4352. COUNTERBALANCING. Primacy is what welded Moscow to Beijing---restraint unwelds it.
McCallion 24 — Christopher McCallion. May 23. Fellow at Defense Priorities, MSc in Theory and History of International Relations from the London School of Economics. Defense Priorities, “Grand strategy: Geography,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/grand-strategy-geography/ Clopus
The United States’ distance from the great powers of Eurasia should act to mutually reassure. There is historical evidence that distance and the stopping power of water serve to assuage continental land powers that “insular” maritime states—like the United States and United Kingdom—pose a reduced threat and tend toward the status quo in their interests. 43 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 7–43. The distinction between continental and insular powers is made by Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 126–128. This tendency helps explain in part why states proved relatively slow to counterbalance the United States after the Cold War. 44 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2005), 124.
In light of this, it is remarkable to consider how extreme the United States’ proclivity for regime change, military intervention, and an expanding forward posture over the past few decades have been in order to overcome the natural palliative provided by its geography and encourage other states to counterbalance it. The main effect of the United States’ post-Cold War aggressiveness has been to unite adversaries. Notably, this includes China and Russia, which are not only the other two great powers in the international system, but whose own geographical proximity, shared land borders, and competing ambitions for influence in Central Asia should make them natural rivals. Instead, they have converged in an anti-American entente, while also operating in close cooperation with regional powers like Iran and North Korea.
Given the unparalleled security afforded by its geography and relative power position, the United States would benefit by abandoning its pursuit of global primacy and instead adopting a more rigorously prioritized grand strategy of restraint. While the possibility of a Eurasian hegemon is remote and its consequences for the United States are diminished by nuclear weapons and the stopping power of water, it remains a prudent strategic hedge for the United States to remain observant of the balance of power in Eurasia, and to help maintain that balance from a distance. 45 For reasons suggested by Layne, The Peace of Illusions, 182.
First, the United States should return to being an offshore balancer, passing the buck to regional powers in order to reestablish a stable local equilibrium. The United States would steadily withdraw its forward deployed forces from Eurasia, and instead provide material support by helping to arm local powers as necessary. This would also allow the United States to gain greater diplomatic flexibility, maximizing its leverage with both partners and competitors in what looks to become a more dynamic multipolar environment.
Second, the United States should retain its “command of the commons” by keeping an edge in the related sea, air, space, and cyber domains. 46 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer, 2003): 5–46. This military strategy emphasizes the United States’ persistent advantages—its maritime buffers, its technological innovation, etc.—while refraining from distant onshore commitments of land forces, where the United States is least likely to be effective. Maintaining a superior ability to contest the media of transportation and communications would allow the United States in a major contingency to secure its commerce and resupply its allies—aiding local balancing—while threatening its adversaries’ ability to do the same. U.S. defense planning should privilege the Navy—particularly its submarine fleet—and retain the ability to control or deny vital maritime chokepoints. 47 Posen, Restraint, 135–144.
Third, the United States should maintain a nuclear deterrent robust enough to convince a risk-acceptant adversary that they will not be able to escalate their way to victory, while being willing to engage in reciprocal arms control agreements as circumstances allow.
4363. BLOC POLITICS. A US-backed ECOWAS against a Russia-backed AES is how West Africa gets an interstate war.
Owolabi 26 — Ayodele S. Owolabi. January 23. Associate Lecturer in International Relations at Liverpool John Moores University. Al Jazeera, “Militarising the Sahel will not defeat terrorism,” https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/23/militarising-the-sahel-will-not-defeat-terrorism Clopus
Given Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS, this emerging security partnership with the US is likely to shape the operational capacity of the proposed 260,000-strong ECOWAS force. This does not bode well for the AES, which is intent on insulating its member states from Western security influence in the name of sovereignty. Because ECOWAS forces would be deployed in member states at the epicentre of terrorist violence, many combat engagements would take place in locations adjacent to AES territories. With AES troops also operating in these areas, military clashes between the two sides become increasingly likely, particularly given the region’s porous borders and fluid combat environments. Given that the Christmas Day strikes reportedly hit unintended targets, the risk that future air strikes by a US-backed ECOWAS could spill into AES territory cannot be dismissed. For deterrence, the AES may seek to leverage Russia’s military backing, evoking echoes of Cold War-era security brinkmanship.
