993. THEY OUTSOURCE IT. "African solutions" ends in the AU coordinating other people's mediators.
PSC Report 26 — Institute for Security Studies Peace and Security Council Report. March 19. The ISS unit that monitors the African Union Peace and Security Council; the piece quotes Paul-Simon Handy, the ISS representative to the AU. ISS PSC Insights, “Leverage crises in APSA interventions: design or coordination flaws?” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/leverage-crises-in-apsa-interventions-design-or-coordination-flaws Clopus
Despite APSA’s robust frameworks and institutional realignment, APSA decision-makers who routinely invoke ‘African solutions’ undermine regional initiatives and seek external conflict mediation, treating African-led interventions as optional or secondary. This hollows out the influence of African actors.
APSA decision-makers invoke ‘African solutions’ but seek external conflict mediation
This decline in Africa’s influence and centrality in its security landscape raises questions about whether AU leaders are missing a point. Has the reform agenda – with its focus on structures, modalities and financing – sidelined the more urgent task of sustaining collective African conflict responses grounded in member states’ unity of purpose?
1004. SUSPENSION STOPPED WORKING. Applying it unevenly taught plotters the cost is negotiable.
Soumahoro 23 — Moussa Soumahoro. November 20. Researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance, Institute for Security Studies Addis Ababa. First published in the ISS Peace and Security Council Report. ISS Today, “Why aren’t sanctions preventing coups in Africa?” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-arent-sanctions-preventing-coups-in-africa Clopus
In previous waves of coups, the AU consistently suspended defaulting states, whereas recently, inconsistencies have crept in. While it promptly suspended Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Gabon, the continental body hesitated to act against Niger even though its Constitutive Act calls for immediate suspension. In Chad, the AU’s response was perplexing as it failed to treat the situation as an unconstitutional change of government, hiding behind security risks .
The AU also kept silent while constitutional manipulations for presidential term extensions occurred in Côte d’Ivoire (2016), Guinea (2020), Gabon (2023), Rwanda (2023) and the Central African Republic (2023). The body’s 2009 Ezulwini Framework on unconstitutional changes of government calls on the AU to deploy preventive missions based on early warning indicators when such events occur.
By not treating the events equally, the AU reinforced a sense of double standards among coup-makers and citizens of countries where constitutional manipulations occurred. This undermined its legitimacy, diluted the deterrent effect of sanctions and fostered defiance among coup plotters in Mali, Guinea and Niger.
ECOWAS, the regional bloc most affected by military overthrows, has issued economic and administrative sanctions against all coup countries in its region. But their effectiveness has been diluted by neighbouring countries’ actions. In Mali’s case, some states expressed reservations about the sanctions and enhanced cooperation with the country’s de facto authorities.
AU ‘double standards’ diluted the deterrent effect of sanctions and fostered defiance among coup plotters
The damaging effects of comprehensive economic sanctions on local livelihoods also limited their chances of succeeding. This fostered widespread aversion to ECOWAS, creating fertile ground for citizens to support the coup plotters in the name of nationalism. Popular rejection of ECOWAS measures in Mali (2020 and 2021), Guinea (2021) and Niger (2023) are examples.
1011. IT STOPPED ENFORCING. Bissau's junta was told no, kept its roadmap, and paid nothing.
PSC Report 26 — Institute for Security Studies Peace and Security Council Report. August 5. The ISS unit that monitors the AU Peace and Security Council; reporting confirmation from senior ECOWAS Commission officials. ISS PSC Insights, “Can the incoming ECOWAS Commission reclaim regional relevance?” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/can-the-incoming-ecowas-commission-reclaim-regional-relevance Clopus
The incoming commission must rebuild the credibility of ECOWAS normative frameworks and responses. This is because the AES effect engendered an ECOWAS that is less resolute in its response to unconstitutional changes of government and democratic subversions .
ECOWAS violated its supplementary act by lifting Guinea’s sanctions after the junta won the election
Notably, when the Guinea-Bissau coup occurred in November 2025, ECOWAS did not display its usual strong stance against coups. This was because the event took place after the official withdrawal of AES members in January 2025. ECOWAS, at its December 2025 summit, rejected the one-year transition proposal by the junta and threatened to impose economic and financial sanctions if it wasn’t withdrawn. The junta resisted and retained its transition roadmap. A constitutional referendum is scheduled for 30 August 2026 and general election for 6 December 2026.
