3514. NOBODY'S WATCHING. The US can't see what the units it trains actually do.
Dalton 20 — Melissa Dalton. July 9. Senior fellow and deputy director with the International Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS, “Conduct Is the Key: Improving Civilian Protection in Nigeria,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/conduct-key-improving-civilian-protection-nigeria Clopus
Nigeria will not succeed in addressing the root causes of conflict in the country if its civilians do not trust state security institutions to protect them. Despite continued abuses and lack of accountability of security forces, the Nigerian government has taken some important steps to address civilian harm resulting from its presence and operations. From 2016 to 2017, the Nigerian government, in partnership with civil society organizations, developed a draft policy on protecting civilians and mitigating civilian harm, still under consideration. Nigeria would be one of the few countries in the world, and the first in Africa, to adopt such a policy.
However, even if the government adopts this policy, given tenuous civilian control of the security forces, the Nigerian government will have to work with international donors and civil society on parallel efforts to incorporate civilian protection into training, doctrine, exercises, and operations of the security forces. The Nigerian military has, with the help of partners, integrated civilian harm mitigation into a number of its military training curricula. Brigades and battalions in the northeast are regularly engaging with community structures in a number of localities to improve the protection of civilians. Notable examples include providing firewood and farming patrols to protect civilians from abduction, harm, or death resulting from opposition group attacks. It will also need to strengthen independent justice institutions to hold violators accountable.
Despite international condemnation of security forces’ abuses, increases in international donor security sector assistance over the last three years have sent mixed messages to the Nigerian government. While abuses and a lack of accountability have subjected specific units—such as the CJTF—to restrictions under the Leahy Laws , and earlier in the conflict, the United States did withhold assistance as a policy matter following a pattern human rights abuses by Nigerian military units, it has been more willing to overlook these concerns in recent years. U.S. security sector assistance has increased under the Trump administration. The Department of Defense notified Congress of over $16 million in training and equipment support (10 U.S.C. 333) in FY2018 and FY2019 for Nigeria and has moved forward with the delivery of 12 Super Tucano light attack aircraft despite civilian casualty concerns in the conduct of Nigerian air operations.
Even with increased security sector assistance, U.S. in-country military presence is limited, and training is neither regular nor widespread. While Nigeria is an important security partner on the continent, the U.S. military lacks the presence and access required to oversee partner forces effectively, nor does it have the influence or degree of cooperation to overcome deficits in Nigerian capacity or conduct. As a result, the approach to mitigating civilian harm in Nigeria will have to include a range of measures that calibrates to the degree of leverage that outside donors like the United States can bring to bear.
3525. THE TEACHER FAILS THE COURSE. Washington can't comply with its own harm-mitigation plan.
Ngulde 6-8 — Adamu Aliyu Ngulde. June 8. Maiduguri-based reporter for Drop Site News covering the Lake Chad conflict. Drop Site News, “U.S.-Nigerian Strikes Killed Dozens of Civilians, Villagers Say,” https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/united-states-nigeria-iswap-borno-strikes-civilian-casualties Clopus
Besides trumpeting the elimination of senior militant leaders, the U.S. government has provided little detail or transparency about who is actually being killed in its attacks, while the Nigerian government has likewise shown little discretion in its own counterinsurgency practices. Last month, after a terrorist attack blamed on ISWAP at a crowded market killed nearly 200 people, the governor of Borno stated that civilian areas can be considered legitimate military targets for retaliatory strikes.
A report by the Pentagon’s Inspector General released days before the attack on Metele concluded that because of funding cuts and reassignments the Department of War is not equipped to comply with its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan. “We’re departing from the rules and norms that we’ve tried to establish as a global community since at least World War II,” Wes J. Bryant, an analyst who worked on civilian harm mitigation at the Pentagon said in an interview with ProPublica. “There’s zero accountability.” Bryant lost his job last year amid a purge of staff focused on mitigating civilian casualties in strikes.
Trump has justified military involvement in Nigeria as part of an attempt to halt attacks on Christians in the country by Islamist groups. People of all faiths have been killed in Nigeria during a complex and multisided insurgency against the government, and the Nigerian government itself is multiconfessional. But activists in the U.S. have spent years working to convince American leadership to view the war as a religious campaign in defense of Christians in particular.
The messaging appears to have been successful in convincing Trump to act. On December 25, 2025 the U.S. carried out its first confirmed airstrike in Nigeria, in Sokoto state in the northwest. No civilian casualties were reported. The strikes, President Trump said , targeted “ISIS Terrorist Scum” who have been “viciously killing, primarily, innocent Christians, at levels not seen for many years, and even Centuries!”
Two months later, U.S. troops began arriving in the country for counterterrorism operations. In a press briefing at the time, AFRICOM Commander General Dagvin R.M. Anderson Commander confirmed the deployment, stating that a meeting with Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu at the end of 2025 had resulted in “increased collaboration between our two nations,” and describing Nigeria as “a very willing and capable partner who requested the unique capabilities that only the U.S. can bring.”
