365Garrison towns are the model---people can't move, and the needs stay unmet anyway.
Dalton 20 — Melissa Dalton. July 9. Senior fellow and deputy director with the International Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS, “Conduct Is the Key: Improving Civilian Protection in Nigeria,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/conduct-key-improving-civilian-protection-nigeria Clopus
As the Nigerian military continues its offensive operations, civilians have suffered casualties and loss of life from airstrikes as recently seen in April 9, 2020, in Damboa. In contested areas in the northeast, the military has clamped down severely on humanitarian access. In “garrison towns” such as Pulka and Gwoza controlled by the Nigerian military, critical humanitarian needs such as health care, clean water, shelter, and protection are unmet , although in many cases, civilians are dependent upon humanitarian aid to survive. In Pulka, civilians are unable to move beyond the military-enforced town perimeter for fear of being attacked by non-state armed groups or by being perceived as part of the armed groups by the Nigerian military.
3661. NO DEFINITION. State told the watchdog there isn't one---and nobody checks the use.
Farooq 22 — Umar A Farooq. July 12. Washington correspondent for Middle East Eye covering US foreign policy and the arms trade, quoting the Government Accountability Office's director of international affairs and trade. Middle East Eye, “US claims it only sells ‘defensive’ weapons to Saudi Arabia. But does this distinction exist?,” https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-saudi-arabia-selling-defensive-weapons-does-distinction-exist Clopus
“My understanding is that the Pentagon and State Department have never had clear definitions of what was an ‘offensive’ vs ‘defensive’ weapon, and largely took Saudi Arabia’s word for what purposes weapons would serve,” Lindsay Koshgarian, programme director of the National Priorities Project, told Middle East Eye.
Meanwhile, arms sales to the kingdom continued, with the US approving a $650m sale to Saudi Arabia late last year.
“Neither the Pentagon nor State Department has evaluated how US weapons were in fact used or whether they were responsible for civilian deaths. All of this points to a US policy where declining sales for ‘offensive’ weapons may have little meaning.”
Then last month, GAO released a damning report saying that the US military has failed to evaluate the use of American-made weapons in the killing of civilians in the Yemen war.
In the report, the government watchdog also noted the State Department had no "specific definitions" as to what constitutes an offensive or defensive weapon, despite the Biden administration's announcement last year.
3672. NOT A LEGAL CATEGORY. The statute sorts by the buyer's conduct, never by the weapon.
Jarrar 21 — Raed Jarrar. December 9. Advocacy Director of Democracy for the Arab World Now. DAWN, “The Fallacy of ‘Defensive’ Weapons Is Just a Ploy to Justify Arms Sales,” https://dawnmena.org/the-fallacy-of-defensive-weapons-is-just-a-ploy-to-justify-arms-sales/ Clopus
Now, the Biden administration has fallen back on the fallacy of "defensive" weapons. Is there really such a thing, though? Not according to existing U.S. law.
U.S. law prohibits selling weapons, of any kind, to abusive governments. The Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act both established guidelines years ago that govern arms transfers to foreign governments. According to a policy analysis by the Congressional Research Service earlier this year , "the acts authorize the termination of future sales and deliveries if a recipient is found to be in substantial violation of a sale-related agreement with the United States or to be otherwise using such defense articles for unauthorized purposes." The Foreign Assistance Act, as well as executive branch policy, it added, "restrict certain sales of defense articles to foreign recipients found to have committed human rights violations." That would certainly include Saudi Arabia.
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act states clearly that a "principal goal" of U.S. foreign policy "shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries," and that "no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."
3683. ONE AIRFRAME. The same aircraft fly surveillance and the strike---sorting them is fiction.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The robust counter-campaign of Operation Lafiya Dole (OPLD), which involved ground operations and airstrikes, led to the successful recapture of the entire self-proclaimed ‘Islamic Caliphate’ of Boko Haram in the period after Nigeria's 2015 election (Ogbozor & Paden, Citation2015). This achievement can be partly attributed to the relocation of the military headquarters, and notably the transformation of the operational mandate of the JTF. This strategic shift from a relatively passive force to an offensive one played a crucial role in the success (Ikeolu, Citation2018). Boko Haram was on the defensive, suffering the loss of territory, resources and fighters, and the Nigerian administration has characterised subsequent attacks by the insurgents as the ‘last kick of a dying horse’ (Premium Times, Citation2017).
