2951. RED LINE. Tinubu cleared the strikes---and still refused anything that touches sovereignty.
Yusuf 25 — Kabir Yusuf. December 26. Reporter for Premium Times, Abuja. Premium Times via allAfrica, “Nigeria: Tinubu Approved U.S. Airstrikes On Terrorists in Sokoto but Gave Conditions - Foreign Minister,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202512270024.html Clopus
The Nigerian government has confirmed that President Bola Tinubu approved US strikes against terrorist camps in the country's North-western region on Thursday.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Tuggar, disclosed this on Friday, hours after the US Department of War and President Donald Trump announced the coordinated military action.
Some observers have raised concerns that the strikes infringe on Nigeria's territorial integrity. However, Mr Tuggar insisted that the federal government would not permit any action that violated the country's sovereignty.
2962. Abuja set the conditions on the joint operation---not Washington.
Yusuf 25 — Kabir Yusuf. December 26. Reporter for Premium Times, Abuja. Premium Times via allAfrica, “Nigeria: Tinubu Approved U.S. Airstrikes On Terrorists in Sokoto but Gave Conditions - Foreign Minister,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202512270024.html Clopus
PREMIUM TIMES had reported the joint US-Nigeria operation against identified terrorist targets in Sokoto State.
The Christmas Day strikes targeted militants linked to the Islamic State (ISIS/ISWAP), accused of violent attacks in the region, including bombings and assaults on civilians.
The attacks were the result of intelligence sharing and strategic coordination between the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Nigerian military.
The Conditions
While casualty figures remain unclear, US officials described the strikes as "precision hits on terrorist targets" aimed at weakening the operational capacity of terrorists and their networks.
"Now that the US is cooperating, we would do it jointly, and we would ensure, just as the president emphasised yesterday before he gave the go-ahead, that it must be made clear that it is a joint operation, and it is not targeting any religion nor simply in the name of one religion or the other," Mr Tuggar said on Channels Television's Sunrise Daily.
"We are a multi-religious country, and we are working with partners like the US to fight terrorism and safeguard the lives and properties of Nigerians," the minister said.
2973. COMMAND. Even under maximum pressure, Abuja kept command authority---conditions hit that wall.
Akintayo 26 — Joshua Akintayo. June. Post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Bayreuth researching the governance and consequences of counter-terrorism. SWP/Megatrends Afrika Policy Brief 50, “Trump in Africa: Nigeria’s Bounded Agency and Structural Dependence Under US Pressure,” https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_50_Jun_2026_Akintayo_Nigeria_s_Bounded_Agency.pdf Clopus
The reasons for Nigeria’s apparent compliance are best understood from the February 2026 deployment of approximately 200 US military personnel to Maiduguri, Kainji and Bauchi.
21 National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), Strategic Plan 2025–2030 (Abuja: NCTC, November 2025). US Department of War, “Readout of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Meeting With Federal Republic of Nigeria National Security Advisor Mr. Mallam Nuhu Ribadu”, press release, November 21, 2025. US Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria, “Joint Statement”.6 State House, Abuja, “Nigeria, United States deepen cooperation on security, counterterrorism as Ribadu meets Vance, Rubio”, May 9, 2026.
