29What Nigeria misses, the world gets---it circulated cryptically for a decade and multi-country outbreaks follow.
Parker 25 — Edyth Parker, Ifeanyi F. Omah, Delia Doreen Djuicy, et. al. May 19. African Center of Excellence for Genomics of Infectious Diseases, Redeemer’s University, Ede, Nigeria. Department of Immunology and Microbiology, The Scripps Research Institute. Institute of Ecology and Evolution, University of Edinburgh. Nature, “Genomics reveals zoonotic and sustained human mpox spread in West Africa,” vol. 643 Clopus
The ongoing zoonotic transmission in the forested border regions of Nigeria and Cameroon identified in this study underscores the continuous risk of MPXV emergence and/or re-emergence. Furthermore, this risk is likely to remain markedly underestimated owing to under-ascertainment of the number of cases and sparse genomic data. Concurrently, consensus evidence now strongly supports that MPXV clade IIb is no longer a solely zoonotic disease, but is sustained in a human subpopulation in Nigeria, where it has been circulating cryptically for nearly a decade. The drivers behind this emergence in humans remain uncertain, however. It is unclear why the initial zoonotic transmission event did not simply result in a self-limiting case or transmission chain as for all previous zoonotic infections. It is most likely that the zoonotic transmission occurred in a more interconnected, mobile subpopulation with greater connectivity to densely populated urban areas and more probable onward transmission driven by behavioural or demographic factors, as observed in the multi-country B.1 outbreak and the recent outbreak in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 11 , 29 .
In this study, all of our Cameroonian sequences were sampled from individuals living in rural areas in the Southwest and Northwest regions, whereas our four zoonotic sequences from Nigeria were sampled in the southern states of Akwa Ibom and Abia. The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon are dominated by the Cameroonian Highlands and Lower Guinean forest ecosystems, which extend into southern Nigeria 15 . These cross-border forest ecosystems are areas of high biodiversity and host a wide range of hosts that are potentially susceptible to MPXV 5 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 . In these regions, agricultural activities, subsistence hunting, the consumption and trade of wild game, and human settlements and movement in forested areas owing to internal displacement associated with conflict heighten exposure at the human–animal interface 2 , 4 . Our findings indicate that the cross-border forest ecosystems are likely to host the shared reservoir that drives viral dispersal between the countries. It is also likely that the extant clade IIb originated in this region. In light of this, improved surveillance in the wildlife population in the forest systems is needed to better understand the transmission and maintenance of MPXV in animal hosts. Additional sampling is likely to reveal substantial unsampled viral diversity in the reservoir, as observed in the deep divergences just in the sampled tree. It is also likely that enhanced surveillance in the human population in border-adjacent communities at the animal–human interface will reveal more zoonotic transmission events. Our results should therefore be interpreted within the limits of our sample, which represents only 4.2% and 7.5% of all suspected mpox cases in Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively.
Our study provides critical insights to facilitate strategic public health interventions in the human epidemic in West Africa. Across our phylogeographic reconstructions, we found that Rivers State and other South South states in Nigeria served as early, dominant and persistent sources of viral export. Interventions should accordingly be targeted to these regions. Notably, we found evidence of prolonged cryptic circulation and geographic expansion before detection in these regions, emphasizing the need for enhanced surveillance and improved diagnostic and surveillance infrastructure. Enhanced surveillance of cases is needed to characterize the underlying transmission network and associated risk factors, allowing targeted interventions before the epidemic becomes more generalized.
However, controlling ongoing mpox epidemics in Africa is impeded by inequities of access to resources such as diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics 30 , 31 . Without access to therapeutics and vaccines, transmission cannot be reduced in either the sustained human epidemic or in populations at high risk for recurrent spillovers from the reservoir. Ongoing zoonotic and human transmission in Africa not only increases the probability of re-emergence and future multi-country outbreaks but, crucially, also results in preventable morbidity and mortality in endemic countries. The global community can no longer afford to neglect mpox in Africa or perpetuate inequities in therapeutic access in our vulnerably connected world.
30The catastrophic one is the one nobody's watching---it outruns every government's capacity.