The series of strikes in May that allegedly killed al-Minuki, alongside dozens of civilians in Metele, has been celebrated by Trump administration officials as a major victory of this new intervention. In a cabinet meeting last week, War Secretary Pete Hegseth spoke about the strikes in Nigeria, claiming that the U.S. had killed a top ISIS commander “responsible for killing Christians and trying to target the U.S. homeland.” In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 3, Secretary of State Marco Rubio made similar comments, stating that the administration was “very concerned about violence against Christians,” and that counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria would continue to help address this issue.
3531. THE GATE IS THE WAR. Access is throttled by operations and hostilities, not by budget.
OCHA 4-29 — United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. April 29. The UN body that coordinates humanitarian access negotiation and reporting across Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. OCHA, “North-East Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states (BAY) First Quarter Humanitarian Access Snapshot (as of 29 April 2026),” https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/nigeria/north-east-nigeria-borno-adamawa-and-yobe-states-bay-first-quarter-humanitarian-access-snapshot-29-april-2026 Clopus
During Q1 2026, the humanitarian access in North-East Nigeria remained highly constrained due to military operations/ongoing hostilities, the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance, and illegal checkpoints along main supply routes (MSRs) and secondary roads, which regularly hindered response operations. Escalating insecurity across affected Local Government Areas (LGAs) continues to compromise civilian safety with attacks on towns regularly leading to large-scale civilian displacement from Gwoza, Pulka, Abadam, and Kukawa LGAs. The persistent insecurity in these areas poses significant risks to humanitarian personnel and assets, thereby limiting access and the ability to conduct timely assessments and interventions. Lastly, bureaucratic constraints in the form of halting cash distributions and registration of communication devices impeded partners' work until they were cleared up by advocacy efforts.
Humanitarian actors are increasingly exposed to risks such as ambushes, abductions, harassment, and threats from non-state armed groups (NSAGs), resulting in reduced field presence and constrained access. These constraints are compounded by the fact that some LGAs in the BAY States are not regularly serviced by UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), which makes road transport the only viable option for humanitarian actors. These challenges continue to delay or limit the delivery of life-saving assistance, further exacerbating unmet needs among vulnerable people.
3542. MONEY DOESN'T BUY ROADS. Insecurity contracts access---agencies spend the surge on armour.
Alesin 4-27 — Philip Alesin. Policy and advocacy professional; PhD thesis on how state dysfunction shapes humanitarian effectiveness in complex emergencies. The New Humanitarian, “To deliver a better humanitarian response, we need to fix Nigeria’s state dysfunction,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2026/04/27/deliver-better-humanitarian-response-fix-nigeria-state-dysfunction Clopus
The state’s inability to secure territory – in the BAY states and beyond – has created a landscape of constant risk for civilians and relief workers. Aid convoys are vulnerable to ambush, farmers are attacked in their fields, while communities are displaced again and again.
Humanitarian agencies must fund their own protection – armoured vehicles, escorts, hardened compounds (even in Abuja) – which diverts scarce resources away from those in need. As insecurity expands, access contracts, coverage shrinks, response speed slows, putting many more at risk.
Infrastructure deficit
Infrastructure deficits are constraints humanitarian actors cannot work around. Bad roads, destroyed bridges and weak communications make movement slow and predictable, increasing exposure to attack. The destruction of critical infrastructure – in a context where transport systems are limited even in peacetime – continues to shape access and deepen vulnerabilities .
Socioeconomic fragility
This further limits what humanitarian actors can achieve. Pre‑existing extreme poverty means aid must be shared with host communities often just as vulnerable as the displaced.
With low literacy a defining characteristic of the BAY states, feedback systems relying on written communication rarely work, and livelihood programmes struggle where educational foundations are so weak. A thin local professional workforce with the language skills needed to engage affected communities limits localisation efforts and long‑term sustainability.
The tension between donor funding and programmatic priorities, the coordination gaps, the weak engagement with affected people, and the protractedness of the crisis are the contexts in which humanitarians typically operate the world over.
Yet in Nigeria’s case there is the added dimension of structural challenges, which produce three predictable outcomes:
Coordination failure – weak state institutions make coordination harder. Nigerian Humanitarian Affairs Minister Bernard Doro recently admitted that “longstanding challenges of fragmentation, duplication, and lack of coordination have hindered effective humanitarian response and poverty reduction efforts in Nigeria”.
Operational distortion – local elites and security actors shape access and targeting, which can also include the theft of supplies.
“Sometimes, [state camp officials and security agents] take those relief materials and mortgage them,” a government official told me. “That’s when you go to the camps and see something like survival sex. It is not [the women’s] intention to have sex for something, but they do it just to have access to food or other amenities.”
Structural constraints – humanitarians cannot rebuild roads, stabilise the currency, or repair education systems – which impacts the success of the aid response.
The system is not failing. The problem is that it’s being asked to replace state functions it was never designed to perform.
A crisis at risk of deeper neglect
After 17 years of insurgent conflict, the northeast remains one of Nigeria’s most visible humanitarian operations. Yet visibility has not translated into sustained political commitment – either at the local or global level.
The Borno State government, while rightly questioning the dependency aid can breed, is also deeply suspicious of the humanitarian system that does the heavy lifting.
