3091. Abuja asked for the joint campaign and supplied the targeting.
Yusuf 25 — Kabir Yusuf. December 26. Reporter for Premium Times, Abuja. Premium Times via allAfrica, “Nigeria: Tinubu Approved U.S. Airstrikes On Terrorists in Sokoto but Gave Conditions - Foreign Minister,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202512270024.html Clopus
"It is a collaboration, it is what we have been calling for," Mr Tuggar said on the breakfast show of Channels TV, monitored by PREMIUM TIMES.
"It was Nigeria that provided intelligence for the US strike in Nigeria. I spoke with the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, for 19 minutes before the strike, and we agreed to talk to President Tinubu for his go-ahead, and he gave it," the minister said.
"After the approval, I spoke again with Marco Rubio five minutes before the strike was launched against the terrorists."
3102. NONE. Regional security cooperation doesn’t exist---the neighbours get no reply.
ADF 2-10 — Africa Defense Forum. Professional military magazine published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command. ADF, “ECOWAS-AES Feud Weakens Security Cooperation as Terrorism Spreads,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/02/ecowas-aes-feud-weakens-security-cooperation-as-terrorism-spreads/ Clopus
Beninese President Patrice Talon told Jeune Afrique magazine that terrorists are thriving due to a lack of cooperation between the three countries.
“As far as we are concerned, there is none,” Talon said of cooperation. “We regularly follow up, explaining that security cooperation would not only help us escape the asymmetric conflict we are suffering, but would also serve their security interests. We got no response.”
3113. MORE, NOT LESS. Tinubu publicly asked for more decisive strikes---consultation ends in no.
Akintayo 26 — Joshua Akintayo. June. Post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Bayreuth researching the governance and consequences of counter-terrorism. SWP/Megatrends Afrika Policy Brief 50, “Trump in Africa: Nigeria’s Bounded Agency and Structural Dependence Under US Pressure,” https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA_PB_50_Jun_2026_Akintayo_Nigeria_s_Bounded_Agency.pdf Clopus
That deployment followed a period of intense coercive pressure – that is, it took place at a time when refusal would have come at a very high cost. Nigerian elites were confronted with the possibility of personal sanctions under the Cruz bill; the government faced the pro- spect of aid restrictions, which would have had implications for an economy already bat- tered by high inflation and currency depreciation; and Trump's explicit military threats ren- dered any refusal of American counter-terrorism assistance politically difficult to defend. According to Reuters, the 200 US personnel at Maiduguri, Kainji and Bauchi are intelligence analysts, advisers and trainers assigned to strictly non-combat roles. They operate a newly established US-Nigeria intelligence fusion cell and fly numerous MQ-9 Reaper drones to col- lect intelligence over northern Nigeria. 25 Notwithstanding this significant deployment, which could easily have been interpreted as a Nigerian concession, Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters (DHQ) used language affirming that Nigerian forces retained full command authority and would lead all missions on sovereign territory. 26 While these moves are aimed, above all, at protecting Tinubu's domestic political standing – particularly in the north of the country – they nonetheless constitute performances of sovereignty. The biggest operational impact to date of the intelligence fusion cell and the MQ-9 drone operations was on 16 May 2026, when, at Trump's direction and in coordination with the Nigerian government, AFRICOM conducted an assault in the Lake Chad Basin that led to the killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki. 27 On 17 and 18 May AFRICOM carried out follow-up strikes in the Metele area of Borno State in which around 100 Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) terrorists were killed. 28 The US and Nigerian governments’ respective framing of these attacks is analytically important and speaks volumes about the evolution of their partnership since the CPC redesignation. For his part, Trump declared that the operation had eliminated the “most active terrorist in the world” and praised Nigeria for the part it had played, while Tinubu thanked Trump “for his leadership and unwavering support” and said Nigeria was looking forward to “more decisive strikes against all terrorist enclaves across the nation”. 29 Just six months after Trump had threatened to bomb Nigeria for persecuting Christians, the two presidents were jointly celebrating the killing of an ISIL commander on Nigerian soil and giving each other the credit in public. A broader qualification applies to military and security assistance. It is true that in recent years, Nigeria received 12 A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and USD 38 million in infrastructure improvements at the Kainji Air Base. 30 But while it has made efforts to reduce dependence on the US by acquiring Turkish Bayraktar drones, 31 Washington largely remains its partner of choice for military hardware and intelligence partnerships.
