463Beijing won't fill the gap---it has never offered anything at that scale.
CRS 8-6 — Congressional Research Service. August 6. Nonpartisan research arm of the U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service, “China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy,” R49080, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R49080.html Clopus
Some reports suggest that China may be seeking to exploit some Administration actions to advance PRC interests in Africa. Examples include PRC offers of aid, even if small and symbolic; China's removal of tariffs on all African countries as of May 1, 2026; PRC promotion of China's RMB as a U.S. dollar alternative; and PRC criticism of U.S. "unilateral bullying" and aid cuts, and promotion of narratives painting China as a reliable economic and development partner to Africa. 193 Given China's approach to providing aid, some observers doubt that China will fill gaps left by U.S. foreign aid reduction in Africa. 194 China to date has, for instance, offered its development partners nothing as extensive as the multi-billion-dollar U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) nor at the scale of grant-based development and humanitarian aid that the United States for decades provided via USAID and other agencies. China has not, to date, acted to substantially increase its voluntary contributions to UN agencies at levels comparable to historical U.S. funding following U.S. withdrawals from some UN agencies. 195
464The model is training and peacekeeping---it doesn't buy a bloc.
Boukhars 2-26 — Anouar Boukhars. February 26. Professor of Political Science at McDaniel College; author of Salafism in the Maghreb. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
China first entered Africa through infrastructure and trade, but its role has since expanded into security. It is now a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping missions on the continent and conducts regular joint military exercises with African partners. These missions sharpen the People’s Liberation Army’s operational readiness and showcase modern hardware , creating entry points for arms sales, training, and localized production. Since 2020, Beijing has become Africa’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia, moving beyond light weaponry into drones, vehicles, and fighter jets . In the Sahel and West Africa—where its role has historically been limited by French dominance and language barriers —Beijing has exploited openings created by France’s declining influence and the impact of international sanctions on Russia. As a result, between 2020 and 2024 China became the largest supplier of arms to West Africa. In 2023, for example, state-owned arms manufacturer China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO) opened a regional sales office in the Senegalese capital Dakar to expand sales and set up maintenance hubs in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. This expanding footprint is also evident in Burkina Faso , where NORINCO’s recent deliveries of armored vehicles, artillery, and rocket systems highlight China’s expanding role as a key security supplier.
Training is another pillar of China’s security approach. Military officers from the Sahel and West Africa are increasingly educated at Chinese defense institutions, reflecting a broader effort that has seen China train around 2,000 African military personnel each year . In parallel, China has expanded law enforcement cooperation, training approximately 2,000 African police officers between 2018 and 2021 . These efforts were reinforced at the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, where Beijing pledged to train thousands more African military and police personnel, including 6,000 senior officers, 500 junior officers, and 1,000 police , by the time of the next summit in 2027. This cooperation often extends beyond technical skills. Chinese programs emphasize regime-centric security practices that prioritize internal stability and control. As a result, Beijing places particular weight on law enforcement, paramilitary, and intelligence bodies tasked with political policing. Combined with the export of surveillance systems, these partnerships equip fragile regimes with tools to monitor populations, suppress dissent, and consolidate power .
465Coercion is Beijing's opening---it runs the sovereignty line against us.
Elumoye et al. 11-5 — Deji Elumoye, Emmanuel Addeh, Chuks Okocha, Michael Olugbode and Adedayo Akinwale. November 5. Abuja correspondents for THISDAY. THISDAY via allAfrica, “Nigeria: China Rejects Planned U.S. Military Action, EU Says It Stands By Nigeria,” https://allafrica.com/stories/202511050026.html Clopus
China stressed that Nigeria must be allowed to handle its internal challenges without undue foreign interference, maintaining that the country must toe the development path suited to its national conditions.
Addressing a press conference in Beijing, spokesperson of China's Foreign Ministry, Mao Ning, said, being Nigeria's strategic partner, it was against any country using religion and human rights as an excuse to interfere and threaten the West African nation with sanctions and force.
466The operation is what turns northern opinion against Washington.
Onapajo 26 — Hakeem Onapajo. January 26. Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow at the Legislative Center for Security Analysis, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies. LSE Africa at LSE, “US military strikes in Nigeria may escalate the security crisis in the Sahel,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2026/01/26/us-military-strikes-in-nigeria-may-escalate-the-security-crisis-in-the-sahel/ Clopus
Although seemingly useful, a continued US-led military operation in Nigeria may be counter-productive and open a floodgate of immediate and long-term security threats.
