3231. SERIAL NUMBERS. Enhanced monitoring is a storage audit---it verifies where an item sits, never what it did.
State PM 25 — U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. January 20. The bureau that runs the Blue Lantern end-use monitoring program. U.S. Department of State fact sheet, “End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles,” https://www.state.gov/end-use-monitoring-of-u-s-origin-defense-articles Clopus
Department of Defense (DoD) EUM for defense equipment transferred via FMS or other U.S. government security cooperation/assistance programs is executed under the auspices of the DoD’s Golden Sentry program and is conducted by Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel assigned to U.S. Embassies abroad.
Under the Golden Sentry program, EUM of U.S.-origin defense articles is a joint responsibility of the partner nations and the U.S. government. The partner assumes full responsibility, based on the terms under which the transfers are made, for the defense articles including physical security and accountability requirements, and restrictions on end-use. Under Golden Sentry, the U.S. government seeks to verify the end-use, physical security and accountability of U.S.-origin defense articles via periodic EUM checks and investigations into potential end-use violations.
Under the Golden Sentry program, the U.S. government conducts routine and enhanced EUM checks. Routine EUM checks are required based on a “watch list ” of significant military equipment (SME), are conducted at least quarterly by SCO personnel during regular visits to partner nation installations in performance of their security cooperation duties, and the checks are documented electronically. Enhanced EUM checks are required based on a list of sensitive items identified in Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). In addition to an initial inventory by serial number, Enhanced EUM requires physical security and accountability assessments of the storage facilities and 100% annual serial number inventories to verify compliance with transfer agreements. The security and accountability assessments are conducted in accordance with defined checklists documented electronically. SCO compliance with program requirements and partner nation compliance with pre-transfer assurances are periodically assessed by personnel from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) – the DoD organization that manages the Golden Sentry Program.
3242. BY DESIGN. The checks are about unauthorized transfer---not how the weapon was used.
CIVIC 21 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. September. Organization that works with armed actors on civilian harm mitigation and with the U.S. Congress on arms transfer policy. CIVIC, “Demystifying End-Use Monitoring in U.S. Arms Exports,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EUM-Brief.pdf Clopus
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 requires the U.S. government to provide reasonable assurance that the recipient of an arms transfer complies with requirements around the use, transfer, and security of U.S. defense articles or services. These requirements have resulted in two separate EUM programs: the Golden Sentry program, managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) and responsible for EUM of government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS); and the Blue Lantern program, managed by the Department of State (DoS) and responsible for EUM of arms sold via direct commercial sales (DCS).
Foreign Military Sales: Golden Sentry
EUM for government-to-government arms sales is managed by the Department of Defense through the Golden Sentry program, and take place in three stages: pre-transfer, during transfer, and post-transfer. Before a transfer, U.S. officials assess the recipient’s willingness and ability to protect U.S. technologies and abide by end-use regulations. During the transfer process, a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) that outlines the specifics of a FMS will also include stipulations for the recipient’s end-use obligations, including conditions on the transfer and security of U.S. arms. After delivery, Golden Sentry provides for two types of EUM: Routine EUM (REUM) and Enhanced EUM (EEUM). REUM is required for all defense articles and services provided through FMS and involves visits to partner nation security installations and inspections of U.S. arms and their storage, as well as basic information gathering at the embassy level and through other sources. EEUM, which is mandated for certain defense articles or munitions-controlled items, requires U.S. personnel to regularly assess the physical security of the storage facilities for the transferred articles, conduct regular, on-site inspections to ensure the physical security of storage facilities, and verify serial numbers of all EEUM-designated defense articles. These EUM measures emphasize the protection of proprietary U.S. defense technology and are almost always concerned with the unauthorized transfer of defense articles, rather than how those weapons, technologies, or services are used. Unfortunately, public reporting on Golden Sentry is scarcer than its State Department counterpart, making civic oversight and accountability more challenging.
3253. Vetting and custody cover part of the risk---the use half is unaddressed.
GAO 25 — U.S. Government Accountability Office. April 24. Congressional audit agency that reviews State and Defense arms transfer programs. GAO-25-107077, “Human Rights: State Can Improve Response to Allegations of Civilians Harmed by U.S. Arms Transfers,” https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107077 Clopus
The Departments of State and Defense (DOD) are the primary U.S. agencies responsible for managing the sale or transfer of U.S. defense articles, such as weapons and equipment. The transfer of these articles to other countries is governed by laws and policies, including human rights requirements. U.S. law generally prohibits assistance to any country where the government consistently violates internationally recognized human rights. In 2023, the Biden administration updated its arms transfer policy to place a greater emphasis on human rights and require U.S. agencies to conduct “appropriate monitoring” to ensure arms are used responsibly. In 2024, the Biden administration required State to obtain additional assurances from recipients that they will respect human rights obligations. State did not pause any arms transfers as a result of these updated policies.