Adalja 19 — Amesh A. Adalja, Matthew Watson, Eric S. Toner, et. al. August 30. Researchers at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security in Baltimore, writing with the director of the Center, Thomas V. Inglesby. Current Topics in Microbiology and Immunology, “Characteristics of Microbes Most Likely to Cause Pandemics and Global Catastrophes,” vol. 424 Clopus
The recent global experience with severe infectious disease epidemics has triggered much interest in understanding the broader pandemic threat landscape. A substantial proportion of pandemic and biological threat preparedness activities have focused on list-based approaches that were in part based on pandemic influenzas of the past, historical biological weapon development programs, or recent outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases (e.g., SARS, MERS, Ebola) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017 ; Casadevall and Relman 2010 ). But such an approach inherently fails to account for agents not currently known or those without historical precedent. For that reason, preparedness activities that are limited to these approaches may hamper preparedness and lessen resilience.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the characteristics of pathogens that could be capable of causing a global catastrophic biological risk (GCBR). These would be events in which biological agents—whether naturally emerging or reemerging, deliberately created and released, or laboratory engineered and escaped—could lead to sudden, extraordinary, widespread disaster beyond the collective capability of national and international governments and the private sector to control. If unchecked, GCBRs would lead to great suffering, loss of life, and sustained damage to national governments, international relationships, economies, societal stability, or global security (Schoch-Spana et al. 2017 ).
Given the severe potential public health consequences of pandemic events, there needs to be a vital interest in developing and maintaining a flexible, rapid, and robust response capability. Anticipating the forms of microbial threats that might cause future pandemics can help strengthen preparedness and response capacities. This paper proposes a framework for considering future pandemic threats and provides recommendations for how this framework should inform pandemic preparedness.
31That's a global catastrophic biological risk---it permanently alters civilization's trajectory and threatens survival.
Yassif 17 — Jaime Yassif. August 1. Program Officer for Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness at the Open Philanthropy Project, Ph.D. Health Security, “Reducing Global Catastrophic Biological Risks,” vol. 15, no. 4 Clopus
In establishing GCRs as one of our program areas and biosecurity and pandemic preparedness as one of our specific focuses, the Open Philanthropy Project systematically assessed a wide range of potential GCR sources—including climate change, nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, asteroids, and volcanos. 1 We came to the conclusion that pandemics are among the most important, tractable, and neglected potential causes of such a catastrophic event. †
By our working definition, a GCR is something that could permanently alter the trajectory of human civilization in a way that would undermine its long-term potential or, in the most extreme case, threaten its survival. This prompts the question: How severe would a pandemic need to be to create such a catastrophic outcome? Some of my colleagues have suggested that an event on the order of at least 100 million fatalities, and probably much higher, would be necessary. This argument is informed in part by the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which caused an estimated 50-100 million fatalities. While it had a devastating impact in terms of loss of life, the pandemic did not appear to alter the long-term trajectory of human civilization. This suggests that a more severe pandemic may be necessary to destabilize civilization over longer time scales. 2
However, these types of estimates are highly uncertain, and they raise challenging questions about the relationship between fatality levels and the resulting second-, third- and higher-order effects that could undermine systems that are necessary to support civilization. For example, we think it is likely that once fatalities got to a certain level, we could expect to see a variety of knock-on effects, including collapsing financial systems, collapsing healthcare systems, disrupted global supply chains, food and water shortages, power disruptions, or military conflict. How would these cascading system failures play out, and how would they influence the severity of pandemic outcomes? In addition to these considerations, as the Center for Health Security essay astutely points out, a high-fatality event may not be necessary to cause a GCBR. Alternative pathways, such as an organism or molecule that causes widespread negative effects on fertility, could also plausibly lead to such an outcome.
Another important open question is: What is the most likely source of a GCBR? Our intuition is that, in the longer term, engineered pathogens—dispersed through a deliberate attack or accidental release—pose the greatest potential risk for this type of event. However, we don't have enough evidence to dismiss the possibility of a GCBR from a natural outbreak. If we saw convincing evidence that countered our intuition, it could lead us to change our working assumptions on this point.
32It's executive discretion---sales get cancelled or suspended before delivery and licenses revoked without notice.
CRS 24 — Congressional Research Service. May 14. The nonpartisan research agency of the US Congress. Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Review of an Arms Sale to Israel: Issues for Congress,” https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12359.html Clopus
The President has a number of mechanisms to alter or end the sales of U.S.-origin defense articles. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 establish the statutory foundations governing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to foreign governments. The AECA prohibits the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles if the President finds that a recipient country has used such articles for unauthorized purposes. The AECA also stipulates that such countries would, absent a presidential waiver, be ineligible for future U.S. sales of defense articles until the President determines the violation has ceased and recipients assure violations will not recur. The law does not provide for such a waiver if Congress has adopted a joint resolution, which would be subject to presidential veto.
The executive branch also has wide-ranging authority to cancel an FMS transaction prior to the articles' delivery. The standard Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) terms and conditions permit the U.S. government, under "unusual and compelling circumstances, when the national interest of the U.S. requires," to "cancel or suspend all or part" of such a letter "at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles."