At the recently concluded ECOWAS summit, no sanctions nor threat of sanctions were voiced to deter violations. Rather, ECOWAS noted ‘efforts underway in Guinea-Bissau to conclude the country’s political transition’. Although the interim military president and prime minister are barred from running in the upcoming election, elements of the military and their proxies may run because the coup-to-ballot pathway has been normalised by the Guinea precedent.
1022. IT BROKE ITS OWN RULE. Sanctions came off once the junta won---the framework doesn't bind.
PSC Report 26 — Institute for Security Studies Peace and Security Council Report. August 5. The ISS unit that monitors the AU Peace and Security Council; reporting confirmation from senior ECOWAS Commission officials. ISS PSC Insights, “Can the incoming ECOWAS Commission reclaim regional relevance?” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/can-the-incoming-ecowas-commission-reclaim-regional-relevance Clopus
ECOWAS, like the AU, lifted all sanctions on Guinea after the junta ran for and won the election. This violated Article 12 of the Supplementary Act A/SP.13/02/12 on Sanctions Against Member States that Fail to Honour their Obligations to ECOWAS. The act stipulates that the perpetrators of coups and their accomplices shall not stand for presidential office in their member states and that ECOWAS and its members shall not recognise governments that obtained power this way.
In the past, ECOWAS pressured juntas to organise elections, which they never contested, leaving room for civilians to run and win. The precedent set by the Guinea situation erodes the credibility of ECOWAS's normative framework and highlights a more cautious body bent on preserving relations with incumbents.
ECOWAS’s inability to address military coups can be attributed to a failure to address governance deficits by incumbent democrats proactively. Since July 2024, successive ECOWAS summits have made no reference to the review of the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, a process it initiated in 2021 after the Guinea coup.
Following several consultations, a final draft was developed in 2023 . Senior commission officials confirm that finalisation of the revised protocol has stalled due to objections from member states to presidential term limits, injunctions against constitutional manipulations and enforcement mechanisms. These were the issues that halted the protocol review in 2015.
1033. DOUBLE STANDARD. It's a syndicate of heads of state---coups condemned, constitutional ones waved through.
Ndiaye 24 — Babacar Ndiaye. September 19. Senior Fellow at the Timbuktu Institute for Peace Studies, former Principal Political Affairs Officer at ECOWAS and transnational organised crime prevention expert at UNODC West and Central Africa. The Defence Horizon Journal, “A Shift Of The Collective Security Architecture In West Africa,” https://tdhj.org/blog/post/collective-security-west-africa-ecowas/ Clopus
In light of ECOWAS’s failure to reverse the recent coup in Niger, marking the fifth such event in three years — an unprecedented occurrence, harsh criticism has surged from various segments of the region, particularly among the youth and broader public opinion. While many of these criticisms stem from a lack of understanding of the legal and political frameworks underpinning ECOWAS’s actions and policies, and are further fueled by disinformation campaigns orchestrated by illiberal foreign powers with ideological and economic interests in West Africa, the regional body has displayed shortcomings. These include inconsistent and sometimes ill-advised measures in addressing unconstitutional changes. Undertaking to restore ECOWAS’s credibility and enhance its effectiveness as a regional organisation that has otherwise achieved significant progress in peace, security, and economic integration, the following points are the most salient:
Adherence to Democracy and Good Governance Protocols: One of the primary challenges for ECOWAS is the non-compliance and blatant violations of its substantial protocol provisions by member state leaders.
Complacency towards heads of state : ECOWAS is often seen as a ‘syndicate of heads of state’, adopting a complacent attitude toward politicians who manipulate national constitutions to extend their tenure, undermining the ideals of democracy and good governance proclaimed. The organisation firmly condemns military coups while tolerating constitutional coups and electoral charades,[32] leading to a perception of double standards. However, this perception is widespread in the region and contributes to discrediting ECOWAS. It was not founded because the bloc had no legal base that prevented a president from hanging on to power. When ECOWAS initiated a reform aimed at amending the Protocol on Good Governance to introduce a term limit to two, a few member states wielded their veto. This hinders a significant, major reform that ECOWAS should rekindle to improve its image, and more effectively prevent military coups.
1044. THE NEW FORCE IS A BRIGADE. They promised an army and funded a rounding error.
Koné 26 — Hassane Koné. March 25. Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel. ISS Today, “How ECOWAS can make its new counter-terrorism force effective,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-ecowas-can-make-its-new-counter-terrorism-force-effective Clopus
Announced in August 2025, the force was initially intended to comprise 260 000 troops with an estimated annual budget of US$2.5 billion. However, the military chiefs opted for a counter-terrorism brigade of 1 650 soldiers to form the core of the force.