3121. BRINK. Jets loiter and return---this is a monthly occurrence, not a horizon.
Guardian 5-12 — The Guardian. Lagos-based Nigerian national daily, carrying Reuters reporting. The Guardian Nigeria, “100 killed in Nigerian airstrike on Zamfara market - Amnesty alleges,” https://guardian.ng/news/100-killed-in-nigerian-airstrike-on-zamfara-market-amnesty-alleges/ Clopus
Amnesty International on Tuesday alleged that at least 100 civilians were killed in a Nigerian military airstrike that struck a crowded market in Zamfara State.
According to Reuters, the rights organisation called on Nigerian authorities to immediately investigate the incident and ensure accountability for those responsible.
The airstrike, which hit the remote Tumfa market in Zurmi district on Sunday, was the second to kill scores of people at a crowded market in northern Nigeria in a month.
Dozens of injured people were being treated at hospitals in Zurmi and nearby Shinkafi, Amnesty said, adding that many of those killed were women and girls.
The Nigerian Air Force has yet to issue a statement on the incident.
Citing witnesses, Amnesty said military jets had been spotted hovering around the area at midday and returned about two hours later and struck the crowded market.
3132. The munitions are the package and procurement is underway---delay concedes the interval.
Ewang 25 — Anietie Ewang. August 19. Researcher in the Africa Division at Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
3141. SAME THEATRE. The package arms the units whose abuses State itself documented.
Hassan 25 — Taiwo Hassan. October 1. Nigerian freelance journalist and activist. Responsible Statecraft, “US arming Nigeria is becoming a crime against humanity,” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nigeria-arms-sale/ Clopus
The very week the United States’ Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a $346 million arms sale to Nigeria , the U.S. State Department also released its 2024 Country report on human rights practices in the West African country.
The report, which has previously affected the country’s eligibility for security assistance, confirmed what civil society groups have been saying for years: that the security forces of Nigeria, Washington’s most significant ally in Sub-Saharan Africa , habitually operate with impunity and without due regard for human rights protection — a key condition for receiving U.S. security cooperation.
For example, the report spotlighted the following human rights abuses as ongoing concerns: “arbitrary and unlawful killings; disappearances; or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious abuses in a conflict.”
It also claimed that “military operations against ISIS-WA, Boko Haram, and criminal organization targets” often resulted in civilian deaths. Other findings include the use of “excessive force,” “sexual violence and other forms of abuse” by the military in the pursuit of jihadists, as well as inappropriate detention for prolonged periods and often in poor conditions of women and children removed from or allegedly associated with jihadists reportedly for “security screening and perceived intelligence value.”
Interestingly, the new arms sale is meant for exactly the same theater of operations where the above alleged abuses have reportedly occurred. There, in the treacherous terrain of the country’s northeast, Nigeria’s army has been fighting for more than a decade in a bloody stand-off with jihadists. The arms are also meant for use in and around the Gulf of Guinea where piracy and illegal trafficking of arms, humans and narcotics pose new challenges.
What this means therefore is that if approved, U.S.-origin weapons comprising an assortment of munitions, precision bombs, rockets and related equipment would arm units of Nigeria’s security forces whose egregious abuses bordering on war crimes are confirmed not just by civil societies but by the U.S. State Department.
Since the 1950s, the U.S. has been the world’s leading arms-exporting nation accounting between 2019 and 2023 for 42 percent of all global arms exports. Several laws exist ostensibly to regulate and ensure that U.S. security assistance is provided to allies without undermining America’s core values. For example, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act expressly forbids the United States from providing security assistance to any country whose government engages in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Investigations by human rights groups and the media , including Reuters and Premium Times , have uncovered a consistent pattern of abuse by security forces that suggests that Nigeria has met this threshold.
However, not once have any of the relevant legal provisions conditioning arms sales on respect for human rights and civilian harm concerns been enforced. Indeed, successive U.S. administrations since the 1970s, Democrats and Republicans alike, have routinely ignored them while there is as yet no record of Congress successfully stopping an arms sale on this account — although it has delayed some. In 2022, during the Biden administration, Congress blocked a planned shipment of 12 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria over human rights concern, but this was soon reversed.