Agency processes do not fully address the risk that recipients may use transferred U.S. defense articles to commit human rights abuses. Existing agency processes, such as vetting recipients and verifying custody of transferred defense articles, address aspects of this risk. Since 2023, State and DOD have also developed processes to respond to reports of civilian harm—including human rights abuses—involving U.S. defense articles. In response to a GAO recommendation, State developed a process called the Civilian Harm Incident Response Guidance, but it does not allow reports from non-U.S. government parties. For example, State received 617 civilian harm reports from August 2023 to December 2024. However, non-U.S. government parties such as the United Nations have identified thousands of civilian harm incidents resulting from the Israel-Hamas conflict alone. Incorporating external reports into its response process would give State a fuller picture of the scope of civilian harm incidents. Further, as of December 2024, State had not completed any investigations into reports it deemed credible. State officials said they needed additional resources to manage this workload. By developing and implementing a strategy to identify appropriate staffing and resources for the process, State could investigate the full scope of reported incidents in a more timely manner.
U.S. Defense Articles Delivered to Israel in October 2023
The United States is the world's largest provider of defense articles to other nations. State and DOD have jointly approved over $100 billion in transfers annually. Public reports have raised concerns that recipients may be using U.S. defense articles in activities that violate human rights.
3261. Congress handed the President this authority decades ago---the CP is the plan.
Stark 20 — Alexandra Stark. October 26. New America, “Managing U.S. Security Partnerships: A Toolkit for Congress---Part II: Arms Sales,” https://www.newamerica.org/insights/tools-congress-manage-us-security-partnerships/part-ii-arms-sales/ Clopus
Passed in 1976, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) gives the president the authority to regulate the export and import of defense articles and services. Executive Order 11958 delegated this authority to the State Department, which is the lead agency on arms sales regulation. 94
3272. ROLLBACK. The same designation flipped with each administration---executive posture doesn’t stick.
Amaize 25 — Ohimai Amaize. November 5. Nigerian journalist and senior editor for social media strategy and audience engagement at the Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council, “With Trump’s threats of military intervention in Nigeria, Tinubu faces a delicate balancing act,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-trumps-threats-of-military-intervention-in-nigeria-tinubu-faces-a-delicate-balancing-act/ Clopus
Being named a “Country of Particular Concern” is not merely symbolic. Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 ( IRFA ), it places a country in the category of states that have “engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” It can trigger diplomatic censure and, in some cases, targeted sanctions or aid restrictions, unless the president grants a waiver for national-security reasons.
Nigeria was first placed on the CPC list in 2020, during the first Trump administration, but was removed in 2021 by the Biden administration ahead of then Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Nigeria. The decision drew sharp criticism from the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), an independent body created by the IRFA. And last month, US Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) introduced a bill calling for the CPC designation and the imposition of sanctions on Nigeria, including measures against Nigerian officials who “implement or support blasphemy and Sharia laws.” The redesignation, therefore, represents a policy reversal and a warning that Washington expects progress on religious-freedom protections or further consequences may follow.
3283. WAIVER. The President can declare an emergency and ship without further delay.
Arabia and Davis 26 — Christina L. Arabia and Christopher M. Davis. May 13. Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade at CRS. Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process at CRS. Congressional Research Service RL31675, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31675 Clopus
The President has the authority to waive the AECA statutory review periods. For example, if the President states in the formal notification to Congress under AECA Sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), 36(d)(2) that "an emergency exists" which requires the sale (or export license approval) to be made immediately "in the national security interests of the United States," the President is free to proceed with the sale or license approval without further delay. The President must provide Congress at the time of this notification a "detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances" that necessitated his action and a "discussion of the national security interests involved." AECA Section 3(d)(2)(A) provides similar emergency authority with respect to retransfers of U.S.-origin major defense equipment, defense articles, or defense services.
Section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) authorizes the President to provide assistance under the FAA "when the President determines … that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States." The President may exercise this authority
without regard to any provision of assistance under this Act without regard to any provision of this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act.
The President must provide a written notification to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair that "to do so is important to the security interests of the United States."
3291. NOTWITHSTANDING. The FAA lets the President act without regard to the AECA---any provision.
Arabia and Davis 26 — Christina L. Arabia and Christopher M. Davis. May 13. Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade at CRS. Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process at CRS. Congressional Research Service RL31675, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31675 Clopus
Section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) authorizes the President to provide assistance under the FAA "when the President determines … that to do so is important to the security interests of the United States." The President may exercise this authority
without regard to any provision of assistance under this Act without regard to any provision of this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act.
The President must provide a written notification to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair that "to do so is important to the security interests of the United States."
