3373. NO FLOOR. Committees bury them, both chambers almost never vote, and none has blocked a sale.
Plagakis 24 — Sofia Plagakis. December 20. Research librarian at the Congressional Research Service. Congressional Research Service R47094, “Fact Sheet: Joint Resolutions of Disapproval Under the Arms Export Control Act,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47094 Clopus
CRS has identified 171 concurrent resolutions and 127 joint resolutions of disapproval (JRDs) that have been introduced since Congress amended the FMSA in 1974. Among the 298 concurrent and joint resolutions: 269 related to FMS, citing Section 36(b) of the AECA, and 27 applied to DCS, citing Section 36(c). Six JRDs referred to commercial technical assistance or manufacturing licensing agreements (Section 36(d) of the AECA); however only two of those six resolutions reference Section 36(d) of the AECA without also referencing Sections 36(b) or (c). 8
In the tables below, resolutions in italics concerned Direct Commercial Sales; resolutions in bold concerned commercial technical assistance or manufacturing licensing agreements, referencing Section 36(d) only; all others concerned Foreign Military Sales. CRS used Congress.gov to build the list of the concurrent resolutions and JRDs. There may be inadvertent omissions.
As seen in Table 1 , all of the concurrent resolutions were referred to their respective committees; however, only three were released by their committees. Only one of the concurrent resolutions received a floor vote by both chambers—H.Con.Res. 194, which objected to President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, Sidewinder missiles, and Boeing 707 refueling aircraft. The House agreed to the resolution by a yea-nay vote of 301-111, but the Senate rejected the measure by a yea-nay vote of 48-52. The Senate indefinitely postponed its companion measure, S.Con.Res. 37, by voice vote on November 5, 1981. The Senate introduced numerous concurrent resolutions of disapproval in 1976, but none were passed by either chamber. 9
As seen in Table 2 , only one joint resolution became public law—S.J.Res. 228, A Joint Resolution Relating to the Proposed Sales of Arms to Jordan (P.L. 99-162). Although the public law led President Reagan to postpone a major arms sale to Jordan at least until early 1986,
3381. CANNOT. A veto-proof margin is an impossible threshold---both chambers have voted and still lost.
Erickson 23 — Jennifer L. Erickson. Associate professor of political science and international studies at Boston College. Global Policy 14(1), “Demystifying the ‘gold standard’ of arms export controls: US arms exports to conflict zones,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.13181 Clopus Wiley blocks a direct fetch; the paragraphs used were spot-verified word-for-word against the publisher’s own PDF
Second, Congress does not—and likely cannot—serve as a meaningful check on executive decision-making. Indeed, to date, Congress has ‘never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale by use of a joint resolution of disapproval’ (Kerr, 2021). For Congress to pass legislation to block or amend a deal, it must do so by veto-proof margins. While a simple majority would send the bill to the president's desk for signature, the president—whose office would have already approved or even spearheaded the deal—would certainly veto it. But, so far, a two-thirds veto-proof majority has proved an impossible threshold. Only twice has Congress achieved even a simple majority on such legislation. In 1986 and 2019, Congress did vote to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia but could not override the presidential veto.3 In fact, Congress rarely even debates proposed sales, which tend to enjoy support rather than provoke controversy. Given the close partisan divides of contemporary Congressional politics, passing veto-proof legislation either to block sales or to reform the existing system seems unlikely any time soon.
Informal political constraints are also minimal. With the exception of proposed sales to Saudi Arabia in 2019 criticised due to the Yemen war and the Jamal Khashoggi murder, the US public has paid little attention to the issue over time. In recent years, moreover, the United States has been reducing its arms export reporting and data availability, making it more difficult for the public, media and researchers to track US arms flows, evaluate their impact or hold policymakers accountable to their export decisions (Echols, 2022). Presidents are therefore extremely unlikely to face electoral backlash for arms deals that might be viewed as going against US interests or values (Erickson, 2015a). Members of Congress, too, face few incentives to initiate or support legislation to block proposed deals. This means that presidential administrations have not only considerable legal authority over arms export decision-making but also considerable flexibility in the interpretation of US rules and whether they privilege arms export promotion or restraint.