Bureaucratic restrictions and security concerns inhibit humanitarian access, while less pronounced forms of political interference skew decision‑making – not always in the best interests of the affected communities.
“I recall in one of the local governments, our women empowerment programme was delayed because the selection process was so politically influenced,” an NGO interviewee explained. “I had to cancel it; and starting it all over we lost a few months.”
Such a long-running crisis also generates relief fatigue. By the end of last year, the UN’s humanitarian response plan was only 31% funded, while UNICEF faced a 53% finance gap.
That under-resourcing also applies to domestic institutions such as the federal National Emergency Management Agency, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, and state‑level agencies.
The scale of needs continues to rise as operational capacity is stretched ever thinner.
Meanwhile, the lack of investment hampers home-grown durable solutions as donors turn their attention to newer, more urgent crises around the world.
What would it take to change course?
Three shifts are essential:
Recognise the crisis for what it is – a systemic governance and development failure.
Rebuild the foundations of state functionality – provide effective governance, security, infrastructure, and public services.
Protect humanitarian space and funding – before the crisis slips further into neglect.
3553. THE ARMY DECIDES. Access outside cleared ground is prohibited---that's a policy, not a shortfall.
Dalton 20 — Melissa Dalton. July 9. Senior fellow and deputy director with the International Security Program and director of the Cooperative Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS, “Conduct Is the Key: Improving Civilian Protection in Nigeria,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/conduct-key-improving-civilian-protection-nigeria Clopus
In addition, based on Nigeria’s Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013 , which prohibits contact with groups designated as terrorists, the Nigerian military denies humanitarian access to areas outside their control. This restriction leaves over a million people without access to humanitarian assistance. The military reportedly prevents aid workers from reaching millions of people and prompts safety concerns as other parties to the conflict may perceive aid groups as taking the government’s side. Amidst restrictions due to Covid-19, more Nigerians allegedly have been killed by Nigerian military and police that the novel coronavirus itself, according to Nigeria’s National Human Rights Commission.
Northeast Nigeria has a history of self-defense groups mobilizing to provide protection or security in the absence of the state. The current crisis led to the proliferation of such groups, some driven by the desire to protect their communities and others formed at the behest of the government. Several of these community militias have been amalgamated into the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). Some CJTF groups have received funding and in-kind assistance from the Borno State government, although civilian authorities do not have full control over their operations. CJTF now performs a range of security functions, often alongside the military, and has achieved tactical successes that reduced Boko Haram’s territorial control.
While community-based militias can provide valuable security functions, they also can cause civilian harm absent local and non-corrupt justice and accountability institutions or community-based norms for protecting civilians. Although CJTF forces are often based in their communities, some CJTF abuses may be attributed , in part, to the fact that some units have separated from their communities of origin, thus diluting relationships with the civilian population, which allowed for positive checks on their behavior in the past. The Nigerian government will likely struggle to demobilize the CJTF, which reportedly includes between 23,000 to 31,000 members. The government has taken few steps to investigate or punish CJTF members who committed human rights abuses, including past recruitment and use of child soldiers. However, some military commanders have removed CJTF leaders from their positions when advocacy groups have raised reports of abuse. The CJTF has signed a commitment to abstain from the use of child soldiers; it remains to be seen whether all members will comply. The CJTF also challenges the authority of local government officials and traditional leaders. It has become integrated into the local war economy, reportedly along with the military, participating in criminal networks even as it acts as a local police force.
3564. DONORS ALREADY TRIED. Insecurity is the first constraint, and the CP adds money to it.
Brechenmacher 19 — Saskia Brechenmacher. May 3. Fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/05/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram Clopus
There are two main reasons why the reintegration of former Boko Haram members has become a key international priority. First, given the unlikelihood of a peace agreement, incentivizing the defection and rehabilitation of low-level fighters has emerged as a potential mechanism to weaken the capacity of violent extremist groups. Second, those individuals who have already returned to their communities—after passing through a government rehabilitation program or being released by the military—have often been met with stigmatization, mistrust, and even violence. Communities are understandably reluctant to welcome those associated with violent extremist groups back into their fold, particularly as long as the victims of the conflict have yet to receive adequate support.
Stigmatization affects not only former combatants but also relatives of suspected fighters, women and girls abducted by Boko Haram, those who were living in Boko Haram–controlled areas, as well as children born out of forced marriages within the group. 53 As a result, there is a high risk that the return of former Boko Haram members could cause new tensions, and that some returnees could even return to violence if they struggle to find acceptance. The same risk surrounds local vigilante groups: while they are generally celebrated for providing protection to civilians during the height of the crisis, communities now worry about the likelihood of future violence associated with their politicization, turn to criminality, and intergroup rivalries. 54
International donors have responded to these challenges in two main ways. At the local level, they have funded programs that seek to provide psychosocial and livelihood support to Boko Haram victims and returnees and bridge intercommunal divisions. These efforts include community dialogues and family support sessions, direct support to returnees (especially women and girls abducted by Boko Haram), trainings for community leaders on reconciliation and conflict resolution, and radio programs that try to build support for the reintegration process. 55 They have also supported the Nigerian government’s small-scale defector program for repentant low-level combatants, called Operation Safe Corridor, and a rehabilitation center in Maiduguri for women and girls formerly affiliated with Boko Haram. In parallel, some donors—most prominently USAID, the International Organization for Migration, and the UN Development Program (UNDP)—have worked with the Nigerian government to develop a legal and policy framework to guide further reintegration efforts, and to harmonize procedures for screening, detaining, rehabilitating, or prosecuting suspects with neighboring countries.