3302. Presidents face no electoral cost for arms deals---interpretation bends toward promotion.
Erickson 23 — Jennifer L. Erickson. Associate professor of political science and international studies at Boston College. Global Policy 14(1), “Demystifying the ‘gold standard’ of arms export controls: US arms exports to conflict zones,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13181 Clopus Wiley blocks a direct fetch; the paragraphs used were spot-verified word-for-word against the publisher’s own PDF
Informal political constraints are also minimal. With the exception of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia in 2019 criticised due to the Yemen war and the Jamal Khashoggi murder, the US public has paid little attention to the issue over time. In recent years, moreover, the United States has been reducing its arms export reporting and data availability, making it more difficult for the public, media and researchers to track US arms flows, evaluate their impact or hold policymakers accountable to their export decisions (Echols, 2022). Presidents are therefore extremely unlikely to face electoral backlash for arms deals that might be viewed as going against US interests or values (Erickson, 2015a). Members of Congress, too, face few incentives to initiate or support legislation to block proposed deals. This means that presidential administrations have not only considerable legal authority over arms export decision-making but also considerable flexibility in the interpretation of US rules and whether they privilege arms export promotion or restraint.
3313. THEIR OWN REGS. Embargo authority runs through regulations the executive writes---and rewrites.
CRS 25 — Congressional Research Service. July 23. Nonpartisan legislative research agency serving Congress. CRS In Focus IF11197, “U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11197 Clopus
The United States can impose an arms embargo on a foreign government based on human rights considerations. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations reflect the executive branch's implementation of statutory provisions related to the export of defense articles, including those related to arms embargoes. In addition, the U.N. Security Council may apply an arms embargo against a country for human rights reasons; Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287c) authorizes the President to implement such sanctions.
3321. NIGERIA-SPECIFIC. Washington blocked, then sold---twice, on the same rights record.
Martin 22 — Guy Martin. April 19. Aerospace and defence journalist for defenceWeb. defenceWeb, “US approves possible AH-1Z Viper sale to Nigeria,” https://defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/us-approves-possible-ah-1z-viper-sale-to-nigeria/ Clopus
The United States has approved a possible sale of 12 Bell AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters to Nigeria in a deal that could be worth nearly a billion dollars if it goes ahead.
The US Department of Defence on 14 April announced that the State Department had approved the possible Foreign Military Sale and notified Congress of the $997 million deal, which also includes 28 T-700 GE 401C engines, and 2 000 Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) guidance sections.
Other equipment included in the proposed sale includes M197 20 mm guns, sighting systems, night vision equipment, technical and logistics support. No Hellfire missiles were mentioned, and it is not clear which branch of service would operate the aircraft.
“$25 million of case funds will be allocated for institutional and technical assistance to the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) to continue Air Ground Integration (AGI) programme, which includes developing targeting processes that are legally compliant with International Humanitarian Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict; and other related elements of logistics and program support,” the Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) stated.
“The proposed sale will better equip Nigeria to contribute to shared security objectives, promote regional stability and build interoperability with the US and other Western partners. This sale will be a major contribution to US and Nigerian security goals,” the DSCA added.
Nigeria has for some time shown interest in acquiring AH-1Z helicopters, but the deal was put on hold over concerns about possible human rights abuses by the Nigerian government. In July last year it emerged that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had placed a hold on the proposed sale.
Nigeria’s military has been upgrading its capabilities in the wake of domestic terrorism and rising armed robberies and kidnappings for ransom – earlier this month, hundreds of people were abducted from trains and held for ransom.
Nigeria has had a sometimes rocky road in acquiring military hardware from the United States. In 2014, the United States blocked any sale by Israel of surplus American-made weapon systems to Nigeria, nixing the proposed sale of ex-Israeli AH-1 Cobras after citing human rights concerns, saying Nigeria was not doing enough to avoid civilian casualties in the fight against Boko Haram. In 2014 the Nigerian Air Force expressed interest in acquiring a dozen Scorpion jets from Textron AirLand to fight Boko Haram insurgents, but nothing came of this.
Under former President Barack Obama’s administration, arms sales to Nigeria were cut back, but when Donald Trump assumed power in 2016, his administration agreed to sell Nigeria 12 A-29 Super Tucano turboprops manufactured in the United States by Sierra Nevada Corporation, and these were delivered last year. They have been used to combat terrorists.
