Nigeria Aff, page 35

477Nothing's moving before November and it's got nothing to do with us.

Bolton 8-12 — Alexander Bolton. August 12. Senior staff writer covering the Senate for The Hill. The Hill, “GOP worries time running out on Trump’s agenda with Congress,” https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6023566-senate-august-recess-trump-agenda/ Clopus

The president signed off on a deal to adjourn the Senate last week after reaching an understanding with Thune and Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.), chair of the Senate Budget Committee, that Republicans would work hard on laying the groundwork for a third budget reconciliation package during the August recess.

But GOP senators privately acknowledge there’s virtually no chance that Trump will get these wish list items before the election, warning that voting on them before November would amplify political targets on vulnerable Republican colleagues.

Several Republican senators at a meeting last week voiced concerns about holding a marathon series of votes on a budget resolution before the August recess, fearing that Democrats could force vulnerable GOP incumbents into a series of tough votes.

One GOP senator who attended the meeting said Thune clearly sided with vulnerable incumbents such as Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), who warned her Republican colleagues that diving into a vote-a-rama weeks before the election would be big mistake.

Instead, Republican senators plan to tackle cryptocurrency regulation and college sports reform when they return to Washington in September.

Thune wants to put political pressure on Democrats by forcing them to vote on the Clarity Act, a bill that would establish a regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies.

Republicans are betting Democrats will block the legislation over the lack of stronger conflict of interest provisions for Trump and his family, which could then unleash a torrent of political advertising from cryptocurrency-backers just in time to help GOP candidates.

Thune initially pledged the Senate would vote on cryptocurrency regulation before the August recess, but Democrats threatened to drag out votes on a continuing resolution (CR), Todd Blanche’s nomination to serve as attorney general and other matters to pressure the GOP leader to delay a politically damaging vote.

If Democrats block the cryptocurrency bill, the Senate would then move immediately to the Protect College Sports Act, a bipartisan bill to set national standards for recruiting and compensating college athletes — a top priority for Trump.

4781. Non-unique---the price is a Hormuz price and it's forecast down.

EIA 8-11 — U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 11. Statistical and analytical agency of the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global oil markets,” https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php Clopus

We assess that production shut-ins averaged 5.5 million b/d in July. For this analysis, we assume that oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz will remain severely constrained through August, with flows slowly increasing in September. This assumption is prompting us to raise our forecast of shut-in crude oil production in August, further reducing inventories. We do not assume that the recent threats to ships transporting Saudi Arabian crude oil through the Bab el-Mandeb strait have resulted in any additional shut-ins of crude oil production. If these assumptions hold, we expect it will take until early 2027 for production and trade patterns to generally return to pre-conflict status. We anticipate nonetheless that some producers around the Persian Gulf will not be able to bring oil output back to pre-conflict averages during the STEO forecast period.

Because of the large drawdown in global inventories triggered by continued disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, we forecast that oil prices will remain elevated until global oil flows return to normal and oil inventories are replenished. We estimate that global oil inventories fell by an average of 4.2 million b/d in 2Q26 and that they will fall by an additional 3.8 million b/d on average in 3Q26. As a result, we forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average around $85/b in 3Q26, $11/b higher than in last month’s STEO. Once the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz gradually increases and shut-in oil production increasingly restarts, we forecast oil prices will begin to fall, decreasing to an average of $78/b by 4Q26. We assess that most shut-in oil production will be largely restored in 1Q27 and that global oil inventories will again start building, gradually lowering oil prices to an average of $69/b in 2027.