Implications for regional stability
Without reconciliation between the AES and ECOWAS, two major risks loom for regional peace and stability. First, rising geopolitical tensions could draw AES and ECOWAS member states into direct interstate military confrontations, potentially plunging West Africa into a regional war. Such a conflict would serve neither side’s counterterrorism objectives. Beyond devastating the region, it would create space for armed groups to expand their operations amid fractured and distracted security responses. Second, the standoff risks turning West Africa into a new theatre for global power rivalry, with a Russia-backed AES on one side and a US and France-backed ECOWAS on the other. In the context of an emerging New Cold War, the use of veto power by these global actors at the UN Security Council could further complicate conflict resolution, with profoundly destabilising consequences for the region.
The AES and ECOWAS now face a stark choice: to revive Cold War-style bloc politics in West Africa while the region slides towards chaos, or to negotiate a security sub-coalition that prioritises human security alongside national sovereignty. Regardless of how the AES views ECOWAS, the burden lies with the latter to manage the unintended consequences of escalating tensions. While there are few indications that the AES is willing to cooperate directly with a West-backed ECOWAS on counterterrorism, ECOWAS could pursue diplomatic engagement to negotiate a concept of operations that guarantees respect for AES sovereignty. As Africa’s most experienced regional security organisation, ECOWAS possesses the diplomatic capacity to do so. For progress to be made, Francophone ECOWAS member states should take the lead in these efforts, while Nigeria exercises its influence more discreetly. Whether ECOWAS can reclaim ownership of its security agenda and define the terms of external engagement will shape not only West Africa’s future, but that of the continent as a whole.
4372. Compare Niger---partnerships die from politics, and Nigeria’s survived a bombing threat.
Murali 26 — Miruthulani Murali. July 30. Research intern at the Counter Terrorism Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. MP-IDSA, “US–Nigeria Counter-Terror Cooperation,” https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/us-nigeria-counter-terror-cooperation Clopus
Notably, while Nigeria has strengthened its counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States, US counter-terrorism efforts in Niger collapsed after the government terminated security agreements and then withdrew all US forces in 2024. [xv] Following a 2023 political coup, the US Department of Defense officially completed its withdrawal from both Air Base 101 in Niamey and Air Base 201 in Agadez, bringing to an end US drone surveillance and ground training operations in Niger. [xvi] The contrasting experiences of Nigeria and Niger show that political stability, host-government approval, and strategic alignment are just as important to the long-term viability of external security alliances.
The collapse of US counter-terrorism engagement in Niger, following a political coup, serves as a stark reminder that security partnerships built on fragile political foundations are vulnerable to rapid reversal. However, from a regional standpoint, the US–Nigeria effort in 2026 shows that, even amid broader political concerns, meaningful and operationally significant collaboration remains achievable.
4381. The command is a bureaucratic actor with a vested interest in the answer it gives.
Sweeney 24 — Mike Sweeney. October 18. Fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Rethinking Africa Command,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/rethinking-africa-command/ Clopus
This paper examines an understudied aspect of the current U.S. approach: the existence of a dedicated unified combatant command with responsibility for Africa. On the surface, command arrangements may seem like an esoteric concern, but in fact they play a critical role in shaping priorities for U.S. engagement and in distributing bureaucratic weight within policymaking structures.
The central argument presented herein is that a substantive shift in U.S. policy would benefit from downgrading responsibility for Africa under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) to a three-star billet, nested under European Command (EUCOM). The current arrangement—in which responsibility for Africa is assigned to a four-star combatant commander—creates a powerful bureaucratic actor, one with a vested interest in maintaining robust U.S. military engagement in Africa. It will likely be more difficult to recalibrate U.S. policy away from a hard-security focus so long as the command exists in its current form.
Arguing this point is not intended to impugn any individual who leads Africa Command (AFRICOM) or those who work at the command. It is simply to recognize the reality that bureaucratic entities, by nature, are unlikely to support a reduction in their missions. Downgrading AFRICOM’s position within the UCP thus would not only publicly symbolize a change in U.S. policy, it would also facilitate implementation of a new approach.
At the same time, retention of a three-star subcommand would still allow the United States to use military force in Africa, if needed. But such a change in command arrangements would reposition the role of military power, moving it away from the forefront of U.S. engagement.
4392. Distance and the arsenal mean a lost region can’t compound into a threat to us.
McCallion 24 — Christopher McCallion. May 23. Fellow at Defense Priorities, MSc in Theory and History of International Relations from the London School of Economics. Defense Priorities, “Grand strategy: Geography,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/grand-strategy-geography/ Clopus
In the Middle East, there is a rough equilibrium of power without the added U.S. presence. 40 Christopher McCallion, “Grand Strategy: The Balance of Power,” Defense Priorities, April 16, 2024, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/grand-strategy/the-balance-of-power. Not only is Iran balanced by its regional rivals, but global oil supplies are both difficult to critically disrupt and of declining importance given the growing number of alternative energy sources. 41 Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press, “Protecting ‘the Prize’: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Security Studies 19, no. 3 (August, 2010), 453–485; International Energy Agency, “World Energy Balances: Overview,” accessed November 17, 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-balances-overview/world; U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Frequently Asked Questions: What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?,” accessed November 17, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3.
