505The air force we arm bombs civilians---nine states and counting.
Abdulsalam 4-16 — Kabir Abdulsalam. April 16. Security correspondent for PRNigeria. PRNigeria, “SPECIAL REPORT: How Nigerian Military Accidentally Bombed Citizens 18 Times in 12 Years,” https://prnigeria.com/2026/04/16/special-report-naf-jets/ Clopus
Between 2014 and 2026, Nigeria’s counter-insurgency and counter-banditry campaigns have increasingly relied on airpower deployed by the Nigerian Air Force, particularly in operations against Boko Haram/ISWAP in the North-East and armed bandits in the North-West.
While these air operations have recorded tactical successes against insurgents, they have also produced a troubling parallel history and repeated accidental airstrikes on civilians.
Investigations from humanitarian trackers and media reports suggest at least 17 documented incidents of “erroneous strikes” over 12 years, leaving about 400 civilians dead, depending on verification thresholds. Affected states cut across Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Niger, and Nasarawa—reflecting the geographic spread of Nigeria’s insecurity and the operational reach of air assets.
Military authorities often describe such incidents as “misidentification errors” or “collateral damage,” while rights groups argue they reflect deeper systemic issues in intelligence gathering, target confirmation, and coordination between ground and air units.
March 16, 2014 – Kayamla, Borno State : Early reported strike killed about 10 civilians during counter-insurgency operations, signalling the risks of expanding air operations in civilian-populated conflict zones.
January 17, 2017 – Rann, Borno State : One of the deadliest incidents. A strike on an IDP camp killed about 40 civilians, including aid workers. The military said the camp was mistaken for a terrorist enclave.
February 28, 2018 – Daglun, Borno State: An airstrike killed 20 civilians, marking one of the early incidents of mass civilian casualties in the counter-insurgency campaign.
April 11, 2019 – Tangaram & Ajia, Zamfara State : A strike in the North-West killed 6 civilians, as air operations expanded beyond the North-East into banditry-prone regions.
July 2, 2019 – Gajigana, Borno State : At least 13 civilians were killed when a strike hit the community during ongoing military operations.
April 13, 2020 – Sakotoku, Borno: At least 17 civilians killed, including children.
506Their own bill asks whether our assistance is enabling persecution.
HR 7457 26 — 119th Congress. Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act of 2026, introduced by Rep. Riley Moore. Congress.gov, “H.R.7457 — Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act of 2026,” https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7457/text Clopus
(1) An assessment of Nigeria’s compliance with the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, including specific actions taken, or not taken, by the Government of Nigeria to prevent persecution, prosecute perpetrators, repeal blasphemy laws, protect vulnerable communities, and facilitate the safe return of internally displaced persons.
(2) Identification of all individuals and entities sanctioned, or under consideration for sanctions, under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act or the Entities of Particular Concern list.
(3) A description of co-investments and collaborative efforts between the Government of Nigeria and the United States to provide and deliver humanitarian assistance to Christians displaced by the attacks from Fulani-ethnic militias, through faith-based or nongovernmental partners, including amounts, recipients, type of assistance provided, and measurable outcomes.
(4) An evaluation and description of historical, ongoing, and planned United States security assistance to Nigeria, and a comprehensive assessment of whether such assistance risks enabling or exacerbating religious persecution.
(5) Whether the Government of Nigeria is taking appropriate steps to cease enforcement of and repeal blasphemy laws, and to investigate instances of non-Muslims, Muslims, and dissenters being subjected to Sharia law or blasphemy laws.
(6) An assessment of conditions of internally displaced persons, including safety, humanitarian needs, and prospects for return.
(7) Recommendations for further executive actions or congressional authority determined to be necessary and most helpful to halt the religious persecution and mass atrocities occurring in Nigeria.
(8) An evaluation of any steps taken by the Government of Nigeria during the reporting period to address religious persecution, dismantle extremist networks, prosecute attackers, reform security forces, or improve protection for at-risk communities.
507A decade of ACLED data---the killings can't be sorted by faith.
Ajala 11-5 — Olayinka Ajala. November 5. Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations at Leeds Beckett University; has researched Nigerian insurgency for over a decade. The Conversation, “Is there a Christian genocide in Nigeria? Evidence shows all faiths are under attack by terrorists,” https://theconversation.com/is-there-a-christian-genocide-in-nigeria-evidence-shows-all-faiths-are-under-attack-by-terrorists-268929 Clopus
I have been researching conflicts, terrorism and the formation of insurgent groups in Nigeria for over a decade.
To understand the degree and intensity of terrorist and insurgency activities in Nigeria in the last 10 years, I analysed data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), an independent violence monitor.
The analysis shows it is difficult, if not impossible, to delineate the killings based on religious affiliations. All the religions in the country have been affected, and there have been fatalities across several ethnic and religious lines.