Yet, the military's triumph did not signify the end of the conflict. On the contrary, Boko Haram is still potent and targeting civilians, livelihoods, security forces, and humanitarian workers (Ogbozor, Citation2019, p. 210). Moreover, the forceful military actions and restrictions which characterised the period of OPLD lead to civilian casualties and widespread displacement (Ogbozor, Citation2019, p. 1). Some severe military counterinsurgency measures, such as the NAF’s massive aerial onslaughts and military restrictions, including prolonged closing of roads, markets, and border points, have been associated with the period of OPLD. Oyewole (Citation2021) argues that Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign has been overly kinetic and reactive and has not yielded the desired result of defeating the insurgents. Indeed, the strategy of enforcing peace through strength rather than through mediation or negotiation undermines the very principles it aims to promote, according to McDappa (Citation2021). OPLD, seen as a peacebuilding framework in military circles, has had a negative rather than positive effect (McDappa, Citation2021).
Nigeria’s airpower dates to the establishment of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in 1964, which has historically depended on foreign training and equipment (Ebiye, Citation1992). Although terrorism in Nigeria predates airpower development, aerial capabilities have been pivotal in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in northern Nigeria, leveraging drones and aircraft for real-time data acquisition (Onuoha, Citation2014). Precision airstrikes have targeted insurgents’ strongholds, though issues such as collateral damage and intelligence accuracy have long been problematic (Ewi & Salifu, Citation2017). The NAF has been integral to counterinsurgency efforts, employing airstrikes to neutralise insurgent strongholds, interrupt supply logistics, and target leadership figures. However, it is essential to note that the Army also employs airpower for purposes such as airstrikes, transportation, interception, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5).
3694. THE PLATFORM IS THE POINT. The bombs are built to drop from the defensive airframe.
Casimiro 8-14 — Christine Casimiro. August 14. Defense reporter for The Defense Post covering foreign military sales. The Defense Post, “US Approves $346M Sale of Ammo, Precision Weapons to Nigeria,” https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/us-nigeria-ammo-bombs-rockets/ Clopus
The US State Department has approved the potential $346 million sale of ammunition and precision-guided weapons to Nigeria.
Defense contractors RTX, Lockheed Martin, and BAE Systems will supply munitions, precision bombs, and rockets intended to support Abuja’s defense against terrorist organizations and curb illicit trafficking within the African country and the Gulf of Guinea.
The sub-Saharan country has requested to purchase MK-82 general-purpose 500-pound (227-kilogram) bombs and Paveway II guided bombs, which are deployable from the Nigerian Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft.
In particular, the possible foreign military sale involves 1,002 MK-82 general-purpose 500-pound bombs, as well as 5,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II all-up-rounds, each consisting of a WGU-59/B guidance section, high-explosive warhead, and MK66-4 rocket motor.
The request also includes 1,002 MXU-650 Air Foil Groups (AFGs) for 500-pound Paveway II GBU-12, 515 MXU-1006 AFGs for 250-pound (113-kilogram) Paveway II GBU-58, 1,517 MAU-169 or MAU-209 computer control groups for Paveway II GBU-12/GBU-58, and 1,002 FMU-152 joint programmable fuzes.
Other defense equipment will accompany the package, such as FMU-139 joint programmable fuzes, bomb components, impulse cartridges, as well as high-explosive and practice rockets.
Related logistical and program support is also part of the proposed sale.
370A “defense service” is repair and training---the statute already counts the counterplan.