Furthermore, it has been plausibly argued that the value of conquest as a source of cumulative power is diminishing, and that the nuclear revolution makes the threat from a regional hegemon irrelevant. 42 For some examples, see Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete?: A Review Essay,” International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring, 1990): 42–64; Robert W. Tucker, The New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? (New York: Universe Books, 1972); Stephen Van Evera, “A Farewell to Geopolitics,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, ed. by Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11–35. While the United States may wish to hedge against overoptimism and avoid testing these propositions in practice, there remains a serious case that the prospect of a rival hegemon is more remote and less threatening than in prior eras, especially to distant nuclear-armed powers like the United States.
The strategic insulation of the United States
The same difficulties the United States faces attempting to project power overseas would also be faced by a Eurasian power attempting to attack the Western Hemisphere. The United States, which has the most capable military in the world, would in such a scenario gain all the advantages of defense off its shores and would likely prove more economically resilient than other great powers. Moreover, its large nuclear arsenal makes it unlikely that even another nuclear armed state could successfully coerce the United States, let alone undermine its sovereignty or survival.
America’s favorable geography
The United States is physically removed from threats in Europe and Asia, bordered to the east and west by vast oceans and to the north and south by friendly neighbors.
The United States’ distance from the great powers of Eurasia should act to mutually reassure. There is historical evidence that distance and the stopping power of water serve to assuage continental land powers that “insular” maritime states—like the United States and United Kingdom—pose a reduced threat and tend toward the status quo in their interests. 43 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 7–43. The distinction between continental and insular powers is made by Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 126–128. This tendency helps explain in part why states proved relatively slow to counterbalance the United States after the Cold War. 44 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2005), 124.
In light of this, it is remarkable to consider how extreme the United States’ proclivity for regime change, military intervention, and an expanding forward posture over the past few decades have been in order to overcome the natural palliative provided by its geography and encourage other states to counterbalance it. The main effect of the United States’ post-Cold War aggressiveness has been to unite adversaries. Notably, this includes China and Russia, which are not only the other two great powers in the international system, but whose own geographical proximity, shared land borders, and competing ambitions for influence in Central Asia should make them natural rivals. Instead, they have converged in an anti-American entente, while also operating in close cooperation with regional powers like Iran and North Korea.
Given the unparalleled security afforded by its geography and relative power position, the United States would benefit by abandoning its pursuit of global primacy and instead adopting a more rigorously prioritized grand strategy of restraint. While the possibility of a Eurasian hegemon is remote and its consequences for the United States are diminished by nuclear weapons and the stopping power of water, it remains a prudent strategic hedge for the United States to remain observant of the balance of power in Eurasia, and to help maintain that balance from a distance. 45 For reasons suggested by Layne, The Peace of Illusions, 182.
First, the United States should return to being an offshore balancer, passing the buck to regional powers in order to reestablish a stable local equilibrium. The United States would steadily withdraw its forward deployed forces from Eurasia, and instead provide material support by helping to arm local powers as necessary. This would also allow the United States to gain greater diplomatic flexibility, maximizing its leverage with both partners and competitors in what looks to become a more dynamic multipolar environment.
Second, the United States should retain its “command of the commons” by keeping an edge in the related sea, air, space, and cyber domains. 46 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer, 2003): 5–46. This military strategy emphasizes the United States’ persistent advantages—its maritime buffers, its technological innovation, etc.—while refraining from distant onshore commitments of land forces, where the United States is least likely to be effective. Maintaining a superior ability to contest the media of transportation and communications would allow the United States in a major contingency to secure its commerce and resupply its allies—aiding local balancing—while threatening its adversaries’ ability to do the same. U.S. defense planning should privilege the Navy—particularly its submarine fleet—and retain the ability to control or deny vital maritime chokepoints. 47 Posen, Restraint, 135–144.
Third, the United States should maintain a nuclear deterrent robust enough to convince a risk-acceptant adversary that they will not be able to escalate their way to victory, while being willing to engage in reciprocal arms control agreements as circumstances allow.
