4214. DEPENDENCE. Their own notification---the package ships with resident American contractors and in-country maintenance.
DSCA 22 — Defense Security Cooperation Agency. April 14. Department of Defense agency that administers Foreign Military Sales and delivers the statutory certification notifying Congress of a proposed sale. U.S. Department of Defense, “Nigeria – AH-1Z Attack Helicopter Related FMS Acquisitions,” Transmittal No. 22-24, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/09/2003602747/-1/-1/0/PRESS%20RELEASE%20-%20NIGERIA%2022-24%20CN.PDF Clopus
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Nigeria for mobile training teams and contract logistics support. The case will include special training on the law of armed conflict and human rights, and air-to-ground integration to minimize civilian harm in air operations. This proposed sale will also require multiple trips by U.S. Government and contractor representatives to participate in program and technical reviews plus training and maintenance support in country, on a temporary basis, for a period of five (5) years. It will also require approximately three (3) contractor support representatives to reside in country for a period of two (2) years to support this program.
4221. The African drone market is Turkish---a NATO ally is who fills in.
ADF 25 — Africa Defense Forum. February 11. Professional military magazine published by U.S. Africa Command. ADF, “As Drone Warfare Expands in Africa, Turkey Increases Share of the Market,” https://adf-magazine.com/2025/02/as-drone-warfare-expands-in-africa-turkey-increases-share-of-the-market/ Clopus
Few weapons have changed the nature of warfare in Africa quite like drones. And few drones have been as popular and as effective as those coming from Turkey.
From small quadcopter-style ZD100 and ZD200 models to the fixed-wing, semi-autonomous Bayraktar TB2, Turkish drones are rapidly becoming the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) of choice for African nations.
While Turkish companies offer a variety of drones for a wide range of purposes, African nations have focused much of their attention on the military drones developed by Baykar, run by the son-in-law of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In late 2024, Kenya became the latest African nation to take delivery of Bayraktar TB2s, receiving six of the flying weapons platforms. Kenya received the UAVs shortly after Baykar announced on social media in August that Kenyan operators had completed their training.
Kenya joins a growing list of Baykar clients in Africa that includes Angola, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia. Rwanda may be trying to acquire Baykar drones as well, according to published reports.
In December 2024, Baykar launched a project to build and maintain Bayraktar TB2s and the more advanced Akinci drones in Morocco. Morocco bought 13 Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2021 for $70 million.
“By setting up a production factory in Morocco, the Turkish company will be able to deliver drones to its African clients quicker than its competitors,” the North African Post wrote in January.
At $2 million to $5 million each, the Bayraktar TB2 costs about a quarter the price of other military-grade drones. That makes it affordable for countries to boost their military capabilities despite modest defense budgets, according to analyst Patrick Kenyette writing for Military Africa.
African nations got their first look at Turkish drone technology during the Libyan civil war. Turkey’s alliance with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord allowed it to flood the battlefield with drones. In 2019, a Turkish drone attacked an air base controlled by the Libyan National Army. Drones also destroyed an Ilyushin cargo plane at the al-Jufra air base controlled by Russian mercenaries.
Turkish drones played a key role in Ethiopia’s defeat last year of Tigray rebels. They have also been employed against terrorists in Somalia. In West Africa, Nigeria and Togo are using Turkish drones to patrol their borders with Burkina Faso and Niger to prevent extremists from invading their countries.
In mid-2024, Turkey announced a plan to promote its drones in Africa with Saudi Arabia providing the financing to help with purchases. Some Baykar-made drones will also be manufactured in Saudi Arabia starting in 2026.
“Turkish drones have proven their effectiveness in many different battles, especially in Libya,” researcher Ahmed Abouyoussef wrote for the Al Habtoor Research Centre. “These locally made drones have provided Turkey with a new foreign policy tool that it has employed to maximize its external influence.”
Turkey’s no-strings-attached approach to drone exports has helped it build new military alliances across Africa, particularly among countries fighting insurgencies such as Ethiopia and Somalia, Abouyoussef noted. However, that same unconditional approach puts Turkey’s drone business at risk should its client nations use those weapons against civilians, as has already been done in some cases, or in other ways that could constitute war crimes, Abouyoussef wrote.
