1132. THEIR OWN AUTHOR. Resources cut willingness and raise the odds a coup succeeds.
Powell 12 — Jonathan Powell. School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nazarbayev University; co-author of the Powell-Thyne coup dataset the field runs on. He tests coup-proofing with a selection model on a global sample. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6), “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état,” https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445732 Clopus
Abstract Previous studies have attested to leaders ‘‘coup-proofing’’ their regimes by reducing the ability or disposition of their armies to seek their removal. The following article tests the utility of these efforts. ‘‘Structural’’ coup-proofing such as counterbalancing is expected to reduce the ability to organize a coup plot by creating substantial coordination obstacles to soldiers. Coup-proofing by spoiling militaries with organizational resources is expected to reduce the willingness to intervene. However, increased organizational resources are expected to increase the army’s capabilities, thereby increasing the likelihood of a coup’s success. The theory is empirically tested using a selection model with a global sample from 1961 to 2000. Findings suggest that both coup-proofing strategies are effective deterrents of coup activity and, more generally, that characteristics of the military appear to be far more important than economic influences on coups.
1143. THE STRAIN IS VISIBLE. A brigade commander was ambushed and executed---and no one came.
Kwarkye and Adebayo 25 — Sampson Kwarkye and Taiwo Adebayo. December 4. Project Manager for Littoral West African States at the ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel. Researcher on the Lake Chad Basin at the Institute for Security Studies. ISS Today, “Nigeria’s deep insecurity demands more than an emergency declaration,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigeria-s-deep-insecurity-demands-more-than-an-emergency-declaration Clopus
Boko Haram’s 15 November kidnapping and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba, Commander of the 25 Task Force Brigade, also exposed Nigeria’s security sector challenges. The group ambushed his convoy following a patrol in Borno state, resulting in the death of four security personnel, including two soldiers.
The ambush suggests security forces were not aware that Boko Haram – relying on its knowledge of the terrain and possibly a network of informants – had tracked the convoy’s movement and booby-trapped the area. When Boko Haram noticed Uba was missing from the ambush site, the lack of reinforcement for the convoy meant they had time to search for him, ultimately capturing and executing him.
These challenges are evident in the repeated failure of security services to detect, disrupt or prevent attacks. Fighters travel many kilometres on motorcycles, eluding detection largely because of limited intelligence and surveillance capacity at various levels. This is despite the potential to work with communities who could provide valuable information about insurgents' movements and activities.
1154. NIGERIA SPECIFICALLY. A quarter of postings are political---and the theater commander they replaced lost ground.
Alli 26 — Fatai Alli. January 19. University of Portsmouth. Twenty-three semi-structured interviews conducted across Nigeria in 2023 with retired senior officers, former Ministry of Defense civil servants, academics and security consultants. Armed Forces & Society, “Democratic Civilian Control in Limited-Access Orders: Rethinking Civil–Military Relations in Nigeria,” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0095327X251410089 Clopus
The 1999 Constitution ( The Nigerian Constitution, 1999 , Section 217, as amended) and the Armed Forces Act of Nigeria (2003) formally enshrine civilian supremacy over the military, laying down statutory frameworks to regulate appointments, promotions, and deployments. Yet in practice, these provisions remain more aspirational than real. Presidential discretion and elite patronage frequently override formal frameworks, with political expediency taking precedence over institutional rules. The result is a pattern of personalized control that distorts military professionalism and weakens operational effectiveness.
Interviewees were emphatic that political interference is routine. PB, a retired major general and former Director of Military Intelligence, estimated that “about 25 per cent of promotions and postings are influenced by politicians,” not based on merit. (Interview with PB, 21 May 2023). PD, a retired rear admiral and former JTF commander in the Niger Delta, lamented the erosion of professional standards: “Appointments once grounded in professional excellence are now determined by religious and political bargaining. The military is not strong enough to resist what the politicians are doing” (Interview with PD, 27 May 2023). PZ, a former Special Forces commander, was blunter: “civilian leaders are winner-take-all; they disregard military hierarchy and protocol once they want something” (Interview with PZ, 24 May 2023).