4402. The peacekeeping claim fails where it’s tested---two decades of force grew the problem.
Walldorf 23 — William Walldorf. August 31. Senior fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Overreach in Africa: rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/ Clopus
Second, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the ineffective nature of contemporary U.S. counterterrorism. Leading counterterrorism experts at a 2022 conference hosted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point used terms like “lackluster,” “harmful at worst,” “unsustainable,” and “ineffective” to describe current U.S. counterterrorism in Africa. 36 Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 1. For similar assessments, see Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 26, 2019), 8, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach. The numbers bear these assessments out. Since the U.S. started military operations against African jihadists in the mid-2000s, the amount of local terrorist activity and the number of jihadist groups on the continent have exploded. Attacks by Islamic terrorists increased by 22 percent continent-wide last year alone. 37 “Fatalities from Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Surge by Nearly 50 Percent,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 6, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/fatalities-from-militant-islamist-violence-in-africa-surge-by-nearly-50-percent/. The trend has been especially bad in West Africa, which saw a seven-fold increase in terrorist attacks between 2017 and 2020. 38 Stephanie Savell, The Costs of United States’ Post-9/11 ‘Security Assistance’: How Counterterrorism Intensified Conflict in Burkina-Faso, Costs of War Project (Providence, RI: Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, March 4, 2021), 3, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Costs%20of%20Counterterrorism%20in%20Burkina%20Faso_Costs%20of%20War_Savell.pdf. See also, Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 1–5.
Third, “better safe than sorry” thinking overlooks the impact of U.S. assistance on coups and violence by local regimes that, in turn, aids terrorist recruitment. According to most experts, the reason for terrorist growth in Africa over the past two decades lies in the failure of autocratic regimes in the region to address the basic needs of their citizens. Recruitment by Islamist groups is “fueled more by hunger, desperation, governance failures, and repressive crackdowns than by fantasies of global Islamist jihad,” notes Herman Cohen, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs. 39 Herman J. Cohen, The Time is Right for a U.S. Pivot to Africa (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 18, 2021), https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/11/the-time-is-right-for-a-u-s-pivot-to-africa/. Eight of the governments in West Africa—most of whom partner with the U.S. on counterterrorism operations—rank near the bottom in recent worldwide governance indexes. 40 Joshua Meservey, Towards Salafism and Its Implications for Regional Terrorism (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, September 24, 2021), https://www.heritage.org/africa/commentary/sahelian-islams-shift-towards-salafism-and-its-implications-regional-terrorism. This has made these states fertile ground for jihadists, who recruit on “predatory state actions” and “install themselves as security providers and defenders of vulnerable populations,” according to regional experts. 41 Warner, “Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa,” 5–6. See also Perez, The Underestimated Insurgency, 20; Savell, The Costs United States’ Post-9/11 ‘Security Assistance,’ 24.
With its focus predominantly on direct force, U.S. counterterrorism in Africa inadvertently makes the regime-led violence that fuels terrorist recruitment like this worse, not better. Specifically, U.S. military training and assistance for counterterrorism has had the unintended consequence of enhancing authoritarian rule and repression against civilian populations in parts of Africa.
A recent study found that when foreign military leaders receive training from the United States, the probability of those leaders later carrying out military coups increases significantly. 42 Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 4 (July 2017): 542–57, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317713557. We see evidence of this across Africa with U.S. counterterrorism partners. In the last two years, U.S.-trained military leaders in West Africa have carried out or attempted at least eight coups. Included here are U.S. counterterrorism partner states Burkina-Faso, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania in West Africa. One of the leaders (Brigadier General Massou Salaou Barmou) of the July 2023 coup in Niger trained at Fort Benning, Georgia and the National Defense University in Washington, DC. 43 Nick Turse, “Niger Coup Leaders Joins Long Line of U.S.-trained Mutineers,” Intercept, July 27, 2023, https://theintercept.com/2023/07/27/niger-coup-leader-us-military/; Nick Turse, “How Many More Governments Will American-Trained Soldiers Overthrow?” Rolling Stone, February 25, 2023, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/west-africa-coup-american-trained-soldier-1234657139/. Michael M. Phillips, “In Africa, U.S.-Trained Militaries are Ousting Civilian Governments in Coups,” Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-africa-u-s-trained-militaries-are-ousting-civilian-governments-in-coups-11649505601; Ted Galen Carpenter, “The U.S. Military is Training Third World Coup Leaders Again,” Cato Institute, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-military-training-third-world-coup-leaders-again; Ted Galen Carpenter, “The U.S. Military is Training Third World Coup Leaders Again,” Cato Institute, April 19, 2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/us-military-training-third-world-coup-leaders-again.