The U.S. government similarly has extensive authority to cancel or modify export licenses for U.S.-origin defense articles. Section 126.7 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) states that such licenses "may be revoked, suspended, or amended without prior notice whenever" the State Department "believes that" the recipient has violated "the terms of any U.S. Government export authorization." The Department may also take these actions if it deems them to be "in furtherance of world peace, the national security or the foreign policy of the United States, or is otherwise advisable."
In 2021, the Biden Administration paused certain weapons sales and transfers to Saudi Arabia, reportedly including transfers of air-to-ground munitions, based on concerns about the effect of Saudi military operations in Yemen on civilians and U.S. national security interests.
33Nothing else binds---the notification is silent and reform is absent.
HRW 25 — Human Rights Watch. August 19. International nongovernmental organization that investigates and reports on human rights abuses in roughly 100 countries. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
Security concerns across Nigeria are real and widespread. In the Northwest, violent raids, killings, and kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs continue to destabilize communities. In the Northeast, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram and its splinter factions continue their brutal insurgency against the government while terrorizing civilians and committing abuses. In the Southeast, separatist armed groups routinely terrorize and attack communities and kill residents.
However, in responding to these threats, Nigerian security forces have been repeatedly implicated in serious rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and conflict-related abuses. The US State Department documented many of these abuses in its own 2024 Human Rights Report on Nigeria , released just last week. Military airstrikes have also repeatedly resulted in the deaths of people mistakenly identified as threats, without accountability. Despite ongoing calls for justice, meaningful reform remains absent.
341. The pipeline runs through the army---sales come out of military stockpiles.
Adetayo 25 — Ope Adetayo. May 30. Reuters correspondent in Abuja covering Nigerian security and conflict. Reuters, “Nigeria detains soldiers, police over weapons sales to armed groups,” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-detains-soldiers-police-over-weapons-sales-armed-groups-2025-05-30/ Clopus
ABUJA (Reuters) -The Nigerian military has detained over two dozen soldiers and members of the police force over sales of weapons from military stockpiles to armed groups, including Islamist insurgents, a spokesperson said.
Africa's most populous country and biggest energy producer, Nigeria is battling insecurity on many fronts, including a long-running insurgency in the northeast and armed kidnapping gangs in the northwest.
Captain Reuben Kovangiya, spokesperson for the military's anti-insurgency operation, said the arrests were part of a crackdown on racketeering involving ammunition.
Local media reported that 18 soldiers, 15 policemen and eight civilians were taken into custody.
"It is part of the counter-arms and ammunition racketeering operation conducted in every theatre of operations," Kovangiya told Reuters. "If any personnel engage in any act that is inimical to the system, they are arrested and tried."
Kovangiya did not elaborate on the types and numbers of weapons sold but said the suspects would be prosecuted.
Nigeria has this year experienced a surge in attacks by militants from Boko Haram and its offshoot, Islamic State West Africa Province, who have overrun some military bases in the northeastern state of Borno.
In the course of most of the raids, militants have seized weapons from army bases.
352. Serving soldiers say commanders run it, and the trade is ongoing.
Punch 25 — Our Reporters. October 4. Punch, Nigeria’s largest-circulation daily, reporting four separate on-the-record interviews with serving soldiers. Punch Newspapers, “How Nigerian soldiers sell weapons to bandits and terrorists,” https://punchng.com/how-rogue-soldiers-divert-weapons-to-bandits-sources/ Clopus
Speaking in separate interviews with Sunday PUNCH, four serving soldiers from different commands confirmed that the illegal acts were ongoing and gave different reasons why it had become rampant.
A soldier serving in Borno State, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, told our correspondent that senior military officers and commanders were complicit in the illegal arms deals.
The Private said the practice was well-known within the force.
“It is not a new thing,” he said. “But one thing is certain, the majority who engage in arms dealing are soldiers and commanders.”
He added that the development had sparked resentment among troops on the ground.
“The majority hate the soldiers and commanders involved in those arms dealings. But those things are happening. They are going on right now as we speak,” he said.
In an interview with Sunday PUNCH, another serving soldier alleged that some troops sell weapons and ammunition to terrorists, blaming the criminal act on harsh living conditions in the military.
363. Battlefield capture is the main channel---and the state cannot track what it hands out.
Berman 24 — Eric G. Berman. October. Founding Director of the Safeguarding Security Sector Stockpiles Initiative and former Managing Director of the Small Arms Survey; field research in Maiduguri. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Exploring the Acquisition and Management of Arms among Volunteer Security Outfits in Nigeria’s Borno State,” https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-acquisition-and-management-of-arms-among-volunteer-security-outfits-in-nigerias-borno-state/ Clopus
The BSSTF keeps records of the serial numbers of the shotguns it has purchased and of the Divisional Police Office to which each of those firearms has been allocated. Craft-produced Dane guns do not have serial numbers or other conventional markings. It is then up to the DPO to determine how firearms are to be distributed among VSOs and subsequently accounted for. 145 Research for this report was unable to gather reliable information on such practices.