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal reaffirmed their commitment to providing troops. Contingents will be stationed in their respective countries, ready for deployment.
ECOWAS has discussed the creation of a regional standby force since 2004. The bloc has sought a military instrument to replace the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, which intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s and Côte d’Ivoire in the early 2000s.
For over a decade, ECOWAS has been criticised for its inaction in the face of terrorism and insecurity
However, member states have lacked the resources, funding and political will to turn this ambition into reality. Several announcements in recent years regarding activating the standby force or creating a new counter-terrorism force have not materialised. For over a decade, this has exposed ECOWAS to criticism for its inaction in the face of terrorism and insecurity in the region.
105Two services converged on it independently---and one of the plotters turned it in.
Abdulmalik 26 — Abdulrahman Abdulmalik. January 29. Investigative reporter for Premium Times, working from multiple senior administration insiders and officials familiar with the joint Army–SSS operation. Premium Times, “EXCLUSIVE: How the coup to topple, kill Tinubu was uncovered and foiled,” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/investigationspecial-reports/852980-exclusive-how-the-coup-to-topple-kill-tinubu-was-uncovered-and-foiled.html Clopus
A covert intelligence operation coordinated by the Army Headquarters and the State Security Service (SSS), helped thwart a deadly plot to overthrow President Bola Tinubu’s government and assassinate key political figures, PREMIUM TIMES can authoritatively report.
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Multiple senior administration insiders said the plot began to unravel in late September 2025 after an unnamed military officer with direct knowledge of the coup contacted the then Chief of Army Staff, Olufemi Oluyede. The officer reportedly disclosed the scheme, saying he feared being implicated as an accessory to treason if he failed to alert authorities.
Our sources said around the same time, the SSS independently gathered intelligence indicating that some serving army officers were plotting to “destabilise the government and undermine Nigeria’s democracy.” An official familiar with the matter said the Director-General of the SSS, Oluwatosin Ajayi, personally briefed Mr Oluyede on the findings.
Faced with converging intelligence from multiple sources, the two security chiefs agreed to act swiftly. A wide-ranging but discreet joint operation was launched by the army and the SSS, with coordinated arrests planned across different parts of the country to neutralise the coup’s masterminds and other collaborators.
106The denial was the cover story---"career stagnation," then a judicial panel for overthrowing the state.
Abdulmalik 26 — Abdulrahman Abdulmalik. January 29. Investigative reporter for Premium Times, working from multiple senior administration insiders and officials familiar with the joint Army–SSS operation. Premium Times, “EXCLUSIVE: How the coup to topple, kill Tinubu was uncovered and foiled,” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/investigationspecial-reports/852980-exclusive-how-the-coup-to-topple-kill-tinubu-was-uncovered-and-foiled.html Clopus
On 30 September 2025, as President Tinubu travelled to Imo State for an official visit, unaware of the plot to depose and possibly assassinate him, the joint operation went into effect. The sweep led to the arrest of the alleged principal architects of the coup, alongside other military and civilian suspects.
The Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), Emmanuel Undiandeye, and the then Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa, were subsequently briefed. Mr Undiandeye was then requested to detain the suspects in the underground holding facility of the Defence Intelligence Agency.
Following the initial arrests, President Tinubu was formally informed of the foiled plot. A visibly shaken president immediately ordered the cancellation of the 1 October National Independence Day parade. He also approved the constitution of a special investigative panel, which later led to additional arrests. The investigative panel was led by General Undiandeye.
One of the detained soldiers later escaped custody but was rearrested by SSS operatives in Bauchi, a military insider said. Meanwhile, a retired officer identified as General Adamu and a former governor, Timipre Sylva, accused of bankrolling the coup plotters, remained at large.
Mr Tinubu later fired and retired the then Chief of Defence Staff, General Musa as well as the chiefs of the navy and airforce. Mr Oluyede was appointed CDS and promoted to the rank of General. Weeks later, Mr Musa returned to government as minister of defence.
In a statement issued on 4 October, the Defence Headquarters said the arrested officers were being investigated for “indiscipline and breach of service regulations.” It added that preliminary findings suggested the officers’ grievances were linked to “career stagnation and failure in promotion examinations.”
Despite mounting evidence and a series of detailed reports by PREMIUM TIMES and other media outlets, the military repeatedly denied that a coup plot existed.
In an 18 October statement the Defence Headquarters described the probe involving the 16 arrested officers as a routine internal investigation aimed at maintaining discipline and professionalism within the armed forces.