This divergence between what the U.S. law says and what the government actually does reflects a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Washington’s foreign policy between its human rights advocacy and the pursuit of global military primacy, in part through arms sales. It is a contradiction the world has seen play out in the bloody conflict in the Middle East where, despite carrying out a genocide in Gaza, Israel remains a top recipient of U.S. security assistance.
As the Center for Civilian in Conflict (CIVIC) noted in a recent report , Washington often “elevates other competing priorities, including addressing threats from non-state actors and strategic competition by other key powers, over concerns for civilian protection and human rights even where significant fears exist about potential misuse of U.S. security assistance.”
3152. The mitigation plan is already in place---and the field hasn’t moved.
WPR 5-12 — The Editors. World Politics Review, “Nigeria’s Civilian Protection Problem Continues,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nigerias-civilian-protection-problem-continues/ Clopus paywalled---the saved source is the free preview; produce the full article through a library proxy if challenged
Amnesty International said the Nigerian military killed more than 100 people in airstrikes on a crowded market in the northwestern state of Zamfara on Sunday, with dozens more wounded. The military acknowledged carrying out strikes as part of its long-running counterinsurgency campaign in northern and central Nigeria, but claimed the dead were mostly “bandits.”
The incident comes only weeks after the military bombed a market in the northeastern village of Jilli in April, killing as many as 200 civilians. As Lesley Anne Warner wrote in WPR last month, the Jilli bombing was the latest in a decade-long series of strikes that have killed civilians, “underscoring the Nigerian military’s continued challenges with intelligence, target identification and air-ground integration.” The Nigerian Air Force unveiled a civilian harm mitigation plan in 2025, but as Warner noted, a significant gap remains between that policy commitment and what is actually happening in the field.
The Nigerian military’s overreliance on airpower for counterinsurgency compounds the problem of civilian casualties and is ultimately ineffective. “While airpower can enable and accelerate counterinsurgency operations, airstrikes alone rarely defeat insurgents, who simply disperse and adapt,” Warner explained. “In fact, empirical evidence increasingly suggests this approach amplifies violence instead of suppressing it.”
3163. Strikes kill the misidentified with no accountability---waiting changes nothing.
Ewang 25 — Anietie Ewang. August 19. Researcher in the Africa Division at Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
Security concerns across Nigeria are real and widespread. In the Northwest, violent raids, killings, and kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs continue to destabilize communities. In the Northeast, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram and its splinter factions continue their brutal insurgency against the government while terrorizing civilians and committing abuses. In the Southeast, separatist armed groups routinely terrorize and attack communities and kill residents.
However, in responding to these threats, Nigerian security forces have been repeatedly implicated in serious rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and conflict-related abuses. The US State Department documented many of these abuses in its own 2024 Human Rights Report on Nigeria , released just last week. Military airstrikes have also repeatedly resulted in the deaths of people mistakenly identified as threats, without accountability. Despite ongoing calls for justice, meaningful reform remains absent.
3171. WRONG OBJECT. These programs guard technology, not people---“use” is a misnomer and their own author says so.
CIVIC 21 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. September. Organization that works with armed actors on civilian harm mitigation and with the U.S. Congress on arms transfer policy. CIVIC, “Demystifying End-Use Monitoring in U.S. Arms Exports,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EUM-Brief.pdf Clopus
Although both Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry are meant to satisfy requirements ensuring U.S. arms are “being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement,” neither program is practically geared towards investigating, verifying, or preventing inappropriate use of U.S. arms. The current EUM framework traces its origins to the Cold War, when the United States was deeply preoccupied with its defense technology falling into the hands of the Soviet Union or aligned regimes. EUM today remains fundamentally shaped by that paradigm, resulting in a system that is focused almost exclusively on protecting technology from diversion by confirming the physical location of exported defense articles, ensuring the physical security of those items, and verifying that they remain reasonably under the control of the agreed-upon end-user. What these programs don’t do is monitor the actual use of U.S. weapons and the conduct of forces employing them, including the use of U.S. weapons in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other civilian harm. Essentially, current EUM programs are designed to protect U.S. technology, not people. The word “use” in end-use monitoring is an unfortunate misnomer.