3392. BYPASS. An emergency determination moots the review period entirely.
Arabia and Davis 26 — Christina L. Arabia and Christopher M. Davis. May 13. Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade at CRS. Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process at CRS. Congressional Research Service RL31675, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31675 Clopus
The President has the authority to waive the AECA statutory review periods. For example, if the President states in the formal notification to Congress under AECA Sections 36(b)(1), 36(c)(2), 36(d)(2) that "an emergency exists" which requires the sale (or export license approval) to be made immediately "in the national security interests of the United States," the President is free to proceed with the sale or license approval without further delay. The President must provide Congress at the time of this notification a "detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances" that necessitated his action and a "discussion of the national security interests involved." AECA Section 3(d)(2)(A) provides similar emergency authority with respect to retransfers of U.S.-origin major defense equipment, defense articles, or defense services.
3403. PAPER RECORD. Fifty years of disapproval resolutions produced one public law---and it bought a postponement.
Plagakis 24 — Sofia Plagakis. December 20. Research librarian at the Congressional Research Service. Congressional Research Service R47094, “Fact Sheet: Joint Resolutions of Disapproval Under the Arms Export Control Act,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47094 Clopus
CRS has identified 171 concurrent resolutions and 127 joint resolutions of disapproval (JRDs) that have been introduced since Congress amended the FMSA in 1974. Among the 298 concurrent and joint resolutions: 269 related to FMS, citing Section 36(b) of the AECA, and 27 applied to DCS, citing Section 36(c). Six JRDs referred to commercial technical assistance or manufacturing licensing agreements (Section 36(d) of the AECA); however only two of those six resolutions reference Section 36(d) of the AECA without also referencing Sections 36(b) or (c). 8
In the tables below, resolutions in italics concerned Direct Commercial Sales; resolutions in bold concerned commercial technical assistance or manufacturing licensing agreements, referencing Section 36(d) only; all others concerned Foreign Military Sales. CRS used Congress.gov to build the list of the concurrent resolutions and JRDs. There may be inadvertent omissions.
As seen in Table 1 , all of the concurrent resolutions were referred to their respective committees; however, only three were released by their committees. Only one of the concurrent resolutions received a floor vote by both chambers—H.Con.Res. 194, which objected to President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, Sidewinder missiles, and Boeing 707 refueling aircraft. The House agreed to the resolution by a yea-nay vote of 301-111, but the Senate rejected the measure by a yea-nay vote of 48-52. The Senate indefinitely postponed its companion measure, S.Con.Res. 37, by voice vote on November 5, 1981. The Senate introduced numerous concurrent resolutions of disapproval in 1976, but none were passed by either chamber. 9
As seen in Table 2 , only one joint resolution became public law—S.J.Res. 228, A Joint Resolution Relating to the Proposed Sales of Arms to Jordan (P.L. 99-162). Although the public law led President Reagan to postpone a major arms sale to Jordan at least until early 1986,
3411. NOT PRECLUDED. The Department can proceed over a congressional hold---the hold has no legal force.
Arabia and Davis 26 — Christina L. Arabia and Christopher M. Davis. May 13. Analyst in Security Assistance, Security Cooperation and the Global Arms Trade at CRS. Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process at CRS. Congressional Research Service RL31675, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL31675 Clopus
The State Department "generally will not formally notify an arms transfer if a Member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal review stage," the Inspector General report states, noting that "the Department is not precluded from proceeding with an arms transfer subject to a congressional hold." 7
3422. BLOW IT. The administration triggers notification anyway---despite the objection.
Stark 20 — Alexandra Stark. October 26. New America, “Managing U.S. Security Partnerships: A Toolkit for Congress---Part II: Arms Sales,” https://www.newamerica.org/insights/tools-congress-manage-us-security-partnerships/part-ii-arms-sales/ Clopus
When the chairs and ranking members of both committees have received this informal notification, their staff review the sale, and may ask for briefings from the State Department, try to get reassurances from the State Department and recipient country about how arms may be used, and/or add conditions or restrictions to a contract. At the end of this process, each of the four offices may decide to “clear” the State Department to move forward on the formal notification process of the sale, or place a “hold.” Placing a “hold” means that the office does not clear the sale and that issues may therefore come up during the formal notification process; however, these holds are a courtesy, so the administration has the legal authority to “blow” a hold, meaning they trigger the formal notification process anyway despite Congress’ objections.