The corrosive effects of such practices are visible across the system. Officers spoke of truncated careers, premature retirements, and the sidelining of merit in favor of patronage. QZ, a former Chief of Defense Staff, argued that “politically motivated appointments lead to huge losses to the nation,” stressing that leadership selection must be guided by institutional stability, not short-term political advantage (Interview with QZ, 10 June 2023). PR, a retired Major General and theater commander of Nigerian armed forces in the Northeast, described how his forced retirement—despite a presidential service extension—enabled the appointment of a favored but inexperienced officer: “within months there were significant territorial and equipment losses to Boko Haram” (Interview with PR, 18 May 2023). PD, in his interview, concluded that patronage-driven advancement has “undermined professionalism and weakened operational effectiveness.”
1161. TWO COMMAND AUTHORITIES. Shared civ-mil power means either side can start the war alone.
White 21 — Peter White. June. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Auburn University; coded military officeholding in cabinets and state councils worldwide against conflict-initiation data. International Studies Quarterly 65(2): 551–561, “Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation,” https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab012 Clopus
How does this more limited type of military involvement in government affect the likelihood of international conflict? There are clear cases of civil–military dysfunction contributing to international conflict that cannot easily be explained by regime type: for example, the Pakistani military's possible role in autonomously initiating the 1999 Kargil War with India 1 and the role that political struggles between civilian and military factions played in miscalculations by the Egyptian government in the lead up to the 1967 war with Israel ( Brooks 2008 ). In each case, the military was a political actor, but not the dominant one. In this section, I outline the three competing arguments for the effect of MPG on conflict initiation.
Military Aggression
The expectation that military officers should favor more aggressive postures in international relations is intuitively appealing. In their training and experience, senior military officers may be socialized to favor offensive military doctrines, which may lead them to favor “first-strike” options ( Posen 1986 ). Weeks (2014) argues that military officers are socialized to view military action favorably for resolving international disputes and as less costly. Horowitz, Stam, and Ellis (2015 , hereafter HSE) agree that military socialization in favor of conflict does occur—though the enthusiasm for military action is tempered by combat experience. They may also view the international environment as inherently hostile and prefer an aggressive stance in international affairs ( Brunk, Secrest, Tamashiro 1990 ). In contrast, civilian politicians and experts are more likely to take into account the diplomatic, economic, and political ramifications of conflict—which may serve to make them more cautious ( Desch 1999 ; Brooks 2008 ). Military officers may also favor international conflict, because heightened tensions and conflict increase military resources and budgets ( Sechser 2004 ). International conflict can also lead dictators to loosen coup-proofing controls on militaries, increasing their autonomy ( Talmadge 2015 ). Logically, given military preferences, socialization, and incentives, as the number of military officers in the government—and the degree of military influence in the regime—increases, so should the state's propensity for international conflict.
Hypothesis 1 : As military participation in government increases, so too does the likelihood of international conflict initiation .
Military Conservatism
The inverse of the Military Aggression argument is Military Conservatism . Related to HSE's argument that combat experience should temper military enthusiasm for aggression, there is a literature that argues for Military Conservatism regarding the use of force. Huntington (1957 , Ch. 3) argues that military officers are characterized by “Conservative Realism,” where they view the international environment in terms of potential threats and value security above all else but see war as a last resort that carries with it extreme danger. There is some empirical evidence in support of this. In several studies of retired and current American military officers and civilian foreign policy practitioners, there have been findings that those with a military background are no more likely to favor military action in response to foreign policy problems than civilians—though military officers and veterans generally favor escalation to higher levels of force once conflict has begun ( Betts 1991 ; Feaver and Gelpi 2011 ). Military officers may also view military force as useful in a more limited set of foreign disputes than civilian politicians ( Feaver and Gelpi 2011 ). Further, while HSE find that leaders with military experience without combat and those who are former rebels are more conflict-prone, those with combat experience are no more bellicose than civilian leaders. Because military members bear the costs of war most acutely and are also uniquely qualified to evaluate the limitations of military force, when the military is more involved in the highest levels of government, there may be reduced propensity for international conflict. 2
Hypothesis 2 : As military participation in government increases, the likelihood of international conflict initiation decreases .