Contrary to popular belief, the so-called Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to security force units
that have committed gross violations of human rights, do not apply to many arms transfers due to the executive branch’s overly narrow interpretation of “assistance.”
3182. THEIR OWN AUTHOR. State says the point is the warfighter’s edge---civilian harm isn’t in the program.
State PM 25 — U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. January 20. The bureau that runs the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program. U.S. Department of State fact sheet, “End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles,” https://www.state.gov/end-use-monitoring-of-u-s-origin-defense-articles Clopus
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the U.S. government (USG) to conduct End-Use Monitoring (EUM) to ensure that foreign end-users are complying with the requirements agreed with by foreign partners via government-to-government transfers or imposed by the U.S. government for direct commercial sale transfers (DCS) with respect to use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense services and such articles and services are used only for the purposes for which they were furnished. USG EUM can include scheduled inspections, physical inventories, general inquiries, and reviews of accountability records by the U.S. government. The end-use of U.S.-origin defense articles should also be in accordance with international law and consistent with any agreements or licenses under which such articles have been transferred. The United States remains committed to expediting, when possible, defense transfers to U.S. allies and partners, while it also seeks to prevent unauthorized access to U.S.-origin defense technologies by hostile state and non-state actors.
The purpose of the EUM program is to improve accountability with respect to defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or Foreign Assistance Act. USG EUM is an important component to protecting sensitive U.S. military and intelligence technologies and ensuring American warfighters retain their military edge over their adversaries. The U.S. commitment to EUM is considerable, as indicated by the fact our pre- and post-transfer checks are more robust than even those of our closest allies and partners in terms of defense trade and shared values. Our strategic competitors, Russia and the People’s Republic of China, lack comparable systems of EUM and conduct their defense trade without the transparency, accountability, and legislative oversight found in the U.S.
Before U.S.-origin defense articles and services are exported or transferred to foreign entities, those entities must agree to:
Not retransfer equipment to third parties without first receiving written U.S. government authorization;
Not dispose of or use the defense article for purposes other than those for which they were furnished without first receiving written U.S. government authorization; and,
Maintain the security of any item with substantially the same degree of protection afforded to it by the U.S. government.
Furthermore, in cases where U.S.-origin defense articles and services are transferred to a foreign government via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or security cooperation programs, that foreign government must also agree to make items available for EUM inspections for the operational life of the equipment.
USG EUM programs are designed to provide end-use verification of defense articles and services sold or leased by the USG to U.S. allies and partners through the FMS system. This, however, does not absolve recipients of the above requirements. The U.S. government takes all allegations of diversion or unauthorized use of defense articles very seriously and engages with partners at all levels to ensure adherence to end-use agreements.
3193. Partner nations hold full responsibility---the US checks where the item is, and a dropped bomb isn’t anywhere.
State PM 25 — U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. January 20. The bureau that runs the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program. U.S. Department of State fact sheet, “End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles,” https://www.state.gov/end-use-monitoring-of-u-s-origin-defense-articles Clopus
Department of Defense (DoD) EUM for defense equipment transferred via FMS or other U.S. government security cooperation/assistance programs is executed under the auspices of the DoD’s Golden Sentry program and is conducted by Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel assigned to U.S. Embassies abroad.
Under the Golden Sentry program, EUM of U.S.-origin defense articles is a joint responsibility of the partner nations and the U.S. government. The partner assumes full responsibility, based on the terms under which the transfers are made, for the defense articles including physical security and accountability requirements, and restrictions on end-use. Under Golden Sentry, the U.S. government seeks to verify the end-use, physical security and accountability of U.S.-origin defense articles via periodic EUM checks and investigations into potential end-use violations.