3433. The Nigeria hold delayed the helicopters---procurement is underway.
Ewang 25 — Anietie Ewang. August 19. Researcher in the Africa Division at Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
3441. SEQUENCE. Governance money can't start until people come home---and the strikes stop that.
Brechenmacher 19 — Saskia Brechenmacher. May 3. Fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/05/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram Clopus
Community stabilization programs rest on the assumption that communities are, in fact, to some degree stable, rather than experiencing temporary displacement or being at high risk of renewed displacement. Yet in northeastern Nigeria, and particularly in Borno State, ongoing insecurity has repeatedly delayed the return of displaced communities and triggered new population movements. As of October 2018, over 2 million individuals remain displaced, a number that has once again increased over the past year. 56 Ongoing military operations around Lake Chad continue to force more people to leave their homes and drive others into secondary displacement, particularly due to the Nigerian military’s ongoing practice of clearing rural villages by pushing civilians into IDP camps in nearby towns. Some refugees that had fled to Cameroon have been forced to return to Nigeria, further adding to the complexity of the situation.
This fluidity has disrupted any linear pathway from conflict to stabilization to early recovery in many areas. Reviews of stabilization assistance in other conflicts indicate that such programs are usually most successful in places where residents can count on basic levels of physical security and nonpredatory security provision. 57 The worst-affected parts of Borno State still do not meet these criteria. While security forces retook control of most LGA headquarters in 2015, they have struggled to hold on to the surrounding rural areas. Repeated attacks and suicide bombings have led the already thinly spread armed forces to prioritize securing urban centers, leaving rural communities and smaller towns with limited protection. 58 International organizations estimate that around 800,000 people are still stuck in areas in northern Borno that are beyond the reach of humanitarian assistance, with little information available about their profile and needs. 59 Even urban areas have not been fully secured: in the lead-up to the 2019 elections, militants launched a new spate of attacks on several northeastern towns, forcing more residents to flee. 60
As a result, most local-level stabilization efforts have centered on more secure areas, such as Maiduguri, Mafa LGA, and Biu LGA in Borno and parts of Adamawa and Yobe States. Aid organizations have had to choose their target areas based on where they have access rather than on conflict dynamics. 61 Programs intended to cover all of Borno State have been restricted to those local government areas where fewer people have been displaced or more have already returned. “Everything hinges on security, as all of our work requires access,” notes one UNDP official charged with implementing an integrated community stabilization program. “Our first question is: is the community accessible? Second, have people returned? If so, how many? Is the situation stable? Only once the number is sizable and the situation has become more stable can you start thinking about stabilization and governance.” In some cases, governance-focused programs have been delayed because the target community has not yet fully returned or remains in precarious living situations, which makes it difficult to start programming on citizen-state relations and service delivery. 62 Instead, interventions remain more short-term and relief-oriented, focused on addressing immediate local needs. Some donors have relied on local partner organizations and informants to reach more remote communities and carry out smaller-scale, flexible interventions. Yet even these activities depend on the Nigerian military ensuring access to key roads, and often pose significant risks to local staff. 63
3452. MONEY ISN'T THE CONSTRAINT. Aid's already flowing---the state is what fails, and the CP can't buy one.
Alesin 4-27 — Philip Alesin. Policy and advocacy professional; PhD thesis on how state dysfunction shapes humanitarian effectiveness in complex emergencies. The New Humanitarian, “To deliver a better humanitarian response, we need to fix Nigeria’s state dysfunction,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2026/04/27/deliver-better-humanitarian-response-fix-nigeria-state-dysfunction Clopus
The humanitarian crisis in northeast Nigeria is often described in the familiar shorthand of protracted conflict, mass displacement, chronic food insecurity. But this obscures a deeper truth; one that explains why, despite billions of dollars in aid, the situation continues to deteriorate.
Northeast Nigeria is not just a long‑running emergency. It is a complex crisis inside a dysfunctional state, where humanitarian outcomes are shaped as much by failures – of governance, security, infrastructure, and socioeconomic systems – as by the violence of Boko Haram and its jihadist cousin, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
And because the humanitarian system is unable to insulate itself from the surrounding dysfunction, these weaknesses seep into every layer of the response. The result is a crisis that is both predictable and persistently unmanageable.
A humanitarian system stretched to breaking point
In 2025, 7.8 million people in conflict-affected Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) states required assistance, including 1.8 million displaced people and 1.4 million returnees. By 2026, 5.9 million were assessed to be in severe to extreme need, with 5.8 million projected to face acute food insecurity during the May-October lean season – up from 4.6 million the year before.