Is there a religious genocide in Nigeria?
Religious violence started in Nigeria in 1953 , seven years before the country gained independence.
Successive military and civilian regimes have since struggled to curtail the string of religious violence, which is often linked to issues such as ethnicity, resource management, competition for resources and colonial boundaries. (British colonialists placed different ethnic groups with sometimes different values in one country.)
Figure 1: Visualisation of terrorist and insurgent attacks and fatalities in Nigeria (2014–2024) based on ACLED dataset.
Author
Figure 1 shows that while the number of attacks carried out by terrorist and insurgent groups have been roughly similar in the last four years, the number of fatalities has declined.
This chart does not explain the categories of people attacked. To understand whether there is a disproportionate attack on Christians, I compared the number of attacks on churches and mosques in Nigeria in the last 10 years.
Figure 2: Visualisation of the yearly attacks on churches and mosques in Nigeria (2014–2024) based on ACLED dataset.
Author
The data shows that non-state actors have attacked both churches and mosques in Nigeria. While there have been more attacks on churches in the last six years, the data reveals that there were more attacks on mosques in 2015 and 2017.
Generally, Nigeria’s population is considered to be roughly evenly split between the two religions, with only around 0.6% adhering to traditional African religions or other beliefs.
Although it is difficult to extract the number of fatalities in these cases, the number of attacks on places of worship is an indication that both Christians and Muslims are under attack by terrorist and insurgent groups in Nigeria.
508The strikes hit a Muslim-majority state and the casualties were Muslim.
Adebayo 2-5 — Taiwo Adebayo. February 5. Lake Chad Basin researcher at the Institute for Security Studies. ISS Today, “US airstrikes were a constrained choice for Nigeria,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/us-airstrikes-were-a-constrained-choice-for-nigeria Clopus
However, US President Donald Trump framed the strikes as an attempt to stop the ( debunked ) ‘Christian genocide’ taking place in the country – a claim that had earlier led him to threaten Nigeria with sanctions and military action.
The US emphasis on Islamic State and Christian persecution doesn’t match Nigeria’s security threats. There are also concerns about civilian casualties in Sokoto, the use of poor intelligence and America’s true intentions. And by contradicting its stance against foreign military intervention, Nigeria has increased the risk of political and sectarian strife.
Sokoto is an overwhelmingly Muslim-majority state, as are the casualties of attacks there, mainly by armed criminal gangs or bandits. None of the locations targeted by the strikes were affected by Islamic State-related activity.
Site of US airstrikes in Sokoto State, Nigeria
The strikes mainly hit Bauni Forest on the Niger border, a base for Lakurawa , a cross-border jihadi-criminal group that is not an Islamic State affiliate. It is operationally linked to Boko Haram’s JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad) faction, a rival to Islamic State West Africa Province.
Another impact site, Jabo, has no documented terrorist presence or history of violent activity. This raised concerns, particularly among Muslims, that innocent communities were affected. Nigerian political officials said Jabo was hit by debris rather than a deliberate strike. However security officials framed this explanation as damage control for a possible US targeting error linked to poor or misapplied intelligence.
It’s possible that the US deliberately labelled the targets as Islamic State to fit a political narrative at home. This ties into Trump’s earlier accusation of ‘Christian genocide’ – much like his ‘white genocide in South Africa’ claims in mid-2025. Allegations about both countries have been thoroughly debunked, but could resonate among evangelical and conservative US constituencies.
Such narratives could endanger fragile security situations in Africa and fuel sectarian tensions, especially in places like Nigeria, with a history of ethno-religious distrust and violence. They can also alienate local communities, who are vital for intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation.
Growing US pressure and threats of unilateral strikes and sanctions left Abuja with few choices
Nigeria’s endorsement of the strikes was a departure from its posture against foreign combat operations on its soil. For years, Abuja received only training and equipment from foreign countries. The aim was to preserve its sovereignty and avoid a backlash, especially in the Muslim-majority north, which is often suspicious of Western intervention. But those concerns lessened as insecurity deepened, even among Muslims. Before the airstrikes, many Christians in Nigeria supported an American intervention.
Growing US pressure and threats of unilateral strikes and sanctions left Abuja with few choices. Rejecting the strikes could have reinforced the impression in Washington – and among some Christians at home – that Abuja was obstructing the protection of Christians, inviting diplomatic and economic repercussions. It might also have portrayed Nigeria’s government as impotent if the US operations proceeded regardless.
Nigeria's intelligence sharing ahead of the strikes appears to have been limited, but officials were pragmatic. They accepted America’s globally familiar ‘Islamic State’ messaging, saying the inclusion of local threats in this narrative was ‘handy strategic mistranslation’ as long as bad actors got hit and ties with America improved.