Under the Golden Sentry program, the U.S. government conducts routine and enhanced EUM checks. Routine EUM checks are required based on a “watch list ” of significant military equipment (SME), are conducted at least quarterly by SCO personnel during regular visits to partner nation installations in performance of their security cooperation duties, and the checks are documented electronically. Enhanced EUM checks are required based on a list of sensitive items identified in Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). In addition to an initial inventory by serial number, Enhanced EUM requires physical security and accountability assessments of the storage facilities and 100% annual serial number inventories to verify compliance with transfer agreements. The security and accountability assessments are conducted in accordance with defined checklists documented electronically. SCO compliance with program requirements and partner nation compliance with pre-transfer assurances are periodically assessed by personnel from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) – the DoD organization that manages the Golden Sentry Program.
3201. NOT A VIOLATION. The statute polices the item’s purpose---counterterrorism strikes are the purpose.
CRS 25 — Congressional Research Service. July 23. Nonpartisan legislative research agency serving Congress. CRS In Focus IF11197, “U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11197 Clopus
Pursuant to Sections 38(g)(7) and 40A(a) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(7) and 2785(a)), and Section 505(a)(3) of the FAA (22 U.S.C. 2314(a)(3)), U.S. origin defense articles sold via FMS and DCS are subject to end-use monitoring (EUM) to ensure that recipients use such items solely for their intended purposes. DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency manages the department's Golden Sentry EUM program for defense articles sold via FMS. The State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls coordinates the Blue Lantern program, which performs an analogous function for items sold via DCS.
Can arms embargoes be applied on the basis of human rights concerns?
The United States can impose an arms embargo on a foreign government based on human rights considerations. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations reflect the executive branch's implementation of statutory provisions related to the export of defense articles, including those related to arms embargoes. In addition, the U.N. Security Council may apply an arms embargo against a country for human rights reasons; Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) authorizes the President to implement such sanctions.
3212. A SAMPLE. Commercial checks are risk-triggered---the volume defeats the program.
CIVIC 21 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. September. Organization that works with armed actors on civilian harm mitigation and with the U.S. Congress on arms transfer policy. CIVIC, “Demystifying End-Use Monitoring in U.S. Arms Exports,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EUM-Brief.pdf Clopus
EUM checks for commercial arms sales are conducted by U.S. embassy personnel under the Blue Lantern program, which can include pre-license, post-license, and post-shipment checks to verify the information of defense article purchasers and end-users — namely, whether the recipient is compliant with U.S. government standards about use, transfer, and security of defense articles and services. Due to the high volume of sales, Blue Lantern checks are more targeted than those in the Golden Sentry program and are conducted on the basis of potential risk. According to State Department reporting, only around 1% of total license applications lead to a Blue Lantern check, while about 25% of checks result in an “unfavorable” finding. Unfavorable findings may result from incorrect information on the application (such as an incorrect address), information suggesting an individual or party involved in the sale is unreliable (for example, currently under investigation or with past criminal records), or refusal to cooperate with the check.
3223. Even credible reports produce no completed investigation---so nothing ever triggers.
GAO 25 — U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 24. Congressional audit agency that reviews State and Defense arms transfer programs. GAO-25-107077, “Human Rights: State Can Improve Response to Allegations of Civilians Harmed by U.S. Arms Transfers,” https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107077 Clopus
Agency processes do not fully address the risk that recipients may use transferred U.S. defense articles to commit human rights abuses. Existing agency processes, such as vetting recipients and verifying custody of transferred defense articles, address aspects of this risk. Since 2023, State and DOD have also developed processes to respond to reports of civilian harm—including human rights abuses—involving U.S. defense articles. In response to a GAO recommendation, State developed a process called the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance, but it does not allow reports from non-U.S. government parties. For example, State received 617 civilian harm reports from August 2023 to December 2024. However, non-U.S. government parties such as the United Nations have identified thousands of civilian harm incidents resulting from the Israel-Hamas conflict alone. Incorporating external reports into its response process would give State a fuller picture of the scope of civilian harm incidents. Further, as of December 2024, State had not completed any investigations into reports it deemed credible. State officials said they needed additional resources to manage this workload. By developing and implementing a strategy to identify appropriate staffing and resources for the process, State could investigate the full scope of reported incidents in a more timely manner.
U.S. Defense Articles Delivered to Israel in October 2023
The United States is the world's largest provider of defense articles to other nations. State and DOD have jointly approved over $100 billion in transfers annually. Public reports have raised concerns that recipients may be using U.S. defense articles in activities that violate human rights.