22 USC 2794 — Arms Export Control Act, section 47, codified at 22 U.S.C. 2794. The statutory definitions that govern every Foreign Military Sale and every commercial export license. Office of the Law Revision Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, “22 USC 2794: Definitions,” https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:22+section:2794+edition:prelim) Clopus
(4) "defense service", except as provided in paragraph (7) of this section, means, with respect to a sale or transfer by the United States under the authority of this chapter or any other foreign assistance or sales program of the United States, any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information (as defined in section 2403(e) of this title ), used for the purposes of making military sales, but does not include design and construction services under section 2769 of this title ;
(5) "training" includes formal or informal instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the United States, contract technicians, or contractors (including instruction at civilian institutions), or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice to foreign military units and forces;
(6) "major defense equipment" means any item of significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List having a nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50,000,000 or a total production cost of more than $200,000,000;
(7) "defense articles and defense services" means, with respect to commercial exports subject to the provisions of section 2778 of this title , those items designated by the President pursuant to subsection (a)(1) of such section;
(8) "design and construction services" means, with respect to sales under section 2769 of this title , the design and construction of real property facilities, including necessary construction equipment and materials, engineering services, construction contract management services relating thereto, and technical advisory assistance in the operation and maintenance of real property facilities provided or performed by any department or agency of the Department of Defense or by a contractor pursuant to a contract with such department or agency;
3711. THE FLEET IS ALREADY GROUNDED. Foreign spares are what put those aircraft in the air.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
Despite the importance of airpower to Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign, the NAF faces substantial challenges, including an aging fleet and limited maintenance infrastructure, leaving many aircraft grounded and dependent on foreign spare parts (Aghedo & Osumah, Citation2015). Operational readiness is further undermined by procurement delays and geopolitical obstacles. While pilot training has improved, gaps in technical expertise and maintenance capabilities highlight the need for greater investment in capacity building (Egbewole, Citation2020). Nevertheless, according to John Campbell the acquisition of A-29 Super Tucano combat aircraft from the US in 2021 has enhanced Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations (Campbell, Citation2021). The integration of the newly acquired Tucanos significantly enhanced the aerial capabilities of the NAF. This strategic upgrade not only improved the operational readiness and effectiveness of their fleet but also expanded their ability to conduct a wider range of missions in support of national security objectives, such as aerial cover for ground forces and tactical intelligence. However, Freedom Onuoha maintains that despite the diversification in military partnerships, challenges related to interoperability with Western systems persist (Onuoha, Citation2014). There are still issues with communication and intelligence sharing with partners, especially the Western countries.
While airpower has bolstered Nigeria’s deterrent capabilities against insurgents, the increasing civilian casualties from airstrike mishaps has raised concerns about the effectiveness of aerial campaigns. The labelling of all NAF’s airstrikes on civilian population as accidents, mistakes, or mishaps by the military obscures their deeper causes, and ignores the two distinct perspectives on how these incidents should be classified – typical mistakes or failures of human or technical functions (Okoli et al., Citation2024). While these occurrences can be either accidental or incidental, accidental mishaps typically involve carelessness, inattention, or negligence, whereas incidental mishaps could occur irrespective of the level of care or intention (Okoli et al., Citation2024). Okoli further noted that while airstrikes that harm civilians may be incidental, given the frequent recurrence of such events and the rising number of civilian casualties, this needs to be examined further.
3722. READINESS. Sustainment packages are what keep technical systems functioning---that's the whole link.
Yousif 23 — Elias Yousif. Research Analyst with the Stimson Center's Conventional Defense program, writing with Rachel Stohl, Stimson Vice President and Director of the Conventional Defense Program. Stimson Center, “‘If we don’t sell it, someone else will’: Dependence & Influence in US Arms Transfers,” https://www.stimson.org/2023/if-we-dont-sell-it-someone-else-will-dependence-influence-in-us-arms-transfers/ Clopus fetched via reader proxy; publisher blocked direct access---spot-check before reading
Each of these factors inform important interest-based calculations that can shape the costs of seeking alternative sources of arms.
For example, threats that importers perceive of as needing to be addressed by military means are clearly a necessary condition for dependency; without a need for military equipment and services, severing an arms relationship would come at little meaningful cost to the importer.4Note: Richard A.I. Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007,” Defense and Peace Economics Volume 31, Issue 7, (May 2019), pg. 853-854, 856-857. But the nature of threat perceptions can also have significant bearing on dependence and the potential leverage of an exporter. A state that perceives physical military threats as likely, imminent, and severe in magnitude is likely to incur a greater cost in security terms from any rupture with a supplier that undercuts readiness. On the other hand, a country for which security threats seem remote and of only marginal severity would likely incur fewer financial, operational, and readiness costs by transitioning to another supplier.