The Sokoto strikes were part of AFRICOM’s broader push for relevance under Trump’s second term. Under the previous administration, US influence declined after Niger’s junta asked it to withdraw from Niger Air Base 201 in 2024. The sprawling facility served as America’s hub for drones and surveillance operations in the Sahel, where Russia is expanding its influence.
After the Nigerian strikes, AFRICOM stated that America intends to get ‘a lot more aggressive’ kinetically in Africa
509Airpower is what's killing the communities it's supposed to protect.
Abdulsalam 4-16 — Kabir Abdulsalam. April 16. Security correspondent for PRNigeria. PRNigeria, “SPECIAL REPORT: How Nigerian Military Accidentally Bombed Citizens 18 Times in 12 Years,” https://prnigeria.com/2026/04/16/special-report-naf-jets/ Clopus
Between 2014 and 2026, Nigeria’s counter-insurgency and counter-banditry campaigns have increasingly relied on airpower deployed by the Nigerian Air Force, particularly in operations against Boko Haram/ISWAP in the North-East and armed bandits in the North-West.
While these air operations have recorded tactical successes against insurgents, they have also produced a troubling parallel history and repeated accidental airstrikes on civilians.
Investigations from humanitarian trackers and media reports suggest at least 17 documented incidents of “erroneous strikes” over 12 years, leaving about 400 civilians dead, depending on verification thresholds. Affected states cut across Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Niger, and Nasarawa—reflecting the geographic spread of Nigeria’s insecurity and the operational reach of air assets.
Military authorities often describe such incidents as “misidentification errors” or “collateral damage,” while rights groups argue they reflect deeper systemic issues in intelligence gathering, target confirmation, and coordination between ground and air units.
March 16, 2014 – Kayamla, Borno State : Early reported strike killed about 10 civilians during counter-insurgency operations, signalling the risks of expanding air operations in civilian-populated conflict zones.
January 17, 2017 – Rann, Borno State : One of the deadliest incidents. A strike on an IDP camp killed about 40 civilians, including aid workers. The military said the camp was mistaken for a terrorist enclave.
February 28, 2018 – Daglun, Borno State: An airstrike killed 20 civilians, marking one of the early incidents of mass civilian casualties in the counter-insurgency campaign.
April 11, 2019 – Tangaram & Ajia, Zamfara State : A strike in the North-West killed 6 civilians, as air operations expanded beyond the North-East into banditry-prone regions.
July 2, 2019 – Gajigana, Borno State : At least 13 civilians were killed when a strike hit the community during ongoing military operations.
April 13, 2020 – Sakotoku, Borno: At least 17 civilians killed, including children.
510The drivers are land, poverty and criminal networks---bombs answer none of them.
RNS 3-5 — Religion News Service. March 5. Independent nonprofit religion newswire, reporting from Nairobi and quoting Lagos-based security analyst Peter Akachukwu. Religion News Service, “In Nigeria’s protracted violence, debate over whether religion is the cause, or the casualty,” https://religionnews.com/2026/03/05/in-nigerias-protracted-violence-debate-over-whether-religion-is-the-cause-or-the-casualty/ Clopus
Security analyst Peter Akachukwu, based in Lagos, said reducing the violence to a simple religious narrative risks obscuring its underlying drivers.
“What we are seeing is not purely religious persecution,” Akachukwu told RNS in a phone interview. “Yes, identity plays a role in who is attacked and how communities interpret the violence. But fundamentally, this is about competition for land, poverty, weak law enforcement and organized criminal networks exploiting those divisions.”
He said armed groups often target vulnerable communities regardless of faith, driven by economic motives such as cattle rustling, ransom kidnappings and territorial control.
“Religion becomes a marker,” he said. “It is not always the root cause.”
Still, data from advocacy groups shows why many Nigerian Christians view the crisis through a religious lens.
According to Open Doors, a global Christian watchdog organization, more Christians are killed for their faith in Nigeria than anywhere else in the world. In its 2025 World Watch List, the organization reported at least 3,490 Christians were killed in Nigeria in their latest reporting period — accounting for the vast majority of Christian deaths recorded globally that year.
The group says violence by jihadist insurgents, including Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province, as well as attacks by armed militants in central Nigeria have disproportionately affected Christian communities.
Over a longer period, estimates vary widely, but some advocacy and monitoring groups report that tens of thousands of Christians have been killed since the insurgency began more than a decade ago, with thousands abducted and churches destroyed.
At the same time, United Nations data underscores that the overall conflict is far broader. The insurgency in northeastern Nigeria alone has killed nearly 350,000 people, including deaths linked to violence, displacement and humanitarian crises.
Analysts say the figures illustrate the complexity of the crisis.
“The numbers show that Christians are heavily affected,” Akachukwu said. “But they also show this is a massive national security breakdown impacting all communities.”
511Abuja belongs to nobody---multi-alignment is the declared doctrine.