Yet global attention has drifted, funding has fallen, media coverage has dwindled, and the crisis has slipped from political agendas – even as the indicators worsen.
Last year saw renewed jihadist attacks in Borno and areas of Yobe – part of a wider Sahelian trend . The violence monitoring group ACLED recorded 3,897 conflict‑related deaths in Borno alone. Aid convoys were being ambushed, farmers killed in their fields, and communities repeatedly displaced.
The World Food Programme warned in late 2025 that rising insecurity was driving a “ sharp spike in hunger ”. Nigeria in 2026 has the world’s highest projected number of acutely food‑insecure people – nearly 35 million citizens.
There have been additional crises. Floods in 2024 and 2025 destroyed homes and farmland. The collapse of the Alau Dam displaced 400,000 people in Maiduguri alone. Cholera outbreaks followed, with over 14,000 suspected cases nationwide by late 2025, including thousands across the northeast, further compounding the region’s humanitarian emergency.
UNICEF, the UN children’s agency, warned last year that 400,000 severely malnourished children across the northeast and northwest were not receiving treatment and were at imminent risk. Only emergency donor mobilisation prevented disaster.
This is a crisis accelerating rather than stabilising.
A troubled state at the core of the crisis
Humanitarian narratives often focus on the conflict, displacement, and funding gaps. But these are symptoms, not causes. The deeper problem is that the northeast is embedded in a dysfunctional state system whose weaknesses predate the insurgency and shape every aspect of the response.
Four pillars of dysfunction – governance, security, infrastructure, and socioeconomic fragility – continue to drive suffering and systematically undermine humanitarian effectiveness.
Governance failures
From the inception of the humanitarian response, weak institutions, blurred mandates, unreliable data and chronic corruption defined the operating environment – undermining the aid system’s effectiveness.
The absence, for example, of a coherent displacement management framework makes coordination difficult, responsibilities overlap, and people fall through the cracks.
As the administrative capacity of the Nigerian state is weak, it pushes humanitarian agencies into basic government roles such as providing primary healthcare. At the same time, bureaucratic delays slow the customs clearance of lifesaving supplies, and fragile supply chains falter.
Meanwhile corruption – the greatest albatross of the Nigerian state – drains resources, erodes trust, and deprives those in need of assistance.
3463. SUBTRACTS. Every strike burns the legitimacy the CP is buying---net zero, at best.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The study acknowledges that the Nigeria Air Force (NAF) airstrikes targeting Boko Haram, ISWAP, Ansaru, Lakurawa, and bandits have unintentionally harmed civilians and damaged their properties, leading to an erosion of public trust in the military and increased instability. While the military claimed that civilian casualties from NAF airstrikes were accidental, the frequency and recurrence of these incidents raised critical concerns about potential intelligence and operational lapses, contrary to the military's stance. The military has faced criticism for its heavy-handed kinetic approaches, often involving seemingly indiscriminate bombing and shelling in populated civilian areas.
Although NAF's airstrikes have been a significant component of the Joint Task Force military strategy since the beginning of Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign in mid-2011, these air campaigns targeting insurgents have been plagued by errors that have frequently led to civilian casualties. The study shows that in the past 10 years, 450 civilians in 18 communities in northern Nigeria have been killed by accidental airstrikes. Even as IHL and human rights laws provide protection for civilians during armed conflicts, the Nigerian military frequently deny culpability and display a lack of transparency in investigating civilian harm. This lack of accountability is exacerbated by the lack of compensation for victims. These issues continue to undermine efforts to reduce airstrike mishaps and improve operational effectiveness. By focusing on the root causes, such as intelligence and operational lapses, instead of merely labelling incidents as accidents, the military can make significant strides in addressing the challenges.
3474. THE WAR IS EXPANDING. Washington isn't watching this campaign, it's flying it.
Ngulde 6-8 — Adamu Aliyu Ngulde. June 8. Maiduguri-based reporter for Drop Site News covering the Lake Chad conflict. Drop Site News, “U.S.-Nigerian Strikes Killed Dozens of Civilians, Villagers Say,” https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/united-states-nigeria-iswap-borno-strikes-civilian-casualties Clopus
MAIDUGURI, Nigeria—On the evening of May 16, the village of Metele in Nigeria’s Borno state was hit by a series of airstrikes carried out in coordination between the U.S. and Nigerian militaries.