First, the historical religious tension between Christian and Muslim communities has been ignited following the framing of the conflict as a Muslim-targeting-Christian problem. Clearly, the rhetoric of Christian genocide by the US government disregards the Muslim victims of the conflicts. Across the Muslim-dominated northern region, there is a growing perception of a well-coordinated Western agenda to decimate the Muslim population in favour of the Christians for political reasons. If not curtailed, such perception may lead to a large-scale conflict that may derail the fragile unity in Nigeria.
Second, foreign invasion to fight terrorism gives the impression of a weak and incapable Nigerian government, which may play into the hands of ambitious military coup makers aiming to attack a democratic regime. Recent military takeovers in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali were justified by the military as necessary due to the inability of the civilian governments to contain terrorism and counter French influence. The democratic breakdown in Nigeria will not only affect the country but will also greatly destabilise the West African sub-region.
Third, the Sahel is presently classified as the hotbed of terrorism by the Global Terrorism Index , as the deadliest terror groups are located there. Launching a war against their counterparts in Nigeria may occasion the influx of other terror groups into Nigeria to show solidarity, escalating insecurity in the region. On the other hand, the war may also push the terrorists to other areas within and outside the country.
Fourth, Nigeria has the largest population in Africa. A badly executed military operation may lead to a large-scale conflict that would cause a massive humanitarian crisis. Already, the conflict has caused over two million internal displacements and refugees in neighbouring countries. The international community may not be able to handle the possible humanitarian crisis that may follow an extensive military operation in northern Nigeria.
Fifth, a US-led military operation in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria will increase anti-US sentiments in Nigeria, as well as the West African region. West Africa is largely Muslim-dominated, with a strong ethnic solidarity of the Hausa and Fulani in many states across the region. A US-led military operation may expose American people and assets to more attacks around the region.
4671. Non-unique---the House is gone and it's gas that did it.
DDHQ 8-14 — Decision Desk HQ. August 14. Election forecasting and polling-aggregation firm. Decision Desk HQ Polling Memo, “Democrats recover their generic ballot edge,” https://decisiondeskhq.substack.com/p/democrats-generic-ballot-august-2026-midterms-house-senate Clopus
For more than a year, Democrats have led on the generic ballot question, which asks poll respondents which party’s candidate they plan to vote for in their local U.S. House race. Though the size of the Democrats’ lead has fluctuated, recent polls have found them with a clearer advantage. In Decision Desk HQ’s polling average , Democrats now lead by about 6 percentage points, 47%-41%.
This lead marks an improvement for Democrats, whose edge had ebbed to only around 4 points in July. But since the conflict with Iran heated up again and the price of gas rose, the Democrats’ have tended to have a larger advantage in surveys testing 2026 preferences. It’s no surprise that military operations against Iran and rising gas prices have hurt the president’s party at a time when concerns about the cost of living and disapproval of President Trump’s handling of the economy are high. Not coincidentally, Democrats held a 7-point or so lead in May when gas prices last peaked .
The extent of the Democrats’ edge in the electoral environment will have repercussions for the 2026 midterms. In Decision Desk HQ’s election forecast, the probability that a party wins control of the House and/or Senate is tied to the generic ballot. The chart below presents how the average affects those chances.
If Democrats only held around a 2.5-point edge on the generic ballot, the forecast would view the battle for House control to be just about a pure toss-up, with Republicans as heavier favorites to keep the Senate. But now that the Democrats’ edge is 6 points, that puts the party closer to the 7.5-point advantage associated with the Senate being a pure toss-up. In that scenario, the House is much more likely to flip to the Democrats.
4682. No link---voters don't rank foreign policy at all.
Burns 26 — Adam Burns. February 16. Historian of US politics and foreign relations; contributor to the LSE US Centre’s 2026 Midterms series. LSE United States Politics and Policy, “The 2026 Midterms: How foreign policy really could make a difference in the midterm elections,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2026/02/16/the-2026-midterms-how-foreign-policy-really-could-make-a-difference-in-the-midterm-elections/ Clopus
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, over 90 percent of Americans were in favour of the US-led attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan – a resounding endorsement for presidential action. Gallup polls in the week prior to 9/11 had public approval for Bush at 51 percent, with 39 percent disapproving of the way he was doing his job. By the following week, Bush’s ratings had soared to 86 percent approval with only 10 percent disapproving. By the midterms the following November this had dropped to 63 percent approval and 29 percent disapproval – still a net improvement and a far more solid base than President Trump currently has.
