Nigeria Aff, page 38

519The product is a contingent, priced by the month.

ADF 5-12 — Africa Defense Forum. May 12. Professional military magazine published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command. Africa Defense Forum, “Mali Siege Reveals Weakness of Mercenary Model,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/05/mali-siege-reveals-weakness-of-mercenary-model/ Clopus

Wagner’s business model in Africa is simple: regime security in exchange for natural resources. Wagner tested its model in the Central African Republic in 2019, where its fighters became security for President Archange-Faustin Touadéra while affiliated companies took over gold and diamond mining operations in the countryside.

Wagner used brutal tactics against people who it accused of seeking to overthrow Touadéra, often targeting civilians for executions and other human rights violations.

Wagner brought similar tactics to Mali in 2021 and Burkina Faso and Niger later. In those cases, Russian companies mined gold, uranium, lithium and other valuable minerals to help Russian President Vladimir Putin avoid international sanctions and finance his invasion of Ukraine.

As an example, Russia is banned from selling gold, however Mali is not. A Russian-built gold refinery in Mali will help Russia avoid international sanctions by laundering Russian gold through Mali, according to a report by the Robert Lansing Institute for Global Threats and Democratic Studies.

The trading of natural resources in exchange for the promise of security has failed to prevent the expansion of the jihadist insurgency into the once-safe central and western regions of Mali and now threatens state collapse.

Africa Corps’ has shifted to a model that focuses on regime protection while offering training and equipment. Experts say ceding the countryside to JNIM insurgents will only allow them to grow stronger.

“It may temporarily shield ruling authorities from collapse, but it expands ungoverned spaces, intensifies insurgencies, and undermines prospects for political reconciliation,” Lansing Institute analysts wrote recently.

520Civilian deaths tripled where Moscow went---that's our impact, not theirs.

ADF 5-12 — Africa Defense Forum. May 12. Professional military magazine published quarterly by U.S. Africa Command. Africa Defense Forum, “Mali Siege Reveals Weakness of Mercenary Model,” https://adf-magazine.com/2026/05/mali-siege-reveals-weakness-of-mercenary-model/ Clopus

As in the CAR, Wagner mercenaries in Mali routinely accompanied soldiers into the field and brutally attacked civilians suspected of working with terrorist groups. International watchdogs estimate that civilian deaths in Mali tripled after Russian mercenaries entered the picture.

“The Russian approach has alienated local populations,” according to Lansing Institute analysts wrote. “Reports of abuses — mass killings, forced disappearances, and sexual violence — have undermined any legitimacy the Malian government hoped to build through its alliance with Moscow.”

That, in turn, has pushed more people into the arms of terrorist groups and worsened ethnic tensions, the analysts added.

The defeats at Kidal and Tinzouatin expose the weakness of Russia’s African mercenaries and the cost for leaders relying on Russia to guarantee their security, according to analysts John J. Chin, Haleigh Bartos and Aleksaundra Handrinos at Small Wars Journal.

“Not only have Russian forces proved unable to quell domestic instability in most places they operate, but they have also left a trail of human rights abuses and exacerbated local grievances in the process,” Chin, Bartos and Handrinos wrote.

“The real question,” they added, “is not whether but how quickly Russia’s weaknesses as a primary security partner will be exposed.”

521Moscow's presence never turned a tide---so there's no case to turn.

Jezequel 2-26 — Jean-Hervé Jezequel. February 26. Sahel Project Director at the International Crisis Group, based in Dakar; historian of colonial and postcolonial Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow’s Influence and Its Limits,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/02/russia-role-west-southern-africa-junta-wagner-africa-corps Clopus

However, Russia may already have reached the high-water mark of its appeal. Its military presence has not decisively turned the tide of conflict, and its limited financial capacity prevents it from offering large-scale reconstruction or development aid. If insecurity continues to worsen, Russia risks facing the same backlash that toppled France’s credibility in the region. Information campaigns can help sustain its image, but they cannot substitute for concrete results on the ground.

The future is thus marked by uncertainty. Russia is firmly entrenched in the political imaginations of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, but its structural weaknesses limit the scope of its power. Unless it can move beyond opportunistic security partnerships and deliver meaningful development support, its influence could plateau—or even decline—as other powers fill the gaps it cannot address.

5221. Turn---the package is the Ukraine munition. Thousands of guidance kits.

DP 8-14 — The Defense Post. August 14. Defense industry trade publication, reporting the DSCA congressional notification. The Defense Post, “US Approves $346M Sale of Ammo, Precision Weapons to Nigeria,” https://thedefensepost.com/2025/08/14/us-nigeria-ammo-bombs-rockets/ Clopus

The US State Department has approved the potential $346 million sale of ammunition and precision-guided weapons to Nigeria.

Defense contractors RTX, Lockheed Martin, and BAE Systems will supply munitions, precision bombs, and rockets intended to support Abuja’s defense against terrorist organizations and curb illicit trafficking within the African country and the Gulf of Guinea.