Another factor shaping an importer’s degree of dependency is the availability of alternate sources, both actual or potential, of necessary defense articles and services. This could include the capacity to replace imports with domestic production or the availability of other external suppliers. Here again, certain factors will shape the availability of these choices. Does the state possess the technical, industrial, or human capital to quickly ramp up domestic production? Are the capabilities available from other suppliers? Do those suppliers coordinate their policies? Are substitute capabilities available? Are alternatives financially viable? In many cases, these factors can prove prohibitive or at least costly, helping to explain the decision to import from the original supplier in the first place.
The type of capability under consideration will also impact the likely availability of alternate supplies. Small arms and light weapons, for example, are relatively simple to produce, can be easily made in large quantities, are manufactured all over the globe, and are generally comparable in capabilities.5Note: Suneel Kumar, “Small Arms and Light Weapon: A Global Threat to Human Security and Development,” The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 69. No 4, (Oct 2008), pg. 787-788. Compare that to advanced fighter aircraft or other highly sophisticated systems, and not only does the market become much smaller, but the likelihood that such a system can be produced domestically also shrinks.6Note: Harrison Kass, “Only 3 Countries Have Built 5th-Generation Fighters, but Militaries are Already Working on More Advanced 6th-gen Jets,” Business Insider, September 4th, 2022, accessed November 3, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/what-features-and-design-will-a-6th-generation-fighter-have-2022-9#:~:text=Fifth%2Dgeneration%20fighters%20are%20so,interconnectivity%20%E2%80%94%20is%20still%20cutting%20edge. Moreover, these advanced systems are less likely to be interoperable with or functionally comparable to those of competing suppliers.
When it comes to sourcing from alternate external suppliers, factors beyond simple market forces play a role. Arms relationships are commonly seen as indicators of international alliances and partnerships, reflecting an alignment of interests between supplier and importer. In that context, supply networks can be partially dependent on ideology, as was often the case during the Cold War.7Note: Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems,” pg. 853. Increasing multipolarity has changed those dynamics, but alignment still has a notable bearing on the menu of suppliers an importer might be able to select from.
Additionally, for importers that do wish to look elsewhere for a particular capability, simply finding a comparable or alternative source may be just the first challenge. A new platform will likely also require new systemic chains of supply, sustainment, and maintenance, as well as new processes to develop interoperability between the new system and those already in service. In some cases, interoperability between systems sourced from different suppliers is either prohibitively expensive or simply not possible. Accordingly, integration efforts are no small task, especially if doctrines, structures, and sustainment systems reflect those of a state’s historical patrons.8Note: David Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan 1998), pg. 8.
Similarly, pivoting to an alternate supplier could risk jeopardizing existing supply relationships that would still be necessary for sustaining systems already in service. If an importer’s transition to another supplier ruptures the relationship with its former patron, it could jeopardize sustainment and maintenance packages that are essential to keeping highly technical capabilities functioning, undercutting readiness.9Note: Government of the United States, Congressional Research Service, “Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities,” Nathan J. Lucas et.al., (Congressional Research Service), pg. 10. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R46337.pdf; Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems,” pg. 854.
Dependency is also shaped by financial considerations, especially in the context of military assistance relationships that sustain arms imports. Countries that receive financing or grants to acquire weapons systems from a particular exporter will face added financial challenges trying to source a comparable capability from elsewhere, especially if alternate suppliers do not offer the same levels of assistance.10Note: Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, pg. 337. This is especially true for countries that have become accustomed to highly advanced and expensive systems that are made financially viable only by long-standing military assistance relationships with external partners. It may even be the case that a country cannot independently finance its defense sector without external support, adding to dependency.11Note: Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” pg. 8-9. Similarly, co-production or offset agreements may also add to the costs of transitioning platforms, especially if these reflect significant domestic investments on the part of the importer.
3731. PRECISION ISN'T PROTECTION. Guidance makes a bomb more lethal, not more discriminating.
Lee 21 — Peter Lee. November 19. Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of Security and Risk Research at the University of Portsmouth; author of Reaper Force, an embedded study of RAF MQ-9 crews. The Conversation, “Modern warfare: ‘precision’ missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here’s why,” https://theconversation.com/modern-warfare-precision-missiles-will-not-stop-civilian-deaths-heres-why-171905 Clopus
Modern guided missiles and bombs are capable of incredible, almost science-fiction-like precision. To research my book, Reaper Force , about the lives of drone operators, I was allowed to watch RAF MQ-9 Reaper drones in real-time action in Syria.