Several VSOs report that they keep logbooks of some of the firearms that they dispense to their members. Kesh Kesh, for example, has a ledger for the shotguns it has issued to its vigilantes. 146 The VGN similarly keeps a written account of firearms it allocates to its members. 147 It provides the weapons it receives from the BSSTF via DPOs to its members on a case-by-case basis as needs arise. It reports that all such firearms are accounted for. 148 As BoSHA disburses firearms from its armouries it records the recipient’s name, telephone number, address and next of kin, as well as the weapon’s make, model and serial number. The amount of ammunition issued to the hunter in question is also noted. 149
143 Author interview with knowledgeable source, Maiduguri, March 2024. 144 Author interviews with knowledgeable sources, Maiduguri, January 2024 and March 2024. Moreover, VSO members have also received instruction on protection of civilians. Ibid. 145 Author Interview with knowledgeable source, Maiduguri, March 2024. 146 Interview by Mohammed Aliyu-Sarki of Commander Bulama Harun Biya, Commandant, Borno State Chapter, Kesh Vigilante Group, Bama, 28 March 2024. 147 Author interview with Commander Mohammad Tar, Commandant, Borno State Chapter, VGN, Maiduguri, 22 March 2024. 148 Ibid. 149 Author interview with Commander Bakar Mustapha Bunu, State Secretary, BoSHA, NHFSS, 27 March 2024, Maiduguri.
ARMS MANAGEMENT AMONG BORNO’S FOUR VOLUNTEER SECURITY OUTFITS
Under Nigerian law, only the police are authorized to issue licences for civilian possession of a limited range of firearms (see subsection 3.1 above). Dane guns are exempt from this check. However, the police in Borno have, apparently, not issued firearms possession licences since at least 2019. BSSTF-procured firearms that VSOs have received apparently do not necessitate a corresponding 151 licence. This does not inherently mean that the DPO responsible for overseeing the distribution and security of these firearms is not aware of how these weapons are being used, and by whom. It is not clear how the Borno state authorities consider the distribution of firearms to VSOs in connection with the civilian licensing provisions of the 1959 Firearms Act.
The Nigerian army reportedly keeps a record of the arms and ammunition provided to VSOs, which 152 have primarily been recovered from enemy forces. It is not known if this oversight measure consists solely of the numbers and/or types of weapons provided and that of the corresponding ammunition, or if it includes serial numbers and headstamps. In 2022, a United Nations study reported that “security agencies in [Nigeria] seize weapons and ammunition; however, the lack of any clear and coherent national procedures and verification processes results in materiel unaccounted for and heightened 153 risks of further diversions”.
This subsection provides a limited number of examples of weapons and ammunition management measures used by the Nigerian state authorities and VSOs for safeguarding their conventional arms and ammunition to prevent diversion. Since 2012, VSOs are likely to have experienced more than 10,000 casualties – with the number having risen sharply since 2023. The vast majority of these casualties are the result of confrontations with Boko Haram. The CJTF alone, for example, has suffered 154 more than 3,500 fatalities – more than half over just the past 16 months. Thus, available evidence indicates that the majority of VSO firearms diversion incidents are the result of VSO battlefield casualties and capture, rather than from inadequate WAM practices for VSO storage facilities.
37Pay and access make it structural---and the guns started as government property.
Punch 25 — Our Reporters. October 4. Punch, Nigeria’s largest-circulation daily, reporting four separate on-the-record interviews with serving soldiers and remarks by National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu. Punch Newspapers, “How Nigerian soldiers sell weapons to bandits and terrorists,” https://punchng.com/how-rogue-soldiers-divert-weapons-to-bandits-sources/ Clopus
Speaking on condition of anonymity, the soldier said low salaries often pushed personnel into illegal deals.
“Soldiers at the war front are hungry, and many of them only depend on their salary, which is not adequate. It is very difficult to survive on your salary when you are fighting for your country, and the living conditions are pathetic,” he said.
He described the illegal trade as “highly lucrative”, noting that desperation made it easy for personnel to convince themselves to participate.
The soldier identified three major sources of fast money within the military as illegal arms sales, drug smuggling, and oil bunkering.
He warned, however, that those who ventured into the business found it hard to stop.
According to him, soldiers deployed in conflict zones have easier access to excess rounds of ammunition, which creates opportunities for diversion.
“Those who indulge in the illegal sale of ammunition are those who have made up their minds to leave the army, and they always devise the means to carry out their deals.