The sub-Saharan country has requested to purchase MK-82 general-purpose 500-pound (227-kilogram) bombs and Paveway II guided bombs, which are deployable from the Nigerian Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft.

In particular, the possible foreign military sale involves 1,002 MK-82 general-purpose 500-pound bombs, as well as 5,000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II all-up-rounds, each consisting of a WGU-59/B guidance section, high-explosive warhead, and MK66-4 rocket motor.

The request also includes 1,002 MXU-650 Air Foil Groups (AFGs) for 500-pound Paveway II GBU-12, 515 MXU-1006 AFGs for 250-pound (113-kilogram) Paveway II GBU-58, 1,517 MAU-169 or MAU-209 computer control groups for Paveway II GBU-12/GBU-58, and 1,002 FMU-152 joint programmable fuzes.

Other defense equipment will accompany the package, such as FMU-139 joint programmable fuzes, bomb components, impulse cartridges, as well as high-explosive and practice rockets.

Related logistical and program support is also part of the proposed sale.

5232. Turn---APKWS is what shoots down Shaheds, and demand is climbing.

Litnarovych 26 — Vlad Litnarovych. March. Defense reporter for UNITED24 Media. UNITED24 Media, “Shahed Killer APKWS Rockets Surge as BAE Systems Delivers 100,000 APKWS Guidance Kits,” https://united24media.com/latest-news/the-rocket-that-hunts-shaheds-just-hit-100000-units-and-demand-is-growing-16639 Clopus

BAE Systems has delivered its 100,000th Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) laser-guidance kit, marking a major production milestone for a precision weapon that has become increasingly important in modern drone warfare, UK Defence Journal reported on March 9.

The APKWS kit converts standard 2.75-inch unguided rockets into precision-guided weapons, offering a significantly cheaper alternative to larger guided missiles while still maintaining high accuracy.

5243. No link---Kyiv's constraint is money. Its factories are idle.

Euromaidan 7-15 — Euromaidan Press. July 15. Ukrainian English-language news outlet covering the defense industry. Euromaidan Press, “How Ukraine came to build more weapons than it can fund,” https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/07/15/ukraine-weapons-industry-funding-gap/ Clopus

Ukraine’s defense production capacity has grown from about $1 billion at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion to $35 billion a year, and the National Security and Defense Council projects $55 billion in 2026.

**Kyiv will allow controlled exports of surplus weapons—Zelenskyy says some categories already run up to 50 percent beyond what Ukraine can use or finance.**

Yet domestic contracts **covered only a third** of that last year, leaving factories idling below capacity. Even after a €90 billion ($106 billion) EU loan, Kyiv still **faces a funding gap** of roughly $23 billion for its 2026 defense needs.

Two moves aim to close it. Kyiv will allow controlled exports of surplus weapons—Zelenskyy says some categories already run up to 50 percent beyond what Ukraine can use or finance—and plow the revenue back into production.

Explore further

#### “Drone Deals”: Ukraine to export surplus weapons as Zelenskyy unveils new defense trade framework

And under the “Danish model” and its German and Baltic cousins, allies now **pay to build** Ukrainian-designed systems in their own factories, moving output beyond the reach of Russian missiles and into NATO supply chains.

Ukraine has now gone further, **signing agreements** that open the EU’s defense-research and production funding to its firms—including a €300 million ($350 million) instrument for its defense industry—though the deals still need parliament’s ratification.

The real growth has moved off the state’s books. Private firms **now turn out** more than 4 million drones a year—the weapons the war runs on—while Ukroboronprom’s supervisory board has **named an acting chief,** Deputy Defense Minister **Serhii Boiev**, and opened a competition for Smetanin’s job.

5254. No impact---deterrence held through the whole war.

FRS 26 — Foundation for Strategic Research. February 16. French defense and security research institute. Note de la FRS n°04/2026, “Twenty-one strategic lessons of the Ukraine war,” https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/notes/twenty-one-strategic-lessons-ukraine-war-2026 Clopus

Lesson 19: Nuclear weapons will continue to reduce the risk of a direct, large-scale clash between nuclear-protected countries

It is impossible to claim with certainty that it is the presence of nuclear weapons in Russia and NATO that limited escalation on both sides: Russia did not overtly attack any Alliance country, and no NATO country has been eager to confront Russia upfront. The Ukraine war validated the “stability-instability paradox”: a lower risk of direct, large-scale clash between nuclear powers, but a higher risk of indirect conflict. It is thus reasonable to assume that nuclear deterrence will continue to reduce the risk of a direct confrontation between the Alliance’s nuclear powers and a non-allied nuclear-armed State such as Russia or China. Nevertheless, as suggested above, Russia could feel confident enough that it would engage in military aggression against a NATO country if Moscow saw the risk of nuclear escalation as marginal, i.e., worth the benefit.