I sat with a three-person crew at a ground-control station in Creech Air Force Base in Nevada as they killed an Islamic State fighter with a Hellfire precision-guided missile . The Reaper drone being piloted was flying 20,000 feet above its target. He was on a moving motorcycle when the missile hit him.
Missile accuracy is judged by how close it gets to its aiming point. Precision refers to the size and predictability of the explosive blast. The strike I watched was accurate and precise and no civilians were hurt.
Degrees of precision
Air-launched missile technology continues to advance rapidly. The 100-pound Hellfire missile was developed to destroy armoured tanks, and its laser targeting is the most accurate system in regular use. It included 20 pounds of explosive charge, though recent versions use less explosives to reduce the risk of collateral damage and civilian deaths.
Having said that, precision can only take you so far: governments do not publish lethal blast-radius information, but a video released by the UK’s Ministry of Defence shows a Hellfire blast radius of several metres. Blast is also affected by the angle at which a missile hits a target, the local topography and any nearby structures which might absorb some of the explosion. Also, even light clouds can disrupt the laser beams that laser-guided missiles like the Hellfire rely on to hit their targets accurately.
This is still much more accurate than more traditional bombs, though these are being improved for accuracy too. Traditional unguided 500-pound, 1,000-pound and 2,000-pound “dumb” bombs are being converted into “smart” Guided Bomb Units (GBU) by attaching a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance tail kit.
The JDAM contains inertial navigation – an internal computer and gyroscopes to ensure it flies straight – as well as global positioning-system guidance capabilities. They can only hit coordinates and can’t “see” or avoid civilians, though unlike the Hellfire missiles, they are not affected by cloud cover. The 2,000-pound version can be lethal up to several hundred metres away but the guidance kit enables them to strike between [10 and 30 metres] of their targets.
Danger to civilians
The development of more precise missiles and guided bombs does not automatically mean a reduction in civilian deaths. For one thing, “precision” is not about protecting civilians so much as making these weapons “ more lethal ”.
A whole range of factors affect the civilian risk during a “precision” attack. These include the size and explosive yield of the missile or bomb; the training and experience of the aircrew involved; the quality of the military intelligence; and the operational environment in which the attack is made.
Political implications for the countries involved are also a factor. The British government, for example, has faced public scrutiny for civilian deaths in air strikes in a way that, say, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has not.
Much also depends on the rules of engagement – or legal guidance, because they will set out how many civilians a government is prepared, or not, to allow its air force to kill in pursuit of its military campaign objectives.
Law of war
The law of war – which includes the Geneva Conventions – requires civilians to be protected in war and not attacked. But – and this is not commonly understood – the law allows civilians to be legally killed in some circumstances: where the number of deaths is judged by the attacker not to be “excessive in relation to the concrete and [direct military advantage] anticipated”. So if a target is judged to be valuable enough, and the military advantage important enough, civilians can and will be killed.
On August 29 2021, ten Afghan civilians were killed by a Hellfire missile from a US Reaper drone. The precision of the missile did not save them. The crew responsible made the mistake through a combination of human error, miscommunication and the fact that the family’s Toyota Corolla had been wrongly identified as the car of an important ISIS target.
Members of the family hit by the August 2021 drone attack with the wreckage of their car.
EPA-EFE/stringer
Lieutenant General Sami Said, the US air force inspector general, described it as “ an honest mistake ”. His enquiry also found that the crew had not broken the law of war.
Sometimes harming civilians is the point
Sometimes air power is also used to directly target or coerce civilian populations. For example, in 2016 Amnesty International reported air attacks by Russian forces on Syrian hospitals. Six hospitals or medical facilities were bombed in three months in areas controlled by forces opposed to the Syrian government. Dozens of civilians were killed or injured. This, despite hospitals being explicitly protected under international humanitarian law.
Direct hits on all of those hospitals indicate the operational effectiveness of the aircraft and weapons involved. Russia was open about its use of “precision” weapons by its air force in Syria at the time. Putin spoke of Russia acting in Syria in support of its government within “the norms of international law ”. When he referred to Russian strike aircraft producing “ positive results "m, it was about keeping Syria’s government in power, not protecting civilians.