4232. Nigeria’s actual diversification is police multicopters and border UAVs---not a strike fleet.
Martin 22 — Guy Martin. October 6. Editor of defenceWeb, southern Africa’s defence and security news service. defenceWeb, “Nigeria acquires Songar armed drones from Turkey as UAV fleet grows,” https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/nigeria-acquires-songar-armed-drones-from-turkey-as-uav-fleet-grows/ Clopus
The Nigerian Police Force has taken delivery of a small batch of Songar armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey’s Asisguard, while larger UAVs are entering Nigerian military service.
Asisguard said the Songar deliveries were concluded on 15 September, but did not reveal further details. In May it was reported by Africa Intelligence that Nigeria had ordered ten Songars.
It is believed the contract was signed in 2021, as Asisguard last year announced contracts had been signed with two African countries and negotiations were underway with a third.
Unveiled in 2019, the Songar multicopter can be fitted with a machinegun, 40 mm grenade launcher or 81 mm mortar. It can also be fitted with a day/night camera gimbal and laser range finder. An electronic sight and ballistic calculation module assists with weapon deployment and recoil management. If using a 5.56 mm assault rifle, the Songar can carry 200 rounds of ammunition and hit a 15 square centimetre target from 200 metres away with single shots, 15-round bursts or fully automatic fire. When carrying a grenade launcher, four rounds can be fired.
The 25 kg drones use a four-armed carbon body design with two coaxially mounted propellers on each arm. A weapon is fitted to a tilting mount, allowing a remote operator to aim it. Flight time is up to 25 minutes for the gun-equipped version and 15 minutes for the grenade launcher version.
The Nigerian police are expected to use the Songar against armed gangs and bandits, which have recently caused havoc in several states.
4241. China eschews kinetic support---their regional expert, and the reluctance caps what it can supply.
ADF 3-17 — Africa Defense Forum. March 17. Professional military magazine published by U.S. Africa Command, reporting George Washington University Elliott School professor David Shinn. ADF, “With Russia Focused on War, China Increases Arms Sales to Africa,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/03/with-russia-focused-on-war-china-increases-arms-sales-to-africa/ Clopus
“Perhaps more significant than arms sales is the attention China is giving to training African military personnel, holding joint military activities such as the recent Brics Plus naval exercise in South Africa, and enlisting African support for its Global Security Initiative,” David Shinn, a professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, told the South China Morning Post.
Shinn added that, unlike Russia or the United States, “China’s security relationship eschews kinetic military support.” Beijing’s reluctance to engage in combat limits its ability to meet some security requests, he said.
4252. Africa isn’t where American power is decided---the command exists to protect its own mission.
Sweeney 24 — Mike Sweeney. October 18. Fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Rethinking Africa Command,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/rethinking-africa-command/ Clopus
This paper examines an understudied aspect of the current U.S. approach: the existence of a dedicated unified combatant command with responsibility for Africa. On the surface, command arrangements may seem like an esoteric concern, but in fact they play a critical role in shaping priorities for U.S. engagement and in distributing bureaucratic weight within policymaking structures.
The central argument presented herein is that a substantive shift in U.S. policy would benefit from downgrading responsibility for Africa under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to a three-star billet, nested under European Command (EUCOM). The current arrangement—in which responsibility for Africa is assigned to a four-star combatant commander—creates a powerful bureaucratic actor, one with a vested interest in maintaining robust U.S. military engagement in Africa. It will likely be more difficult to recalibrate U.S. policy away from a hard-security focus so long as the command exists in its current form.
Arguing this point is not intended to impugn any individual who leads Africa Command (AFRICOM) or those who work at the command. It is simply to recognize the reality that bureaucratic entities, by nature, are unlikely to support a reduction in their missions. Downgrading AFRICOM’s position within the UCP thus would not only publicly symbolize a change in U.S. policy, it would also facilitate implementation of a new approach.
At the same time, retention of a three-star subcommand would still allow the United States to use military force in Africa, if needed. But such a change in command arrangements would reposition the role of military power, moving it away from the forefront of U.S. engagement.
4262. Moscow’s client is the bloc Nigeria is in a standoff with---structural, not a preference.
Owolabi 26 — Ayodele S. Owolabi. January 23. Associate Lecturer in International Relations at Liverpool John Moores University. Al Jazeera, “Militarising the Sahel will not defeat terrorism,” https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/23/militarising-the-sahel-will-not-defeat-terrorism Clopus
In severing security ties with the West, the AES have pivoted towards Russia as a principal security partner to counterbalance decades of US and European influence in West Africa, signalling a deepening but still evolving security partnership with Moscow. While these strategic choices reflect an emerging self-help posture with new preferences for non-conventional allies, they are also intensifying geopolitical tensions across the region.