This tendency toward coups and repressions is unsurprising. A large body of work points to the ineffective and counterproductive outcomes of training for counterterrorism and other purposes. “Despite committing vast amounts of resources toward foreign military training—including almost $15 billion to train over 2.3 million military students around the world between 1999 and 2016—the United States,” according to Renanah Miles Joyce, a professor at Brandeis University and former analyst at the Department of Defense, “has struggled to produce militaries that are either competent or liberal-minded, especially in weak and unstable states.” 44 Renanah Miles Joyce, “Rethinking How the United States Trains Foreign Militaries,” Lawfare, August 14, 2022, https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinking-how-united-states-trains-foreign-militaries. On the failure of training to produce liberal norm diffusion, see Renanah Miles Joyce, “Soldiers’ Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 48–90; Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek, “Is Human Rights Training Working with Foreign Militaries? No one Knows and That’s O.K.,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/is-human-rights-training-working-with-foreign-militaries-no-one-knows-and-thats-o-k/. See also Mara Karlin, “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint,” Foreign Affairs 96, no. 6 (November/December 2017): 111–120; Rachel Tecott, “Why America Can’t Build Allied Armies,” Foreign Affairs, August 26, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-26/why-america-cant-build-allied-armies. A core problem here is that interests favored by the United States (i.e., liberal norms, respect for civilian control) are often misaligned with the interests of the militaries that the U.S. trains (i.e., population control, institutional power). U.S.-trained militaries often absorb the skills training well but ignore the values training. Coups like those recently in West Africa sometimes follow. 45 Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” International Security 146, no. 4 (2018): 126–38.
4411. Offshore balancing is the alternative---arm locals, keep the commons, drop the onshore commitment.
McCallion 24 — Christopher McCallion. May 23. Fellow at Defense Priorities, MSc in Theory and History of International Relations from the London School of Economics. Defense Priorities, “Grand strategy: Geography,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/grand-strategy-geography/ Clopus
First, the United States should return to being an offshore balancer, passing the buck to regional powers in order to reestablish a stable local equilibrium. The United States would steadily withdraw its forward deployed forces from Eurasia, and instead provide material support by helping to arm local powers as necessary. This would also allow the United States to gain greater diplomatic flexibility, maximizing its leverage with both partners and competitors in what looks to become a more dynamic multipolar environment.
Second, the United States should retain its “command of the commons” by keeping an edge in the related sea, air, space, and cyber domains. 46 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer, 2003): 5–46. This military strategy emphasizes the United States’ persistent advantages—its maritime buffers, its technological innovation, etc.—while refraining from distant onshore commitments of land forces, where the United States is least likely to be effective. Maintaining a superior ability to contest the media of transportation and communications would allow the United States in a major contingency to secure its commerce and resupply its allies—aiding local balancing—while threatening its adversaries’ ability to do the same. U.S. defense planning should privilege the Navy—particularly its submarine fleet—and retain the ability to control or deny vital maritime chokepoints. 47 Posen, Restraint, 135–144.
Third, the United States should maintain a nuclear deterrent robust enough to convince a risk-acceptant adversary that they will not be able to escalate their way to victory, while being willing to engage in reciprocal arms control agreements as circumstances allow.
4422. West Africa is already self-arming---two rival regional forces stood up without us.
Owolabi 26 — Ayodele S. Owolabi. January 23. Associate Lecturer in International Relations at Liverpool John Moores University. Al Jazeera, “Militarising the Sahel will not defeat terrorism,” https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/1/23/militarising-the-sahel-will-not-defeat-terrorism Clopus
After launching what he called “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS [ISIL] terrorist scum” in northwest Nigeria on December 25, United States President Donald Trump promised “many more”, reaffirming his stance that the US “will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to prosper”. The strikes occurred less than a week after the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) commissioned a joint military force comprising a 5,000-strong contingent, presented as a symbol of collective self-reliance and security autonomy, in a concerted effort to combat terrorist groups in its member states. They also followed moves by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish an ambitious plan announced in August 2025 to activate a 260,000-strong joint counterterrorism force, backed by a proposed $2.5bn annual budget for logistics and front-line support.
While these developments may be presented by their proponents as decisive steps against terrorism, there is little evidence that militarised escalation alone can defeat armed groups in the Sahel. Instead, they signal an accelerating militarisation of the region. Not only does this fuel emerging geopolitical tensions in West Africa, but it also, more importantly, edges the Sahel towards interstate armed conflict, posing far graver risks to regional peace and stability.