3742. THE INPUT IS INTELLIGENCE. Every listed cause is upstream of the weapon---and stays.
Onuoha et al. 23 — Freedom Onuoha, Idris Mohammed and Oluwole Ojewale. December 13. Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Security, Violence and Conflict Research Group at the University of Nigeria. Conflict Researcher at Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto. Regional Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator for Central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies. ISS Today, “Nigeria’s military mistakes cost the country its civilians,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-military-mistakes-cost-the-country-its-civilians Clopus
Last week’s accidental bombing of Tudun Biri in Kaduna State by the Nigerian Army’s drone unit is the country’s most devastating military mishap in six years, with 120 casualties. Survivors say they were bombed twice in the 5 December incident, and one family said they lost 32 members.
Punch newspaper reports that over 425 people, including children and women, were killed by military accidental bombings between September 2017 and 2023.
Drawing from previous findings and the official response from the Nigerian Defence Headquarters on past airstrike mishaps, three main factors are needed to avoid accidental bombings. These are human intelligence (collection of information from human sources), signal intelligence (electronic transmissions that can be collected by air, military aircraft, ground sites, or satellites), and imagery intelligence (analysis and visual representation of security-related activities on the ground).
3753. BLUNT INSTRUMENT. Their own protection advocate says the fix is local intelligence, not kit.
Dietrich 16 — Kyle Dietrich. June 21. Senior program manager for the Africa program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict; graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. CIVIC, “How Nigeria’s Air Campaign Against Boko Haram Could Backfire,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/how-nigerias-air-campaign-against-boko-haram-could-backfire/ Clopus
On June 17, the Nigerian Air Force announced it was escalating its air campaign against Boko Haram militants in northeastern Nigeria. But the new phase of its counterinsurgency operations, called ‘Operation Gama-Aiki’ (“Finish the Job” in Hausa), could be deeply problematic, raising the likelihood of increased civilian casualties, decreased trust between the government and the people, and practically handing militants more ammunition against the government.
Nigeria has conducted hundreds of air strikes against potential Boko Haram militants since President Muhammadu Buhari took office a year ago. While these air strikes and regional military operations have been successful at dislodging militants from the Sambisa Forest and other insurgent strongholds, reports show that because the Nigerian military often lacks precision-guided weapons, air strikes cause significant civilian harm and often create more distrust and fuel radicalization.
According to one report , 92 percent of all civilian deaths and injuries were thanks to explosive weapons used in populated areas, with 28 percent attributable to air-launched weaponry. In 2015, Nigeria was the fourth most harmful conflict (after Syria, Iraq, and Yemen) for civilians because of explosive weapons, which includes aircraft launched bombs and rockets.
Although there is a general lack of public reporting from remote areas where Boko Haram operates, we know insurgents often live among local populations, forcibly marry women and recruit men to fight, and use civilians including abducted persons as human shields. The likelihood of civilian harm as a result of an air strike remains high, as we saw in 2015 when an air strike accidentally killed more than 35 people at a funeral gathering in a Niger border town.
To address allegations and counter widespread local distrust of the military’s air operations, Nigerian military leaders must ensure that ongoing operations avoid harming civilian men, women, and children and do more to protect them from Boko Haram.
To do this, the Nigerian Air Force needs to develop stronger local intelligence, robust pre-strike assessments, and rapid post-strike battle damage assessment capabilities. If, despite all precautionary measures, the military harms civilians, it should appropriately address such harm by making amends in the form of public apologies, monetary payments, or other assistance to victims or their families. CIVIC is currently calling on the Nigerian military to create a civilian harm tracking capability , which would bolster the military’s capacity to prevent and respond to allegations of civilian harm caused by their operations.
All this is no easy feat, but one concrete step the Nigerian Air Force could take immediately would be to avoid using cluster bombs or similar munitions. (Nigeria is a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions but has not ratified the treaty.) Not only are cluster bombs a dangerous and imprecise weapon of war, but there are reports that Boko Haram uses the military’s unexploded ordnance, including cluster bomblets , in IEDs against civilian and military targets .