“Especially those who are in operational grounds like Katsina and Maiduguri; those that are in operation like that are not assigned limited numbers of rounds. That is where the opportunity to engage in illegal sale of rounds is. Those ones don’t return unexpended rounds,” he revealed.
He also criticised military remuneration, saying it fuels corruption.
“In the military, even paramilitary, the salary is a scam; it is not enough to survive. That is why many of those who are in business with terrorists do not mind the danger in it,” he said.
Sharing a personal experience, another soldier also confirmed the existence of such shady deals but declined to provide further details.
He told Sunday PUNCH that although names of offenders were often circulated in military group chats, such arrests had become rare in recent times.
The soldier disclosed that he once returned from Maiduguri, Borno State, with unexpended rounds but chose to bury them rather than risk being caught with the ammunition.
An army officer also said he witnessed the arrest of some soldiers who attempted supplying arms to Boko Haram insurgents in Maiduguri.
He noted that the incident happened before his redeployment to the 8 Division, Sokoto.
In October last year, during the destruction of arms by the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Abuja, the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, blamed the proliferation of weapons in Nigeria on corrupt dealings within the security agencies.
Visibly enraged by the trend, Ribadu rained curses on security personnel who facilitated the movement of arms to terrorists, bandits, and other non-state actors.
According to him, a sizeable number of the illicit arms used to commit crimes in the country originally belonged to the government but ended up in the wrong hands because of compromised officials.
The NSA warned that the threat was not only internal but also fuelled by “merchants of death and evil from outside the world.”
38ISWAP overran the bases and took the kit---the arms flow is documented.
Soufan 25 — The Soufan Center. May 21. Nonprofit global security research center founded by former FBI supervisory special agent Ali Soufan. The Soufan Center, “The Islamic State West Africa Province’s Tactical Evolution Fuels Worsening Conflict in Nigeria’s Northeast,” https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-may-21/ Clopus
Security in northeastern Nigeria is deteriorating rapidly amid a surge in violent, coordinated attacks by jihadist factions - primarily the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) – a splinter group of Boko Haram formed in 2015. ISWAP has intensified operations since January 2025, with an escalation of attacks on military targets in recent weeks. This offensive has exposed both the inherent failures and the broader collapse of Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy, while underscoring ISWAP's tactical adaptability. This escalation unfolds alongside other security challenges, including Fulani herder-farmer violence and activity by non-state actors such as bandits and vigilante groups , who exploit weaknesses in the state apparatus.
ISWAP has demonstrated an evolution in its tactics, as seen in a series of complex assaults in May 2025. Most recently, on May 16, insurgents attacked a military base in Wulgo near the Cameroonian border, resulting in casualties among both Nigerian and Cameroonian forces. Just two days later, the group attacked another base in the neighboring state of Yobe. ISWAP has found repeated success in attacking supercamps through a combination of nighttime raids, targeted isolation of bases by detonating surrounding roads and bridges, and the accumulation of a growing stockpile of looted weapons to facilitate future incursions. These supercamps have been at the core of the military’s counterinsurgency strategy since 2019, during a peak in the operations of Boko Haram and ISWAP but have now become strategic liabilities. Initially implemented to consolidate personnel and equipment into secure hubs in population centers, the strategy has left rural and less densely populated areas vulnerable – some of which are now controlled or contested by ISWAP. Many of these installations are underfunded and poorly fortified due to corruption and mismanagement, leaving them exposed to attacks and looting.
On May 11, the group overran the 50 Task Force Battalion in New Marte, in Borno State, stealing ammunition and at least 45 vehicles, abducting soldiers, and destroying key military assets. Between May 12 and 13, ISWAP launched a wave of near-simultaneous assaults across Borno, attacking bases in New Marte, Dikwa, and Rann, and road infrastructure like the Damboa-Maiduguri corridor. This string of violence caused thousands to flee. Moreover, disruption of this key supply route could facilitate ISWAP’s efforts to assert dominance over southern Borno.
This week, Borno State Governor Babagana Zulum warned of renewed escalation by ISWAP, highlighting the group's “total control” over several local government areas (LGAs) – including Marte, which houses over 300 towns and villages – following destructive assaults on Nigerian army bases in the northeastern state of Borno and neighboring Yobe state. ISWAP’s territorial consolidation remains strongest in Borno as well as areas surrounding the town of Damboa. Additional strongholds include the Lake Chad basin, Alagarno, and Sambisa forests. The implementation of forced taxes as well as jizya – a compulsory tax for non-Muslims – ultimately sustains insurgency efforts, as further landgrabs propel fundraising efforts.