Civil–Military Competition
A third approach, Civil–Military Competition , is agnostic regarding any inherent predisposition to conflict, instead arguing that where civilians and military elites are sharing and in competition over political power, pathologies are introduced into foreign policy decision-making, which make international conflict more likely. These include poor information sharing, multiple chains of command, the growth of armed organizations outside the military, and political incentives to exacerbate international tensions. Most important is the existence of more than one authority in the state to initiate and escalate international conflict, which creates more opportunities for domestic actors to use international conflict to gain political advantage.
First, Civil–Military Competition makes errors in “strategic assessment” more likely ( Brooks 2008 ). Brooks demonstrates that both preference divergence and shared political power between civilian and military elites negatively affect a government's ability to effectively process information and make sound, unified foreign policy decisions. 3 Brooks argues that when civilian politicians and military officers share political power, foreign policy decision-making authority is contested and unclear. Here, military and civilian officials may issue contradictory orders, postpone a decision, or fail to reach a decision. It is unlikely that the state's decision-making process is fully coordinated between the military, diplomatic, and intelligence arms of the government. There is little in the way of consultation, information sharing, and joint decision-making. Poor decisions—that do not take into account relative capabilities, externalities, and other factors that would suggest caution—are more likely.
In addition to these types of error, a particular dangerous element of Civil–Military Competition is the existence of more than one command authority. Both the military and the civilian authority are capable of commanding military force. In Egypt's case, the diffusion of authority between Nasser and ‘Amr meant that ‘Amr was able to unilaterally escalate tensions with Israel by prepositioning troops without civilian authorization ( Brooks 2008 , 89–91). This dual authority is exacerbated by the proliferation of armed organizations within the state. Political competition between civilian and military leaders takes place in the shadow of a coup (e.g., Svolik 2012 ). A common response is for civilian leaders to build up armed alternatives to the military to “counter-balance” it (e.g., De Bruin 2018 ). This has the effect of not only creating two command authorities, but two militaries—one which answers to the military hierarchy and the other to the civilian leadership. Either the civilian or military leadership can use the forces under their command to initiate or escalate international conflict.
1172. OUTBIDDING. When both factions need a domestic audience, the outbidding runs to real war.
White 21 — Peter White. June. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Auburn University; coded military officeholding in cabinets and state councils worldwide against conflict-initiation data. International Studies Quarterly 65(2): 551–561, “Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation,” https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab012 Clopus
Another factor is domestic political support. When civil and military leaders are sharing power, a key factor in their relative power is their respective support in the broader society ( Brooks 2008 ). When an international issue has domestic salience, there is an incentive for “outbidding”—with either the civil or military leaders escalating international conflict to demonstrate their bona fides to a domestic audience. Because under Civil–Military Competition the authority to start or escalate conflict is divided, the outbidding risk extends beyond rhetoric to actual conflict. This was a likely factor, for example, in the civilian faction in Syria sending the armed forces under its control into Jordan in 1970 to support the Palestinian side in the civil war there.
Domestic political incentives for international conflict exist for leaders under other civil–military arrangements, but they are especially severe under Civil–Military Competition, because of the division of military authority. There is more than one command authority, and very often, more than one armed force that can be ordered into conflict. Put differently, under Civil–Military Competition, in addition to a higher likelihood of miscalculation, there is a greater opportunity for the civil or military factions in a regime to act on incentives to outbid or divert domestic politics using international conflict. This opportunity does not exist in the same way in systems where command authority is unitary. In contrast to the aggression and conservatism arguments, Civil–Military Competition does not presuppose that one group—the military or the civilians—will pursue a more aggressive course; either can. In Egypt in 1967, it was the military pursuing escalatory action, while in Syria in 1970 it was the civilians.