RealClear Polling has seen Trump with net negative polling (on average) for almost a year. At the start of February 2026, 55 percent disapproved of the way he was doing his job with only 43 percent approving (a net negative of -12). When it comes to how much this is about the president’s foreign policy, public surveys have suggested that US citizens in 2026 don’t feel that foreign policy is a high priority , have mixed feelings about the removal of Maduro, and generally oppose the idea of the US “running” Venezuela. Even more unpopular was Trump’s expressed desire to “take control of Greenland” – with 75 percent of those surveyed by CNN opposing the idea. So, as substantive points of difference – Bush’s foreign policy moves in 2001-2, and the president who made those moves – were significantly more popular than Trump and his policies as he started off the midterm year.
“ Don’t Tariff on Me ” by ken fager , CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
But isn’t it still “the economy, stupid”?
In 1992, while working on Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, the strategist James Carville famously coined the now widely-accepted electoral adage “ it’s the economy, stupid ”. Indeed, it proved true in the 1998 midterms when Clinton’s Democrats achieved unlikely gains (which, along with 2002, was one of only two times this has happened in the last 80 years ).
Well, even if it is the economy that will determine voters’ verdicts this November, the president’s foreign policy might well play an outsized role through Trump’s favoured method of foreign policy pressure: tariffs. “Tariff”, Trump argued, “is the most beautiful word in the dictionary” , and his second term, even more so than his first, has leaned into tariffs as a form of foreign policy. High tariffs to protect America, put “America First”, and keep foreign countries in line.
4693. The persecution story is a domestic product about a debunked claim.
Adebayo 2-5 — Taiwo Adebayo. February 5. Lake Chad Basin researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. ISS Today, “US airstrikes were a constrained choice for Nigeria,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/us-airstrikes-were-a-constrained-choice-for-nigeria Clopus
The strikes mainly hit Bauni Forest on the Niger border, a base for Lakurawa , a cross-border jihadi-criminal group that is not an Islamic State affiliate. It is operationally linked to Boko Haram’s JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad) faction, a rival to Islamic State West Africa Province.
Another impact site, Jabo, has no documented terrorist presence or history of violent activity. This raised concerns, particularly among Muslims, that innocent communities were affected. Nigerian political officials said Jabo was hit by debris rather than a deliberate strike. However security officials framed this explanation as damage control for a possible US targeting error linked to poor or misapplied intelligence.
It’s possible that the US deliberately labelled the targets as Islamic State to fit a political narrative at home. This ties into Trump’s earlier accusation of ‘Christian genocide’ – much like his ‘white genocide in South Africa’ claims in mid-2025. Allegations about both countries have been thoroughly debunked, but could resonate among evangelical and conservative US constituencies.
Such narratives could endanger fragile security situations in Africa and fuel sectarian tensions, especially in places like Nigeria, with a history of ethno-religious distrust and violence. They can also alienate local communities, who are vital for intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation.
Growing US pressure and threats of unilateral strikes and sanctions left Abuja with few choices
Nigeria’s endorsement of the strikes was a departure from its posture against foreign combat operations on its soil. For years, Abuja received only training and equipment from foreign countries. The aim was to preserve its sovereignty and avoid a backlash, especially in the Muslim-majority north, which is often suspicious of Western intervention. But those concerns lessened as insecurity deepened, even among Muslims. Before the airstrikes, many Christians in Nigeria supported an American intervention.
Growing US pressure and threats of unilateral strikes and sanctions left Abuja with few choices. Rejecting the strikes could have reinforced the impression in Washington – and among some Christians at home – that Abuja was obstructing the protection of Christians, inviting diplomatic and economic repercussions. It might also have portrayed Nigeria’s government as impotent if the US operations proceeded regardless.
Nigeria's intelligence sharing ahead of the strikes appears to have been limited, but officials were pragmatic. They accepted America’s globally familiar ‘Islamic State’ messaging, saying the inclusion of local threats in this narrative was ‘handy strategic mistranslation’ as long as bad actors got hit and ties with America improved.