Ultimately, air strikes against Boko Haram are a blunt instrument against an often-unseen enemy, when what the current phase of the conflict requires is a surgical approach. Air operations need to be balanced with longer-term military and non-military approaches that stabilize communities and restore security.
It should be a strategic imperative for Nigeria to do more than avoid causing harm to civilians; the government and security forces should re-focus their mission on improving the physical protection of civilians from Boko Haram. By preventing accidental harm and protecting civilians from violence, the Nigerian military will be better placed to break the cycle of violence and rebuild trust and damaged relations between affected communities and security forces.
3764. ONLY ONE THING PROTECTS. A camera can't see through a wall---so not firing is the variable.
Lee 21 — Peter Lee. November 19. Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of Security and Risk Research at the University of Portsmouth; author of Reaper Force, an embedded study of RAF MQ-9 crews. The Conversation, “Modern warfare: ‘precision’ missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here’s why,” https://theconversation.com/modern-warfare-precision-missiles-will-not-stop-civilian-deaths-heres-why-171905 Clopus
As aerial firepower has become more sophisticated, the risks of civilian deaths also rise for other reasons. For example, IS has repeatedly demonstrated effective methods of reducing its enemy’s aerial advantage, such as resorting to urban warfare and creating a network of tunnels under cities such as Mosul and Fallujah in Iraq.
In urban warfare it is impossible to avoid all civilian deaths. A camera in the sky cannot tell if there are civilians out of sight behind walls, in buildings, under trees or in tunnels. Choosing not to shoot is the only sure protection for civilians in unclear circumstances.
For all these reasons, no degree of missile precision will stop the tragedy of civilian deaths in war. And wars show no sign of ending. Perhaps it is time for a more honest dialogue about the limits of technology and the human costs involved.
377The label is a vote-getter, not a category---it's how the sale survives the floor.
Jarrar 21 — Raed Jarrar. December 9. Advocacy Director of Democracy for the Arab World Now. DAWN, “The Fallacy of ‘Defensive’ Weapons Is Just a Ploy to Justify Arms Sales,” https://dawnmena.org/the-fallacy-of-defensive-weapons-is-just-a-ploy-to-justify-arms-sales/ Clopus
But the resolution failed, 30-67, mostly because of the myth that the weapons included in the deal are only "defensive" in nature—280 Raytheon-built Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, known as AMRAAMs, that Saudi Arabia says its fighter jets need against Houthi drones from Yemen.
Earlier this year, President Joe Biden announced that he would no longer sell "offensive weapons" to the Saudi government that would assist in their ongoing military campaign in Yemen, which left many wondering what exactly the difference is between a "defensive" and "offensive" weapon. In a statement slamming the efforts in the Senate to block the Saudi arms sale, the Biden administration argued that doing so would "undermine the President's commitment to aid in our partner's defenses at a time of increased missile and drone attacks against civilians in Saudi Arabia."
But weapons are weapons. This new false dichotomy of "defensive" versus "offensive" weapons is nothing more than a political ploy to justify selling more arms to abusive governments like Saudi Arabia's. This arms sale represents a further backtrack on Biden's campaign vow that, as president, he would make the Saudi government "pay the price" for its killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi—including by making it "very clear we were not going to in fact sell more weapons to them," especially to resupply the Saudi-led war in Yemen that has killed thousands of civilians and created the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
378There are no defensive weapons without offensive value---and the ban never stopped a shipment.
Farooq 22 — Umar A Farooq. July 12. Washington correspondent for Middle East Eye covering US foreign policy and the arms trade, quoting the director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies. Middle East Eye, “US claims it only sells ‘defensive’ weapons to Saudi Arabia. But does this distinction exist?,” https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/us-saudi-arabia-selling-defensive-weapons-does-distinction-exist Clopus
"I think that the GAO report acknowledges what many of us outside of government have been saying forever, that this distinction is a fake one," said Phyllis Bennis, director of the New Internationalism Project at the Institute for Policy Studies.
"There are really no defensive weapons that don't have offensive value."
Concerns over broader escalation with Iran
While the ban on "offensive weaponry" has not stopped weapons from flowing to Saudi Arabia, experts have raised concerns that the reports of lifting weapons restrictions come at the same time that the Biden administration is seeking greater cooperation between Gulf allies as well as Israel.