Overarching Challenges
Several overarching challenges have complicated local-level stabilization efforts over the past two years. Ongoing insecurity presents the most immediate challenge, particularly in Borno State. Recurring attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP as well as ongoing military operations have delayed the return of displaced populations, prolonged humanitarian crisis conditions, and made it difficult for aid organizations to reach vulnerable communities. Second, donors have struggled to work through and with the Nigerian government, whose conflict response has been plagued by weak coordination and corruption. Difficulties in locating effective counterparts create a classic dilemma for external actors: work through the government and risk bureaucratic delays and political obstruction, or bypass it to the extent possible and risk creating parallel structures that fail to strengthen host government capacity. Lastly, weaknesses in regional cooperation present another significant hurdle. From reintegrating ex-combatants to preventing farmer-herder conflicts and rebuilding rural economies, many of the issues facing the Lake Chad region require cross-border approaches. To date, coordination efforts remain largely externally driven, and progress in implementation has been slow.
357The state converts development money into handouts---and it bars the NGOs who'd do the work.
Anyadike 11-5 — Obi Anyadike. November 5. Senior Africa editor at The New Humanitarian, reporting with community workers in Maiduguri. The New Humanitarian, “Boko Haram is back, and Nigeria’s IDP return policy is in trouble,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/11/05/boko-haram-back-nigeria-idp-return-policy-trouble Clopus
Protection is part of the equation of a successful resettlement policy, but so too are the economic opportunities that would allow people to make a fresh start. The Borno government’s restrictions on NGOs working with the resettled – and donor aid cuts – have undermined the livelihood support that could have eased re-entry.
Instead, people are being offloaded in rural towns whose local economies have been hammered by years of conflict. Health services – in poor shape even in Maiduguri – suffer from even more extreme staff shortages, drug and funding shortfalls, and physical decay. Schools face similar problems.
In the absence of structured and sequenced support, Zulum visits rural towns delivering food and cash handouts. The aid is sorely needed – people are hungry – but the help is ad hoc and resembles political campaigning rather than systematic development assistance.
Buka Bukarslay was resettled in Marte in 2022 with his two wives and nine children. In his first year, he had a brother killed collecting firewood, and he himself was shot in the mouth and arm during an ISWAP attack on the town that killed the head of the vigilante CJTF that he was sitting next to.
When he is completely broke, he hitches a ride with traders heading to Maiduguri and looks for help from relatives in the city. “There is no income in Marte,” he explained. He would stay in Maiduguri if he could, but he doesn’t have the money to rent a room and his relatives have no space to spare.
“Boko Haram calls us to go back to the bush”
The majority of IDPs are teenagers. They didn’t grow up farming, and their social world was the urban IDPs camps. The lack of economic opportunities in the rural areas, the tussles over landownership that exist, and the antagonisms and frustrations stirred by the weakness of state authority can potentially sharpen the ideological appeal of the insurgents.
“The fundamental issue is: what people are returning to,” said the Abuja-based consultant. “The conditions that dragged people into terrorism a decade ago still exist.”
Babagana Umaru fought with JAS until he surrendered in 2017. He joined the federal government’s Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) amnesty programme in 2019, and graduated a year later, before resettling in Banki, on the Cameroon border. The start-up capital he was given was enough to start a roadside fruit and vegetable business.
But he has found civilian life tough. He feels the community hasn’t really forgiven him, and chafes at what he feels are deliberate slights when he’s omitted from invitations to weddings and naming ceremonies. His lack of money also grates – compared to what, on reflection, seems now an easier lifer in the bush when fay’u kept him comfortable.
Some of his comrades who also went through OSC feel the same. He says he “knows a couple” who have given up and rejoined JAS.
“Boko Haram calls us to go back to the bush,” he told The New Humanitarian. “It’s only my mum talking to me saying ‘Don’t go back’ that stops me. But sometimes my heart is heavy and I think about it.”
The same remobilisation is underway among some former JAS fighters who have passed through the state government’s scheme, regarded as less rigorous and securitised than OSC. These men – believed by Maiduguri residents to be behind a spike in local kidnappings – are helping to fuel JAS’s resurgence.
“So many have gone back,” said the head of a community-based NGO in Maiduguri who asked not to be named for security reasons. “They surrendered, but then didn’t find what they were looking for. It’s all about livelihoods.”
358Donors have no counterpart---the civilian institutions are corrupt and fight each other.