Nigeria’s military role in countering an attempted coup in neighbouring Benin was praised as a major win for ECOWAS. But when a Nigerian Air Force C-130 aircraft made an emergency landing in Burkina Faso two days later, the AES interpreted this as a violation of its airspace and sovereignty, authorising its air force to neutralise any aircraft involved in further violations. Tensions were heightened by reports that France had provided Nigeria with surveillance and intelligence support during the Benin intervention, fuelling apprehension about France’s potential re-entry into the AES security landscape. With Nigeria now willing to extend security cooperation with the US following the Christmas Day strikes, the stakes have risen further for the AES. Although aimed at militants operating in northwest Nigeria, the strikes appear calculated to bolster US strategic legitimacy as a counterterrorism actor in the region, potentially opening the door to further operations in Nigeria’s northeast, where ISWAP and Boko Haram remain active.
4272. Cross-supplier integration is prohibitive---doctrine and sustainment are built around the incumbent patron.
Yousif 23 — Elias Yousif. Research Analyst with the Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center, researcher on U.S. arms transfer policy and security cooperation. Stimson Center, “‘If we don’t sell it, someone else will:’ Dependence & Influence in US Arms Transfers,” https://www.stimson.org/2023/if-we-dont-sell-it-someone-else-will-dependence-influence-in-us-arms-transfers/ Clopus
Additionally, for importers that do wish to look elsewhere for a particular capability, simply finding a comparable or alternative source may be just the first challenge. A new platform will likely also require new systemic chains of supply, sustainment, and maintenance, as well as new processes to develop interoperability between the new system and those already in service. In some cases, interoperability between systems sourced from different suppliers is either prohibitively expensive or simply not possible. Accordingly, integration efforts are no small task, especially if doctrines, structures, and sustainment systems reflect those of a state’s historical patrons. 8 Note: David Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan 1998), pg. 8.
4281. Nigeria's Turkish drones fly the Burkina and Niger frontier---different mission, different theatre.
ADF 25 — Africa Defense Forum. February 11. Professional military magazine published by U.S. Africa Command. ADF, “As Drone Warfare Expands in Africa, Turkey Increases Share of the Market,” https://adf-magazine.com/2025/02/as-drone-warfare-expands-in-africa-turkey-increases-share-of-the-market/ Clopus
African nations got their first look at Turkish drone technology during the Libyan civil war. Turkey’s alliance with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord allowed it to flood the battlefield with drones. In 2019, a Turkish drone attacked an air base controlled by the Libyan National Army. Drones also destroyed an Ilyushin cargo plane at the al-Jufra air base controlled by Russian mercenaries.
Turkish drones played a key role in Ethiopia’s defeat last year of Tigray rebels. They have also been employed against terrorists in Somalia. In West Africa, Nigeria and Togo are using Turkish drones to patrol their borders with Burkina Faso and Niger to prevent extremists from invading their countries.
In mid-2024, Turkey announced a plan to promote its drones in Africa with Saudi Arabia providing the financing to help with purchases. Some Baykar-made drones will also be manufactured in Saudi Arabia starting in 2026.
“Turkish drones have proven their effectiveness in many different battles, especially in Libya,” researcher Ahmed Abouyoussef wrote for the Al Habtoor Research Centre. “These locally made drones have provided Turkey with a new foreign policy tool that it has employed to maximize its external influence.”
Turkey’s no-strings-attached approach to drone exports has helped it build new military alliances across Africa, particularly among countries fighting insurgencies such as Ethiopia and Somalia, Abouyoussef noted. However, that same unconditional approach puts Turkey’s drone business at risk should its client nations use those weapons against civilians, as has already been done in some cases, or in other ways that could constitute war crimes, Abouyoussef wrote.
4292. The TB2 cruises at 130 km/h and carries four munitions---it can't fly the campaign.
Martin 22 — Guy Martin. October 6. Editor of defenceWeb, southern Africa’s defence and security news service. defenceWeb, “Nigeria acquires Songar armed drones from Turkey as UAV fleet grows,” https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/nigeria-acquires-songar-armed-drones-from-turkey-as-uav-fleet-grows/ Clopus
Nigeria’s military is also getting Bayraktar TB2 UAVs from Turkey – it has been reported that Nigeria ordered six UAVs and two ground stations. Photos posted online in September showed several of the UAVs on the Baykar factory floor in Nigerian markings.