The Sokoto strikes were part of AFRICOM’s broader push for relevance under Trump’s second term. Under the previous administration, US influence declined after Niger’s junta asked it to withdraw from Niger Air Base 201 in 2024. The sprawling facility served as America’s hub for drones and surveillance operations in the Sahel, where Russia is expanding its influence.
After the Nigerian strikes, AFRICOM stated that America intends to get ‘a lot more aggressive’ kinetically in Africa
4704. No internal link---this Congress isn't passing anything to trade off.
Taylor 26 — JT Taylor. January 8. Head of Government Relations research for Hartford Funds’ global macro team. Hartford Funds, “Washington’s 2026 Playbook,” https://www.hartfordfunds.com/insights/market-perspectives/global-macro-analysis/washingtons-2026-playbook.html Clopus
After a year in which the executive branch significantly broadened its role, lawmakers entered 2026 looking to reassert congressional authority. Throughout 2025, the Trump administration advanced its agenda through executive actions—canceling appropriated spending, restructuring federal agencies via DOGE, imposing tariffs, and authorizing military strikes in the Middle East and Caribbean—often without waiting for legislative approval.
The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed in July, stands as the primary legislative achievement for Republican leadership. It delivered on tax cuts, defense spending, immigration enforcement, and energy production, but also underscored how limited opportunities for major legislation have become. With fewer than 40 bills enacted last year, the 119th Congress is on pace to be among the least active in a president’s opening years.
As midterms approach, the key question for 2026 is whether Congress can reclaim a stronger role, or whether executive action becomes the prevailing mode of governance. Republicans are considering a second reconciliation bill focused on affordability, though expectations remain modest. The year begins with debates over Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies and the risk of another government shutdown—issues likely to consume political capital early. Without a clear strategy to strengthen its influence, Congress may continue to see policymaking driven by executive orders and regulatory action.
Inside Capitol Hill: What’s Next for Lawmakers
Reconciliation in Focus
Republicans remain split on whether to pursue another reconciliation bill to bypass the Senate filibuster. Some senators favor starting the year with a budget resolution that includes military funding, healthcare provisions, and immigration enforcement grants. While President Donald Trump and party leaders have shown hesitation, Sen. Majority Leader John Thune (R-SD) and others view reconciliation as a fallback if bipartisan healthcare talks stall. And although Trump favors abolishing the filibuster altogether, that’s not on the table. In the near term, an affordability-focused reconciliation package is the most viable route to significant legislation before the midterms.
471Approval is underwater and the country says wrong track.
DDHQ 8-14 — Decision Desk HQ. August 14. Election forecasting and polling-aggregation firm. Decision Desk HQ Polling Memo, “Democrats recover their generic ballot edge,” https://decisiondeskhq.substack.com/p/democrats-generic-ballot-august-2026-midterms-house-senate Clopus
President Donald Trump’s standing remains roughly in the same vicinity as it has been more months now. In Decision Desk HQ’s polling average, his job approval rating is at 40% while his disapproval stands at 57%.
Right Track/Wrong Track
Americans continue to hold strongly negative views about the direction of the country. In Decision Desk HQ’s average, 62% say the nation is on the wrong track, while only about 31% say it’s on the right track. The right track mark is right around low point for Trump’s second term.
472Tariffs are what's hitting the districts that decide the House.
Burns 26 — Adam Burns. February 16. Historian of US politics and foreign relations; contributor to the LSE US Centre’s 2026 Midterms series. LSE United States Politics and Policy, “The 2026 Midterms: How foreign policy really could make a difference in the midterm elections,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2026/02/16/the-2026-midterms-how-foreign-policy-really-could-make-a-difference-in-the-midterm-elections/ Clopus
Although frequently retracted (leading some to use the term “ TACO ” or “Trump Always Chickens Out”), Trump uses tariffs on US imports from overseas as a way of influencing the behaviour of other countries – a form of economic “ imperialism ” some might say. Take, for example, the recent threat to levy tariffs on imports from the NATO countries who sent troops to Greenland .
Although these tariffs might well be threatened by a pending US Supreme Court decision , the average voter appears not to be feeling the advantages Trump assures them his tariffs are reaping. Indeed, many voters in districts the Democrats will need to win this November (if they are to recapture the House of Representatives) feel that the tariffs are currently impacting them in a negative manner.
473Foreign policy is a low priority---their own polling says so.