Brechenmacher 19 — Saskia Brechenmacher. May 3. Fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/05/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram Clopus
In addition to ongoing insecurity, donors highlight the need to work through Nigerian government structures as a significant challenge. This problem was particularly acute in the early years of the crisis, when the Nigerian government under Goodluck Jonathan pursued a highly militarized response, and donors struggled to find viable counterparts for civilian stabilization efforts. Under Buhari, the Nigerian government has somewhat diversified its response operations: in 2016, it turned to the World Bank and the European Union to conduct a comprehensive Recovery and Peace-Building Assessment (RPBA) in the northeast, which informed the development of the so-called Buhari Plan that lays out a blueprint for postconflict stabilization and recovery. The Office of the National Security Adviser has emerged as a federal-level partner for international donors on civilian protection and demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) issues.
Yet while Buhari has publicly declared the northeast to be in a “post-conflict stabilization phase,” 64 coordination between the various civilian institutions charged with leading the civilian response is still weak. This list of institutions includes the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Initiative (PCNI), the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), an Inter-Ministerial Task Force charged with coordinating humanitarian relief operations, the Victim’s Support Fund, the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement in Borno, as well as state-level emergency management agencies. Many of these institutions have been marred by corruption, while institutional rivalries and overlapping mandates impede collaboration, obscure lines of accountability, and result in ad-hoc interventions. 65 As one EU diplomat put it, for international partners, “it is in many cases completely unclear who has the authority to make decisions and who is supposed to take the lead.” 66 On paper, the PCNI, inaugurated by Buhari in October 2016, was meant to serve as the primary strategy and coordination body. Yet the initiative was slow to get started, and its actual role on the ground has been limited. State- and local-level actors have often felt insufficiently consulted or involved in its activities. 67 In Borno, the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement has taken on a central role, yet its leadership has shown little interest in engaging with donors that are seeking to improve transparency in relief and recovery activities. 68
In addition, policymaking at the federal level is not always aligned with the priorities of the state governments. In the early years of the insurgency, political tensions between Jonathan and the governors of Borno and Yobe States (who belonged to the opposition party) exacerbated already weak coordination. 69 Even today, diplomats and donor agencies in Abuja face a constant balancing act between different levels of governance. As one foreign embassy representative notes, “it is striking how different the discourse is at the local level than it is in Abuja. . . . There is much less recognition that there are continued challenges [in Abuja], whereas the local-level actors react more speedily.” 70 At the same time, state governments are reluctant to give up control over resource flows and interventions: for example, the Borno State government has resisted the PCNI’s efforts at response coordination. 71 For donors seeking to engage on policy questions, this often means having to build support and seek influence across multiple levels while navigating conflicting information, political divides, and different degrees of reform commitment.
Lastly, across all levels of governance, corruption and mismanagement directly undermine the conflict response. Under Goodluck Jonathan, humanitarian aid delivery was highly politicized, and projects for the northeast’s economic recovery launched by the Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE) existed mostly on paper. While Buhari was first elected on the promise of fighting corruption, he has failed to follow through on many of his reform commitments. A 2016 Senate investigation into PINE uncovered large-scale corruption that continued into Buhari’s first term in office, including questionable payments to contractors, money spent on shelters that never materialized, and over $7.9 million in funds that could not be accounted for. 72 There have been few investigations or prosecutions of corruption cases, and the government’s use of security votes—which are opaque discretionary funds provided to certain federal, state, and local government officials for security-related expenses that serve as de facto slush funds—dramatically increased between 2016 and 2018. 73
On the ground, reports of government officials, traditional leaders, and local politicians diverting aid abound. Both NEMA and its state-level counterparts have been led by political cronies who have been accused of diverting millions of aid dollars into private hands. 74 For local-level stabilization efforts, the scale of corruption poses multiple challenges: it undermines citizen trust in the recovery process, risks worsening perceptions of government neglect, and draws money away from urgent reconstruction and service delivery needs. It also perverts political incentives: as long as certain federal, state, and local actors are benefiting financially from ongoing insecurity and the continued influx of resources into the northeast, they have little interest in seriously tackling the crisis and its drivers.
Civil society groups in the northeast are concerned that the Nigerian government’s move toward stabilization and early recovery will further worsen corruption. Its approach to stabilization so far has centered heavily on the return of displaced populations and infrastructure reconstruction, which has already attracted large amounts of funding from international development banks. Ahead of the 2019 presidential election, reconstruction activities appeared to be focused on demonstrating visible progress in the fight against Boko Haram, at the expense of careful planning and preparation. This became particularly evident in the rushed return of IDPs to their home communities over the course of 2018, an issue explored in further detail below. Peacebuilding organizations also highlight the risk of reconstruction resources being used to benefit politicians’ economic interests while the needs of local communities are sidelined. 75
Many interviewees on the ground criticize the government’s reconstruction efforts for insufficiently involving local communities, and prioritizing those areas with political connections or rich in symbolism. A focus on political drivers of the crisis is conspicuously lacking. “The government is trying to resolve things faster than the conflict allows for,” says one local nonprofit worker. “They recognize the issue of underdevelopment and poverty, but they haven’t really acknowledged the governance dimension. We feel that there is a real risk if they fail to listen to the people who are affected. It is the first thing that gets cut.” 76
Insufficient Regional Cooperation
Lastly, stabilization efforts to date have been stymied by weaknesses in regional cooperation. Although Nigeria has been most severely affected by Boko Haram’s violence, the crisis spans the entire Lake Chad basin. Challenges such as the return of displaced populations, the reintegration of Boko Haram members, and socioeconomic recovery in rural areas require cross-border approaches. Given the porousness of borders in the region, a lack of coordination risks simply displacing the conflict from one country to the next. Yet to date, political and civilian cooperation has lagged behind joint military action.