4431. NON-UNIQUE. The break already happened---a designation and a bombing threat did it, not us.
Amaize 25 — Ohimai Amaize. November 5. Nigerian journalist and Atlantic Council contributor on West African politics. Atlantic Council, “With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-trumps-threats-of-military-intervention-in-nigeria-tinubu-faces-a-delicate-balancing-act/ Clopus
US-Nigeria relations have taken a sharp turn in recent days, indicating the widening gap between Abuja and Washington. On October 31, US President Donald Trump announced the redesignation of Nigeria as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) for severe violations of religious freedom. The next day, in a follow-up social media post, Trump threatened military action against Nigeria, as well as a full cutoff of US aid to the country, if its government “continues to allow the killing of Christians.”
For Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, the designation and threat of military intervention couldn’t have come at a more politically fraught moment. With a population of more than 230 million people , Nigeria continues to grapple with inflation , a struggling currency , and widespread poverty despite recent reforms. With the CPC designation, Washington is questioning the government’s ability to protect its citizens from religiously motivated violence. The moment demands Nigeria to deliver a more coherent diplomatic posture toward the United States.
4442. NO LINK. The dispute is a frame fight---and engagement can’t move it, so neither can a sale.
Warner 25 — Lesley Anne Warner. November 14. Africa security analyst, formerly of CNA and the U.S. Africa Command. Just Security, “The Political Theater Behind Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Nigeria Threat,” https://www.justsecurity.org/124725/trump-nigeria-military-threat/ Clopus
The diplomacy on this issue has also been complicated at both ends. For Nigeria’s part, it lacks accredited diplomatic leadership in Washington, due to President Tinubu’s decision to recall all Nigerian envoys worldwide in September 2023 for what was described as a reorganization of the country’s diplomatic corps. Furthermore, since taking office in May 2023, Tinubu has not visited the U.S. capital. However, enhanced diplomatic engagement may have offered only marginal opportunities to pre-empt or de-escalate diplomatic tensions. In this respect, Trump’s allegations of Christian persecution in Nigeria mirror the debunked conspiracy theory he and others on the American right continue to wield against South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and the ruling African National Congress (ANC) that there is a “genocide” of white farmers in their country.
Indeed, this pattern of championing selective narratives while dismissing broader evidence offers a cautionary lesson: there is minimal return on investment in persuading the president and his inner circle with facts once they have acquired their own ideologically entrenched truths. Notably, even after several months of diplomatic outreach and lobbying , including an Oval Office meeting between Trump and Ramaphosa, the U.S. president recently declared that no U.S. government officials would be attending the G20 in South Africa – and that the country should not even be a member of the G20.
U.S. Military Options: Flight of Fancy?
In response to the Trump administration’s directive to develop military options, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has proposed a range of approaches, each constrained by distinct diplomatic, strategic, and operational considerations. AFRICOM was originally created as — and largely continues to be — a ‘posture-limited theater,’ with a limited forward military presence and drawing on only 0.3 percent of the Department of Defense’s operating budget, according to the congressional testimony of previous combatant commanders. The command’s annual posture statements identify Nigeria as central to counterterrorism strategy in West Africa, prioritizing the containment and degradation of Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa through an approach intended to let African partners lead, with the United States and allies providing enabling support, rather than the United States engaging directly in combat operations. The backbone of bilateral engagement has been episodic training to build the capacity of the Nigerian military and associated institutions and robust foreign military sales, which has included the delivery of 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft in 2021 and substantial munitions packages, such as a $346 million precision-guided weapons sale approved this August. Regionally, Nigeria has participated in annual multinational exercises such as Flintlock , which is focused on joint special operations, and Obangame Express , which is billed as the “largest multinational maritime exercise in Western and Central Africa.” The U.S. military also provides advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence-sharing, to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a five-nation regional security mechanism comprising forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (until withdrawing earlier this year), and Nigeria.
The first option presented by AFRICOM, deepening “partner-enabled operations” with Nigerian security forces, essentially represents an intensification of the bilateral security cooperation already underway, which has not resolved longstanding conflicts across the country. Moreover, longstanding legal restrictions under the Leahy Law, which prohibits assistance to security forces that have perpetrated human rights abuses, have rightfully put guardrails on the bilateral security relationship for more than a decade. Lastly, the evisceration of the foreign assistance apparatus means that bureaus like the State Department’s Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the former U.S. Agency for International Development, which the Trump administration shut down, are no longer working to address the root causes of insecurity in the country. Those efforts ordinarily would work hand-in-glove with military- and law-enforcement responses.