Enikanolaiye 26 — Sola Enikanolaiye. August. Nigerian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, setting out the Ministry’s strategic-autonomy framework in an address delivered in Abuja. Vanguard, “Strategic autonomy: Nigeria’s doctrine for self-determination in a multipolar world,” https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/08/strategic-autonomy-nigerias-doctrine-for-self-determination-in-a-multipolar-world/ Clopus
Engage all major powers without being locked into one camp. In a multipolar world, alignment is a choice made per issue, not per decade. Nigeria maintains a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China on infrastructure and more. It deepens trade and security ties with the US and EU. It expands South-South cooperation with India, Brazil, and the Gulf. It leads on the continent through AfCFTA and AU reform.
This is not non-alignment. It is multi-alignment: engaging all, belonging to none, and extracting maximum value for Nigeria from each relationship. Strategic autonomy is alignment to Nigerian national interests. Nigeria’s 5 Pillars offer more than a foreign policy. They offer a template for mid-sized and emerging powers navigating great power competition. It is a policy of conviction without rigidity. Of partnership without dependence. Of ambition without illusion.
Nigeria will continue to deepen partnerships that deliver infrastructure, jobs, and technology, but always on Nigerian terms. In 2026, the measure of sovereignty is not who you oppose. It is what you are able to build. We can no longer afford an economy built only on exporting raw materials to one market and importing finished goods from another. The African Continental Free Trade Area gives us the platform to build regional value chains. At the same time, we must diversify globally.This is why we welcome China’s decision to grant zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, while we simultaneously deepen trade with the EU, the US, the Gulf, and our neighbors in ECOWAS. No single partner can meet all our development needs, and we will not be dependent on any one.
The primary duty of any government is the protection of its citizens. That principle must guide our security partnerships. African-led solutions through the AU and ECOWAS remain our first choice. But we will not outsource our judgment. We greatly appreciate the US but if any country says he can help me to wipe out terrorism in Nigeria in the next two weeks, will I say because I’m friend to the US I will not agree? No,”. The safety of Nigerians comes first. Strategic autonomy means we evaluate every security offer by one metric: does it deliver peace, security and stability for our people?
In a multipolar world, we must talk to everyone and be forced to choose no one. This is not duplicity. It is maturity. We have demonstrated this in recent weeks. We condemned Afrophobic attacks in South Africa because the dignity of Nigerians abroad is non-negotiable. We pushed the agenda at the recent ECOWAS Summit in Freetown Sierra Leone where President Tinubu’s voice was clear and unambiguous. At the same time, we are preserving and strengthening the Nigeria-South Africa strategic partnership because both countries benefit from trade, investment, and regional leadership. That is strategic autonomy in practice.
The 4D Agenda meets a fragmenting World
The global shifts make this doctrine necessary today. Today, we have multipolarity. The unipolar moment has passed. Power is diffused across Washington, Beijing, Brussels, New Delhi, Riyadh, and other capitals. Under President Tinubu’s 4D Foreign Policy Agenda: Demography, Development, Diaspora and Democracy – Nigeria’s diplomacy is calibrated to one question: what does this mean for Nigerian citizens? Ideological blocs are secondary to results.
Africa has 60 per cent of the world’s youngest population. By 2050, one in four people on earth will be African. Nigeria will be the third most populated country in the world by 2050. We cannot allow our future to be scripted by others. We must define our own development model, centered on jobs, skills, and innovation. In this context, some analysts have described our approach as “pragmatism devoid of doctrine.” I disagree.
“I don’t agree with that kind of characterization. Everything foreign policy is about national interest,”. What we are doing is giving that age-old principle a modern name and structure. We are drawing from our own history. As one of my lecturers at the University used to say, ” non-alignment is alignment to your national interest.” That remains true. Doctrine without delivery is rhetoric. For strategic autonomy to produce tangible benefits, Africa must take deliberate steps.
512Coastal West Africa is where the Russian model fails---and it's failing now.
Ochieng 2-26 — Beverly Ochieng. February 26. Analyst based in Dakar covering geopolitical developments in West Africa and the Sahel. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
Russia’s interests in West Africa mirror those in other parts of the continent, including the Sahel. It wants to gain access to natural resources, build new security and military partnerships, and challenge Western influence. West African states also offer something that the landlocked Sahel states cannot—access to ports to support logistics for Russia’s broader presence on the continent. The search for basing rights has been a theme undergirding Russia’s activism across Africa for years, though these efforts have yet to pay off.