Burns 26 — Adam Burns. February 16. Historian of US politics and foreign relations; contributor to the LSE US Centre’s 2026 Midterms series. LSE United States Politics and Policy, “The 2026 Midterms: How foreign policy really could make a difference in the midterm elections,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2026/02/16/the-2026-midterms-how-foreign-policy-really-could-make-a-difference-in-the-midterm-elections/ Clopus
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, over 90 percent of Americans were in favour of the US-led attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan – a resounding endorsement for presidential action. Gallup polls in the week prior to 9/11 had public approval for Bush at 51 percent, with 39 percent disapproving of the way he was doing his job. By the following week, Bush’s ratings had soared to 86 percent approval with only 10 percent disapproving. By the midterms the following November this had dropped to 63 percent approval and 29 percent disapproval – still a net improvement and a far more solid base than President Trump currently has.
RealClear Polling has seen Trump with net negative polling (on average) for almost a year. At the start of February 2026, 55 percent disapproved of the way he was doing his job with only 43 percent approving (a net negative of -12). When it comes to how much this is about the president’s foreign policy, public surveys have suggested that US citizens in 2026 don’t feel that foreign policy is a high priority , have mixed feelings about the removal of Maduro, and generally oppose the idea of the US “running” Venezuela. Even more unpopular was Trump’s expressed desire to “take control of Greenland” – with 75 percent of those surveyed by CNN opposing the idea. So, as substantive points of difference – Bush’s foreign policy moves in 2001-2, and the president who made those moves – were significantly more popular than Trump and his policies as he started off the midterm year.
“ Don’t Tariff on Me ” by ken fager , CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
But isn’t it still “the economy, stupid”?
In 1992, while working on Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, the strategist James Carville famously coined the now widely-accepted electoral adage “ it’s the economy, stupid ”. Indeed, it proved true in the 1998 midterms when Clinton’s Democrats achieved unlikely gains (which, along with 2002, was one of only two times this has happened in the last 80 years ).
Well, even if it is the economy that will determine voters’ verdicts this November, the president’s foreign policy might well play an outsized role through Trump’s favoured method of foreign policy pressure: tariffs. “Tariff”, Trump argued, “is the most beautiful word in the dictionary” , and his second term, even more so than his first, has leaned into tariffs as a form of foreign policy. High tariffs to protect America, put “America First”, and keep foreign countries in line.
474Their own bill says conditioning Nigeria aid is bipartisan---Trump signed it.
HR 7457 26 — 119th Congress. Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act of 2026, introduced by Rep. Riley Moore. Congress.gov, “H.R.7457 — Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act of 2026,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7457/text Clopus
(5) there is bipartisan congressional support to consider appropriate security cooperation with Nigeria, including conditioning of foreign assistance as was done in the Fiscal Year 2026 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill signed into law by President Trump as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, to enhance efforts to protect innocent lives;
(6) the United States should deliver humanitarian assistance, co-funded by the Government of Nigeria, through trusted civil society organizations, including faith-based organizations, in Nigeria’s middle belt states;
(7) the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury should impose targeted sanctions, including visa bans and asset freezes under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, on individuals or entities responsible for severe religious freedom violations, or report to Congress the reasons such sanctions have not been imposed, including—
475Congress has already frozen a Nigeria package---both parties did it.
Onyedinefu 21 — Godsgift Onyedinefu. July 29. Abuja correspondent covering government and politics for BusinessDay. BusinessDay, “US Congress halts $875m arms sale to Nigeria over human rights concerns,” https://businessday.ng/news/article/us-congress-halts-875m-arms-sale-to-nigeria-over-human-rights-concerns/ Clopus
U.S. lawmakers are holding down proposed sale of attack helicopters to Nigeria amid mounting concerns about the Nigerian government’s human rights record as its military grapples with multiple security crises at once.
Nigeria recently took delivery of six tucano aircraft valued at $500 million from the US, but a report by Foreign Policy revealed that top Democrat and Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have delayed clearing a proposed sale of 12 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters and accompanying defense systems to the Nigerian military, pausing a deal worth some $875 million.
According to the report by the behind-the-scenes controversy over the proposed arms sale illustrates a broader debate among Washington policymakers over how to balance national security with human rights objectives.
The hold on the sale also showcases how powerful U.S. lawmakers want to push the Biden administration to rethink U.S. relations with Africa’s most populous country amid overarching concerns that Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari is drifting toward authoritarianism as his government is besieged by multiple security challenges, including a jihadist insurgency.