However, on 26 January, the military publicly acknowledged for the first time that officers had indeed plotted to illegally overthrow President Tinubu’s administration. It announced that those indicted would be arraigned before a military judicial panel.
107And the shake-up tracks the plot---analysts say the denial didn't convince.
Al Jazeera 25 — Al Jazeera, quoting Confidence MacHarry, security analyst at the Lagos consultancy SBM Intelligence, and Senator Iroegbu, an Abuja-based security analyst speaking to the Associated Press. October 24. Al Jazeera, “Nigeria replaces top security officials days after coup plot denial,” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/24/nigeria-replaces-top-security-officials-days-after-coup-plot-denial Clopus
While the military on Saturday denied that there was a coup plot, local media and some analysts are not convinced.
“Military leadership reshuffle is a very normal and regular procedure in Nigeria,” Confidence MacHarry, a security analyst at Lagos-based consultancy SBM Intelligence, told the AFP news agency.
At the same time, the “military has failed to convincingly deny” the alleged coup plot, he said.
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“This shake-up could thus be a means of taking the wind out of the sails of coup plotters” who reportedly complained about career stagnation “or as a means of punishment for the military chiefs for their failure to improve security”, he added.
108Who is charged settles it---a serving battalion commander, retired generals, and a man inside the villa.
AFP 26 — Agence France-Presse. May 8. International wire service; reporting from court documents it obtained and from proceedings at the Federal High Court in Abuja. France 24, “What to know about Nigeria’s court martial over 2025 coup plot,” https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260508-what-to-know-about-nigeria-s-court-martial-over-2025-coup-plot Clopus
Three dozen officers are on trial for allegedly planning to overthrow the government.
If successful, it would have brought an end to more than a quarter century of democracy in Africa's most populous country, which spent much of the 20th century under junta rule after gaining independence from Britain in 1960.
Here is what we know so far:
The Nigerian military has not officially identified a ringleader of the alleged coup plot and the court martial will be held behind closed doors, as is usual, at a military venue in Abuja.
Local media reports named Colonel Mohammed Ma'aji as the officer who mobilised the plotters.
Court documents seen by AFP accused "Ma'aji and others" of committing an "act of terrorism".
Ma'aji reportedly gained much of his operational experience in the Niger Delta, where he participated in major army operations targeting militancy and oil theft.
At the time of his arrest, the 49-year-old was serving as commanding officer of the Nigerian Army 19 Battalion.
In a separate trial for civilians who allegedly participated in the coup plan, court documents seen by AFP named former oil minister Timipre Sylva -- who is at large and has not been officially charged -- as having allegedly acted alongside the accused.
Also allegedly involved was an electrician who worked at the presidential villa.
1091. THAT'S THE ASSUMPTION THAT BROKE. Analysts name Nigeria's borderlands as a coup hot spot now.
Brechenmacher and Brown 26 — Saskia Brechenmacher and Frances Z. Brown. January 30. Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. Vice President for Studies at Carnegie; served on the White House National Security Council staff across three administrations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa’s Democratic Kaleidoscope: Trends to Watch in 2026,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/africa-democracy-protest-elections-coups Clopus
Moreover, given public discontent with governance and rising insecurity across Central and West Africa, future coup attempts in the region appear likely . Benin, Niger, and Nigeria’s borderlands have all emerged as hot spots. Benin, for instance, experienced a failed coup attempt in December and is headed for presidential elections in April; it has also suffered increasing violence as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has expanded its operations .
1102. THE GRIEVANCE IS LIVE. The colonel's own account: promotion, welfare, and frustration across the ranks.
Mohammed 26 — Yakubu Mohammed. August 12. Premium Times, rounding up a sixteen-part investigative series built on court filings and documents obtained exclusively by the paper, including Ma’aji’s own written account. Premium Times, “COUP SERIES ROUND-UP: What we know about alleged failed plot against Tinubu,” https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/902304-coup-series-round-up-what-we-know-about-alleged-failed-plot-against-tinubu.html Clopus
At the centre of the alleged conspiracy was Mohammed Ma’aji, a Nigerian Army colonel who had served in many military formations.
Investigators identified him as the principal coordinator of the plot. His own account as contained in the documents exclusively obtained by this newspaper provides perhaps the clearest explanation of how he came to contemplate overthrowing the government.
Mr Ma’aji said he had twice failed in his bid for promotion to brigadier general—first in 2023 and again in 2024. He said the disappointment contributed to his decision to revive a movement to change the government.