Russia nonetheless faces challenges building relations with coastal West African states. While Russia has been able to capitalize on political instability, security challenges, and anti-French sentiment to establish and entrench itself in the Sahel, it has fewer opportunities to tap into grievances in coastal West Africa. Anti-French and anti-Western sentiment are comparatively lower in most of these states, which also enjoy more stability and security than Sahelian countries. Nor have regional leaders jumped at Russia’s traditional offering of regime security services. Emerging Islamist militant insurgencies have not yet demanded sustained external intervention that Russia could exploit. The political discourse around resource nationalism and sovereignty—though focused on unwinding colonial legacies—is more nuanced than in some Sahel states, focusing on the need to strengthen regulatory frameworks rather than legitimizing unelected authorities.
Russia is also unlikely to outpace well-established cooperation from China, the EU, and the United States, which have built political goodwill with coastal West African governments. In the past decade, coastal West African states have ramped up joint initiatives to improve regional infrastructure and interconnectivity. These initiatives have attracted investments in pivotal sectors such as energy and logistics from China, notably for the Benin-Niger crude oil pipeline , and the United Arab Emirates, which has several port expansion and solar energy projects underway in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, among others. In parallel, the EU and United States have stable security partnerships, including training and surveillance programs, with militaries along the Gulf of Guinea corridor to counter threats posed by armed groups, human trafficking networks, and narcotics cartels.
Despite the challenges, Russia is trying to position itself as a responsive and dependable partner in West Africa, using the Sahel as a launching pad for political outreach and disinformation operations aimed at undermining Western influence. Given the tough geopolitical environment, Russia has focused on engagements with receptive West African leaders, while looking for opportunities to stoke instability should it emerge and open new doors for Russian influence.
Russia’s Low-Effort Outreach
In recent years, Russia has cultivated a handful of West African states that have ties to Moscow’s partners in the Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Togo, a quiet regional powerbroker that currently has the only well-equipped deep seaport in the region, is one example. Togo has served as a diplomatic bridge between the Sahelian junta-led governments and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Since 2022, Togo has on separate occasions successfully negotiated tensions between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire and between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. The Pan-Africanist leanings of Togo’s government align with those of the Sahelian juntas. At the same time, Togo has taken a multivector approach; Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey has also argued that Togo could provide the United States a foothold for advancing counterterrorism in the Sahel.
As Togo looked to balance its partnerships, Russia expanded security cooperation there, especially after the full-scale invasion in Ukraine began in 2022. In 2024, the two countries negotiated a bilateral security agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin and Togo’s President of the Council of Ministers Faure Gnassingbé endorsed in late 2025. The agreement encompasses intelligence and counterterrorism support, joint military exercises, and—perhaps most importantly—access to Togo’s port for Russia’s navy and airfields for Russian planes. If implemented fully, Russia will gain access to maritime routes that connect West Africa with the Western Hemisphere, while also undercutting France’s efforts to limit access to the sea for Sahelian states.
Similarly, Russia has taken advantage of Guinea’s favorable attitude toward its partners in the Sahel. Although Guinea’s former junta leader and now president, Mamady Doumbouya, is close to France and previously served in the French Foreign Legion, he is allowing Russia to move materiel through the port in Conakry on sanctioned vessels to support forces in Mali. This flow through Guinea is important , because unlike other coastal states, including Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, Guinean leaders are accommodating to Russia. Guinea’s role as a logistics hub builds on Russia’s long-standing presence in Guinea’s gold mining sector , where it has a concession for one of the country’s largest mines, which accounts for nearly 20 percent of output for Russia’s Nordgold company, which is under Western sanctions. Guinea, similar to Togo, values diversification in its relations with external powers. China oversees the junta’s flagship iron ore project in Simandou and the UAE is invested in the bauxite sector .
Russia has also courted Equatorial Guinea. In 2024, Moscow sent 200 Africa Corps military instructors to the country. They are reportedly training elite guards inside the country, mirroring other Russian deployments intended to boost regime security. The deployment came on the heels of economic discussions between the two countries, which have focused on hydrocarbons and minerals.
513Africa Corps is rented manpower, not an air force.
ADF 5-12 — Africa Defense Forum. May 12. Professional military magazine published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command. Africa Defense Forum, “Mali Siege Reveals Weakness of Mercenary Model,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/05/mali-siege-reveals-weakness-of-mercenary-model/ Clopus
The cost of Africa Corps’ services —estimated to be around $10 million a month for a contingent of around 2,000 mercenaries — has many experts thinking the government should demand a stronger commitment to justify a return on investment.
According to Habib Al Badawi, a professor of international relations at Lebanese University, the image of Russian forces abandoning the community they helped Malian forces capture in 2023 proved a powerful propaganda victory for Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-based Azawad Liberation Front (ALF).
The West Africa program lead for the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung think tank Ulf Laessing told Al Jazeera that “Africa Corps has really lost credibility” with their retreat from Northern and Central Malian bases.
Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reported that several dozen Malian army, police and paramilitary forces were left behind to be taken captive at Kidal, in addition to valuable Russian mercenary equipment such as a drone operating station.