The value of nuclear weapons seems to have been confirmed by the invasion of Ukraine: many countries will probably have noted that once again, a non-nuclear-protected country was attacked. Western allies and friends are already demanding stronger protection, including through extended nuclear deterrence. Some experts suggest a direct impact on the global proliferation risk, but others think such fears may be exaggerated. Nicholas Miller, “The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine”, Proliferation Papers , Institut français des relations internationales , n° 67, April 2024.

526Capacity is the binding constraint---that's the whole turn.

Pettyjohn and Dennis 23 — Stacie Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis. June 28. Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security; Research Associate in the CNAS Defense Program. Center for a New American Security, “Production Is Deterrence,” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/production-is-deterrence Clopus

Ukrainian forces have sought workarounds and alternate weapons in part because the U.S. defense industrial base has been unable to produce enough of the most in-demand weapons at the necessary pace. Political issues have also played a role, but, regardless, manufacturing capacity is a limiting factor with no quick solution. During the unipolar era when the United States faced no peer competitors, it scaled back weapons production and optimized for efficiency, leaving a consolidated missiles and munitions industry that today relies on complicated and fragile supply chains. 18 In “Precision and Posture,” a 2022 CNAS report, the authors explored how the Pentagon exacerbates this problem with volatile and inconsistent munitions buys that fail to provide industry with a regular demand signal. 19 As a result of these trends, the United States cannot quickly produce more weapons when needed. Supply chain issues have created bottlenecks that inhibit rapid acquisition of key components and materials, especially rocket motors, microelectronics, and energetics. To surge production, industry not only must overcome supply chain issues but also open new production lines, which requires additional machine tooling and an expanded workforce. Putting these pieces in place typically takes several years and requires substantial investment. Many defense companies are unwilling to take these steps without contracts in place to assure predictable demand. This is not simply an American problem; the European defense industrial base is in an even worse state and continues to be reliant on the United States. 20

American defense companies are trying to meet the continuing demand from Ukraine, while also rebuilding U.S. and allied stocks that have been drawn down. This is in addition to building stores of the weapons that would be needed for a war against China, which the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies as the United States’ “pacing challenge.” 21 Many of the precision-guided munitions (PGMs) needed to strengthen deterrence against China differ from those that Ukraine and other allies and partners need. The DoD must meet both important requirements simultaneously—arming European allies and partners while also procuring the right weapons for the Indo-Pacific. The president’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget request claims to address these problems by allocating $30.6 billion to a category it calls “missiles and munitions” and maximizing munitions orders “that are most relevant for deterring and, if necessary, prevailing over aggression in the Indo-Pacific.” 22 Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks added that the Pentagon is “buying to the limits of the industrial base even as we are expanding those limits.” 23

Ukrainian forces have sought workarounds and alternate weapons in part because the U.S. defense industrial base has been unable to produce enough of the most in-demand weapons at the necessary pace.

The following analysis of the FY24 budget request assesses the Biden administration’s claims and answers the following questions: Are planned buys of key types of weapons, especially the antiship capabilities needed for the Indo-Pacific and the air defenses required for both theaters, sufficient? Can the DoD continue to arm Ukraine and rebuild U.S. stockpiles while arming for the China challenge? Has the DoD taken sufficient steps, including the use of multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts and large lot procurement (LLP), to strengthen industry?

To answer these questions, the authors build on last year’s analysis of PGM procurement, which assessed spending on a select portfolio of “key conventional PGMs.” This year’s report expands the key conventional PGM portfolio to include surface-to-air missiles and torpedoes to examine whether buys are sufficient to meet the steady state demand for air defense around the globe and the demands of future possible warfighting missions in the Indo-Pacific, such as sinking ships. Compiling DoD spending on this tailored list of critical PGMs provides a clearer picture of current joint conventional weapons capability and the ability to meet the projected warfighting demands.

The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support warfighting requirements for China—the NDS’s priority challenge—by increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles and beginning to build out the high-low mix of interceptors that are needed to create a layered system of air defenses. Nevertheless, current inventories of standoff weapons, maritime strike PGMs, and air defense interceptors remain far too small to blunt an initial Chinese invasion, let alone prevail in a protracted war. Largely through supplemental appropriations, the DoD is also making moderate progress in rebuilding its inventory of the seven PGMs given to Ukraine and expanding U.S. production capacity to meet the current and future demand from the United States and allies and partners. The DoD must continue to develop the PGMs that it needs to counter China, while expanding the production of existing weapons to counter Russia and refill U.S. stockpiles. It can achieve both of these objectives because, except for air defense weapons, the PGMs needed for a war in the Indo–Pacific and those needed currently in Europe differ. Finally, the Pentagon has trial MYP and LLP programs for PGMs, but the services and Congress need to embrace these initiatives, even though they limit their budgetary flexibility, to create a stable demand signal for industry. The primary benefit of MYP is strategic, not economic—it will help create a healthy missiles-and-munitions industrial base that can meet the current demand and surge when needed. Thus, Congress needs to appropriate funds for these pilot programs and support their expansion.

527The freed rounds are APKWS and Paveway---the two things Kyiv burns.