In the early years of the crisis, international donors lacked a clear regional approach to the crisis. The U.S. government, for example, proceeded primarily on bilateral lines, with the aim of targeting the unique vulnerabilities of each of the Lake Chad countries. Only as the conflict expanded and as the government of Goodluck Jonathan proved to be an unwilling partner did donors’ focus shift to a regional response. The U.S. government created or adapted various structures to better coordinate U.S. activities across countries, including USAID’s West Africa Regional CVE Unit (based in Accra) and an interagency coordination structure within the State Department headed by a senior coordinator on Boko Haram, established in 2015. These initiatives proved fairly successful in ensuring greater alignment and better information-sharing between agencies. 77
Yet on the ground, several factors have stood in the way of closer collaboration. First, the region lacks an effective political infrastructure. It is divided between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which includes Niger and Nigeria, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), which includes Chad and Cameroon. A history of interstate conflict—while not as devastating as the region’s civil wars—exacerbates these divisions. The Lake Chad Basin Commission, which formally hosts the Multinational Joint Task Force, lacks funding and capacity, and has little experience dealing with peace and security issues. Its capacity to manage a conflict response operation of this scale has therefore been doubted from the outset. 78
359The campaign is self-defeating---a miss isn't a tragedy, it's a combat failure.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The frequency of airstrike mishaps in Nigeria has raised serious concerns regarding the country's airpower capabilities and operational effectiveness. The successful execution of airstrikes in combat situations demands a high level of technical expertise and precision. While some unintended civilian casualties could be deemed understandable if the intended target is hit, it is a much graver operational failure when an airstrike completely misses its mark and causes indiscriminate harm elsewhere (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5). The loss of civilian lives through failure to take adequate precautions in targeting, or through disproportionate military response is against international laws of armed combat.
Nigeria’s recurring pattern of airstrike mishaps reflects operational deficiencies or ineptitude, particularly in its counterinsurgency efforts. These mishaps not only tarnish the reputation of the Nigerian military but also significantly impact its combat proficiency (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 6, 7). Consequently, they undermine the military's overall effectiveness and pose a major challenge to the country's counterinsurgency endeavours (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 2). There is a need to recognise that accurate intelligence is crucial for the success of airstrikes; it informs target selection, timing, and execution. When intelligence is flawed, airstrikes can miss their intended targets, hitting civilian areas or friendly forces instead. These failures can result from inadequate reconnaissance, faulty data analysis, or communication breakdowns within the military hierarchy. Mutch and Afzal (Citation2023) describe these mishaps as a case of an ‘innocent mistake.’ However, this perspective overlooks the systemic issues within military intelligence operations. Intelligence failures often reflect deeper problems in the planning and execution stages of military operations. For instance, if intelligence reports are based on outdated or incomplete information, the likelihood of an airstrike hitting the wrong target increases. Similarly, if there is a failure in communication between intelligence analysts and military commanders, the airstrike may proceed based on incorrect or misunderstood data. These deficiencies in intelligence, in conjunction with military errors, are significant factors contributing to civilian harm resulting from airstrikes conducted for counterinsurgency operations.
360Their own advocate dates the reform---and names misidentification as the unsolved problem.
CIVIC 25 — Center for Civilians in Conflict, quoting Vianney Bisimwa, CIVIC Africa and MENA Program Director. June 3. The NGO that has run civilian-harm-mitigation training for the Nigerian military since 2018. CIVIC, “CIVIC Welcomes Nigerian Air Force’s New Action Plan to Prevent Civilian Harm,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/press-releases/civic-welcomes-nigerian-air-forces-new-action-plan-to-prevent-civilian-harm/ Clopus
Abuja, NIGERIA, June 3, 2025 – Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) welcomes the Nigerian Air Force’s recent announcement of a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which marks an important commitment to take tangible steps to minimize harm to civilians from aerial operations.
“We applaud efforts by Nigerian military leaders to protect civilians, especially amid mounting security challenges. This is a promising step to take concrete measures to prevent civilian harm,” said Vianney Bisimwa, Africa and MENA Program Director at CIVIC.
Focusing on preventing civilian harm from airstrikes is a promising step to institutionalize protection of civilians practices in Nigeria’s military. It has become clear that a pattern of airstrikes harming civilians—often due to misidentification and air-to-ground integration challenges—requires a concerted effort to identify practical solutions.
We encourage all security forces in Nigeria to follow the example set by the Air Force. Sustained, consistent progress in the protection of civilians will require a policy framework that builds on the Action Plan and connects it to parallel efforts among other security forces in the country. To that end, CIVIC reiterates its call for a national Protection of Civilians Policy in Nigeria applicable to all security forces. Ongoing reviews of national policy frameworks offer a key opportunity to elevate protection of civilians and coordinate efforts among security forces.