4453. LINK TURN. Direct military action is what manufactures the resentment---partner governments farm it.
Walldorf 23 — William Walldorf. August 31. Senior fellow at Defense Priorities. Defense Priorities, “Overreach in Africa: rethinking U.S. counterterrorism strategy,” https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/overreach-in-africa-rethinking-us-counterterrorism-strategy/ Clopus
Fifth, “better safe than sorry” thinking misses the extent to which current U.S. policy aids the growth of anti-Americanism in Africa. Direct U.S. military action in Africa generates anti-Americanism that aids recruitment by Islamist groups and might someday lead to direct attacks on the United States.
Drone strikes can be an effective tactic for disrupting terrorist organizations and operations. 59 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 (July/August 2013): 33; Asfandyar Mir, “What Explains U.S. Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan,” International Security 43, no. 2 (2018): 45–83. Unfortunately, U.S. airpower has produced extensive collateral damage over the past decade and a half in Africa. The vast majority of U.S. drone and air strikes in Africa have been in Libya and Somalia. The numbers of civilian deaths from drones in these two countries are murky because of poor reporting by AFRICOM, but reliable estimates put deaths in the thousands. 60 “All Belligerents in Libya, 2011,” Airwars, https://airwars.org/conflict/all-belligerents-in-libya-2011/; “All Belligerents in Libya, 2012-present,” Airwars, https://airwars.org/conflict/all-belligerents-in-libya/; “U.S. Forces in Somalia,” Airwars, https://airwars.org/conflict/us-forces-in-somalia/. The total number of confirmed civilian deaths runs as high as 3,200 between Somalia and Libya. This includes 2,519 during the 2011 NATO-led operation in Libya, 743 in Libya since 2012, and 161 in Somalia since 2007. Whether this type of collateral damage aids terrorist recruitment is a debatable topic, but it certainly can’t help the U.S. cause. 61 For an optimistic assessment of drone effectiveness, regardless of collateral damage, see Joshua A. Schwartz, Mathew Furhmann, and Michael C. Horowitz, “Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, or are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 66, no. 3 (2022): 1–14. On arguments that U.S. air power aids terrorist recruitment, see Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid, Counterterrorism From the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 23, 2022), 4–5, https://www.csis.org/analysis/counterterrorism-sky-how-think-over-horizon-about-drones; Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, “The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror,” The Independent Review 23, no. 1 (Summer 2018): 51–67; Abdulerasheed Al-Faqih, “Civilian Casualties and Effectiveness of U.S. Drone Strikes in Yemen,” Just Security, April 3, 2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/54464/civilian-casualties-effectiveness-u-s-drone-strikes-yemen-part/.
Drones aside, the general presence of U.S. forces in Africa has created popular frustration and anger at the United States that, again, inadvertently helps terrorist recruitment. In West Africa, local governments (many of whom ironically partner with the U.S. on counterterrorism) often intentionally fuel this resentment. The Malian government tries, for example, to tap into popular discontentment with France and the United States to deflect blame from itself for the poor living conditions faced by everyday Malians. According to Denis Tull, the regime draws upon “a discourse of international tutelage” to communicate to “skeptical voters that its responsibility for the continuing crisis [in Mali] is limited given the persistence of intrusive foreign [i.e., U.S. and French] intervention.” 62 Denis M. Tull, “Rebuilding Mali’s Army: The Dissonant Relationship Between Mali and Its International Partners,” International Affairs 95, no. 2 (2019): 414.
Reported civilian deaths from U.S. strikes in Somalia
Airwars has tracked U.S. counterterrorism strikes in Somalia since 2007. Due to variations in reporting quality, Airwars uses a grading system to assess casualty allegations based on the type and number of public reports and visual evidence. While the United States tries to minimize collateral damage, there are hundreds of alleged instances of civilian deaths resulting from counterterrorism strikes.
Though anti-French sentiment runs much deeper in West Africa than anti-Americanism, the latter is still there. 63 On anti-French sentiment, see David Rich, “Niger Becomes France’s Partner of Last Resort after Mali Withdrawal,” France24, February 18, 2022, https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20220218-niger-becomes-france-s-partner-of-last-resort-after-mali-withdrawal. The largest deployment of U.S. forces in West Africa—roughly 800 special operators—is in Niger. 64 Abhijit Mohanty, “Why is the US Military Fighting in Niger?” Geopolitical Monitor, April 7, 2020, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/why-is-the-us-military-fighting-in-niger/. Leading public figures in Niger claim that the U.S. presence makes things worse, not better. “Are they really here to help our soldiers?” asked Boulama Hamadou Tcherno, a civil society leader in Niger in 2020. “Terrorism has increased since the arrival of U.S. soldiers; in fact, their presence on the ground does not make any changes.” 65 Mohanty, “Why is the US Military Fighting in Niger?” On a similar note, Mariama Bayard, leader of the opposition in Niger asserted, “U.S. soldiers are creating a perfect condition for the Sahel to blow up.” 66 Mohanty, “Why is the US Military Fighting in Niger?”