4792. No link---Nigerian output is at its highest of the year.

Addeh 5-14 — Emmanuel Addeh. May 14. Abuja-based energy correspondent for THISDAY. THISDAY, “Nigeria Hits Highest 2026 Oil Output Despite Missing 1.5m Bpd OPEC Quota,” https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/05/14/nigeria-hits-highest-2026-oil-output-despite-missing-1-5m-bpd-opec-quota/ Clopus

Nigeria recorded its strongest oil production performance so far in 2026, as total liquid output rose to 1.66 million bpd in April from 1.54 million bpd in March, although crude output fell short of the 1.5 million bpd quota allocated to the country by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Latest production data released by the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NUPRC) showed that crude oil production alone increased to 1.489 million bpd in April from 1.383 million bpd in March, reflecting a rise of about 7.7 per cent. OPEC does not consider condensates in its overall monthly output data.

In all, crude oil and condensate in April was 49.90 million barrels, representing an increase from the 47.93 million barrels recorded in March. On a daily basis, total liquid production rose from 1.55 million bpd in March to 1.66 million bpd in April, indicating an increase of approximately 7.1 per cent month-on-month.

In addition, total liquid production was 50,451,281 barrels in January. It then fell in February to 41,550,703 barrels, before rising again to 47,928,897 barrels in March and further to the 49,902,382 barrels in April.

For daily average production, it began at 1,627,461 bpd in January, dropped to 1,483,954 in February, then increased to 1,546,093 in March and rose again to 1,663,413 in April. By April, daily output had not only recovered but slightly exceeded January’s level, showing a gradual improvement after the February decline.

However, despite the improvement, the country still missed the OPEC production target, with the NUPRC data indicating that Nigeria’s average crude oil production in April represented 99 per cent of the country’s OPEC quota of 1.5 million bpd.

Combined condensate production therefore rose to 174,872 bpd in April, compared to 163,251 bpd in March, representing an increase of roughly 7.1 per cent. The improved national output was driven largely by stronger production from key export terminals, particularly Bonny, Forcados, Bonga, Anyala-Madu and several offshore assets.

Bonny retained its position as Nigeria’s biggest producing stream in April, with combined crude oil and condensate production rising to 8.85 million barrels from 8.42 million barrels in March, an increase of about 5.1 per cent.

Also, Forcados posted one of the strongest recoveries among the country’s major streams during the month. Total output surged to 7.35 million barrels in April from 5.18 million barrels in March, representing a sharp increase of about 42 per cent.

Qua Iboe, one of Nigeria’s major export grades, however recorded a decline in output. Total production from the stream fell to 4.97 million barrels in April from 5.25 million barrels in March, representing a decline of about 5.4 per cent.

The NUPRC data further showed that some streams remained inactive or posted minimal production volumes during the period. The Aje field again recorded no production in April.

Overall, the April figures represented Nigeria’s highest production level since the beginning of the year and suggested continued recovery in the country’s upstream petroleum sector after years of operational disruptions caused by crude theft, pipeline vandalism, deteriorating infrastructure, underinvestment and force majeure declarations at several export terminals.

4803. Wrong theatre---the oil violence is the Delta, not the northeast.

Robinet 1-29 — Fabrice Robinet. January 29. UN News, reporting an interview with Mohamed Malik Fall, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria. UN News, “Violence roiling Nigeria extends beyond religious lines, amid a deepening humanitarian crisis,” https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166857 Clopus

What was once a localized insurgency has morphed into something broader and more diffuse.

In Nigeria’s northwest – in states such as Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto – armed criminal groups have seized control of rural areas, carrying out mass kidnappings and extortion, a phenomenon authorities describe as banditry.

Entire villages have been abandoned, and around one million people are now displaced in the region, according to United Nations estimates.

In the country’s central belt, clashes between farmers and herders over land, intensified by climate pressure and environmental degradation, have triggered further displacement.

Elsewhere, separatist movements and attacks linked to oil production continue to destabilize communities.

The cumulative result is a country with roughly 3.5 million internally displaced people – nearly 10 percent of all displacement across Africa.

A loaded claim

Recent attacks against churches and Christian schools have revived international attention. In January, more than 160 worshippers were abducted during Sunday services in Kaduna State.

Days earlier, villages in the northwest were attacked, killing dozens, while students near a Catholic school in Papiri were again targeted.