CIVIC is ready to support Nigeria in implementing the policy and to promote the development of parallel efforts.
“The ultimate test of any policy framework is how well it delivers results for civilians,” Bisimwa said.
361Eight years of training the same force---the counterplan is a repeat, not a fix.
CIVIC 24 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. Protection-of-civilians NGO that has trained Nigerian security forces and community militias in the northeast since 2018. CIVIC, “Barriers and Bridges to Protection: Civil-Military Engagement in Northeast Nigeria,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/barriers-and-bridge-to-protection/ Clopus
Civilians in northeast Nigeria are caught in the middle of an ongoing conflict between the Government of Nigeria and multiple armed opposition groups (AOGs) that have grown from Boko Haram since 2009. Tens of thousands have lost their lives, with many more injured and millions displaced from their homes and facing food insecurity. Efforts to defeat AOGs have been complicated, however, by a well-documented history of civilian harm and abuse by government security forces resulting in poor civil-military relations generally, and particularly in the northeast.
In 2018, Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) began engaging with communities and the military in northeast Nigeria to address the civil-military relationship, which according to civilians in the region, is a critical component to realizing improved protection. CIVIC began by providing training to Nigerian security forces on the protection of civilians and civilian harm mitigation. Recognizing that civilians are the best agents of their own protection, CIVIC then sought to enable civilian advocacy through the formation of local community protection committees. The goal of these committees was to first assess the threats to the community, and then to pursue improved protection outcomes through advocacy and engagement with security forces. Finally, civilians participating in the CPCs and military leaders deployed to the community engaged in new dialogue concerning civilian protection threats and the local civil-military relationship. Throughout this process civilians were encouraged to regularly engage with security forces to advocate for their protection from AOG attacks and raise concerns related to abuses committed by both state and non-state forces. This brief, “ Barriers and Bridges to Protection: Civil-Military Engagement in Northeast Nigeria “, is intended to be a reflection on the dialogue and engagement process in Banki and Monguno since 2019.
362Reform after Rann produced protocols---then denial, buried reports, and more gunships.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
Following the NAF airstrike at the Rann IDPs camp, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) played a crucial role in ensuring the protection of civilians and adherence to IHL. Seif Magango, spokesperson of the OHCHR stated, ‘While we acknowledge that the authorities have characterised the civilian deaths as accidental, we implore them to undertake all necessary measures in the future to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure in consistence with Nigeria's international legal obligations’ (Seif Magango, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). The question of whether the NAF airstrike violated IHL arose following the evidence that the tents used by the displaced persons were easily visible from the air. It prompted inquiries into the circumstances leading to such an incident. It is reasonable to expect that the military would have been aware of the populated civilian area and implemented the necessary precautions to prevent harm to the Rann camp.
High-profile incidents, such as the Rann attack have prompted some operational changes. For example, pre-strike reconnaissance protocols and enhanced pilot training measures have been reported (Alli, Citation2019). Nevertheless, logistical and resource limitations frequently compromise the effectiveness of these adjustments. Moreover, in disregard of civilian losses from aerial operations, the NAF approved a deal for more Cobra attack helicopters after the Rann attack (Jamiu, Citation2022). This move has been condemned by civil rights organisations because of the increasing civil casualties from aerial operations (Jamiu, Citation2022).
The NAF has shown a pattern of denying responsibility and even involvement in mishaps. Similar to the military’s response to the Rann attack, NAF initially denied the air raid in Buwari, Yobe State, stating that, ‘no bomb or missile was even used’ (Jamiu, Citation2022). However, the NAF later acknowledged the attack, admitting that civilian casualties may have occurred. The Rukubi attack is another instance in which NAF denied responsibility. Instead of acknowledging the operational error, the NAF designated the deceased as terrorists planning an attack on the community and required survivors to provide proof of civilian casualties. The NAF maintained that they had conducted surveillance and had verified the presence of terrorists before taking action (Ayodele Famuyiwa, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). Samiala, the surviving victim of the attack described above, remains deeply troubled by the Air Force's refusal to admit to the mistake in the airstrike and upset by the portrayal of his innocent siblings as terrorists. Samiala's emotional distress is palpable as he refutes the NAF’s account: ‘I lost eleven of my siblings in that tragic event; my siblings were inaccurately labeled as terrorists and killed in the airstrike’ (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a). He maintained that they were peaceful herders and that the deaths of his siblings had left an irreplaceable void in his life. Samiala further described the blatant NAF refusal to admit the mistake as the height of injustice.
Apart from the denial of NAF’s accidental airstrikes, as in the case of Rukubi, the failure to make reports of internal investigation public is another critical concern. Despite initiating two probes into the Rann attack, the outcomes have not been made public (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a). The NAF also initiated an investigation into the death of over 20 soldiers in an airstrike in Mainok, but it remains uncertain whether the military will reveal the report on this incident. Amnesty International (Citation2023) reported that after every erroneous strike, the military established an inquiry board to investigate the incident, but no further details were disclosed, and no punishments were given. The rights group contends that the Nigerian military's failure to take responsibility for past actions has resulted in more mistaken attacks. Further, Human Rights Watch (Citation2023b) notes that Nigerian government inability to hold the NAF accountable is fostering a culture of impunity and posing an increasing threat to the lives of the civilians whom the military should safeguard. As a result, the army has continued to conduct airstrikes that inadvertently result in civilian casualties (Amnesty International, Citation2024).