On April 30, ISWAP attempted to isolate the strategically significant town of Damboa by detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on bridges along the Biu–Damboa road, cutting off reinforcements and constraining the military’s response. These attacks reflect a sophisticated strategy of infrastructure sabotage and base encirclement, aimed at weakening the military’s logistical resilience and the additional symbolic victory of acquiring a town that hosts a strong military presence, due to its position as a key humanitarian distribution hub for IDPs fleeing from jihadist violence.
Since March 2025, ISWAP has carried out at least twelve targeted attacks on military outposts, reflecting a resumption of the group’s 2018-2019 operational tempo. During this period, it temporarily seized the town of Baga, home to the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF is a regional military coalition formed to combat insurgencies in the Lake Chad region , comprised of military personnel from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin. Recent attacks suggest a shift to proactive confrontation, with equipment losses valued in billions of naira, raising concerns over the military’s already weak capacity to sustain a counteroffensive.
Following the assault on the New Marte military base, on May 19 ISWAP released a 15-minute long, high-quality propaganda video titled “Fight Them, Allah Will Punish Them By Your Hands.” This is significant because the group has not released video propaganda in several years. The video showcases executions, footage of IEDs targeting army patrols, and stolen weapons from the New Marte assault, as well as disparaging scenes of the Nigerian military’s retreat. The sophistication of the media reflects the communication mode of IS core and suggests a concerted effort to appeal to local populations and boost recruitment, with the use of Hausa subtitles. Analysts suggest that IS advisers may have been deployed to assist ISWAP fighters on the ground, claims supported by the group’s evolution in battlefield strategy and renewed media output.
In addition, ISWAP has leveraged explosive-rigged off-the-shelf commercial drones with increasing frequency. Initially used for reconnaissance and propaganda dissemination, drones have since been rigged to drop explosives – a trend that has been observed since late 2024 across West Africa more broadly. The growing use of kinetic drone technology points to external support and increased funding, likely from Islamic State’s central leadership . The transition to this method of warfare, as well as possibly increased support from the core, has proven to be a decisive factor in the group’s recent wave of tactical successes.
39The state hands out the weapons and can’t see them again.
Berman 24 — Eric G. Berman. October. Director of the Safeguarding Security Sector Initiative, former Managing Director of the Small Arms Survey and visiting scholar at Northwestern; field research in Maiduguri. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, “Exploring the Acquisition and Management of Arms among Volunteer Security Outfits in Nigeria’s Borno State,” https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-acquisition-and-management-of-arms-among-volunteer-security-outfits-in-nigerias-borno-state/ Clopus
- These VSOs acquire their firearms from two principal sources: local gunsmiths and state authorities. The rule that materiel recovered from battlefield capture is to be turned over to government security forces seems to be largely respected. Federal and State governmental authorities are likely to have furnished these VSOs with more than 10,000 firearms, many of which are assault rifles the government’s security forces dispense on a temporary basis, and monitor. Assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and gun trucks are sometimes provided to the CJTF for “joint operations” that extend beyond specific time-bound reconnaissance and clearance operations. Most of the arms and ammunition that the government provides to VSOs comes from recovered Boko Haram stocks; ammunition is issued sparingly.
401. The northwest is the air campaign---the bandit theatre is where the bombs fall.
HumAngle 25 — HumAngle Media. Nigerian investigative outlet reporting conflict and humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin and the northwest from the ground. HumAngle, “Nigerian Military Airstrike Kills 20 Civilians, Injures Dozens In Zamfara,” https://humanglemedia.com/nigerian-military-airstrike-kills-20-civilians-injures-dozens-in-zamfara/ Clopus
Less than three weeks after a military airstrike killed ten civilians in the Gidan Bisa and Rumtuwa area of Sokoto in northwestern Nigeria, another tragedy has struck in the region. At least 20 people have been killed and many more injured after a military aircraft targeted Tungar Kara in the Maradun area of Zamfara State.
The airstrike, intended to neutralise terror groups, instead hit civilians, local vigilantes, and members of the state-backed security outfit *Askarawa.* Residents told HumAngle that the victims had mobilised to repel a band of terrorists who were trying to rustle some cattle in the villages when the fighter jet shelled the area.
The terrorists had fled before the airstrike, which mistakenly targeted the locals, misidentifying them as terrorists. “There was an attack on the community, prompting the residents to call for help. The local *Yansakai* [a vigilante group] and community protection guards showed up and were able to chase the terrorists away. It’s on their way back that the jet mistook them as the terrorists,” a source told HumAngle.
At least 19 military airstrikes in the past decade, including the latest in Tungar Kara, have mistakenly hit Nigerian civilians instead of their intended terrorist targets. These errors have claimed over 400 lives, injured hundreds more, and violated humanitarian laws that mandate minimal harm to civilians during conflict.