The violence revived memories of the 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok , most of them Christian, by Boko Haram – a moment that once galvanized global outrage.

Citing the need to protect Christians from Islamist militants, the US administration ordered airstrikes on Christmas Day against jihadist positions in northern Nigeria. In Washington, some officials have since argued that a “Christian genocide” is underway.

The UN is refraining from that characterisation.

“Attributing this violence to the targeted persecution of a religious group – I would not take that step,” Mr. Fall said. “The vast majority of the more than 40,000 people killed in the insurgency are Muslims. They were attacked and killed in mosques.”

He pointed to an attack in Maiduguri, the historic centre of the insurgency, carried out on Christmas Eve in an area “between a mosque and a market,” which killed Muslim worshippers as they left prayers.

4814. No impact---downturns don't produce great-power war.

Drezner 16 — Daniel W. Drezner. May. Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School, Tufts University; nonresident senior fellow at Brookings. Brookings Institution Project on International Order and Strategy, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,” https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IOS-Drezner-web-1.pdf Clopus

Multiple scholars have observed a secular decline in interstate violence in recent decades. 105 The Kantian triad of more democracies, stronger multilateral institutions, and greater levels of cross-border trade is well known. In recent years, international relations theorists have stressed that commercial interdependence is a bigger driver of this phenomenon than previously thought. 106 The liberal logic is straight-forward. The benefits of cross-border exchange and economic interdependence act as a powerful brake on the utility of violence in international politics. The global supply chain and “just in time” delivery systems have further imbricated national economies into the international system. This creates incentives for governments to preserve an open economy even during times of crisis. The more that a country’s economy was enmeshed in the global supply chain, for example, the less likely it was to raise tariffs after

the 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, global finan- ciers are strongly interested in minimizing political risk; historically, the financial sector has staunchly opposed initiating the use of force in world politics. 108 Even militarily powerful actors must be wary of alienating global capital.

Globalization therefore creates powerful pressures on governments not to close off their economies through protectionism or military aggression. Interdependence can also tamp down conflicts that would otherwise be likely to break out during a great power transition. Of the 15 times a rising power has emerged to challenge a ruling power between 1500 and 2000, war broke out 11 times. 109 Despite these odds, China’s recent rise to great power status has ele- vated tensions without leading to anything approach- ing war. It could be argued that the Sino-American economic relationship is so deep that it has tamped down the great power conflict that would otherwise have been in full bloom over the past two decades. Instead, both China and the United States have taken pains to talk about the need for a new kind of great power relationship. Interdependence can help to reduce the likelihood of an extreme event—such as a great power war—from taking place.

Will this be true for the next generation economy as well? The two other legs of the Kantian triad—democratization and multilateralism—are facing their own problems in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. 110 Economic openness survived the negative shock of the 2008 financial crisis, which suggests that the logic of commercial liberalism will continue to hold with equal force going forward. But some international relations scholars doubt the power of globalization’s pacifying effects, arguing that interdependence is not a powerful constraint. 111 Other analysts go further, arguing that globalization exac- erbates financial volatility—which in turn can lead to political instability and violence. 112

A different counterargument is that the continued growth of interdependence will stall out. Since 2008, for example, the growth in global trade flows has been muted, and global capital flows are still considerably

smaller than they were in the pre-crisis era. In trade, this reflects a pre-crisis trend. Between 1950 and 2000, trade grew, on average, more than twice as fast as global economic output. In the 2000s, however, trade only grew about 30 percent more than output. 113 In 2012 and 2013, trade grew less than economic output. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that global flows as a percentage of output have fallen from 53 percent in 2007 to 39 percent in

2014. 114 While the stock of interdependence remains high, the flow has slowed to a trickle. The Financial Times has suggested that the global economy has hit “peak trade.”