That deployment followed a period of intense coercive pressure – that is, it took place at a time when refusal would have come at a very high cost. Nigerian elites were confronted with the possibility of personal sanctions under the Cruz bill; the government faced the pro- spect of aid restrictions, which would have had implications for an economy already bat- tered by high inflation and currency depreciation; and Trump's explicit military threats ren- dered any refusal of American counter-terrorism assistance politically difficult to defend. According to Reuters, the 200 US personnel at Maiduguri, Kainji and Bauchi are intelligence analysts, advisers and trainers assigned to strictly non-combat roles. They operate a newly established US-Nigeria intelligence fusion cell and fly numerous MQ-9 Reaper drones to col- lect intelligence over northern Nigeria. 25 Notwithstanding this significant deployment, which could easily have been interpreted as a Nigerian concession, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters (DHQ) used language affirming that Nigerian forces retained full command authority and would lead all missions on sovereign territory. 26 While these moves are aimed, above all, at protecting Tinubu's domestic political standing – particularly in the north of the country – they nonetheless constitute performances of sovereignty. The biggest operational impact to date of the intelligence fusion cell and the MQ-9 drone operations was on 16 May 2026, when, at Trump's direction and in coordination with the Nigerian government, AFRICOM conducted an assault in the Lake Chad Basin that led to the killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki. 27 On 17 and 18 May AFRICOM carried out follow-up strikes in the Metele area of Borno State in which around 100 Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists were killed. 28 The US and Nigerian governments’ respective framing of these attacks is analytically important and speaks volumes about the evolution of their partnership since the CPC redesignation. For his part, Trump declared that the operation had eliminated the “most active terrorist in the world” and praised Nigeria for the part it had played, while Tinubu thanked Trump “for his leadership and unwavering support” and said Nigeria was looking forward to “more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation”. 29 Just six months after Trump had threatened to bomb Nigeria for persecuting Christians, the two presidents were jointly celebrating the killing of an ISIL commander on Nigerian soil and giving each other the credit in public. A broader qualification applies to military and security assistance. It is true that in recent years, Nigeria received 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and USD 38 million in infrastructure improvements at the Kainji Air Base. 30 But while it has made efforts to reduce dependence on the US by acquiring Turkish Bayraktar drones, 31 Washington largely remains its partner of choice for military hardware and intelligence partnerships.
2981. LEAHY. Vetting doesn’t reach a sale the buyer pays for---the statute is about appropriations.
CRS 25 — Congressional Research Service. July 23. Nonpartisan legislative research agency serving Congress. CRS In Focus IF11197, “U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11197 Clopus
Pursuant to Sections 38(g)(7) and 40A(a) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(7) and 2785(a)), and Section 505(a)(3) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2314(a)(3)), U.S. origin defense articles sold via FMS and DCS are subject to end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients use such items solely for their intended purposes. DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages the department's Golden Sentry EUM program for defense articles sold via FMS. The State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls coordinates the Blue Lantern program, which performs an analogous function for items sold via DCS.
Can arms embargoes be applied on the basis of human rights concerns?
The United States can impose an arms embargo on a foreign government based on human rights considerations. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations reflect the executive branch's implementation of statutory provisions related to the export of defense articles, including those related to arms embargoes. In addition, the U.N. Security Council may apply an arms embargo against a country for human rights reasons; Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) authorizes the President to implement such sanctions.
Do the Leahy Laws apply to arms sales?
The U.S. "Leahy Laws"—Section 620M of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2378d) and 10 U.S.C. 362—prohibit certain U.S. "assistance" to a foreign security force unit when there is credible information that such unit has committed a "gross violation of human rights" (GVHR). The State Department generally interprets this term to encompass (1) torture, (2) extrajudicial killing, (3) enforced disappearance, or (4) rape under color of law (in which a perpetrator abuses their official position to commit rape). The State Department leads a process of unit-level GVHR vetting before providing security assistance. The Leahy Laws do not define "assistance"; in practice, the executive branch considers the term to mean support provided with U.S.-appropriated funds. The restrictions are thus not applicable to FMS or DCS, unless such sales use Foreign Military Financing, which consists of U.S.-appropriated funds. (See also CRS In Focus IF10575, Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting ("Leahy Laws") .)
2992. ALREADY LAW. Sales are security assistance and 502B already bars them---nobody applies it.
CRS 25 — Congressional Research Service. July 23. Nonpartisan legislative research agency serving Congress. CRS In Focus IF11197, “U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11197 Clopus
Although the AECA does not refer specifically to human rights, the act includes general provisions and conditions for the export of U.S.-origin defense articles that may indirectly address human rights concerns. For example,
Section 38(a)(1) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) authorizes the President to control the import and export of defense articles for broad policy goals, including world peace and U.S. security and foreign policy.