Under Civil–Military Competition, it is likely that there will be military officers at high levels of government in non -security roles. This creates the conditions for competition between the military and civilians as political factions. With the division of political power into military and civilian factions, also comes the division of the authority to initiate international conflict. Under Civil–Military Competition, there are more paths through which international conflict may be initiated and through which either faction may act on political incentives to escalate international tensions.
1183. THE MIDDLE IS GONE. Twenty years of Partly Free states falling into the Not Free column---and they're aggressive abroad.
Freedom House 26 — Freedom House. Annual survey of political rights and civil liberties covering 195 countries, scored by in-country analysts and reviewed by external advisers. Freedom in the World 2026, “The Growing Shadow of Autocracy,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy Clopus
Since 2005, the group of countries with Partly Free status has shrunk substantially. Nineteen Partly Free countries have dropped to Not Free, swelling the ranks of the world’s autocracies, which have become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. Democratic governments have long worked together to counter the spread of authoritarian rule. But in recent years, European countries have sharply reduced their funding for foreign democracy aid. And in 2025, the US administration abruptly canceled most foreign aid programs, began to disengage from international organizations, and refrained from condemning fraudulent elections—effectively abandoning long-standing principles of its foreign policy. As democracies move further away from their traditional role as defenders of freedom, the world could face a dangerous future led by emboldened autocrats.
Most democracies remain resilient in the face of daunting challenges. Despite internal pressures and threats from foreign powers, democracies continue to demonstrate that their domestic political systems are responsive and capable of course correction. Of the 87 countries rated Free in 2005, a total of 76—more than 85 percent—have remained Free throughout the two-decade period of global decline. Moreover, new democracies have repeatedly taken root under difficult circumstances, and aspirations for democracy routinely find popular support in even the most repressive environments.
1194. DEGENERATE AUTOCRACY. Repression selects for loyalty over competence---then the regime miscalculates a war.
Egorov and Sonin 26 — Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. February 17. Professor at Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management. Professor at the University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy. American Journal of Political Science, “Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy,” https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.70039 Clopus quoted from the authors’ NBER working-paper version, WP 31187
Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin NBER Working Paper No. 31187 April 2023 JEL No. C73,D72,D83,P16 ABSTRACT Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for the regime, such as Mao’s Big Leap Forward or the Pol Pot’s collectivization drive, they typically involve both a monumental miscalculation and an institutional environment in which better-informed subordinates have no chance to prevent the decision from being implemented. We offer a dynamic model of non-democratic politics, in which repression and bad decision-making are self-reinforcing. Repressions reduce the threat, yet raise the stakes for the incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the mechanism of disastrous individual decisions in highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes.
1201. NIGERIAN AIR POWER is what closed the route---the Cotonou plotters were trying to open it.
Parens and Radil 26 — Raphael Parens and Steven Radil. April 24. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. Political geographer at the University of Florida and founder of GeoPublic Analytics. FPRI, “Why Niger Can Seize Uranium But Cannot Sell It,” https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/04/why-niger-can-seize-uranium-but-cannot-sell-it/ Clopus
The specific failure points in the junta’s plan are informative. Benin offered the safest overland route to the Atlantic, but Niger closed that border in 2023 and cannot reopen it without concessions that would cost Tchiani politically among his AES junta allies in Mali and Burkina Faso, and internally with a loss of face to his own political rivals. The coup attempt in Cotonou, whose plotters used language echoing the Sahel juntas and whose leader subsequently fled to Niamey, suggest an attempted territorial solution to the network problem by installing a more compliant government in Benin. However, France pushed back, providing special forces support for anti-coup operations backed up by Nigerian air power. Thus, France showed that not only could it protect its clients, the Beninese government of Patrice Talon, but that it could also block Niger’s uranium export attempts by military means. Thus the Beninese gambit failed, and the border remains closed.