115

If economic growth continues to outstrip trade, then the level of interdependence will slowly decline, thereby weakening the liberal constraint on great power conflicts. And there are several reasons to posit why interdependence might stall out. One possibility is due to innovations reducing the need for traded goods. For example, in the last decade, higher energy prices in the United States triggered investments into conservation, alternative forms of energy, and unconventional sources of hydrocarbons. All of these steps reduced the U.S. demand for imported energy. A future in which compact fusion engines are developed would further reduce the need for imported energy even more. 116

A more radical possibility is the development of technologies that reduce the need for physical trade across borders. Digital manufacturing will cause the relocation of production facilities closer to end-us- er markets, shortening the global supply chain. 117 An even more radical discontinuity would come from the wholesale diffusion of 3-D printing. The ability of a single printer to produce multiple com- ponent parts of a larger manufactured good elimi- nates the need for a global supply chain. As Richard Baldwin notes, “Supply chain unbundling is driven by a fundamental trade-off between the gains from specialization and the costs of dispersal. This would be seriously undermined by radical advances in the direction of mass customization and 3D printing by sophisticated machines…To put it sharply, transmis- sion of data would substitute for transportation of

goods.” As 3-D printing technology improves, the need for large economies to import anything other than raw materials concomitantly declines. 119

Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further. 120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity. 121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

There have been other drivers of the decades-long reduction in militarized interstate disputes. Nuclear deterrence has helped curb violent conflict among the great powers. Multilateral peacekeeping missions mit- igate small country conflicts. Even if there is a decline in interdependence, it is possible that the “Long Peace” will endure. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict the degree to which either innovations or geopolitics will lessen the need for international trade. Even technological optimists acknowledge that the future diffusion of 3D printing is unclear. Advocates of networked manufacturing insist that economic openness is a prerequisite for the process to continue. 122 And the degree of geopolitical revisionism among great powers might be endogenous—that is to say, preexisting levels of globalization might constrain revisionist impulses, rather than such impulses weakening the glo- balized economy.

482The market is being set by a chokepoint---and the strip goes down from here.

EIA 8-11 — U.S. Energy Information Administration. August 11. Statistical and analytical agency of the U.S. Department of Energy. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Short-Term Energy Outlook: Global oil markets,” https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php Clopus

Following the signing in June of the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, the spot price of Brent crude oil fell as low as $69 per barrel (b) on July 2. Global crude oil prices rose and volatility increased later in July following renewed attacks on tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz and the related reduction in oil shipments through the waterway. The Brent spot price reached as high as $105/b on July 23.

In addition to renewed attacks on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz, crude oil prices were driven higher due to a new blockade threat on Saudi Arabia’s oil exports through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Bab el-Mandeb is both a major world oil transit chokepoint and one of the alternative routes used to move Saudi Arabia’s oil shipments while avoiding the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia retains the option to divert flows through the Suez Canal as well as via the Sumed pipeline in Egypt. However, these alternatives take longer, are more expensive, and are more limited in capacity.

We estimate that crude oil and petroleum liquids transported through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 4.9 million barrels per day (b/d) in the second quarter of 2026 (2Q26), down from an average of 21.6 million b/d in 4Q25 before the conflict began. Similarly, total volumes of crude oil and liquids through the Bab el-Mandeb strait averaged 8.1 million b/d in 2Q26, up from an average of 5.4 million b/d in 4Q25 as Saudi Arabia re-routed crude oil flows away from the Strait of Hormuz through the East-West pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea.

We assess that production shut-ins averaged 5.5 million b/d in July. For this analysis, we assume that oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz will remain severely constrained through August, with flows slowly increasing in September. This assumption is prompting us to raise our forecast of shut-in crude oil production in August, further reducing inventories. We do not assume that the recent threats to ships transporting Saudi Arabian crude oil through the Bab el-Mandeb strait have resulted in any additional shut-ins of crude oil production. If these assumptions hold, we expect it will take until early 2027 for production and trade patterns to generally return to pre-conflict status. We anticipate nonetheless that some producers around the Persian Gulf will not be able to bring oil output back to pre-conflict averages during the STEO forecast period.