The U.S. military presence in Somalia has unintentionally helped Al-Shabaab too. Tricia Bacon, a professor at American University and former foreign affairs officer on counterterrorism at the State Department, argues that Al-Shabaab recruitment is aided significantly by foreign intervention, including U.S. forces being on the ground in Somalia. Drawing on a collective Somali identity, the group has made the departure of foreign forces a central component of its messaging and overall agenda. 67 Bacon, Inside the Minds of Somalia’s Ascendant Insurgents, 14–15, 36, 49, 58–59.
4464. NO IMPACT. Their own analyst says the impasse gets managed, not resolved---nobody walks.
Warner 25 — Lesley Anne Warner. November 14. Africa security analyst, formerly of CNA and the U.S. Africa Command. Just Security, “The Political Theater Behind Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Nigeria Threat,” https://www.justsecurity.org/124725/trump-nigeria-military-threat/ Clopus
Ultimately, Trump’s threatened military action appears more as political theater choreographed for his domestic base, akin to deploying the National Guard to American cities. Whatever response the administration settles on in this case is highly unlikely to improve the plight of Nigerian civilians, including Christians, due to the structural governance, economic, and security drivers of conflict across the country. Much like other countries that have found themselves in the crosshairs of the Trump administration, Nigeria will discover that this disconnect is something that will need to be carefully managed – and unlikely to be resolved — for the duration of Trump’s tenure. In other words, increased diplomatic engagement and lobbying will not hurt, but ultimately is not likely to resolve this impasse in the bilateral relationship.
Working in Nigeria’s favor is that it is one of Africa’s largest economies , and can fortify relationships with other countries, should U.S. influence wither. The Trump administration’s decision to gut foreign assistance and bully a State that possesses regional clout simply accelerates this pivot, undermining American strategic interests on the continent while expanding the influence of competitors at minimal cost.
447The vacuum is structural---no ambassadors, no visit, no channel.
Amaize 25 — Ohimai Amaize. November 5. Nigerian journalist and Atlantic Council contributor on West African politics. Atlantic Council, “With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-trumps-threats-of-military-intervention-in-nigeria-tinubu-faces-a-delicate-balancing-act/ Clopus
Since his inauguration in May 2023, Tinubu has not traveled to Washington and allowed a diplomatic vacuum to fester. In September 2023, Tinubu recalled all Nigerian ambassadors worldwide and still has yet to appoint permanent replacements. What’s more, he was conspicuously absent from Trump’s meeting in July with West African leaders . Tinubu’s distance from the White House may also reflect political caution on his part, following renewed reporting on his past in the United States, including his connection to a federal criminal case and questions about his academic records .
Although Tinubu appointed a handful of consuls-general and chargés d’affaires (including in Washington ) earlier this year, Nigerian foreign policy experts note that these temporary measures fall far short of the representation expected of a country of Nigeria’s stature, and reports have detailed the poor state of Nigerian diplomatic missions. Officials in Abuja cite financial constraints for the delay in appointing ambassadors. Amid the dispute with the United States, Tinubu is now reportedly finalizing a list of ambassador nominees.
4481. The designation is the instrument---censure, sanctions and aid, not the arms account.
Amaize 25 — Ohimai Amaize. November 5. Nigerian journalist and Atlantic Council contributor on West African politics. Atlantic Council, “With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-trumps-threats-of-military-intervention-in-nigeria-tinubu-faces-a-delicate-balancing-act/ Clopus
Being named a “Country of Particular Concern” is not merely symbolic. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 ( IRFA ), it places a country in the category of states that have “engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” It can trigger diplomatic censure and, in some cases, targeted sanctions or aid restrictions, unless the president grants a waiver for national-security reasons.
Nigeria was first placed on the CPC list in 2020, during the first Trump administration, but was removed in 2021 by the Biden administration ahead of then Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria. The decision drew sharp criticism from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent body created by the IRFA. And last month, US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a bill calling for the CPC designation and the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria, including measures against Nigerian officials who “implement or support blasphemy and Sharia laws.” The redesignation, therefore, represents a policy reversal and a warning that Washington expects progress on religious-freedom protections or further consequences may follow.