“Children were playing, women were preparing meals, and there was nothing to suggest that anything unusual was about to happen,” recalled Goni Ahmed, a local resident who directly witnessed the strikes. He described a scene in which village life was suddenly destroyed by the attack. “First, we heard aircraft overhead. Shortly afterward, there were loud explosions that shook the ground. After the blasts, I could hear people shouting, crying, and calling for assistance. The sounds of panic and confusion continued for quite some time.”
Panic enveloped Metele and villagers fled their homes, not knowing if further strikes would take place. “Many people in the community still remember those days as some of the most difficult we have experienced,” Ahmed recalled.
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Ali Zagina lost four relatives in the strike, and his house was destroyed. “We are in great pain, a pain I believe we will never forget,” Zagina said. “As a resident of Metele this is one of the saddest days of my life.” Zagina, his wife and his four children are now renting a home in the Gomari neighborhood of Maiduguri. “I could not recognize my house or many parts of the community because almost the entire area had been reduced to ashes,” he told Drop Site News.
The strikes were part of an expanding war between the Nigerian government and local Islamist groups which has drawn the increased involvement of the Trump administration, with little scrutiny. Metele, a remote community in northern Borno State near the Nigeria-Niger border, has long been affected by insurgent activities. Security sources and local residents have frequently identified the area and its surroundings as locations where fighters affiliated with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) operate.
In the days immediately after the bombing of Metele, U.S-Africa Command (AFRICOM) announced strikes across northeastern Nigeria, allegedly killing huge numbers of ISWAP fighters, claiming in a statement posted online that, “In coordination with the Nigerian Armed Forces our #counterterrorism efforts from May 16-18, 2026, eliminated more than 175 ISIS terrorists in Northeastern Nigeria.”
Trump claimed they had killed Abu Bilal al-Minuki, a global commander in the Islamic State, as well as a number of other senior leaders of the group. The Islamic State has not confirmed these or other killings; Nigeria previously claimed in 2024 to have killed al-Minuki. In a post on Truth Social the President described the strikes as “flawlessly executed” and called al-Minuki “the most active terrorist in the world.”
The Nigerian Army echoed these statements, calling it a “landmark joint counter-terrorism operation of historic significance.” The army said the raid in Metele was a “complex precision air-land operation” that killed other “terrorist commanders.”
Yet villagers in Metele said that the attacks hit residential areas and killed innocent people. “The community experienced a tragic airstrike attack recently which caused heavy casualties and destruction in Metele,” Zannah Abba Aji, the village head of Metele told Drop Site News. He was in Maiduguri, the state capital, when the strikes took place. “Many innocent civilians were affected during the incident,” he said.
In the aftermath of the attack, Aji gathered a list of 27 people that he said were civilians that were killed in the attack. The list, which he shared with Drop Site, included 12 women and children.
Other villagers who were injured in the bombings were sent by truck south to Maiduguri for treatment. In an interview, Dr. Adam Asil Tijjani, who works at the University of Maiduguri Teaching Hospital, confirmed that several noncombatants had been killed in the strikes, telling Drop Site that two women and four children received in the aftermath of the bombings had died from their injuries there. Tijjani said that the hospital was overwhelmed with patients with burns, fractures, shrapnel wounds, and trauma-related injuries—forcing them to route some of the casualties to another facility called the State Specialist Hospital. “We received many patients within a short period,” he said.
Neither AFRICOM nor the Nigerian army responded to a request for comment on the civilian deaths.
Civilian Toll
Nigeria has been at war for several years with ISWAP—an off-shoot of the insurgent army Boko Haram, which has also been fighting the Nigerian government since 2009. In addition to battling the government, ISWAP and Boko Haram have viciously fought each other across the Lake Chad Basin which spans West and Central Africa.
3481. ALREADY IN THE PACKAGE. Targeting and human-rights training came with the aircraft.
US Mission Nigeria 21 — U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria. August 31. Official release of the United States diplomatic mission to Nigeria, quoting the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa. U.S. Mission Nigeria, “U.S.-made A-29 Super Tucano Aircraft Officially Inducted into Nigerian Air Force,” https://ng.usembassy.gov/u-s-made-a-29-super-tucano-aircraft-officially-inducted-into-nigerian-air-force/ Clopus
The Super Tucanos were the impetus for significant deepening of training and professional relationships, he added. Precision targeting, air-to-ground integration, and human rights training are all included in the partnership between the U.S. and Nigeria. The aircraft will assist the Nigerian Air Force in their fight against violent extremist organizations including the Islamic State West Africa Province. The joint structure of air-to-ground integration also supports Nigerian Army and Navy operations.