The loss of Kidal was the latest defeat for Africa Corps, the 2,500-member Russian government-controlled successor to the Wagner Group that first arrived in Mali in 2021.
In July 2024, Tuareg rebels ambushed fighters with the then-Wagner Group and Malian troops in Tinzouatin near the Algerian border. The battle killed 80 or more Russian fighters and up to 54 Malian soldiers. It remains one of the deadliest days for Russian forces since Wagner arrived in Africa in 2017.
Wagner’s business model in Africa is simple: regime security in exchange for natural resources. Wagner tested its model in the Central African Republic in 2019, where its fighters became security for President Archange-Faustin Touadéra while affiliated companies took over gold and diamond mining operations in the countryside.
514Moscow only gets in where the state has already collapsed.
Jezequel 2-26 — Jean-Hervé Jezequel. February 26. Sahel Project Director at the International Crisis Group, based in Dakar; historian of colonial and postcolonial Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
Russia is also limited by the lack of opportunities in the more secure countries of the region. Notably, Russia’s influence tends to flourish where state authority is seriously challenged by armed insurgences and Western actors are discredited. Since 2022, in more stable contexts such as Senegal or Côte d’Ivoire, Moscow has increased its presence through diplomatic, cultural, or economic channels. For instance, according to an International Crisis Group report, the Russian Embassy in Abidjan has recently increased its staff “ by between 1.5 and 3 times .” This being said, the expansion of Russian influence in coastal West Africa has been less impressive so far than in the central Sahel. This may reflect a structural limitation: Russia’s appeal is strongest where violence and political disorder open doors, and weaker where political institutions remain relatively resilient.
Russia’s appeal is strongest where violence and political disorder open doors, and weaker where political institutions remain relatively resilient.
Financial capacity is another significant constraint. While Moscow has signed agreements on food aid, nuclear energy, and mining, the material impact of these promises remains modest compared to what Western donors and China can mobilize. More generally, Russia does not operate in a vacuum. Other actors—including China, Türkiye, and even the Gulf states—are also seeking to expand influence in the region. In the context of the AES, these competitors may offer alternatives that limit Moscow’s room to maneuver. The result is that while Russia has carved out a prominent role, its ability to consolidate and expand this influence remains uncertain.
Overall, the regimes in Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou seem satisfied in the sense that Russia has validated their political choices and provided immediate tools of survival. But deeper frustrations persist, as Moscow has not yet demonstrated the ability to transform the countries’ security environments or significantly boost their economies.
The Uncertain Future of Russia’s Role in the Sahel
While Moscow has successfully developed its influence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, it is not guaranteed to maintain or expand this position for long. The future will depend on the evolving regional security situation, domestic political dynamics, and the actions of competing external powers.
As long as France and other Western allies remain discredited, Moscow can present itself as a reliable alternative, especially to regimes that prioritize sovereignty and regime survival over long-term reforms. Its symbolic capital as a partner resisting Western dominance remains potent, particularly among younger generations mobilized around anti-colonial narratives.
As long as France and other Western allies remain discredited, Moscow can present itself as a reliable alternative.
However, Russia may already have reached the high-water mark of its appeal. Its military presence has not decisively turned the tide of conflict, and its limited financial capacity prevents it from offering large-scale reconstruction or development aid. If insecurity continues to worsen, Russia risks facing the same backlash that toppled France’s credibility in the region. Information campaigns can help sustain its image, but they cannot substitute for concrete results on the ground.
The future is thus marked by uncertainty. Russia is firmly entrenched in the political imaginations of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, but its structural weaknesses limit the scope of its power. Unless it can move beyond opportunistic security partnerships and deliver meaningful development support, its influence could plateau—or even decline—as other powers fill the gaps it cannot address.
515The coastal states are the ones Moscow can't crack.
Ochieng 2-26 — Beverly Ochieng. February 26. Analyst based in Dakar covering geopolitical developments in West Africa and the Sahel. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
Russia’s interests in West Africa mirror those in other parts of the continent, including the Sahel. It wants to gain access to natural resources, build new security and military partnerships, and challenge Western influence. West African states also offer something that the landlocked Sahel states cannot—access to ports to support logistics for Russia’s broader presence on the continent. The search for basing rights has been a theme undergirding Russia’s activism across Africa for years, though these efforts have yet to pay off.
Russia nonetheless faces challenges building relations with coastal West African states. While Russia has been able to capitalize on political instability, security challenges, and anti-French sentiment to establish and entrench itself in the Sahel, it has fewer opportunities to tap into grievances in coastal West Africa. Anti-French and anti-Western sentiment are comparatively lower in most of these states, which also enjoy more stability and security than Sahelian countries. Nor have regional leaders jumped at Russia’s traditional offering of regime security services. Emerging Islamist militant insurgencies have not yet demanded sustained external intervention that Russia could exploit. The political discourse around resource nationalism and sovereignty—though focused on unwinding colonial legacies—is more nuanced than in some Sahel states, focusing on the need to strengthen regulatory frameworks rather than legitimizing unelected authorities.