Nigeria joins a rapidly growing list of Bayraktar TB2 operators in Africa. One of the most recent customers is Djibouti, which revealed its TB2s in June, while Niger received six in May after a November 2021 order for the type.
Turkey has sold its Bayraktar TB2 to Ethiopia, Ukraine, Morocco, Qatar, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Poland.
The Bayraktar TB2 has a cruising speed of 130 km/h with an operational altitude of 7 300 metres and 27 hours endurance (communications range is around 300 km). The 12 metre wingspan aircraft has a maximum takeoff weight of 700 kg and can carry a 150 kg payload. It is powered by a Rotax 912 engine and can be fitted with a swappable electro-optical/infrared/laser designator or multi-purpose AESA radar.
The Bayraktar TB2 is used operationally by the Turkish Armed Forces and is able to employ MAM and MAM-L guided munitions and UMTAS missiles (four munitions can be carried at a time).
4303. Even the successful case shows what the buyer gets---leverage runs back to Beijing.
Asia Times 26 — Asia Times. July. Regional news and analysis publication, reporting a June 2026 study by the Takshashila Institution on Chinese arms exports. Asia Times, “China’s often flawed arms still buy lasting influence,” https://asiatimes.com/2026/07/chinas-often-flawed-arms-still-buy-lasting-influence/ Clopus
Pakistan shows how that dependence works. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data show China was the world’s fifth-largest arms exporter from 2021 to 2025, accounting for 5.6% of global arms exports.
Pakistan was by far China’s biggest customer, taking 61% of its arms exports over that period. Pakistan’s reliance on Chinese systems has deepened as US sanctions linked to its nuclear and missile programs have blocked access to US and Western weapons.
For China, arming Pakistan also helps to keep rival India strategically stretched. A crisis involving Pakistan in Kashmir and China along the Himalayan frontier would force India to divide strategic attention, military assets and political bandwidth between two nuclear-armed adversaries.
The military relationship is reinforced by economics. Pakistan is a central node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking western China to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan’s Gwadar port.
That route gives China a partial hedge against the Strait of Malacca, through which an estimated 75% to 80% of China’s crude oil supply passes and could conceivably be blocked in any conflict with the United States. For Pakistan, CPEC has been an economic lifeline, bringing as much as $25.9 billion in Chinese direct investment and generating up to 260,000 jobs .
That’s given China rich leverage over Pakistan. The deeper Pakistan’s dependence on Chinese arms, finance and infrastructure becomes, the harder it is for Pakistan to resist China’s geopolitical preferences. Any attempt to scale back CPEC projects or limit Chinese influence could expose Pakistan to financial penalties, diplomatic pressure or reduced military cooperation.
4311. NO LINK. The relationship’s ballast is investment and trade---arms are the small line.
Amaize 25 — Ohimai Amaize. November 5. Nigerian journalist and Atlantic Council contributor on West African politics. Atlantic Council, “With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-trumps-threats-of-military-intervention-in-nigeria-tinubu-faces-a-delicate-balancing-act/ Clopus
The US–Nigeria relationship has historically been one of pragmatic partnership. The United States is Nigeria’s largest foreign investor , with US investments concentrated in oil and gas, wholesale trade, and services. Bilateral trade surpassed thirteen billion dollars in 2024, and Nigeria ranks among the top African markets for US exports.
Washington also provides strategic security support, including military training, counterterrorism assistance, and limited arms sales to help Nigeria confront groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, while also addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria, in turn, remains a strategic partner for US interests in West Africa, which faces overlapping crises of extremism, migration, and democratic backsliding. Under Tinubu, however, the relationship appears to be drifting—not through open hostility, but mutual disengagement.
A diplomatic drift
Since his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu has not traveled to Washington and allowed a diplomatic vacuum to fester. In September 2023, Tinubu recalled all Nigerian ambassadors worldwide and still has yet to appoint permanent replacements. What’s more, he was conspicuously absent from Trump’s meeting in July with West African leaders . Tinubu’s distance from the White House may also reflect political caution on his part, following renewed reporting on his past in the United States, including his connection to a federal criminal case and questions about his academic records .