Section 42(a) of AECA (22 U.S.C. 2791(a)) requires the executive branch, to consider, among other factors, whether a given defense article sale might "increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict." See also Section 511 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2321d).
Section 3(a) of AECA (22 U.S.C. 2753(a)) requires prospective recipients of defense articles to meet certain prerequisites for eligibility. These include purchaser commitments to refrain from transferring title to or possession of any defense article to unauthorized persons, as well as from diverting articles for unauthorized purposes or uses. See also Section 505(a) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2314(a)).
Section 4 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2754) states that defense articles may be sold or leased for specific purposes only, including internal security, legitimate self-defense, and participation in collective measures requested by the United Nations or comparable organizations. See also Section 502 of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2302).
Section 3(c)(1)(B) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(1)(B)) prohibits the sale or delivery of U.S.-origin defense articles when either the President or Congress find that a recipient country has used such articles in substantial violation of an agreement with the United States "for a purpose not authorized" by AECA Section 4 or FAA Section 502. (See also Section 505(d) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2314(d)).) If found to be in violation by presidential determination or joint resolution of Congress, Section 3(c)(3) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(3)) stipulates that, absent a presidential waiver, such countries would be ineligible for future U.S. arms sales until the President determines the violation has ceased and recipients assure violations will not recur. Such a waiver is not available if Congress has adopted a joint resolution described above.
Human Rights-Related Prohibitions
Section 502B(a)(1) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(1)) states that a "principal goal" of U.S. foreign policy "shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries." Section 502B(a)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(2)) prohibits security assistance to "any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Section 502B(a)(2) also restricts licenses for the export of "crime control and detection instruments and equipment" to such countries. Certain exceptions can apply if the President certifies to Congress that "extraordinary circumstances" warrant the provision of assistance or licenses.
Section 502B(d)(2) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(2)) defines "security assistance" to include, for the purposes of the section, "sales of defense articles or services, extensions of credits (including participations in credits), and guaranties of loans" under the AECA. This section also defines security assistance to include
assistance provided pursuant to part II of the FAA for military assistance (chapter 2), the economic support fund (chapter 4), military education and training (chapter 5), peacekeeping operations (chapter 6), or anti-terrorism assistance (chapter 8); and
any license in effect with respect to the export to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country of (i) defense articles or defense services under Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778); or (ii) items listed under the 600 series of the Commerce Control List, which contains dual-use items controlled for export.
Section 502B(d)(1) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(d)(1)) defines "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." In determining whether a government engages in a consistent pattern of such violations, Section 502B(a)(4) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(a)(4)) requires the President to give particular consideration to violations of religious freedom. Section 502B(b) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(b)) additionally tasks the Secretary of State to prepare a report to Congress with information on prospective foreign recipients of U.S. security assistance.
Section 502B(c)(1) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1)) provides mechanisms for Congress to request a report, due within 30 days, from the Secretary of State concerning human rights in a particular country. Pursuant to Section 502B(c)(4)(A) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2304(c)(4)(A)), Congress may, at any time after receiving such a report, "adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such country." If the State Department does not produce the report within 30 days, this section prohibits delivery of security assistance to the country pending the report's delivery. The executive branch has objected to the provision on constitutional grounds; George H.W. Bush did so in a 1989 signing statement.
Executive branch determinations pursuant to some other human rights-related laws, such as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Division A of P.L. 106-386 , as amended), can also result in restrictions on arms sales to certain foreign governments.
Neither the AECA nor FAA explicitly requires that recipients of U.S. origin defense articles follow international humanitarian law (IHL).
