431. Root cause proves priority, not exclusivity---and security aid feeds it.
UNDP 23 — United Nations Development Programme. February. Second edition of the Journey to Extremism study; 2,196 interviews across eight African countries, including 1,000-plus former members of violent extremist groups. UNDP, “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement,” https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement Clopus
More fundamental reasons also explain the limited success of these stateled security-driven responses. UNDP’s 2017 study made clear that governance issues, and the distrust and alienation they can engender, are at the core of the growth of violent extremism in Africa. VE groups have a strong appeal in contexts where citizens feel marginalized, receive limited or no government services, and suffer from systemic inequality and pervasive state corruption and repression. Security-driven approaches typically lead with military force. They provide equipment and training that reinforces state security capacities, while largely ignoring governance deficits. Such responses tend to be counterproductive because they bolster governments that many citizens see as corrupt, abusive and unaccountable, thus enhancing the appeal of the perceived alternative offered by VE groups. For example, the French intervention in the Sahel was criticized for revolving mainly around a military-centric strategy, leaving national governments to deal with their populations’ underlying grievances.95
Given the weakness or absence of national state security capacities, two forms of more informal security responses have also emerged in Africa in response to increased violent extremism: civilian vigilante groups and foreign mercenaries. The former, often based on traditional structures and group identities, have arisen in several areas of the Sahel to tackle violent extremist activity at a more localized level, sometimes with the explicit backing of national governments. In Nigeria’s Borno state, for example, vigilante groups emerged in response to Boko Haram in 2013, and were later organized under an umbrella civilian joint task force with limited oversight by the Nigerian military.96 This model spread to Cameroon in 2014 and to Chad in 2015, where the groups are known as vigilance committees (comités de vigilance).97 More recently, Burkina Faso legalized and encouraged the formation and deployment of vigilante groups in the fight against violent extremism.98 Civilian vigilante groups have had some
Notwithstanding the limited success of security-driven responses in the past decade, the vast
majority of resources for addressing violent extremism continue to be directed towards
security-focused capacities and interventions while prevention efforts remain grossly underfunded
Notwithstanding the limited evidence of the success of relying predominantly on security-driven responses in sub-Saharan Africa and the many challenges referred to above, most international support for addressing violent extremism continues to be directed towards security-focused capacities and interventions rather than being complemented by development-focused ones, which lead to more sustainable outcomes.
The United Nations is clearly a central player in countering and preventing violent extremism, as well as on peace and security issues more broadly. The Secretary-General’s 2021 Common Agenda includes preventing conflicts and promoting peace as one of its 12 core commitments. This includes a commitment to developing a New Agenda for Peace and reflects learning from UNDP’s 2017 study about the need to integrate PVE within peacebuilding.101
However, despite this encouraging policy direction, civil society organizations have expressed concerns that in actual practice, the United Nations is reinforcing
442. Arms buying is the corruption---the procurement line is where the money goes.
TI 24 — Transparency International Defence and Security, with the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre. July. TI’s defence-governance programme; findings from the Government Defence Integrity Index for Nigeria. Transparency International, “Nigeria’s Defence Sector: Persistent Corruption Risk Amidst Escalating Security Threats,” https://ti-defence.org/publications/nigerias-defence-sector-persistent-corruption-risk-amidst-escalating-security-threats/ Clopus
Nigeria’s armed forces are spread thin in efforts to defend national borders, as well as to manage internal conflicts and domestic protests. As of 2023, Nigeria had around 135,000 active-duty armed forces. 15 However, the ratio of military personnel to population is approximately 1.1 per 1,000 people, far lower than the NATO average of 6 per 1,000 people or more than 20 military personnel per 1,000 people in countries facing conflicts, such as Eritrea, 16 Israel, and Syria. This places Nigeria’s armed forces in a difficult position, as they face numerous security threats. The military is currently deployed on multiple fronts, fighting the Boko Haram terrorist activities in the north-eastern corridors of the country, combatting banditry in north-west Nigeria, responding to communal crises in the Middle Belt and other hotspots around the country, and preventing piracy and oil theft in the Niger Delta area and the Gulf of Guinea. There are also reports of soldier desertion and allegations of corruption in the supply of
danger whilst on the front lines. 17
Much of the concern over corruption in the Nigerian armed forces stems from its sizeable but highly opaque military expenditure. From 2016 to 2022, Nigeria spent a total of over US$19.9 billion on security alone. 18 The military budget was increased from US$2.4 billion in 2020 to a massive US$4.5 billion in 2021, slightly decreasing to US$3.2 billion in 2023. 19 Despite the little increase in military success on the front line, Nigeria is the largest arms importer in sub-Saharan Africa, representing 16% of regional imports between 2019 and 2023. 20 In its 2022 investigation, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) revealed that about US$15 billion has been squandered through fraudulent arms procurement deals in the last 20 years. 21 It also notes that these and other dealings of Nigeria’s defence and security institutions are shrouded in secrecy.