But he also presented the proposed coup as a response to insecurity, pervasive corruption in the country, bad governance, suppression of critical voices of the youth, bad governance, what he considered the poor welfare and working conditions of serving and retired military personnel. He claimed that widespread frustration existed within the armed forces and that the desire for change was genuine.
He wrote of how he incessantly came under pressure from those he called “like minds” within the military.
1113. ASK A NIGERIAN POLITICAL SCIENTIST. Every condition that produced the coup belt is present here.
Moshood 25 — Abdul-Wasi Babatunde Moshood. February 19. Political scientist at Lagos State University with recently published research on preventing military coups in Nigeria, interviewed by The Conversation Africa. The Conversation, “Is Nigeria in danger of a coup? What the country should do to avoid one,” https://theconversation.com/is-nigeria-in-danger-of-a-coup-what-the-country-should-do-to-avoid-one-political-analyst-248281 Clopus
Are these factors present in Nigeria today?
The sociopolitical and economic conditions that led to coups in other countries in west Africa are present in Nigeria.
Nigeria is still largely divided along lines of clans and religion. Insecurity is at high levels across the country. The removal of the petrol subsidy has caused economic problems.
Commodity prices have skyrocketed . Food inflation reached 40.75% in 2024 – its highest level in 25 years.
The colonial legacy in Nigeria is still evident in the north versus south divide that plagues the country’s politics. Bad leaders exploit the division for their own selfish gain by using marginalisation rhetoric.
1121. IT EATS THE ARMY. Balancing is paid for out of personnel, armaments and soldier quality.
Powell 12 — Jonathan Powell. School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nazarbayev University; co-author of the Powell-Thyne coup dataset the field runs on. He tests coup-proofing with a selection model on a global sample. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(6), “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état,” https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445732 Clopus
Coup-proofing is similarly expected to deter plotters through the creation of coordination challenges, thus lowering the probability of success. Circumstances may arise, however, that convince multiple spheres of the armed forces to act against the head of government. How then, should we expect armed forces that are ‘‘balanced’’ to function in the execution stage of the attempt? I argue that even when controlling for sample selection, that is, when looking at conditions under which plotters feel they have the highest likelihood of success or when high levels of the expected payoff of success convinces plotters to act, the challenges created by coup-proofing can still undermine their effort. Scholars of both civil–military relations and international conflict have suggested that coup-proofing often hinders the ability of soldiers (Quinlivan 1999; Pilster and Bo¨hmelt 2011; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Reiter and Stam 1998; Biddle and Long 2004). First, when a state puts more resources into structural coup-proofing, they inevitably do so at the expense of the regular armed forces. This is due to a reduction in personnel, armaments, or in soldier quality due to a lack of training and nonmerit recruitment and promotion, strategies that often coincide with structural coup-proofing. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko purged seasoned army officers, executing many, and his military recruitment took on a personalist character, with ‘‘political considera- tions’’ being more important than ‘‘military ones’’ (Kisangani 2000, 215). The quality of his forces was clearly diminished, as seen during skirmishes between 1977 and 1978 when the Zairean military was soundly humbled by former Katangan soldiers. In short, the capacity of Mobutu’s military to carry out effective maneuvers was eliminated due to coup-proofing. Second, in addition to shortages in training or materiel, coup-proofing undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges. This is as true for waging battle as it is for attempting a coup. Durrell-Young (1997,
23), for example, has claimed that unity of command is a ‘‘sine qua non for
Powell 1025
successful military operations,’’ and unity of command is what structural coup-proofing such as counterbalancing specifically attempts to avoid. Pollack (2002,
386), for example, has noted that Muammar Qaddafi ‘‘frequently and unexpectedly’’ rotated command positions during the 1980s, limited the military’s training through prohibition of live-fire exercises, and proscribed the regular military from forming division-level commands, which would have to be created ‘‘on an ad hoc basis in the field’’ (Pollack 2002, 386). The Libyan leader instead put paramount importance on his Jamahiriyyah Guard, who proved their utility by beating back an army coup attempt in May 1984. The end result was a regular army in which ‘‘concerted’’ action was ‘‘nearly impossible,’’ and accounts of the Chadian conflict fail to report ‘‘a single mention of Libyan forces conducting a tactical counterattack’’ (Pollack 2002,
386). As Pollack concluded, the Libyans deployed ‘‘far more advanced and far more powerful weaponry [against the Chadian army]... but were crushed nonetheless’’ (Pollack 2002, 417).