3003. Every administration ignores the rights provisions---primacy outranks them.
Hassan 25 — Taiwo Hassan. October 1. Nigerian freelance journalist and activist. Responsible Statecraft, “US arming Nigeria is becoming a crime against humanity,” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nigeria-arms-sale/ Clopus
Since the 1950s, the U.S. has been the world’s leading arms-exporting nation accounting between 2019 and 2023 for 42 percent of all global arms exports. Several laws exist ostensibly to regulate and ensure that U.S. security assistance is provided to allies without undermining America’s core values. For example, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act expressly forbids the United States from providing security assistance to any country whose government engages in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Investigations by human rights groups and the media , including Reuters and Premium Times , have uncovered a consistent pattern of abuse by security forces that suggests that Nigeria has met this threshold.
However, not once have any of the relevant legal provisions conditioning arms sales on respect for human rights and civilian harm concerns been enforced. Indeed, successive U.S. administrations since the 1970s, Democrats and Republicans alike, have routinely ignored them while there is as yet no record of Congress successfully stopping an arms sale on this account — although it has delayed some. In 2022, during the Biden administration, Congress blocked a planned shipment of 12 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria over human rights concern, but this was soon reversed.
This divergence between what the U.S. law says and what the government actually does reflects a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Washington’s foreign policy between its human rights advocacy and the pursuit of global military primacy, in part through arms sales. It is a contradiction the world has seen play out in the bloody conflict in the Middle East where, despite carrying out a genocide in Gaza, Israel remains a top recipient of U.S. security assistance.
As the Center for Civilian in Conflict (CIVIC) noted in a recent report , Washington often “elevates other competing priorities, including addressing threats from non-state actors and strategic competition by other key powers, over concerns for civilian protection and human rights even where significant fears exist about potential misuse of U.S. security assistance.”
The contradiction has grown even more recently as America’s global hegemony faces growing challenges in an increasingly multipolar world. Therefore, besides its role in counterterrorism operations against jihadists in the Sahel, Nigeria’s potential as a likely constraint on the growing influence of China and, more recently, Russia and Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa makes it an ally too dear to lose.
But while all U.S. administrations have ultimately prioritized America’s global military primacy over any other concerns, Trump has gone much further than most by cutting staffing and shuttering programs in the Pentagon that previously helped put human rights and civilian harms mitigation at the heart of U.S. security assistance. The net result is that today, Washington is less able to guarantee the appropriate use of U.S.-origin weapons, thus increasing the risk of abuse.
The situation is further complicated by the interest of America’s “Military Industrial Complex” to maintain profitability by selling to U.S. partners older weapons systems for which the Pentagon no longer has any use. Consequently, U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has grown exponentially over the past two decades. It includes $1.5 billion in government-to-government Foreign Military Sales and over $200 million in direct commercial sales by U.S. companies. This is in addition to a program of periodic trainings and joint military drills in which different units of Nigeria’s military have participated.
3011. THEIR OWN AUTHOR. The Air Force already adopted the harm-mitigation plan---signal sent.
CIVIC 25 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. June 3. Organization that has worked with the Nigerian military and northeastern communities on protection of civilians since 2018. CIVIC, “CIVIC Welcomes Nigerian Air Force’s New Action Plan to Prevent Civilian Harm,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/press-releases/civic-welcomes-nigerian-air-forces-new-action-plan-to-prevent-civilian-harm/ Clopus
Abuja, NIGERIA, June 3, 2025 – Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) welcomes the Nigerian Air Force’s recent announcement of a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which marks an important commitment to take tangible steps to minimize harm to civilians from aerial operations.
“We applaud efforts by Nigerian military leaders to protect civilians, especially amid mounting security challenges. This is a promising step to take concrete measures to prevent civilian harm,” said Vianney Bisimwa, Africa and MENA Program Director at CIVIC.
Focusing on preventing civilian harm from airstrikes is a promising step to institutionalize protection of civilians practices in Nigeria’s military. It has become clear that a pattern of airstrikes harming civilians—often due to misidentification and air-to-ground integration challenges—requires a concerted effort to identify practical solutions.