Because of the large drawdown in global inventories triggered by continued disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, we forecast that oil prices will remain elevated until global oil flows return to normal and oil inventories are replenished. We estimate that global oil inventories fell by an average of 4.2 million b/d in 2Q26 and that they will fall by an additional 3.8 million b/d on average in 3Q26. As a result, we forecast the Brent crude oil spot price will average around $85/b in 3Q26, $11/b higher than in last month’s STEO. Once the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz gradually increases and shut-in oil production increasingly restarts, we forecast oil prices will begin to fall, decreasing to an average of $78/b by 4Q26. We assess that most shut-in oil production will be largely restored in 1Q27 and that global oil inventories will again start building, gradually lowering oil prices to an average of $69/b in 2027.

483Nigerian supply is recovering---the constraint is theft, not the insurgency.

Addeh 5-14 — Emmanuel Addeh. May 14. Abuja-based energy correspondent for THISDAY. THISDAY, “Nigeria Hits Highest 2026 Oil Output Despite Missing 1.5m Bpd OPEC Quota,” https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/05/14/nigeria-hits-highest-2026-oil-output-despite-missing-1-5m-bpd-opec-quota/ Clopus

Combined condensate production therefore rose to 174,872 bpd in April, compared to 163,251 bpd in March, representing an increase of roughly 7.1 per cent. The improved national output was driven largely by stronger production from key export terminals, particularly Bonny, Forcados, Bonga, Anyala-Madu and several offshore assets.

Bonny retained its position as Nigeria’s biggest producing stream in April, with combined crude oil and condensate production rising to 8.85 million barrels from 8.42 million barrels in March, an increase of about 5.1 per cent.

Also, Forcados posted one of the strongest recoveries among the country’s major streams during the month. Total output surged to 7.35 million barrels in April from 5.18 million barrels in March, representing a sharp increase of about 42 per cent.

Qua Iboe, one of Nigeria’s major export grades, however recorded a decline in output. Total production from the stream fell to 4.97 million barrels in April from 5.25 million barrels in March, representing a decline of about 5.4 per cent.

The NUPRC data further showed that some streams remained inactive or posted minimal production volumes during the period. The Aje field again recorded no production in April.

Overall, the April figures represented Nigeria’s highest production level since the beginning of the year and suggested continued recovery in the country’s upstream petroleum sector after years of operational disruptions caused by crude theft, pipeline vandalism, deteriorating infrastructure, underinvestment and force majeure declarations at several export terminals.

484Output rises on offshore terminals the air campaign never touches.

Addeh 5-14 — Emmanuel Addeh. May 14. Abuja-based energy correspondent for THISDAY. THISDAY, “Nigeria Hits Highest 2026 Oil Output Despite Missing 1.5m Bpd OPEC Quota,” https://www.thisdaylive.com/2026/05/14/nigeria-hits-highest-2026-oil-output-despite-missing-1-5m-bpd-opec-quota/ Clopus

Combined condensate production therefore rose to 174,872 bpd in April, compared to 163,251 bpd in March, representing an increase of roughly 7.1 per cent. The improved national output was driven largely by stronger production from key export terminals, particularly Bonny, Forcados, Bonga, Anyala-Madu and several offshore assets.

Bonny retained its position as Nigeria’s biggest producing stream in April, with combined crude oil and condensate production rising to 8.85 million barrels from 8.42 million barrels in March, an increase of about 5.1 per cent.

Also, Forcados posted one of the strongest recoveries among the country’s major streams during the month. Total output surged to 7.35 million barrels in April from 5.18 million barrels in March, representing a sharp increase of about 42 per cent.

Qua Iboe, one of Nigeria’s major export grades, however recorded a decline in output. Total production from the stream fell to 4.97 million barrels in April from 5.25 million barrels in March, representing a decline of about 5.4 per cent.

The NUPRC data further showed that some streams remained inactive or posted minimal production volumes during the period. The Aje field again recorded no production in April.