Russia is also unlikely to outpace well-established cooperation from China, the EU, and the United States, which have built political goodwill with coastal West African governments. In the past decade, coastal West African states have ramped up joint initiatives to improve regional infrastructure and interconnectivity. These initiatives have attracted investments in pivotal sectors such as energy and logistics from China, notably for the Benin-Niger crude oil pipeline , and the United Arab Emirates, which has several port expansion and solar energy projects underway in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, among others. In parallel, the EU and United States have stable security partnerships, including training and surveillance programs, with militaries along the Gulf of Guinea corridor to counter threats posed by armed groups, human trafficking networks, and narcotics cartels.
Despite the challenges, Russia is trying to position itself as a responsive and dependable partner in West Africa, using the Sahel as a launching pad for political outreach and disinformation operations aimed at undermining Western influence. Given the tough geopolitical environment, Russia has focused on engagements with receptive West African leaders, while looking for opportunities to stoke instability should it emerge and open new doors for Russian influence.
Russia’s Low-Effort Outreach
In recent years, Russia has cultivated a handful of West African states that have ties to Moscow’s partners in the Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Togo, a quiet regional powerbroker that currently has the only well-equipped deep seaport in the region, is one example. Togo has served as a diplomatic bridge between the Sahelian junta-led governments and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Since 2022, Togo has on separate occasions successfully negotiated tensions between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire and between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. The Pan-Africanist leanings of Togo’s government align with those of the Sahelian juntas. At the same time, Togo has taken a multivector approach; Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey has also argued that Togo could provide the United States a foothold for advancing counterterrorism in the Sahel.
As Togo looked to balance its partnerships, Russia expanded security cooperation there, especially after the full-scale invasion in Ukraine began in 2022. In 2024, the two countries negotiated a bilateral security agreement, which Russian President Vladimir Putin and Togo’s President of the Council of Ministers Faure Gnassingbé endorsed in late 2025. The agreement encompasses intelligence and counterterrorism support, joint military exercises, and—perhaps most importantly—access to Togo’s port for Russia’s navy and airfields for Russian planes. If implemented fully, Russia will gain access to maritime routes that connect West Africa with the Western Hemisphere, while also undercutting France’s efforts to limit access to the sea for Sahelian states.
Similarly, Russia has taken advantage of Guinea’s favorable attitude toward its partners in the Sahel. Although Guinea’s former junta leader and now president, Mamady Doumbouya, is close to France and previously served in the French Foreign Legion, he is allowing Russia to move materiel through the port in Conakry on sanctioned vessels to support forces in Mali. This flow through Guinea is important , because unlike other coastal states, including Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, Guinean leaders are accommodating to Russia. Guinea’s role as a logistics hub builds on Russia’s long-standing presence in Guinea’s gold mining sector , where it has a concession for one of the country’s largest mines, which accounts for nearly 20 percent of output for Russia’s Nordgold company, which is under Western sanctions. Guinea, similar to Togo, values diversification in its relations with external powers. China oversees the junta’s flagship iron ore project in Simandou and the UAE is invested in the bauxite sector .
Russia has also courted Equatorial Guinea. In 2024, Moscow sent 200 Africa Corps military instructors to the country. They are reportedly training elite guards inside the country, mirroring other Russian deployments intended to boost regime security. The deployment came on the heels of economic discussions between the two countries, which have focused on hydrocarbons and minerals.
516Moscow already hit its high-water mark---it can't deliver.
Jezequel 2-26 — Jean-Hervé Jezequel. February 26. Sahel Project Director at the International Crisis Group, based in Dakar; historian of colonial and postcolonial Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
However, Russia may already have reached the high-water mark of its appeal. Its military presence has not decisively turned the tide of conflict, and its limited financial capacity prevents it from offering large-scale reconstruction or development aid. If insecurity continues to worsen, Russia risks facing the same backlash that toppled France’s credibility in the region. Information campaigns can help sustain its image, but they cannot substitute for concrete results on the ground.
The future is thus marked by uncertainty. Russia is firmly entrenched in the political imaginations of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, but its structural weaknesses limit the scope of its power. Unless it can move beyond opportunistic security partnerships and deliver meaningful development support, its influence could plateau—or even decline—as other powers fill the gaps it cannot address.
517Russia can't build the airframes---exports collapsed and aircraft is its worst category.
MT 3-9 — The Moscow Times. March 9. Independent English-language Russian newspaper, reporting SIPRI’s annual arms-transfers dataset. The Moscow Times, “Russian Arms Exports Fall 64% in 5 Years,” https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/03/09/russian-arms-exports-fall-64-in-5-years-a92160 Clopus
Russian arms exports have fallen sharply over the past five years, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) think tank said in a new report published Monday.