Although Tinubu appointed a handful of consuls-general and chargés d’affaires (including in Washington ) earlier this year, Nigerian foreign policy experts note that these temporary measures fall far short of the representation expected of a country of Nigeria’s stature, and reports have detailed the poor state of Nigerian diplomatic missions. Officials in Abuja cite financial constraints for the delay in appointing ambassadors. Amid the dispute with the United States, Tinubu is now reportedly finalizing a list of ambassador nominees.
Tentative diplomacy
Tinubu’s contacts with the Trump administration appear to be limited. In April in Paris, he met for the first time with Massad Boulos, Trump’s senior advisor for Africa and a citizen of Nigeria among other countries. While that encounter signaled a tentative opening, there is no indication of any ongoing back-channel relationship.
4322. NO INTERNAL LINK. Even abolishing the command leaves the ability to use force---prominence isn’t power.
Sweeney 24 — Mike Sweeney. October 18. Fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Rethinking Africa Command,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/rethinking-africa-command/ Clopus
As debate grows over U.S. policy towards Africa, consideration should be given to altering the continent’s status under the Department of Defense’s Unified Command Plan (UCP).
Eliminating Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the UCP would both signify a policy shift away from a counterterrorism focus and ease the process of implementing that change within the policymaking bureaucracy.
Establishing a three-star subcommand, nested under European Command (EUCOM), would still allow the United States to use force in Africa, when necessary, but would reduce the prominence of military power in U.S. policy toward the continent.
AFRICOM and EUCOM essentially share much of their force structure; this unique relationship would facilitate the transition to the proposed three-star subcommand.
Altering the U.S. military footprint in Africa should also be considered in the context of any changes to policy and command arrangements. Making specific recommendations at this time is complicated by the opaqueness of the current footprint.
Introduction
A small but growing number of analyses have questioned U.S. policy towards Africa. 1 See, for example, Paul D. Williams, “Subduing al-Shabaab: The Somalia Model of Counterterrorism and Its Limits,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 2 (Summer 2018) 95–111, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1484227; Jason Warner with Julia Broomer, and Stephanie Lizzo, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001–2021: Summary Document of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, U.S. Military Academy, February 4, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/CTC-Africa-Regional-Workshop-Summary-Document.pdf; Alex Thurston, “An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Quincy Brief no. 32, November 7, 2022, https://quincyinst.org/report/an-alternative-approach-to-u-s-sahel-policy/; Sara Jacobs, “A New U.S. Approach in Africa: Good Governance, Not Guns,” Foreign Policy, December 12, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/12/us-counterterrorism-strategy-africa-security-assistance-governance-extremism/; Elizabeth Shackelford and Ethan Kesseler with Emma Sanderson, Less Is More: A New Strategy for U.S. Security Assistance to Africa (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2023) https://globalaffairs.org/research/report/less-more-new-strategy-us-security-assistance-africa; C. William Walldorf, Jr., “Overreach in Africa: Rethinking U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy,” Defense Priorities, August 31, 2023, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa; John J. Chin and Haleigh Bartos, “Rethinking U.S. Africa Policy Among Changing Geopolitical Realities,” Texas National Security Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 2024) 114–132, https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/52237. These critiques argue, first, that the United States has allowed counterterrorism to become the primary element of U.S. engagement in Africa with outcomes that have been questionable at best. 2 Perhaps the most cogent assessment came from a small conference of counterterrorism experts convened at West Point in October 2021. The summary report from that event asserted: “U.S. counterterrorism assistance in Africa between 2001–2021 has been lackluster at best and harmful at worst. The workshop’s discussions underscored that U.S. efforts, in both the kinetic and non-kinetic realms, have tended to be most effective at bringing about short-term operational successes but generally not strategically successful in the long-term. Considering these insufficiencies, participants agreed that a rethink of broader U.S. engagement toward the continent is needed.” See Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001–2021,” 1. Second, they suggest other priorities—including promoting good governance, bolstering democracy, and encouraging economic growth—as the basis for a more effective approach. 3 See, in particular, Jacobs, “A New U.S. Approach in Africa”; Shackelford and Ethan, Less Is More; and Chin and Bartos, “Rethinking U.S. Africa Policy Among Changing Geopolitical Realities.” These proposals are offered with a clear eye: there is no silver-bullet solution to Africa’s challenges. But by prioritizing areas that foster long-term stability in Africa, U.S. policy could produce better results than an immediate focus on kinetic counterterrorism.