Read also: US-China trade surges, disregards ongoing economic contention and post-pandemic effects
Nigeria is on the front lines in the battle against Boko Haram, one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, and plays a role in U.S. and international efforts to roll back extremist groups in the Sahel region of West Africa. But Western governments and international human rights organizations have ramped up their criticisms of the Nigerian government, particularly in the wake of its ban on Twitter, systemic corruption issues, and the Nigerian military’s role in deadly crackdowns on protesters after widespread demonstrations against police brutality last year. New policing structure to prioritise human rights, transparency - Bamidele
476Presidents can't persuade---they can only hold their own side.
Rottinghaus 13 — Brandon Rottinghaus. October 28. Professor of Political Science at the University of Houston. Brookings Institution, “Going Partisan: Presidential Leadership in a Polarized Political Environment,” https://www.brookings.edu/articles/going-partisan-presidential-leadership-in-a-polarized-political-environment Clopus
Debate persists about whether or not presidents lead public opinion, how they do it and the effect it has on Congressional voting behavior. In this paper, Brandon Rottinghaus articulates and finds support for an alternative strategy to the “going public” presidential leadership tactic. With the United States currently experiencing a hyper-polarized political environment, he argues that the president’s goal in “going partisan” is to directly mobilize local partisans and leaning partisans and indirectly engender greater party support of the president’s party within Congress. The end goal is not to persuade cross-pressured members of Congress or persuade opposition partisans, but rather to hold copartisan members of Congress in the fold. Thus, presidents target wavering copartisans in the public and in Congress with their rhetoric. This approach explains why presidents primarily travel to states that they won in previous elections, why presidents spend time courting partisan voters and provides the proper context for modern presidential leadership. Presidential visits have a significant impact on state-based partisan (and leaning partisan) presidential approval and partisan support in Congress.
The implications of this finding allows scholars to reassess the way presidents lead in a polarized political environment, as presidents are not focused on persuading a national persuadable audience but instead on political partisans. In particular, this provides additional evidence of the president’s effectiveness at motivating his partisans and how mobilized partisanship at the state level engenders more partisan support of the president. The effect is modest (about half a percentage point per year) but effective considering the president’s limited options. The creation of mutual executive-legislative partisan goals through greater partisan support softens the bargaining environment for presidents. Importantly, that these effects are specific to a more polarized period in the country and within Congress, there is additional evidence that presidential leadership has evolved into a partisan effect as political polarization has cemented in Congress. The rumors of the death of the president’s ability to leverage his popularity into support in Congress is greatly exaggerated. This effect wanes, however, in the polarized period, suggesting new partisan tactics are necessary.
Conclusion and Implications for Presidential Leadership
The polarization of politics has had a profound effect on political decision-making and presidential leadership. These changes alter the way that presidents attempt to persuade the public and, indirectly, members of the legislature. The “going partisan” theory is the next step in an evolving lineage of theorizing about how presidents adapt their political persuasion to their political environment. In particular, this theory has a number of advantages:
First, it helps to explain how presidents act in a system besieged by partisan polarization. The arc of the political process necessitates that presidents alter their tactics to lead and that scholars update their theoretical expectations about the success presidents may find.
Second, the “going partisan” theory helps to explain why presidential leadership doesn’t always work, perhaps more generally why presidential leadership of Congress does not always work.
Third, this theory is more cleanly resonant with evidence of the permanent campaign, which dominates the president’s strategic goals in the modern political era.
Ultimately, there is both good news and bad news for presidents. The good news is that big losses are avoided. Presidents, even those with a minority in both houses of Congress, can maintain a defensive position by keeping a minimum amount of opposition unified around the White House’s agenda. Although presidential leadership of the public is never easy, persuading copartisans is an easier task. Indeed, during the skirmishes over the budget and the implementation of the Affordable Care Act in late 2013, President Obama kept the Democrats unified around primary policy goals. Even as the House Republicans crafted their final spending offer before the government shutdown in October, “the Democrats didn’t budge, killing the proposal without a single defection. Their unity was so assured that Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) didn’t bother to convene a private caucus meeting to discuss the measure before the vote.” [1]
The bad news for presidents is that fewer substantial policy innovations or major agenda items are likely to be initiated or maintained. Going partisan is a sustainable strategy only as a defensive measure rather than as an offensive one. That is, presidents should focus on facilitating legislative action when they have majorities, even if opponents howl about an unfair process.