Isamotu (Citation2023) claims that due to the Nigerian government's lack of cooperation, those seeking legal redress against the military have faced deterrence. For example, after the Tudun Biri incident, Dalhatu Salihu filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government, but he was discouraged by his community leaders (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b). Similarly, despite persistent efforts by Samiala to seek justice following the Rukubi attack, he encountered frustration and disappointment. Samiala stated, ‘We have exhausted every avenue in pursuit of justice … ..’ (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b). The discouragement faced by victims in pursuing legal action is a sad reminder of the challenges that confront civilians in affected areas. Nevertheless, rights groups have consistently advocated the payment of compensation to victims. Abubakar Umar Garba, an intelligence and security expert, stated that timely compensation would ease the suffering and grief of the victims’ relatives and further advised the military high command to act on the compensation issue to prevent problems (Abubakar Garba, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). This lack of compensation underscores the government's failure and the suffering of the affected families. Nigerian security forces have also not adapted to the changing security landscape in the northwest, failing to apply the lessons learned from combating Boko Haram to bandits. Leena Hoffmann, a Fellow at the Chatham House African program, concludes that the Nigerian military is unable to engage in self-reflection, hold itself accountable, and transform into a force that protects civilians (Leena Hoffmann, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). This underscores the need for robust oversight and transparent investigations to rebuild confidence in the military (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b).
In this study, Nigeria’s airpower, intelligence lapses, civilian harm, and human rights concerns were analysed in relation to NAF’s combat airstrikes in northern Nigeria from 2014 to 2024.
363Partners can't leave the population centres---that's the whole surveillance gap.
OCHA 24 — United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Nigeria Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. Humanitarian Action, “Nigeria,” https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1190/article/nigeria-1 Clopus
Operational challenges persist. In Borno State, for instance, all primary supply routes are insecure for civilians, humanitarian workers, and supplies. Partners are still unable to deliver outside major population centres due to insecurity. Though some areas of Adamawa and Yobe states have witnessed improved security, aid organisations are still grappling with significant threats.
The persistent conflict and insecurity have severed people from their primary livelihoods, notably agricultural activities. Those who venture outside the protective trenches surrounding the population centres in many parts of Borno are at risk of being killed, maimed, kidnapped or subjected to sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). This has led to severe food insecurity across north-east Nigeria. Females, in their quest for survival, are often pushed towards negative coping mechanisms such as sex work. Young boys, in their desperation, become easy targets for recruitment by non-state militant groups.
364The army's own posture ceded the countryside---fortified towns, no reach beyond them.
Anyadike 11-5 — Obi Anyadike. November 5. Senior Africa editor at The New Humanitarian, reporting with community workers in Maiduguri. The New Humanitarian, “Boko Haram is back, and Nigeria’s IDP return policy is in trouble,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/11/05/boko-haram-back-nigeria-idp-return-policy-trouble Clopus
The IDPs all stressed their feeling of vulnerability. All of them knew someone who had been either kidnapped or killed by the insurgents – some of them family members. With only threadbare protection from a seemingly indifferent military, there was a profound sense that they were on their own. “We can rely only on God”, was a common refrain.
Nguro Soye lies just outside Bama, roughly 70 kilometres from Maiduguri. It was resettled in 2022 with IDPs from Maiduguri’s Dalori II camp. When The New Humanitarian visited a few months after their arrival , the residents spoke of the constant harassment they faced from JAS at night – despite the presence of a military detachment only a few kilometres away. That threat appears to have only increased.
“Most of us have regretted coming,” said Fatima Mohamed, who arrived in Nguro Soye with her husband and teenage sons. “In Maiduguri, we stayed peacefully, but here there is no security. Everybody is thinking of leaving – and many have – because Soye at night … You lie in bed listening, wondering what will happen.”
“Losing ground”
Much of Borno’s countryside has been depopulated by the 15-year insurgency. The army switched to a “super camp” strategy in 2019 after losing a series of remote outposts, concentrating its forces in fortified bases in key towns. The drawback is they have offered little challenge to the consolidation of jihadist control over the wider terrain.
Yet, until recently, the military felt it had the upper hand – an optimism shared by the state government. An estimated 160,000 former JAS fighters and their families had deserted for amnesty and resettlement through the so-called “ Borno Model ” between 2021 and 2024. The stabilisation strategy, enthusiastically backed by the UN Development Programme, had looked set to rebuild state authority and legitimacy.
But the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) , which is distinct from JAS and the largest and most sophisticated of the insurgent groups, is still very much present. It has worked out how to overpower the military’s bases, with a devastating attack in September on Banki being the latest. Its use of dismounted night assaults, drones, IEDs, and feint attacks all demonstrate a tactical dexterity.