453. Corruption is why the strikes miss---it degrades the battlefield, not just the books.
TI 24 — Transparency International Defence and Security, with the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre. July. TI’s defence-governance programme; findings from the Government Defence Integrity Index for Nigeria. Transparency International, “Nigeria’s Defence Sector: Persistent Corruption Risk Amidst Escalating Security Threats,” https://ti-defence.org/publications/nigerias-defence-sector-persistent-corruption-risk-amidst-escalating-security-threats/ Clopus
The 2020 GDI reveals a very high level of risk of corruption in Nigerian defence institutions. 41 Since this study, the Nigerian government has arguably not undertaken the necessary reforms to significantly improve the situation. Vulnerabilities in defence institutions and their weak relations with civilian/external oversight institutions remain and are reflected in the historical trend of other fragile and conflict-affected states with weak defence and other public institutions.
The effects of a sustained lack of institutional resilience to corruption have been profound in Nigeria. This self- reinforcing phenomenon reflects a system that not only provides opportunities for the diversion of funds and the peddling of influence, but also contributes to failures of equipment and tactics on the battlefront and ongoing political and economic fragility. 42
461. The barrier is falling---AI lowers the technical and operational threshold.
Guerra et al. 26 — Steph Guerra, Aurelia Attal-Juncqua, John P. Tarangelo, Casey Aveggio, Katie Dammer and David Glickstein. RAND Center on AI, Security, and Technology; Guerra is former Assistant Director for Biosecurity at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. RAND Corporation, RR-A4999-1, “Building a Defense-in-Depth Biosecurity Strategy for the AI Era,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA4999-1.html Clopus
The convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and biology offers great promise for medicine and public health, including the potential to yield transformative societal benefits. Yet this same convergence could introduce serious global health and national security risks. As capabilities continue to advance, AI-enabled biotechnology might lower the technical, operational, and motivational barriers to creating biological weapons. It might also enable high-consequence attacks involving enhanced or novel pathogens. The dual-use nature of biotechnology requires proactive mitigation measures to counter these threats.
In this report, the authors develop a defense-in-depth mitigation strategy that is robust, complementary, and deployable across a wide variety of threat scenarios. To create the strategy, the authors assessed the capabilities of various actor types across different steps of the bioweapon-development pathway prior to an attack, from ideation to weaponization. They also examined how different mitigations could add friction to primary milestones that nefarious actors must bypass to successfully execute an attack using AI-enabled biological weapons.
The authors describe a network of nine mitigations, each with their own strengths and weaknesses and areas of mutual reinforcement, and propose next steps for how decisionmakers in the public and private sectors can work collaboratively to advance this strategy.
Key Takeaways
Different threat actors require different prevention mechanisms. Resource-constrained individuals might be thwarted at material or information access chokepoints. However, technologically sophisticated or well-resourced groups, such as state actors, might be immune to access controls and therefore require deterrence through elevated perceived costs and a degraded expected utility of attack.
Prevention must evolve beyond access controls alone. Although restricting dual-use information and materials remains necessary, determined actors with sufficient resources can circumvent these barriers. An effective strategy, therefore, requires a complementary detection architecture that identifies and disrupts misuse patterns in digital and physical domains before they culminate in harm, shifting the paradigm from denial to integrated monitoring and early response.
Aggregate signals matter. Threat actors operating across multiple nodes of the AI-biology ecosystem—probing different models, querying multiple synthesis providers, sourcing materials from separate vendors—produce signals that appear ambiguous when observed individually but form identifiable patterns of concern when analyzed collectively. Realizing this aggregate value requires centralized information-sharing infrastructure that no entity can provide alone.
472. Their base rate is backward-looking---the skeptic’s case doesn’t rule it out.
Millett and Snyder-Beattie 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. July/August. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, PhD, former head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Clopus
H ow worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives.
Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths, 1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone. 2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population, 3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time. 4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.
A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens. 5 , 6
While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island. 7 , 8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). 9
In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu, 10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population. 11 , 12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics. 13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective. 18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well. 19-21
Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes. 22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology. 23 , 24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention. 25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI, 26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII. 27
Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction. 28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released” (quoted in ref. 29 ) . Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons. 30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows. 31 , 32
What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that despite the low probability of such events, society still ought to invest more in preventing the most extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes.
481. Their deterrence answer concedes ours---it only works on actors who want to survive.
NASEM 24 — National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Consensus study report of the National Academies’ Committee on Nuclear Terrorism, chapter 3, “New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks.” The National Academies Press, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction,” doi: 10.17226/27215 Clopus
porting Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Russia’s loss of control of the group in June 2023 illustrates the principal-agent problem that proxy groups can present ( Rácz 2020 ).
3.5 THE LIMITS OF DETERRENCE IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
Many nuclear weapon scenarios involving state sponsors, to include covert delivery via proxies, would be deterred if states assume their involvement could be attributed to the sponsoring state via nuclear forensics, or other intelligence, resulting in subsequent public identification and condemnation, and international retribution ( National Academies of Sciences 2021 ). In short, deterrence works for rational state actors. Deterrence measures can also work for many non-state actors. While individual terrorists or suicide bombers may not be inhibited from employing a nuclear weapon or IND, their leaders would presumably want to survive to continue to pursue the terrorist groups’ goals and maintain the public perception of their image and capabilities. Many terrorist groups could also be deterred by damage to their reputation, which might make them reluctant to violate nuclear norms.
Principles of deterrence are less likely to dissuade millenarian groups. This is because deterrence works best for adversaries that seek to maximize their chances of survivability and therefore seek to minimize the risk of massive retaliation. But many millenarian groups may actively court retaliation in the hope of sparking a broader war ( Stern 2004 ).
In sum, when it comes to relying on deterrence for managing the nuclear terrorism threat, state-sponsored groups are more likely to be deterred than non-state-sponsored groups. However, it is also true that these kinds of non-state-sponsored groups are less likely to have access to nuclear weapons and materials. They are also unlikely to possess the expertise and operational capabilities to carry out a successful nuclear terrorist attack. Nonetheless, access and capability can change over time. If information becomes more available online, fissile and radiological materials proliferate without adequate security safeguards, and efforts to recruit insiders increase, more terrorist groups may be able to acquire the means to engage in nuclear terrorism.
3.6 NEW TYPES OF MILLENARIANISM AND TERRORIST RECRUITMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
FINDING 3-4: Examples of new types of millenarian groups—the type of terrorist group most likely to ignore anti-nuclear norms—are emerging. There is also increasing evidence that extreme-right-wing accelerationist groups are recruiting U.S. military personnel. If those personnel have insider knowledge about or access to nuclear facilities, materials, or intelligence, they may be in a position to compromise current U.S. nuclear security safeguards.
492. The pursuit is documented and the radiological route has fewer barriers.
NASEM 24 — National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Consensus study report of the National Academies’ Committee on Nuclear Terrorism, chapter 3, “New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks.” The National Academies Press, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction,” doi: 10.17226/27215 Clopus
Terrorist groups have been pursuing nuclear and radiological weapons and devices for decades ( Ferguson et al. 2005 ). A few prominent examples include: (1) Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful, repeated attempts to mine uranium, hire Russian nuclear scientists, and purchase Russian nuclear technology in the 1990s; (2) Al Qaeda’s unsuccessful alleged attempts to purchase nuclear weapons and material from a variety of sources in the 1990s and recruit insiders, as well as attempts to design a nuclear weapon that would have included explosive testing in Afghanistan; and (3) ISIS’s access to a cache of cobalt-60 when it overran Mosul ( Ward 2018 ). In August 2014, an insider at the Doel 4 nuclear power plant in Belgium carried out a successful act of nuclear sabotage. The sabotage did not result in the release of radiological material, but the costs were significant. The saboteur was never identified, but the nuclear regulator added new requirements for defending against insider threats ( Bunn et al. 2016 ).