Nigeria purchased the A-29s through the Foreign Military Sales program, which follows the Department of Defense’s “Total Package Approach” model and includes spare parts for several years of operation, contract logistics support, munitions, and a multi-year construction project to improve Kainji Air Base infrastructure. The total sale is valued at almost $500 million, making it the largest FMS program in sub-Saharan Africa.
3492. IT'S BEEN TRIED. The plan and the board exist---a market still got bombed this spring.
Shibayan and Umar 4-12 — Dyepkazah Shibayan and Haruna Umar. April 12. Associated Press correspondents in Nigeria. Associated Press, “At least 100 dead in Nigeria after air force ‘misfire’ on market, sources say,” https://apnews.com/article/nigeria-airstrike-northeast-market-9da7e31dd8db3cec17e676e53f8b59cf Clopus
MAIDUGURI, Nigeria (AP) — A Nigerian Air Force strike targeting jihadi rebels hit a local market in northeastern Nigeria , killing over 100 civilians including children and injuring many others, a rights group and local media reported on Sunday. Officials confirmed a misfire without providing details.
Amnesty International cited survivors as saying that at least 100 people were killed in the airstrike on Saturday on a village in Yobe state, near the border with Borno state, which is the epicenter of the jihadi insurgency that has ravaged the region for over a decade.
“We have their pictures and they include children,” Isa Sanusi, Amnesty International's Nigeria director, told The Associated Press, referring to the casualties.
“We are in touch with people that are there, we spoke with the hospital,” he said. “We spoke with the person in charge of casualties, and we spoke with the victims.”
A worker at the Geidam General hospital, in Yobe, said at least 23 people injured in the incident were receiving treatment. The worker spoke anonymously as he was not authorized to speak to the media.
Such misfires are common in Nigeria, where the military often conducts air raids to battle armed groups who control vast forest enclaves. At least 500 civilians have died since 2017 in such misfires, according to an AP tally of reported deaths. Security analysts point to loopholes in intelligence gathering as well as insufficient coordination between ground troops, air assets and stakeholders.
The large, remote market located near the Borno-Yobe border is known to be often used by Boko Haram jihadis to buy food supplies.
Abdulmumin Bulama, a member of a civilian security group working with the Nigerian military in the northeast, said there was intelligence that Boko Haram terrorists had gathered very close to the market and were planning an attack on nearby communities.
“The intel was shared and the Air Force jet acted based on the credible information,” Bulama said.
The Yobe State Government confirmed in a statement that a Nigerian military strike was targeting a stronghold of the Boko Haram jihadi group in the area and that “some people … who went to the Jilli weekly market were affected.”
The Yobe State Emergency Management Agency also acknowledged that an incident had occurred resulting in “casualties affecting some marketers” and said it had dispatched response teams to the area.
Nigeria's military issued a statement saying it conducted a successful strike on a “terrorist enclave and logistics hub” belonging to jihadis in the area, killing scores of them as they rode on motorcycles. It did not provide any detail about a possible misfire, but noted that motorcycles remain prohibited in conflict hot spots and “any such movements in restricted areas are therefore treated with the utmost seriousness.”
Amnesty International has called for an independent investigation into the incident, adding that the military is “fond of” labeling civilian casualties as bandits
3503. WRONG DIAGNOSIS. The failure is corruption, patronage and rival agencies---no course fixes that.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
In the literature, two main factors have been linked to airstrike accidents: intelligence deficiencies and military errors. Writing in 2014, Onuoha attributes mistakes to excessive reliance on inadequate reconnaissance and the poor fusion of human intelligence (HUMINT) with technical data. More recently, Campbell (Citation2021) highlights contributory factors to the mishaps that include flawed intelligence, technical inaccuracies, and the challenge of differentiating between combatants and non-combatants in complex conflict environments.