The Burkina Faso route runs through territory where al-Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, treats the region’s sparse highways as revenue streams and has been experimenting with drone-delivered explosives. This is not a corridor that the junta can secure by the same apparatus that seized a mine. Indeed, Niger’s ally Burkina Faso has failed to secure its own sovereignty, with its own attempts at circumvention of the international rules-based order, via the forced withdrawal of French counterterrorism forces, resulting in a breakdown of its own economic and political system outside the capital, Ouagadougou.
Togo and its Port of Lomé, the apparent destination, initially seemed a viable option. But Orano’s decision to launch a criminal complaint in France for the suspected theft of nuclear materials “in the interests of a foreign power” changed the calculus abruptly. As a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signatory, Togo has overlapping obligations under the agreement and UN Security Council resolutions requiring states to intercept illicit nuclear transfers. Once the Paris prosecutor formally labeled the cargo as stolen property, a willing transit state became a liability in the network overnight. Even Russia’s waiting bulk carrier eventually abandoned its anchorage off Lomé and departed empty.
The pattern is consistent. At every point where the uranium has to move from Niger’s territory into the networked infrastructure of global commerce, the old rules-based order asserts residual friction. Not enough friction to undo the seizure but still enough to resist the completion of the sovereign act and reward Niger with payment for its exports.
1212. ONE AIRLIFT. Their author says a single workaround sets the precedent---and the juntas are watching.
Parens and Radil 26 — Raphael Parens and Steven Radil. April 24. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. Political geographer at the University of Florida and founder of GeoPublic Analytics. FPRI, “Why Niger Can Seize Uranium But Cannot Sell It,” https://www.fpri.org/article/2026/04/why-niger-can-seize-uranium-but-cannot-sell-it/ Clopus
The uranium’s current immobility is not a triumph of the rules-based order. The mine is still seized and Orano has no realistic legal recourse. Niger’s recent offer to return Orano’s proportional share of the stranded stockpile confirms that the junta is releasing only what the network refused to let it sell. The junta’s territorial legitimacy is otherwise undimmed. If Niger finds a workaround, perhaps by an airlift through willing airspace (another form of territory), it will establish a precedent that makes the next seizure, in Niger or elsewhere, easier to complete. Africa’s juntas and other small state authoritarians are likely watching this experiment with rapt attention.
What the convoy’s stalemate does reveal is where the residual leverage of the old order actually lies. It lies not in territorial pressure but in the networked nodes through which strategic materials must flow to have value. Ports. Airports. Insurers. Financiers. Markets. Transit states with something to lose.
1223. WHO ROLLED IT BACK. Loyalists held Cotonou because the Nigerian Air Force showed up---and the juntas were behind it.
Siegle and Wahila 26 — Joseph Siegle and Hany Wahila. January 13. Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies. Research Associate at the Africa Center. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Benin: Rebuilding Democratic Norms Has Far Reaching Regional Implications,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/en-elections-2026/benin/ Clopus
The stakes of Benin’s 2026 election were soberly punctuated by an attempted coup by a group of mid-level military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri on December 7, 2025. Several people were killed in the attempt, and the coup plotters temporarily gained control of the national television and radio stations before being apprehended or chased away by loyalist troops with support from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces, including the Nigerian Air Force and special forces from Côte d’Ivoire. The prospect of a return to military government in Benin recalls the 18-year repressive and economically stagnant era of Mathieu Kérékou, which spawned Benin’s democracy movement in the early 1990s.
Young people hold placards with slogans such as “Never Again” at a rally decrying the country’s abortive coup and call for the preservation of democracy on December 13, 2025. (Photo: AFP)
The coup attempt has far-reaching regional implications. The rollback of the attempted putsch was a welcome respite for ECOWAS, given that 5 of the West African regional bloc’s 15 member states have succumbed to coups since 2020. At the same time, the revelation that the coup plotters may have been aided by the military juntas in neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso reflects an apparent effort on the part of the Sahelian juntas to normalize military takeovers within the West African region.