Although terrorists confront considerable challenges in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device (IND), the enormous consequences of a nuclear detonation call for continued vigilance by the United States and reinvigorated efforts by the international community to reduce the risk. Attacks involving nuclear sabotage or deploying a radiological dispersal device (RDD) have fewer barriers for non-state actors to pursue. These risks reinforce the need for an ongoing international commitment to managing and reducing nuclear terrorism challenges.
Radiological material found in secure nuclear power plants and other facilities can be used to make an RDD (aka “dirty bomb”) or a radiological exposure device (RED) ( Council on Foreign Relations 2006 ). According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, there have been over 80 attacks on nuclear facilities around the globe since 1963, the
503. Material security is the weak link---research reactors have no binding standard.
Belfer 25 — Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Project on Managing the Atom. Harvard Kennedy School research center directed by nuclear-security specialists Matthew Bunn and William Tobey. Belfer Center, “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet Clopus
There are hundreds of locations holding nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material and no binding global standards for how well these weapons and materials should be secured. There are more than 130 research reactors with HEU, some of which are in developing and transitional countries.
Once nuclear material is acquired, could terrorists make a nuclear weapon? Yes
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1977): "A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could design and build a crude nuclear explosive device... [O]nly modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required."
511. Deniability is gone---Africa Corps is the defence ministry, not a contractor.
Ronc 26 — Nadina Ronc. July 1. Independent geopolitical and security analyst specialising in Russian influence operations in Africa. Elcano Royal Institute, “Russia’s new security order in the Sahel and its Euro-Atlantic implications,” https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/russias-new-security-order-in-the-sahel-and-its-euro-atlantic-implications/ Clopus
During earlier operations in the Central African Republic and Mali, the Kremlin used Wagner to maintain plausible deniability, since Wagner was seen as a non-state actor. Africa Corps does not have this benefit. Led by Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and senior GRU officer Andrei Averyanov, Africa Corps operates within Russia’s official military and diplomatic structure, although its members are still referred to as ‘instructors’ or ‘security partners’. [1]
This shift to a formal structure changes Russia’s options. Wagner often operated with considerable authority and challenged the existing order, but Africa Corps aims to establish a lasting Russian presence. By moving from a private military group to an official Defence Ministry unit, the Kremlin seems ready to give up some deniability for a more stable and reliable way to exert influence as Western involvement decreases.
A new security order
After Western missions departed, Russian personnel, equipment and advisers moved in to support the junta in Bamako and aid operations against insurgents. In Mali, Russian support mainly focuses on protecting the regime, helping on the battlefield and strengthening a small group of ruling elites, rather than protecting civilians or building institutions.
This model is being adopted by other countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger, which have followed Mali’s example by increasing security cooperation through the Alliance of Sahel States and related organisations. In Niger, Africa Corps instructors arrived after the July 2023 military coup d’état, which also saw the withdrawal of Western military support. This demonstrated Moscow’s rapid response to political changes.
522. Africa is staged for the wider war---proxies pin down NATO when it starts.
Albanese 25 — Michael Albanese. July 25. Special Projects Lead for Picogrid, based in Kyiv, previously with the Atlantic Council and the Center for European Policy Analysis. Center for European Policy Analysis, “Putin Building African Springboard for War on West,” https://cepa.org/article/putin-building-african-springboard-for-war-on-west/ Clopus
Russian operations in Africa are not just about fomenting instability or profiting from resource extraction, they are also part of a long game to make the continent a front in a global confrontation with the West.
US officials have warned that Russia may soon begin coordinating its war efforts with China in an attempt to open multiple theaters of conflict — forcing the US and its allies to split their attention, stretch resources, and confront crises across the globe.
This concern has been echoed by Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe. He warned the alliance must prepare for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and the Pacific, highlighting the possibility that Moscow and Beijing may coordinate campaigns as early as 2027.
This is why Putin has refused to scale down Russia’s Africa footprint, even as it faces staggering battlefield losses in Ukraine. As the Kremlin prepares for a broader confrontation with NATO, Africa is being readied to serve as a launchpad for asymmetric operations, proxy escalation, and logistical disruption.
From the Sahel to the Mediterranean, Russian proxy forces could attack European interests or pin down NATO assets in the event of open war. It is no accident that the countries now flooded with Russian arms and military advisers sit on maritime chokepoints and energy corridors critical to European stability.