Though still the world’s third largest supplier behind the United States and France, Russia’s share of global arms sales fell from 21% in 2016-20 to 6.8% in 2021-25.
“It was the only supplier among the top 10 globally whose arms exports decreased (-64%) between the two periods,” SIPRI said.
The think tank attributed the decline to substantially lower sales to Algeria, China and Egypt.
India, China and Belarus accounted for 74% of Russia’s exports of weapons in 2021-25.
SIPRI analyzes trends over half-decades because a few deliveries of major contracts can tilt yearly figures.
It stated that Russia planned to sell fewer weapons than the United States and France in the coming years and, in categories such as warships and combat aircraft, fewer than the other top 10 suppliers.
518Ukraine ate the export base---what's left goes to Mali.
Boukhars 2-26 — Anouar Boukhars. February 26. Professor of Political Science at McDaniel College; author of Salafism in the Maghreb. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus
The second lever, arms sales , reinforces these relationships by offering partners equipment that Russia presents as combat-tested and well-suited to counterinsurgency. Arms transfers are not just commercial transactions but also mechanisms for embedding Russian systems within local defense infrastructures. However, given the constraints of its war in Ukraine, Russia’s exports to West Africa and the Sahel have become more concentrated than broad, accounting for 11 percent of all arms imports to these subregions combined in 2020–2024. This placed Russia behind China (26 percent) and tied it with Türkiye (11 percent). Within this narrower footprint, Mali absorbed 54 percent of all Russian deliveries, reflecting Moscow’s strategic emphasis on cultivating select partners where influence can be maximized rather than spread thinly across many states.
The third lever, the use of mercenaries and state-controlled military companies, has allowed Moscow to project force flexibly while securing resource concessions. The Wagner Group’s previous activities in Mali and Burkina Faso blended combat support and regime security with extraction deals, creating a dual security-commercial model. After the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Moscow formalized this presence by creating the Africa Corps under the Ministry of Defense, absorbing many of the Wagner Group’s functions. Since then, the corps has consolidated its role in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where troops first deployed in April 2024 to train Nigerien forces, including in the use of drones . Taken together, these levers enable Moscow to project influence and secure commercial gains in an increasingly competitive field where other powers are also vying for engagement.
Beyond security, Russia is also broadening its economic footprint by leveraging sectors where it maintains competitive advantages , namely in energy, mining, fertilizers, and wheat exports. Russian oil, gas, and mining firms such as Nordgold and Rusal have deepened operations in West Africa, while low-cost wheat and fertilizers now reach a widening group of markets. Russian tech and service companies have gained traction as well. The Russian ride-hailing service Yandex Go entered Côte d’Ivoire in 2018 and has since expanded across other West African cities. Though Russia remains modest in scale relative to West Africa’s larger economic partners, these initiatives complement Moscow’s security activities and help sustain its broader influence in the region.
Beijing’s Model of Security
China first entered Africa through infrastructure and trade, but its role has since expanded into security. It is now a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping missions on the continent and conducts regular joint military exercises with African partners. These missions sharpen the People’s Liberation Army’s operational readiness and showcase modern hardware , creating entry points for arms sales, training, and localized production. Since 2020, Beijing has become Africa’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia, moving beyond light weaponry into drones, vehicles, and fighter jets . In the Sahel and West Africa—where its role has historically been limited by French dominance and language barriers —Beijing has exploited openings created by France’s declining influence and the impact of international sanctions on Russia. As a result, between 2020 and 2024 China became the largest supplier of arms to West Africa. In 2023, for example, state-owned arms manufacturer China North Industries Group Corporation Limited (NORINCO) opened a regional sales office in the Senegalese capital Dakar to expand sales and set up maintenance hubs in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. This expanding footprint is also evident in Burkina Faso , where NORINCO’s recent deliveries of armored vehicles, artillery, and rocket systems highlight China’s expanding role as a key security supplier.
Training is another pillar of China’s security approach. Military officers from the Sahel and West Africa are increasingly educated at Chinese defense institutions, reflecting a broader effort that has seen China train around 2,000 African military personnel each year . In parallel, China has expanded law enforcement cooperation, training approximately 2,000 African police officers between 2018 and 2021 . These efforts were reinforced at the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, where Beijing pledged to train thousands more African military and police personnel, including 6,000 senior officers, 500 junior officers, and 1,000 police , by the time of the next summit in 2027. This cooperation often extends beyond technical skills. Chinese programs emphasize regime-centric security practices that prioritize internal stability and control. As a result, Beijing places particular weight on law enforcement, paramilitary, and intelligence bodies tasked with political policing. Combined with the export of surveillance systems, these partnerships equip fragile regimes with tools to monitor populations, suppress dissent, and consolidate power .