We encourage all security forces in Nigeria to follow the example set by the Air Force. Sustained, consistent progress in the protection of civilians will require a policy framework that builds on the Action Plan and connects it to parallel efforts among other security forces in the country. To that end, CIVIC reiterates its call for a national Protection of Civilians Policy in Nigeria applicable to all security forces. Ongoing reviews of national policy frameworks offer a key opportunity to elevate protection of civilians and coordinate efforts among security forces.
3022. Policy commitment and what happens in the field are different things.
WPR 5-12 — The Editors. World Politics Review, “Nigeria’s Civilian Protection Problem Continues,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nigerias-civilian-protection-problem-continues/ Clopus paywalled---the saved source is the free preview; produce the full article through a library proxy if challenged
Amnesty International said the Nigerian military killed more than 100 people in airstrikes on a crowded market in the northwestern state of Zamfara on Sunday, with dozens more wounded. The military acknowledged carrying out strikes as part of its long-running counterinsurgency campaign in northern and central Nigeria, but claimed the dead were mostly “bandits.”
The incident comes only weeks after the military bombed a market in the northeastern village of Jilli in April, killing as many as 200 civilians. As Lesley Anne Warner wrote in WPR last month, the Jilli bombing was the latest in a decade-long series of strikes that have killed civilians, “underscoring the Nigerian military’s continued challenges with intelligence, target identification and air-ground integration.” The Nigerian Air Force unveiled a civilian harm mitigation plan in 2025, but as Warner noted, a significant gap remains between that policy commitment and what is actually happening in the field.
The Nigerian military’s overreliance on airpower for counterinsurgency compounds the problem of civilian casualties and is ultimately ineffective. “While airpower can enable and accelerate counterinsurgency operations, airstrikes alone rarely defeat insurgents, who simply disperse and adapt,” Warner explained. “In fact, empirical evidence increasingly suggests this approach amplifies violence instead of suppressing it.”
3033. PRINCIPAL-AGENT. Recipients fly their war, not ours---that’s structural, not a paperwork problem.
Erickson 23 — Jennifer L. Erickson. Associate professor of political science and international studies at Boston College. Global Policy 14(1), “Demystifying the ‘gold standard’ of arms export controls: US arms exports to conflict zones,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13181 Clopus Wiley blocks a direct fetch; the paragraphs used were spot-verified word-for-word against the publisher’s own PDF
Whether the United States supplies a conflict directly or indirectly, it faces two intractable and inevitable challenges in doing so. These challenges raise the likelihood that US arms supplies will undermine its arms export ‘gold standard’ reputation and its national interest more broadly.
First, even careful US efforts to vet armed groups struggle to prevent the diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALW), especially to illicit markets and unfavourable actors. Diversion might occur before weapons even arrive at their intended destination. Once arrived, they might change hands in a multitude of ways. For example, in 2015, Syrian rebels trained under the US train and equip programme gave arms to the Nusra Front ‘in exchange for safe passage’ (Reuters, 2015). US-trained rebels also sometimes chose to join Nusra Front fighters (Mazzetti et al., 2017), or US arms might be captured in Jihadist attacks (Perry et al., 2017). In addition, millions of dollars of weapons shipped to Jordan were stolen, sold on the black market and purchased by criminal networks and rural tribes, and likely also shipped out of the country (Mazzetti & Younes, 2016). However well-intentioned, similar concerns persist with US arms transfers to Ukraine in its fight against Russia, with US exports initially maximising speedy distribution of high volumes of material over tracking (Katz, 2022). In October 2022, the US government announced a plan to address arms diversion risks from its Ukraine assistance. While the plan is welcome, experts note that, like other end-use monitoring, it tends to focus on high-tech weapons systems, rather than SALW, which are particularly prone to diversion. Moreover, ‘even small leaks of an $18 billion enterprise could translate into significant risks, posing a security threat to Ukraine, the region, and beyond’ (Yousif & Stohl, 2022). In short, controlling where weapons go once they have left US hands cannot be guaranteed, especially amidst the dynamic, complex and even chaotic environment of war.