533. The vacuum is real---jihadists are closing on three capitals while Moscow doubles down.
ACSS 26 — Africa Center for Strategic Studies. July 8. The U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies, at National Defense University. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Russia’s New Frontier in Africa,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russias-new-frontier-in-africa/ Clopus
While Russia’s influence is most evident in the Sahel, similar patterns are seen in Libya, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Madagascar, among others. Moreover, with 80 documented information operations targeting two dozen African countries , Russia’s polarizing narratives have advanced anti-democratic messaging across the continent.
An Achilles’ heel of Russia’s strategy of disruption in Africa, however, is that it is not sustainable. While Moscow may have been successful at pushing out Western security partners in the Sahel, by investing little in the stability of these highly fragile countries facing escalating jihadist insurgencies, security is bound to unravel.
This appears to be just what is happening. Jihadist groups are moving ever closer to Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou . The insurgents are mounting sieges on dozens of towns across the three countries and have effectively constricted fuel supplies in Bamako. Insurgent attacks on Bamako and other Malian cities in 2026 killed the Minister of Defense, knocked out the power grid, and exposed the vulnerability of the military regime. The airport in Niamey has been closed twice during the year due to jihadist attacks.
Russian paramilitary forces retreating from Kidal, Mali following insurgent attacks. ( Screen capture )
Rather than rebuild the security coalitions they dismantled, the juntas have further cracked down on citizens. In Mali and Burkina Faso, violence against civilians by the militaries (and their Russian partners) since 2023 has resulted in more civilian fatalities than those caused by the jihadists .
Despite this collapsing house of cards, Russia and its junta allies remain on the offensive with their most potent asymmetric tool: information operations. Audaciously, this is not just directed at shoring up domestic support for the Sahelian juntas but is also targeting neighboring democratically oriented governments in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin. Social media accounts linked to Russia and the juntas extol the fictional development and stability realized under the military regimes. Any jihadist gains are blamed on Western collusion.
Despite this collapsing house of cards, Russia and its junta allies remain on the offensive with their most potent asymmetric tool: information operations.
This messaging is coupled with the same narratives that proved successful in the Sahel—democracy has failed, voting is pointless, the West is the cause of Africa’s challenges, and only a strongman can bring order. While divorced from the realities in the Sahelian countries, this simplistic messaging resonates with some.
West Africa, thus, is in the throes of a pivotal race. Will the relentless negative messaging topple another democratic-leaning government before the fallacy of junta success is exposed? Or will the Sahelian military regimes collapse first, shattering any such illusion?
A column of black smoke rises over Bamako, Mali in the aftermath of the April 25 attacks. (Photo: AFP)
A coup in Nigeria or one of the other major West African countries—with a subsequent realignment to Russia—would be a great prize for Moscow. It would also enable Moscow to pivot from its failing strategy in the Sahel to a much more promising frontier in coastal West Africa. Nigeria’s economy is roughly 10 times that of the three Sahelian countries combined.
543. Their own Air Force wrote the concession---and the gap is still open.
Warner 26 — Lesley Anne Warner. April 22. Africa security analyst and columnist covering African security affairs for World Politics Review. World Politics Review, “Nigeria’s Airpower-Centric Counterinsurgency Is Costing Civilian Lives,” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/nigeria-boko-haram-iswap-jilli-civilian-casualties/ Clopus the free portion of a paywalled article---the cut ends where the paywall does
On the evening of April 11, Nigerian military airstrikes hit a market in the northeastern village of Jilli, located near the epicenter of the country’s two-decadelong jihadist insurgency, killing as many as 200 civilians. While defending the choice of target as a terrorist enclave and logistics hub, the Nigerian Air Force subsequently announced it was dispatching a fact-finding mission to assess the extent of possible civilian casualties.
The Jilli market bombing is the latest in a series of government airstrikes over the past decade that have killed civilians, underscoring the Nigerian military’s continued challenges with intelligence , target identification and air-ground integration. Between 2017 and 2024, more than 500 civilians were killed in such attacks, both in the northeast against the two jihadist insurgencies operating there—Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)—as well as in the northwest against armed criminal groups that the government generally refers to as “bandits.” In January 2017, an airstrike hit a camp for internally displaced persons in Rann . Another strike in December 2023 struck a religious gathering in Kaduna .
Recognizing that civilian deaths boost extremist recruitment, the Nigerian Air Force unveiled a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) action plan in May 2025 and inaugurated a dedicated CHMR Board two months later in July. The Jilli airstrike makes it clear that a gap remains between this emphasis on civilian harm mitigation and operational practice.