An effective counterinsurgency operation requires tactical intelligence that offers actionable insights to improve decision-making and operational efficiency. Tactical intelligence is real-time, local information critical for planning and executing military and security activities, and its evolution in Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts dates to the Boko Haram insurgency, which began in late 2000s. According to Campbell (Citation2021), the initial shortcomings in intelligence gathering facilitated Boko Haram's rise. While the initial rise of Boko Haram can be linked to poor military intelligence, reforms, including the establishment of specialised military intelligence units and participation in international intelligence-sharing initiatives, have gradually improved Nigeria’s tactical intelligence capabilities (Campbell, Citation2021). The initial inability to collect and analyse timely intelligence that had limited military operations seem to have eased with the establishment of a specialised JTF intelligence unit and the collaborations with neighbouring countries.
To this end, Aghedo and Osumah (Citation2015) maintained that accurate intelligence enabled Nigerian forces to reclaim territories such as those in the Sambisa Forest, utilising surveillance drones and HUMINT to locate insurgent hideouts and plan precise strikes. The Nigeria Ministry of Defense (Citation2019) highlights successes where timely intelligence disrupted insurgent supply chains and facilitated the recovery of key territories during OPLD. Onuoha (Citation2014) noted the importance of intelligence in force protection, citing its role in anticipating ambushes and mitigating IED threats, which has helped reduce casualties in conflict zones. Integrating local populations into intelligence efforts yields crucial HUMINT for civilians and the military despite challenges like mistrust and fear of insurgent reprisals (Fatile & Adejuwon, Citation2018). Collaborative efforts, such as those by the MNJTF, have significantly enhanced intelligence capabilities through shared resources and joint operations, with Walker (Citation2020) emphasising the positive impact of regional cooperation.
Nonetheless, Nigeria faces significant barriers to practical and tactical intelligence. Ikelegbe and Umukoro (Citation2016) point to technological deficiencies, such as limited access to satellite imagery and real-time communication systems, which impair intelligence accuracy and responsiveness. Ochonu (Citation2020) documents difficulties in HUMINT acquisition, including community distrust, insurgent intimidation, and the complexity of Nigeria's diverse cultural landscape. Inter-agency rivalry among the military, DSS, and police exacerbates inefficiencies in intelligence processing, according to Alli (Citation2019), reducing its tactical utility. Meanwhile, insurgent groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP have adapted with counterintelligence tactics, such as misinformation and encrypted communication, often outpacing government responses (Ewi & Salifu, Citation2017).
More broadly, the Nigerian military faces technical challenges in logistics, intelligence, and command, which limit its capacity to maintain control over counterinsurgency operations (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 15). Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign has exhibited significant command and intelligence failures, attributed to technical and operational issues, including corruption within the military hierarchy (Okoli et al., Citation2024). Also, funds intended for counterinsurgency logistics are sometimes mismanaged, creating operational deficits due to a patronage system that exists within the military and the possibility of double agents and saboteurs compromising tactical intelligence (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 15). These factors, in addition to a lack of cooperation with local communities, limit the efficiency of counterinsurgency operations.
In addition to intelligence deficiencies, the Nigerian military has faced strong criticism for frequently employing indiscriminate bombing and shelling in densely populated areas, resulting in serious civilian harm (Amnesty International, Citation2018). Counterinsurgency operations have been marred by errors that have caused significant civilian casualties, stemming from indiscriminate use of force, inadequate training and discipline, and strained civil–military relations. The emergence of drones as an integral aspect of military airpower has transformed modern warfare. While drone-fired airstrikes are intended to hit targets with high precision, some have missed, causing civilian or other unintended damages, highlighting the human cost of modern warfare (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 6), The timeline of NAF airstrike errors, locations, reasons provided by the military, and the number of civilian casualties is detailed in .
depicts the timeline, locations and number of civilians killed from military airstrike mishap in northern Nigeria from 2014. A total of 450 civilians have lost their lives, and the annual average of 1.5 erroneous airstrikes during this period shows the frequency of these events. Of particular concern is the deadliest single attack, which claimed 120 lives in Tudun Biri in Kaduna State. A total of eight states in the northern region of the country have been impacted: four in the northwest, two in the northeast, and two in the northcentral regions. The northeast region has borne the brunt, with nearly half of the total incidents. Borno State alone has witnessed six airstrike mishaps, while Yobe State has experienced one. In the northwest, six incidents have been reported – in Sokoto, Zamfara, Kaduna, and Katsina States. In the northcentral region, there have been three mishaps, with two in Niger State and one in Nasarawa State.