3332. CONGRESS AGREES. Bills exist only because executive designations get reversed by the next administration.
Warner 25 — Lesley Anne Warner. November 14. PhD, visiting scholar with the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previously a U.S. government official at USAID, the State Department and a House Foreign Affairs Committee staffer. Just Security, “The Political Theater Behind Trump’s ‘Guns-a-Blazing’ Nigeria Threat,” https://www.justsecurity.org/124725/trump-nigeria-military-threat/ Clopus
The narrative that Christians are being systematically targeted in Nigeria has been a fixture of U.S. domestic politics for over two decades, beginning when USCIRF first placed Nigeria on its Watch List in 2002. This issue remains deeply important to the electoral coalition that twice delivered the White House to President Trump, who won support from nearly two-thirds of Protestant voters and 55 percent of Catholics in 2024. The first Trump administration designated Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern in December 2020, which was then reversed by the Biden administration in 2021.
Although the issue had been relatively peripheral to mainstream U.S.-Africa policy, years of sustained congressional focus has included advocacy by Republican Representative Chris Smith of New Jersey (the current chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa) and by former Republican members of Congress including Frank Wolf and Jim Moran , both of Virginia. Meanwhile in Nigeria, select church leaders have leaned into the narrative that Christians are being targeted on the basis of their religion, while many Nigerian legislators have actively resisted this framing, emphasizing that violence affects both Christians and Muslims without sectarian distinction.
Senator Ted Cruz, the Texas Republican chairing the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, introduced the Nigeria Religious Freedom Accountability Act of 2025 (S.2747) in September, which has a companion bill (H.R.5808) in the House of Representatives introduced by Representative Marlin Stutzman (R-IN) in October. Both bills would require the secretary of state to designate Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern (now done, as noted above, without the legislation – see below) and to designate Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa as Entities of Particular Concern. The bills also would require the president to impose targeted sanctions under Executive Order 13818 on Nigerian officials who have “enforced blasphemy laws, including through prosecution, conviction, imprisonment, or other deprivation of liberty of individuals pursuant to such laws.”
Both S.2747 and H.R.5808 would codify the CPC designation in law, preventing future administrations from reversing it without congressional action. However, neither has cosponsors, indicating they function primarily as messaging to domestic constituencies and to garner favor with Trump rather than as serious legislative vehicles that have a chance at making it to his desk. Both bills face uncertain prospects and would require additional cosponsors and prioritization by committee chairs before advancing to committee action and then to floor votes. Two additional measures more recently introduced by Smith ( H.Res.860 ) and Rep. Riley Moore (R-WV) ( H.Res.866 ) in early November commend the president for redesignating Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern and, as resolutions rather than bills, are also symbolic measures that have no legal impact.
3343. One administration built the civilian-harm machinery---the next shut it down.
Hassan 25 — Taiwo Hassan. October 1. Nigerian freelance journalist and activist. Responsible Statecraft, “US arming Nigeria is becoming a crime against humanity,” https://responsiblestatecraft.org/nigeria-arms-sale/ Clopus
But while all U.S. administrations have ultimately prioritized America’s global military primacy over any other concerns, Trump has gone much further than most by cutting staffing and shuttering programs in the Pentagon that previously helped put human rights and civilian harms mitigation at the heart of U.S. security assistance. The net result is that today, Washington is less able to guarantee the appropriate use of U.S.-origin weapons, thus increasing the risk of abuse.
3351. NEVER ONCE. The disapproval route has never stopped a sale---it moves timing, not outcomes.
Arabia and Davis 26 — Christina L. Arabia and Christopher M. Davis. May 13. Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade at CRS. Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process at CRS. Congressional Research Service RL31675, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31675 Clopus
The AECA contains procedures for congressional joint resolutions of disapproval concerning notified FMS and DCS transactions. 21 Section 36(b)(1) of the AECA prohibits the U.S. government from issuing an LOA if Congress "enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed sale." AECA Section 36(c)(2) prohibits the U.S. government from issuing an export license for a DCS transaction if Congress "enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed export." As noted, the President must notify the Speaker of the House, as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, of potential FMS and DCS transactions subject to congressional review. The AECA does not require that a companion measure be introduced in either chamber.
Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale via a joint resolution of disapproval. Nevertheless, Congress has, by expressing strong opposition to prospective arms sales, during consultations with the executive branch, affected the timing and the composition of some arms sales, and may have dissuaded the President from formally proposing certain arms sales (see " AECA Resolutions of Disapproval: Selected Examples ").
3362. THRESHOLD. Review only bites at two-thirds of both chambers---that is the whole story.
Stark 20 — Alexandra Stark. October 26. New America, “Managing U.S. Security Partnerships: A Toolkit for Congress---Part II: Arms Sales,” https://www.newamerica.org/insights/tools-congress-manage-us-security-partnerships/part-ii-arms-sales/ Clopus
The successful passage of a joint resolution of disapproval requires the support of two-thirds of both chambers in order to override the expected presidential veto. While this is a high barrier to passage—indeed, Congress has never successfully blocked a sale via a joint resolution of disapproval—legislation to block an arms sale gets a privileged vote. 108 Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed sale through a joint resolution. 109