Overall, the April figures represented Nigeria’s highest production level since the beginning of the year and suggested continued recovery in the country’s upstream petroleum sector after years of operational disruptions caused by crude theft, pipeline vandalism, deteriorating infrastructure, underinvestment and force majeure declarations at several export terminals.

485Nigeria's conflicts are regionally distinct---oil violence is its own theatre.

Robinet 1-29 — Fabrice Robinet. January 29. UN News, reporting an interview with Mohamed Malik Fall, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria. UN News, “Violence roiling Nigeria extends beyond religious lines, amid a deepening humanitarian crisis,” https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/01/1166857 Clopus

What was once a localized insurgency has morphed into something broader and more diffuse.

In Nigeria’s northwest – in states such as Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto – armed criminal groups have seized control of rural areas, carrying out mass kidnappings and extortion, a phenomenon authorities describe as banditry.

Entire villages have been abandoned, and around one million people are now displaced in the region, according to United Nations estimates.

In the country’s central belt, clashes between farmers and herders over land, intensified by climate pressure and environmental degradation, have triggered further displacement.

Elsewhere, separatist movements and attacks linked to oil production continue to destabilize communities.

The cumulative result is a country with roughly 3.5 million internally displaced people – nearly 10 percent of all displacement across Africa.

A loaded claim

Recent attacks against churches and Christian schools have revived international attention. In January, more than 160 worshippers were abducted during Sunday services in Kaduna State.

Days earlier, villages in the northwest were attacked, killing dozens, while students near a Catholic school in Papiri were again targeted.

The violence revived memories of the 2014 abduction of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok , most of them Christian, by Boko Haram – a moment that once galvanized global outrage.

Citing the need to protect Christians from Islamist militants, the US administration ordered airstrikes on Christmas Day against jihadist positions in northern Nigeria. In Washington, some officials have since argued that a “Christian genocide” is underway.

The UN is refraining from that characterisation.

“Attributing this violence to the targeted persecution of a religious group – I would not take that step,” Mr. Fall said. “The vast majority of the more than 40,000 people killed in the insurgency are Muslims. They were attacked and killed in mosques.”

He pointed to an attack in Maiduguri, the historic centre of the insurgency, carried out on Christmas Eve in an area “between a mosque and a market,” which killed Muslim worshippers as they left prayers.

486The Gulf got safe on a naval program---the plan doesn't touch it.

Baldridge 25 — Kempton Baldridge. August 7. Maritime security writer for the Center for Maritime Strategy. Center for Maritime Strategy, “Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: Progress and Future Challenges,” https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/piracy-in-the-gulf-of-guinea-progress-and-future-challenges/ Clopus

The largest and most influential contribution Nigeria has made towards combating piracy is their Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, or Deep Blue Project. Started in August 2019 and officially implemented in June 2021, the Deep Blue Project has cost nearly $200 million since its inception . In addition to facilitating better communication between the Nigerian Defense and Transportation ministries and the private shipping industry, the Deep Blue Project provides better training for NIMASA in the areas of intelligence gathering and sharing, maritime security, and special mission vehicle operation. The project has commissioned 600 specially-trained troops as well as several quick response security vessels and aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and armored vehicles, demonstrating a thorough understanding of the multi-domain approach needed to effectively combat piracy . Since the implementation of the Deep Blue Project, Nigerian territorial waters have become safer. Of the fifty-nine piracy incidents reported between 2022 and 2024, only three occurred in Nigerian waters or ports. At the start of its fifth year of implementation , the Deep Blue Project has been a model of not just effective anti-piracy policy, but also the beginning of a national maritime investment strategy .

While other countries have yet to implement a project similar in scale to Deep Blue, many have made modest increases to their offshore forces recently. Angola received one of three corvettes from France in 2022 , and signed a contract with United Arab Emirates for three corvettes in 2023 . The Ghanaian Navy acquired four new Flex Fighter-type patrol vessels in 2022 , with two additional SAFE Boats International Defenders-type patrol boats delivered in 2023 . Senegal received three offshore patrol vessels (OPV) from France in 2023 and 2024 and Cote D’Ivoire also received an OPV from Israel in 2023 . These increases in naval forces are a step in the right direction, however regional navies must accompany this with a proportional program such as Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project.