Analysts have raised concerns about the gap in the military’s air-to-ground integration as one of the reasons the military has repeatedly mistargeted civilians during air raids, limiting the ability to access real-time intelligence on targets. Effective air-to-ground integration typically relies on real-time intelligence sharing between ground forces and military aircraft. However, Nigeria’s military often conducts airstrikes spontaneously, without sufficient collaboration with local intelligence gatherers or ground troops. This lack of coordination continues to fuel deadly mistakes.
Unfortunately, the military hardly acknowledges these mistakes or provides information to support victims, including measures to mitigate future mishaps.
Human rights organisations and security analysts warn that the recurring airstrikes on civilian settlements have profound and far-reaching consequences for counterterrorism efforts in the region. “Launching air raids is not a legitimate law enforcement method by anyone’s standard. Such reckless use of deadly force is unlawful, outrageous and lays bare the Nigerian military’s shocking disregard for the lives of those it supposedly exists to protect,” Amnesty International said in a statement.
The northwestern region has been a stronghold for terror groups for over a decade now. These terrorists have relentlessly attacked and raided rural villages across the region, imposing levies on communities, and forcing residents to work on farmlands confiscated. This conflict, which began as a face-off between farmers and herders, among other factors, has claimed more than 20,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes.
412. Banditry becomes jihadism where the state fails---Lakurawa is the proof.
UNIDIR 25 — United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing Exits from Armed Conflict project. March. UN research institute; findings from a survey of 2,236 community members across Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states. UNIDIR, “The Lakurawa: North-West Nigeria’s Newest Threat?,” https://unidir.org/publication/the-lakurawa-north-west-nigerias-newest-threat/ Clopus
A resurgent armed group, the Lakurawa is plaguing the North West of Nigeria, adding to the victimization faced by communities already deeply affected by banditry violence, farmer-herder conflicts and climate change. In its most recent survey in the North West of Nigeria, the Managing Exits from Armed Conflict (MEAC) project was able to gather perspectives from 2,236 community members across Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara states about the Lakurawa. Here is what we know.
Background on the Lakurawa
Little is known about the origins of the cross-border armed group known as the “Lakurawa” (1). Some sources indicate that the group was formed in 2010 by herdsmen from Mali and Niger who settled in Sokoto State, which had long been impacted by instances of banditry and cattle rustling (2). Although difficult to verify and confirm at the time of writing, one well-placed MEAC source traced the origins of the Lakurawa to a group of Malian herdsman who fought alongside the Séléka militia coalition against the Anti-balaka in the Central African Republic around 2012-2013. After eventually returning to Mali, the group clashed with the military, forcing them to relocate to Niger. Following several years of moving in and out of Nigeria’s northwestern region, the group appears to have settled in Nigeria more permanently (3).
Other sources indeed indicate that sometime around 2017, the herdsmen, who initially carried rifles to protect themselves and their cattle, were seasonally hired by local leaders in the North West of Nigeria to combat bandits and provide protection to communities (4). While the Lakurawa was reportedly successful in pushing back various bandit groups, it gradually turned against the communities it was hired to protect. The herdsmen-turned- militiamen established bases in border communities in north-western Sokoto (5), levied taxes against them, and sought to impose their version of Sharia law, harshly punishing those accused of breaking its strict code (6). As a result, the relationship between the group and communities quickly deteriorated and turned violent, and in 2022, the group was dislodged by Nigerian security forces and retreated into Niger (7).
In recent statements, the Nigerian military attributed the Lakurawa’s reemergence in September 2024 to a gap in security coordination between Niger and Nigeria following the suspension of joint border patrols due to the coup in Niger in July 2023 (8). The group now operates primarily in the dense forests of northwestern Sokoto and northern Kebbi states, along the Niger-Nigeria border
(9). Suspected of being affiliated with the Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS), the Lakurawa is estimated to be composed of some 200 fighters and is reportedly well-armed with small arms and light weapons, explosives and drones (10). Nigerian authorities proscribed the Lakurawa as a terrorist organization in January 2025, paving the way for the use of military force against the group (11).
Community perceptions of the Lakurawa: presence and recruitment efforts
While the Lakurawa has only recently started making headlines in international media, MEAC’s survey confirms that the group is relatively well known across the North West: 60 per cent of respondents in Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara interviewed between January and February 2025 indicating having heard of the group (12). In Sokoto State, where the Lakurawa is most active, 64 per cent of those interviewed knew of the Lakurawa (13).