554. Revenge is the measured mechanism---local exposure raises insurgent violence for months.
Condra et al. 10 — Luke N. Condra, Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar and Jacob N. Shapiro. October. Political scientists at Stanford, Princeton and the London School of Economics; Felter is a retired Army Special Forces colonel who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16152, “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq,” https://www.nber.org/papers/w16152 Clopus
The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq Luke N. Condra, Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro NBER Working Paper No. 16152 July 2010, Revised October 2010 JEL No. F51,F52,H56,J22,K42,O53 ABSTRACT A central question in intrastate conflicts is how insurgents are able to mobilize supporters to participate in violent and risky activities. A common explanation is that violence committed by counterinsurgent forces mobilizes certain segments of the population through a range of mechanisms. We study the effects of civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan to quantify the effect of such casualties on subsequent insurgent violence. By comparing uniquely detailed micro-data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we can distinguish short-run 'information' and 'capacity' effects from the longer run 'propaganda' and 'revenge' effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence that local exposure to civilian casualties caused by international forces leads to increased insurgent violence over the long-run, what we term the 'revenge' effect. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks and lead to increased violence over the next 6 months. There is no evidence that out-of-area events—errant air strikes for example—lead to increased violence, nor is there evidence of short run effects, thus ruling out the propaganda, information, and capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting the constraints on insurgent production of violence may be quite conflict-specific. Our results imply that minimizing harm to civilians may indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan to reduce insurgent recruitment.
565. Government action is the trigger recruits name themselves.
UNDP 23 — United Nations Development Programme. February. Second edition of the Journey to Extremism study; 2,196 interviews across eight African countries, including 1,000-plus former members of violent extremist groups. UNDP, “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Pathways to Recruitment and Disengagement,” https://www.undp.org/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement Clopus
The Journey to Extremism research has helped to highlight how this dynamic plays out in Africa, especially through its examination of the 'tipping point into violent extremism. The 2017 study revealed that counter-terrorism operations and the conduct of state security actors have often catalysed or accelerated recruitment, rather than the reverse. In examining levels of trust towards different state security actors, the new dataset confirms low trust in security sector actors, as illustrated in Figure 34. Questionnaire respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in different security authorities at the time they joined the VE group.
Contrary to the 2017 study findings, which found a significant variation between the voluntary and reference groups, these levels are low across in the outlook of all respondents, with trust in the police significantly lower than in the military. Accordingly, the regression analysis does not find trust in security actors to be a significant predictor of voluntary recruitment.
62 percent of voluntary recruits reported to have ‘little or no trust’ in the police, with 61 percent of the reference group responding similarly, likely reflecting profound divides between communities and security actors in the outlook of both groups, which is known to offer fertile ground for recruitment into VE groups. Forced recruits have higher levels of trust in both the police and military than either voluntary recruits or the reference group.181
In the primary group of respondents, female recruits have higher levels of trust in the state security apparatus than male recruits (55 percent of females report some trust
in the military, compared with 37 percent of males). No visible gender difference was found in the reference group.
These findings underscore the need to pay greater attention to the broader relationship between the conduct of state security forces and the growth of violent extremism. While the variation between the voluntary and reference groups is less pronounced than in the 2017 study, it does reflect the level of frustration and lack of trust in the police and military. Further evidence of this crucial aspect of the journey to extremism, including emotive factors, personalized and attitudinal aspects, is further examined in Chapter 3 relating to the ‘tipping point’ for recruitment and the recruitment process.
2.4.4. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND IDENTIFICATION
WITH THE NATION-STATE
Democratic participation is a common feature of governance, reflecting the relationship between state and citizen, as well as the opportunity to address grievances through the democratic process and the underlying perception of the possibility of change. Self-identification with the nation-state and the notion that national identity is a precondition for stable, well-functioning states is another well-established feature of theories of governance.182 Moreover, national self-identification is an important source of demarcation, revealing perceptions of in- and out-group identities, sentiments of inclusion and exclusion, and notions of legitimacy, with the potential to foster either unity or fragmentation. It follows that political exclusion and fragmentation are considered key push factors towards violent extremism.
They are associated with marginalization from society, 82 community and family, leading to a personal search for identity, meaning and purpose, which could be addressed by membership in an extremist network.