The attempted coup in Benin follows a sustained, Russian-sponsored information operation that disseminates baseless claims of progress by the Sahelian military juntas to foster disillusionment within the coastal West African democracies. The messaging campaigns are paradoxical, given the deteriorating security , economic, and political environment in each of the three junta-led countries—and the tangible risk that Bamako and Ouagadougou could fall to jihadists. The cult-of-personality surrounding Burkina Faso’s junta leader , Ibrahim Traoré, is the exemplar of these campaigns.
1231. WEAPONS FOR ORE. Tehran offered drones and missiles for yellowcake---that's the trade.
ADF 24 — Africa Defense Forum. October. Professional military magazine published by U.S. Africa Command; reporting analysis by Liam Karr of the Institute for the Study of War and Eric Brewer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. ADF Magazine, “Niger, Iran Uranium Deal Raises Fears of Nuclear Proliferation,” https://adf-magazine.com/2024/10/niger-iran-uranium-deal-raises-fears-of-nuclear-proliferation/ Clopus
As Niger tries to address a cratering economy and constant terror attacks, its ruling junta is turning to a new ally with a dangerous request.
Iran has been working secretly on a deal with Niger’s ruling junta to buy 300 metric tons of uranium ore worth more than $56 million. According to analysts, the uranium could be funneled into Iran’s ongoing effort to develop a nuclear weapon.
In exchange for the “yellowcake” uranium ore, Iran has promised the Nigerien junta economic aid, agricultural assistance and weapons, including drones and surface-to-air missiles, according to observers.
The deal has been in the works even though Nigerien ore exports have been blocked since the July 2023 coup that overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum.
In its most recent quarterly report, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iran has more than 5,700 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium that could be converted rapidly to weapons-grade material.
1242. THE COUP IS THE CAUSE. Tehran arrived a month after Bazoum fell---the junta wanted allies who wouldn't ask.
ADF 24 — Africa Defense Forum. October. Professional military magazine published by U.S. Africa Command; reporting analysis by Liam Karr of the Institute for the Study of War and Eric Brewer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. ADF Magazine, “Niger, Iran Uranium Deal Raises Fears of Nuclear Proliferation,” https://adf-magazine.com/2024/10/niger-iran-uranium-deal-raises-fears-of-nuclear-proliferation/ Clopus
Iranian officials approached the Niger junta in August 2023, about one month after the July 2023 coup. The visit was the first step toward circumventing international sanctions aimed at preventing Iran from developing a bomb.
In June 2024, Niger’s junta evicted French company Orano from the Imouraren uranium mine in the northeast. Orano is 90% controlled by the French government. Imouraren is considered to be one of the world’s largest uranium deposits and Niger is the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer.
The junta ended military cooperation with France in December 2023 and began looking for allies who would not make demands about good governance or democracy.
“The Nigerien junta is likely seeking military support or near-term access to revenue to bolster its counterinsurgency efforts and economy, strengthening its regime security,” analyst Liam Karr wrote recently in a report for the Institute for the Study of War.
Niger has struggled since the 2023 coup. Sanctions, diplomatic disputes and border closings with its West African neighbors, such as Benin, have made it impossible for Niger to export natural resources, including oil. As a result, the junta has been forced to cut its budget by 40% and has defaulted on $519 million in international debt payments. The World Bank expects Niger’s economic growth in 2024 to be 45% less than it was in the pre-coup period.
Inflation and insecurity are on the rise.
“The junta has sought to exchange Nigerien natural resources for loans and weapons to help address these challenges,” Karr noted in his report. Iran has joined Russia in offering the junta quick cash to help solve its economic and security problems. Russian officials have approached Niger about taking over operations of the Imouraren mine.
As Niger negotiates with Iran over uranium sales, the junta faces a growing threat from anti-coup movements within the county and from insurgents along its western border with Burkina Faso. The result is a junta increasingly driven to desperation for cash and weapons to maintain its hold on power.
“These challengers foment insecurity and undermine the junta’s legitimacy by showing the ineffectiveness of the junta and security forces,” Karr wrote.