423. Alt causes are linear---and the borderland groups are merging, not separate.
ACLED 25 — Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. March 27. The conflict-event dataset used by the UN, the World Bank and the US government; the report draws on the author’s field research for the Clingendael Institute. ACLED, “New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands,” https://acleddata.com/report/new-frontlines-jihadist-expansion-reshaping-benin-niger-and-nigeria-borderlands Clopus
Between 2023 and 2024, JNIM and ISSP have escalated their operations in the border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria, significantly transforming these areas into a volatile frontline ( see graph below ). This renewed southward expansion through sustained violent campaigns is driven by the persistent pursuit of new manpower and recruitment opportunities as these groups continue to grow and build their insurgent armies, 5 as well as the need for access to resources through smuggling and illicit trade routes essential for their operations. Expansion into these remote and less secure areas further allows both groups to establish new operational bases and expand their logistical networks. This expansion has led to territorial contestation and has profoundly impacted the local communities, who find themselves increasingly caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict.
How JNIM and ISSP expand southward
Violent attacks by JNIM and ISSP have significantly increased in the border areas between the Sahel and the littoral borderlands, each using different tactics. Both groups have expanded out of their traditional areas of operation in the Sahel toward Benin and Nigeria, crossing paths in the southwestern border regions of Niger ( see map below ).
JNIM has used eastern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger as staging grounds to initially expand into Benin in 2021 and in Togo in 2022, and since the beginning of 2024, consolidating its presence in northern Benin and southern Dosso in Niger. In northern Benin and southern Dosso, JNIM has entrenched itself within the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex protected area, including Park W, from where the group has staged its campaign along the Benin-Niger border, which has also facilitated movements toward Nigeria. 6 JNIM has used media and propaganda campaigns to promote its presence, and has claimed several operations in Benin, Niger, and Togo. 7
ISSP, which originates and operates from its strategic bases in northeastern Mali’s Menaka and Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, 8 has instead intensified its activities in northern and central Dosso and introduced tactics of economic warfare, in particular through attacks on the Benin-Niger oil pipeline. ISSP’s strategy initially involved primarily nonviolent activities, including collecting zakat (alms or taxes), clandestinely managing supply lines, and moving forces and reinforcements across Dosso’s hinterland into Nigeria. Several routes across Dosso initially constituted a supply corridor for the group before ISSP developed it into a support zone. In early 2024, it transformed into a combat zone as the group began launching attacks on security forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure.
Certain media narratives have misleadingly attributed the surge in violence along the Niger and Nigeria border to a “new terrorist group” known by the moniker “Lakurawa.” 9 Rather than an altogether new group, these militants are also reported to have long entertained relations with ISSP, exploiting the chronic instability in the central Sahel. 10 In fact, attacks attributed to the so-called Lakurawa are long-established ISSP operations in Niger’s Dosso region and Nigeria’s northwestern states of Sokoto and Kebbi. 11 This mislabeling overlooks how groups like JNIM and ISSP operate and adapt to changing circumstances when they infiltrate, contest, and consolidate territory, and also employ hybrid tactics that mix self-defense, insurgency, and banditry — complexities that oftentimes are poorly understood or described in oversimplified or outdated terms in official accounts and the media.
ISSP has maintained a low profile, operating covertly to infiltrate and entrench itself along the Niger-Nigeria border, and is now also expanding its operations toward the Beninese border. 12 The expansion of JNIM and ISSP follows different geographical trajectories but the two groups’ presence overlap in Niger’s Dosso region, and especially in the communes of Gaya and Dioundiou ( see map below ). JNIM and ISSP’s overlapping presence in the same areas creates a complex and volatile situation due to their different operational and violent tactics and objectives.
For example, JNIM has carried out a series of attacks on military and security force positions, 13 including focusing on embedding itself in communities on both sides of the Benin-Niger border through proselytization, community outreach, and involvement in the local economies and illicit trade. Meanwhile, ISSP has carried out similar attacks by engaging in armed confrontations with the military and security forces. What stands out, however, is its more aggressive approach and use of economic warfare, targeting the oil pipeline, in particular the section between Bela and Lido that passes through the Dioundiou commune. 14 Additionally, in a more recent development, the group also began targeting civilians on a larger scale, including by committing mass atrocities, as happened on 22 February 2025, when likely ISSP fighters attacked several villages around Koutoumbou, in Diondiou commune, on the border with Nigeria.
Both JNIM and ISSP operate in Gaya, creating a competitive dynamic as both groups vie for influence and control over the same geographical area. It cannot be ruled out that in these early stages of infiltration and territorial contestation, the two groups could establish a modus vivendi by coexisting or demarcating their respective areas of operation in the process of destabilizing the territory. Either way, considering the enmity, and the protracted and deadly turf wars between JNIM and ISSP elsewhere in the region, this proximity more likely increases the risk of broader competition and confrontation.