Second, recipients may not necessarily use US-supplied weapons in ways consistent with US interests and/or international law. In this way, the US faces what is essentially a principal–agent problem when it comes to arms transfers. And because recipients' interests and foreign policy priorities can change, even weapons’ transfers that seem like safe bets (e.g. unlikely to be used in conflict) might later turn into risks or liabilities. Weapons sold in peacetime may be later used in wartime, and recipients that were originally engaged in conflict may become parties to a conflict. Saudi Arabia is a prime example, in which past arms transfers thought to be solely defensive in their purpose were nevertheless later put to offensive use. Prior to 2015, the United States viewed arms transfers to Saudi Arabia as a means to build a political and economic relationship and as a deterrent to conflict with Iran, unlikely to be used in conflict. The Libyan conflict provides numerous additional examples. The French government insisted that US arms sold to France but found in Libyan camps in 2019 were intended to protect French troops, not transferred to Libyan armed groups (Walsh et al., 2019). The UAE and Turkey, both major US weapons customers, have also directly intervened in the Libyan conflict with US weapons. Human Rights Watch (2020) observes that the UAE has ‘conducted unlawful strikes’ in both Yemen and Libya and therefore risks US complicity in war crimes, if conducted with US-supplied weapons and munitions as some evidence collected on the ground suggests.
3041. MEASURED. Across four democracies, rights records don’t change who gets major systems.
Johnson and Willardson 18 — Richard Johnson and Spencer Willardson. University of Strathclyde. Nazarbayev University. International Studies Quarterly 62(2), “Human Rights and Democratic Arms Transfers: Rhetoric Versus Reality with Different Types of Major Weapon Systems,” https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/62/2/453/4951414 Clopus
Do states follow their own rules limiting arms sales to states that violate human rights? We systematically examined the sale of different types of weapons systems by four mature democracies—United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany—whose rhetoric calls for limiting sales to human rights abusers. We distinguished these types in terms of their varying capabilities and potential for use in repressing population. This is, to our knowledge, the first study to examine these issues for multiple countries at the same time while also accounting for weapons type. Our results indicate that human rights violations by states largely do not affect their opportunity or ability to import major weapons systems from major democratic suppliers. This finding is a bit distressing from a normative standpoint, and differs from the more optimistic results generated by some prior studies.
Knowing that human rights considerations do not appear to meaningfully affect policy outcomes in most cases is an important starting point for more detailed questions about the policy-making process and the considerations of decision makers in states. Is there a simply a wide disconnect between the measures of human rights violations and the decision-making about weapons? Do decision makers in arms exporting countries think about the worst-case scenario for weapons sales, or do they look at the type of human rights violations a state is making and make a calculated risk to provide weapons? If that is the case, what influence do the other factors (economic, political pressure, or existing arms dependence) play when weighing such decisions?
3052. BY DESIGN. The statute is permissive and there’s no electoral cost---so restraint never binds.
Erickson 23 — Jennifer L. Erickson. Associate professor of political science and international studies at Boston College. Global Policy 14(1), “Demystifying the ‘gold standard’ of arms export controls: US arms exports to conflict zones,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13181 Clopus Wiley blocks a direct fetch; the paragraphs used were spot-verified word-for-word against the publisher’s own PDF
Second, Congress does not—and likely cannot—serve as a meaningful check on executive decision-making. Indeed, to date, Congress has ‘never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale by use of a joint resolution of disapproval’ (Kerr, 2021). For Congress to pass legislation to block or amend a deal, it must do so by veto-proof margins. While a simple majority would send the bill to the president's desk for signature, the president—whose office would have already approved or even spearheaded the deal—would certainly veto it. But, so far, a two-thirds veto-proof majority has proved an impossible threshold. Only twice has Congress achieved even a simple majority on such legislation. In 1986 and 2019, Congress did vote to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia but could not override the presidential veto.3 In fact, Congress rarely even debates proposed sales, which tend to enjoy support rather than provoke controversy. Given the close partisan divides of contemporary Congressional politics, passing veto-proof legislation either to block sales or to reform the existing system seems unlikely any time soon.