1253. THE ROUTE. The material moves by truck through al-Qaeda and Islamic State country---that's the pathway.
SightLine 25 — SightLine U3O8. November. Uranium-sector news service; the underlying reporting is Le Monde’s, sourced to multiple French government and security officials. SightLine U3O8, “The possible sale of 1,000 metric tons of Nigerien uranium to Russia is alarming France,” https://sightlineu3o8.com/2025/11/the-possible-sale-of-1000-metric-tons-of-nigerien-uranium-to-russia-is-alarming-france/ Clopus syndicated from Le Monde---confirm against the original before reading
Hundreds of metric tons of uranium are being loaded onto trucks crossing regions controlled by jihadist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group. According to multiple French government sources, this high-risk operation is currently under consideration by Russian and Nigerien authorities. The Elysée has been informed, and the matter is raising concern among leaders in Paris.
French officials said they are convinced that a deal was recently reached for $170 million between the junta led by General Abdourahamane Tiani and the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom for the acquisition of 1,000 metric tons of yellowcake (concentrated but unenriched uranium) produced by French nuclear group Orano at its former Arlit mine in northern Niger, where some 1,400 metric tons are stored.
According to a senior French security source, both parties are now working to set up a convoy of around 30 trucks to transport the uranium via Burkina Faso to the port of Lomé, Togo by the end of November. From there, it would be shipped to Russia by cargo vessel.
The source added that Nigerien military, customs and intelligence officials held talks in October with their Burkinabé and Togolese counterparts to secure their cooperation – an essential step for such a perilous convoy.
1264. AND IT'S GETTING WORSE. Islamic State fired near the airport where it sits---and the junta is getting irrational.
Rhoubeid and Farrell 26 — Adal Rhoubeid and Maureen Farrell. March 3. PhD candidate in peace and conflict studies at Kent State and former security advisor to the president of Niger. Nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Atlantic Council, “How a crisis over a stockpile of uranium created an opening for US reengagement in Niger,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/how-a-crisis-over-a-stockpile-of-uranium-created-an-opening-for-us-reengagement-in-niger/ Clopus
At the heart of Niger’s current dilemma sits approximately one thousand tons of uranium yellowcake immobilized at Niamey’s international airport. The junta nationalized the Somair mine—Orano’s principal uranium subsidiary, in which the French company held a 63.4 percent stake—in June 2025, at which point the yellowcake already transported to Niamey came under the junta’s direct control. Tchiani announced plans to sell and transport this material via Lomé port in Togo to unknown buyers. However, following a discreet visit by Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé to Niamey on December 9-10—just days after the Benin coup failed—the shipment was frozen and remains at the Niamey airport.
Then, on January 29, the terrorist group Islamic State Sahel Province opened fire near the airport—further evidence of the intensifying risk that possession of the uranium poses for the junta. This yellowcake has become a hot potato that is causing significant problems for the Nigerien government, prompting Tchiani to consider returning the uranium to Orano.
First, the uranium cannot practically be returned to the mines in Arlit, one thousand kilometers north of Niamey. The logistics of reversing such a massive shipment would be prohibitively expensive and politically embarrassing, essentially advertising the junta’s failure to execute its economic strategy.
Second, the material cannot be transported through Benin or Nigeria. The failed coup ensures that Niger’s border with Benin will stay closed and relations between the two countries will remain hostile. Transit through Nigeria faces similar obstacles given Nigeria’s strong opposition to the Niger junta and Abuja’s decisive intervention in Benin.
Third, there are international legal barriers complicating Niger’s intention to export the uranium. In August 2025, French uranium processing company Orano filed a complaint , prompting French authorities to open an investigation into Niger’s government for “organized theft for the purpose of serving the interests of a foreign power.” An international arbitration tribunal ruled in September 2025 that Niger cannot sell, transfer, or facilitate transfer of the uranium. This legal action makes any third country or company facilitating the uranium’s transport potentially liable.