This paper examines an understudied aspect of the current U.S. approach: the existence of a dedicated unified combatant command with responsibility for Africa. On the surface, command arrangements may seem like an esoteric concern, but in fact they play a critical role in shaping priorities for U.S. engagement and in distributing bureaucratic weight within policymaking structures.
The central argument presented herein is that a substantive shift in U.S. policy would benefit from downgrading responsibility for Africa under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to a three-star billet, nested under European Command (EUCOM). The current arrangement—in which responsibility for Africa is assigned to a four-star combatant commander—creates a powerful bureaucratic actor, one with a vested interest in maintaining robust U.S. military engagement in Africa. It will likely be more difficult to recalibrate U.S. policy away from a hard-security focus so long as the command exists in its current form.
Arguing this point is not intended to impugn any individual who leads Africa Command (AFRICOM) or those who work at the command. It is simply to recognize the reality that bureaucratic entities, by nature, are unlikely to support a reduction in their missions. Downgrading AFRICOM’s position within the UCP thus would not only publicly symbolize a change in U.S. policy, it would also facilitate implementation of a new approach.
At the same time, retention of a three-star subcommand would still allow the United States to use military force in Africa, if needed. But such a change in command arrangements would reposition the role of military power, moving it away from the forefront of U.S. engagement.
4333. TURN. This is how we hold the bag---the partner retreats and we inherit the war.
Walldorf 23 — William Walldorf. August 31. Senior fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Overreach in Africa: rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/ Clopus
Furthermore, if France follows suit and fully retreats from Niger like it has from Mali and Burkina-Faso, the United States could find itself holding the bag in West Africa. 76 Boureima Balima, Abdel-Kader Masou, and Bate Felix, “Niger Junta Revokes Military Deals with France,” Reuters, August 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/west-african-defence-chiefs-mull-response-niger-coup-2023-08-03/. In the current crisis, France has evacuated civilians and the new Nigerien junta has terminated its security partnership with France, which could be a prelude to full French departure, especially if the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) chooses not to intervene militarily to reverse the coup. Much like the 1954 aftermath of France’s collapse at Dien Bien Phu that brought the United States into Vietnam, U.S. military engagement in West Africa could increase dramatically in future years to pick up the pieces of what France leaves behind. All in the name of fighting terrorist threats to the United States that really aren’t threats to the United States.
In sum, U.S. counterterrorism policy in Africa appears to be doing more harm than good, both for Africans and for U.S. security goals. The misuse of U.S. training and security assistance by many African partners aids illiberalism and terrorist recruitment. The direct use of force by the United States in African conflict zones fuels anti-Americanism and may aid future recruitment of global-reach terrorists. Finally, the dangers of strategic overstretch run high, especially in West Africa.
4341. ENTANGLEMENT. Every increment is load-bearing---the command needs a theater and the crisis supplies one.
Cavanna 26 — Thomas Cavanna. February 26. Former non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Modern Diplomacy, “Washington’s buildup in Nigeria could ensnare the U.S. in a protracted conflict,” https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/26/washingtons-buildup-in-nigeria-could-ensnare-the-u-s-in-a-protracted-conflict/ Clopus
On February 10, the Pentagon announced it would send 200 troops to Nigeria to train local forces to counter jihadists, joining a small detachment already on the ground to support the Nigerian army’s intelligence operations . Those measures followed President Trump’s decision to order an air strike on Christmas Day 2025 against a local group named Lakurawa in northwestern Nigeria after repeatedly condemning Abuja’s inaction in the face of a “Christian genocide .”
Washington has emphasized that it would not participate in Nigeria’s military operations or seek permanent bases in West Africa . Yet those troop deployments could lead to a dangerous entanglement.
Such dynamics may already be in play. Washington’s African military command (AFRICOM) is using the Nigerian crisis to offset its 2024 expulsion from Niger (its former intelligence hub in the Sahel ) and the Trump administration’s stated disinterest in “long-term… presence or commitments” on the continent .
The U.S. government itself may retain strategic interest in Nigeria, which possesses critical minerals that could help Washington compete with China , accounts for 20% of sub-Saharan Africa’s economy, and is projected to reach 400 million people by 2050 .