2022 and 2024 saw two of the lowest instances of reported piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in nearly 30 years, however there is some debate as to the reason behind the decline between the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and NIMASA. IMB believes that foreign navies increasing patrols of the area is behind the decline, while NIMASA cites its successful implementation of the Deep Blue Project . Furthermore, despite the reporting of fewer pirate attacks and boardings in 2022, the IMB urged caution at celebrating presumptuously, as the pirate groups were still reported in the region and may have pulled back their attacks to better find ways around the increased security presence.

There will continue to be challenges . Initiatives such as Deep Blue are still in their infancy. For it to remain effective, it must continue to be adequately funded and supported, especially as new and improved surveillance technology comes online. Government corruption and fair policy implementation also pose challenges for sustaining anti-piracy efforts. The underlying poverty in the Gulf of Guinea must also be addressed, along with improved community engagement that includes coastal fisherman into national security planning.

In their report of the region, Dryad Global, a maritime risk management firm said “Without a tangible improvement in onshore conditions that create legitimate and sustainable alternatives to piracy it is extremely difficult to see that there has been or will be any substantive deterrence against individuals’ intent to participate in piracy.” If anti-piracy efforts are to succeed in the long-run, economic insecurity must be addressed for the coastal communities of the region. As the graph below illustrates, there is a slight relationship, between the unemployment rate of Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries) and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

Despite these challenges, there is reason to be optimistic about the future. Based on the eleven reported piracy incidents of piracy so far in 2025, by the year’s end, there may not be much more than twenty attacks in the Gulf of Guinea; this is still significantly lower than the average of nearly forty-six attacks annually between 2011 and 2020. Maritime piracy is trending downwards for the region, and international and regional actors and stakeholders have demonstrated an earnest interest in addressing the issue. The involvement of nations with more developed blue water navies can help train Gulf of Guinea nations as they develop more robust communications and intelligence networks under the framework laid out in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. Additionally, Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project provides an example how individual nations can build upon the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and share information better, coordinate action, strengthen laws and invest in equipment, manpower and training with the explicit purpose of securing maritime borders for private and public investment.

487West African piracy is at a 35-year low---one incident all quarter.

MarEx 4-8 — The Maritime Executive. April 8. Trade publication of record for the commercial shipping industry, reporting the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre quarterly data. The Maritime Executive, “Piracy Falls to Lowest Levels in 35 Years During First Quarter of 2026,” https://maritime-executive.com/article/piracy-falls-to-lowest-levels-in-35-years-during-first-quarter-of-2026 Clopus

Regionally, the concern continues to center on Southeast Asia, which accounted for three-quarters of all the reported incidents. The Singapore Strait, while showing a positive decline, continues to be the hot spot, accounting for half of all the incidents globally in the quarter. While most of the activity is considered low-level and opportunistic, there were still eight incidents during the first quarter in the busy shipping lanes around Singapore. However, this compares with 31 incidents in the first quarter of 2025, before the authorities apprehended a group that was thought to be leading many of the boardings.

Despite the decline, one crewmember was still taken hostage, and another was injured during the incidents in the Singapore Strait region. IMB notes that the incidents also included two bulk carriers, each over 150,000 dwt.

It also noted the first incidents in the Philippines last quarter, with four reports versus none in 2025. Two were in the anchorage near Manila, and the other two were in Batangas Bay. One crewmember was taken hostage during the incidents in the Philippines.

There were also two incidents reported off Somalia as activity returned to East Africa. There was one attempted attack and one hijacking in the first quarter. Conversely, the decline off West Africa continued with only one report in the Gulf of Guinea region this quarter.

488Openness survived the worst shock since the Depression---the brake is structural.