Informal political constraints are also minimal. With the exception of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia in 2019 criticised due to the Yemen war and the Jamal Khashoggi murder, the US public has paid little attention to the issue over time. In recent years, moreover, the United States has been reducing its arms export reporting and data availability, making it more difficult for the public, media and researchers to track US arms flows, evaluate their impact or hold policymakers accountable to their export decisions (Echols, 2022). Presidents are therefore extremely unlikely to face electoral backlash for arms deals that might be viewed as going against US interests or values (Erickson, 2015a). Members of Congress, too, face few incentives to initiate or support legislation to block proposed deals. This means that presidential administrations have not only considerable legal authority over arms export decision-making but also considerable flexibility in the interpretation of US rules and whether they privilege arms export promotion or restraint.
3063. Nigeria is the counterweight in the Sahel---Washington won’t spend the relationship on this.
Hassan 25 — Taiwo Hassan. October 1. Nigerian freelance journalist and activist. Responsible Statecraft, “US arming Nigeria is becoming a crime against humanity,” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nigeria-arms-sale/ Clopus
The contradiction has grown even more recently as America’s global hegemony faces growing challenges in an increasingly multipolar world. Therefore, besides its role in counterterrorism operations against jihadists in the Sahel, Nigeria’s potential as a likely constraint on the growing influence of China and, more recently, Russia and Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa makes it an ally too dear to lose.
But while all U.S. administrations have ultimately prioritized America’s global military primacy over any other concerns, Trump has gone much further than most by cutting staffing and shuttering programs in the Pentagon that previously helped put human rights and civilian harms mitigation at the heart of U.S. security assistance. The net result is that today, Washington is less able to guarantee the appropriate use of U.S.-origin weapons, thus increasing the risk of abuse.
3071. NO FORUM. The region is split and arming against itself---there is nobody to consult.
ADF 2-10 — Africa Defense Forum. Professional military magazine published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command. ADF, “ECOWAS-AES Feud Weakens Security Cooperation as Terrorism Spreads,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/ecowas-aes-feud-weakens-security-cooperation-as-terrorism-spreads/ Clopus
As noted by The Africa Report, geopolitics compounds mistrust among ECOWAS and AES countries. ECOWAS countries have sought to maintain traditional partnerships with Western allies, while AES states have aligned with Russia and others.
Friction arose December 8, 2025, when a Nigerian cargo aircraft landed without prior authorization in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso. Although Nigeria’s military cited a technical problem, Burkinabe authorities detained two pilots and nine Soldiers, saying that the aircraft had violated their airspace. The AES denounced the incident as an “unfriendly act,” put their air defenses on maximum alert and authorized them to “neutralize any aircraft that violates confederal airspace.”
On December 14, 2025, ECOWAS heads of state decided to “maintain dialogue with Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger with a view to effective and strengthened collaboration in the face of the deteriorating security situation.”
3082. THEY SAY NO. Abuja calls the pipeline what it asked for---it will never consent to losing it.
Yusuf 25 — Kabir Yusuf. December 26. Reporter for Premium Times, Abuja. Premium Times via allAfrica, “Nigeria: Tinubu Approved U.S. Airstrikes On Terrorists in Sokoto but Gave Conditions - Foreign Minister,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202512270024.html Clopus
On Thursday, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the strike, describing it as part of structured counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States.
The ministry said the collaboration respects Nigeria's sovereignty and international law and involves intelligence sharing and tactical support.
"This has led to precision hits on terrorist targets in Nigeria by air strikes in the North West," the ministry's spokesperson, Kimiebi Ebienfa, said in a statement. "Terrorist violence in any form -- whether directed at Christians, Muslims, or other communities -- remains an affront to Nigeria's values and to international peace and security."
The United States also confirmed Nigeria's participation in the operation, highlighting ongoing security collaboration between both countries.
Although the US framed the strike as targeting terrorists who kill Christians, the Nigerian government said it was aimed at terrorists threatening civilians in northern states.