groups [ 11 ]. These armed groups are responsible for mass killings, hostage takings, and destruction of houses and infrastructure including health facilities. During 2014–2016, Boko Haram gained control of progressively more territory in the state. Approximately 2.2 million people fled their homes due to the terrorist activities and millions more are in need of humanitarian assistance [ 12 ]. A large, number of people remained trapped in inaccessible areas of Borno State that the polio program could not access to conduct disease surveillance or vaccination [ 13 ]. Because of this situation, the polio program in Nigeria could not rule out the possibility of continued polio transmission in the state.
28The pathogens here are the dangerous ones---detection is slow and it spreads unchecked.
Eneh 25 — Stanley Chinedu Eneh, Chidera Gabriel Obi, et. al. July 16. Department of Community Health, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. IVAN Research Institute, University of Nigeria, Enugu. Frontiers in Public Health, “The resurgence of Lassa fever in Nigeria: economic impact, challenges, and strategic public health interventions,” vol. 13 Clopus
Socioeconomic and Behavioral factors play substantial roles in the spread of Lassa fever. Widespread poverty and substandard housing is an ideal environment for rodent infestations, thereby increasing the risk of disease transmission. In rural areas, traditional food storage methods often create a passage for rodents to access food supplies, facilitating the spread of the disease ( 32 ). On the other hand, urbanization has led to overcrowding, poor sanitation, and inadequate waste management, which further exacerbate the risk of outbreaks ( 32 ). Other cultural practices, such as bushmeat consumption, also contribute to the transmission of zoonotic diseases like Lassa fever. These interconnected factors underscore the need for a multifaceted approach to address the root causes of Lassa fever outbreaks in Nigeria.
Healthcare system challenges
Nigeria’s healthcare system faces significant challenges due to resource constraints, which have hindered efforts to control Lassa fever outbreaks. Limited funding severely impacts disease surveillance, delaying response times and allowing the virus to spread unchecked ( 33 , 34 ). Diagnostic limitations, including a shortage of diagnostic facilities, hinder timely case confirmation, while the high cost of treatment, with ribavirin courses costing between $500 and $800, restricts access to care, particularly affecting low-income households. Inadequate training for healthcare workers on case management and infection prevention and control strategies further complicates the situation, leading to increased transmission within healthcare settings ( 35 ). Furthermore, weak political commitment, particularly at the sub-national level, impedes sustained investments in epidemic preparedness and undermines the implementation of national strategies at the local level. Budget allocations for Lassa fever control often depend on external donor funding and emergency responses rather than proactive planning. Coordination across different tiers of government remains fragmented, and workforce attrition due to brain drain and poor working conditions further compounds the healthcare system’s limited capacity ( 36 ).
Gaps and challenges in disease control in Nigeria
Eradication of Lassa fever has faced various challenges and gaps in Nigeria. These have led to increased endemicity and have imposed a substantial burden on the public health system. One of such challenges is the underfunding of the health systems. Health system strengthening is often overlooked ahead of other sectors, which has led to the underdevelopment of disease surveillance and health systems. This has prompted most funding efforts toward epidemics to come from International Health Organizations ( 37 ). In the long term, this widens the control of epidemics as it makes the country become reactive rather proactive.
Lassa fever is more prevalent in rural areas; yet Nigeria’s healthcare delivery system is weakest in these areas ( 37 ). Rural communities are associated with poorer health outcomes, higher mortality rates, and lower life expectancy due to inadequate access to healthcare services ( 38 ). This increases the impact of the disease in these areas as they are characterized by poor access roads and unreliable internet connections. These lead also to limited access to health support and transmission of critical data. These deficiencies consequently lead to increased health and economic burden.
Another area of challenge is the misinformation and stigmatization that arises during the control of Lassa fever. Studies have shown that survivors of Lassa fever often face stigmatization ( 39 , 40 ) which can discourage others from getting medical help when symptoms arise. This action can often result in delayed detection, diagnosis and treatment of Lassa fever. Moreso, as often seen in epidemics, there can be various misconceptions toward the disease such as modes of transmission and lack of trust in medical interventions contributing to the spread of the disease ( 1 ). These misconceptions can lead to a lack of follow up or utilisation of preventive measures for the disease among affected individuals. These persistent challenges highlight the need for effective strategies and approaches that can strengthen Nigeria’s response to Lassa fever. Lessons drawn from neighboring countries that have faced similar epidemics could offer valuable insights for bridging these gaps.