4492. The quarrel is over how to describe the violence---both sides say the victims are of all faiths.
Murali 26 — Miruthulani Murali. July 30. Research intern at the Counter Terrorism Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. MP-IDSA, “US–Nigeria Counter-Terror Cooperation,” https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/us-nigeria-counter-terror-cooperation Clopus
The vaunted success of the present phase of US–Nigeria joint operations ironically came in the wake of tensions between the two countries. US Senator Ted Cruz raised alarm over what he characterised as an ongoing “Christian genocide” in Nigeria. [v] However, Gimba Kakanda, Senior Special Assistant to the President of Nigeria on Research and Analytics, argued that this characterisation oversimplified a far more complex issue, rooted in ethnic rivalries, land disputes, and resource competition rather than deliberate religious persecution. [vi] Notably, Boko Haram and ISWAP victims have included both Christians and Muslims. In his response, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu noted that the security challenges facing his country did not constitute a war against any particular religion. He countered that “portraying Nigeria’s security challenges as a targeted campaign against a single religious group is a gross misrepresentation of reality”. [vii]
Despite these statements, US President Donald Trump designated Nigeria as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ in November 2025 due to concerns about religious freedom. [viii] The designation highlighted the differing interpretations in Washington and Abuja of Nigeria’s security crisis, with the former placing greater emphasis on religious freedom concerns. At the same time, the latter argued that the violence stemmed from a broader combination of insurgency, criminality and local conflicts.
Meanwhile, the Global Terrorism Index of 2026 found Nigeria to have recorded the largest increase in terrorism-related fatalities worldwide in 2025, which registered a 46 per cent spike, with the death toll rising to 750 that year. [ix] The terror killings have been mainly attributed to two terrorist groups—the ISWAP and Boko Haram—which reportedly carried out 80 per cent of all terrorism-related deaths in the country. [x] When considered collectively, these developments indicate that Nigeria’s security situation has grown increasingly complex, with persistent terrorist activity continuing to shape both external engagement and domestic security priorities.
4501. The package moves with no accountability attached---that’s what burns the partnership.
HRW 25 — Human Rights Watch. August 19. International nongovernmental human rights investigation and advocacy organization. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
Security concerns across Nigeria are real and widespread. In the Northwest, violent raids, killings, and kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs continue to destabilize communities. In the Northeast, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram and its splinter factions continue their brutal insurgency against the government while terrorizing civilians and committing abuses. In the Southeast, separatist armed groups routinely terrorize and attack communities and kill residents.
However, in responding to these threats, Nigerian security forces have been repeatedly implicated in serious rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and conflict-related abuses. The US State Department documented many of these abuses in its own 2024 Human Rights Report on Nigeria , released just last week. Military airstrikes have also repeatedly resulted in the deaths of people mistakenly identified as threats, without accountability. Despite ongoing calls for justice, meaningful reform remains absent.
4512. Escalating the American role is what makes Nigerians stop cooperating---with their own government.
Cavanna 26 — Thomas Cavanna. February 26. Former non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Modern Diplomacy, “Washington’s buildup in Nigeria could ensnare the U.S. in a protracted conflict,” https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/26/washingtons-buildup-in-nigeria-could-ensnare-the-u-s-in-a-protracted-conflict/ Clopus
The expansion of Washington’s “Christian genocide” rhetoric may antagonize local communities, incentivizing them to stop cooperating with Nigeria’s authorities . It could also destabilize a country of 240 million people, split roughly in half between Muslims (56%) and Christians ( 43% ).
Combined with the Trump administration’s bombastic and divisive rhetoric, an increase in U.S. military operations may bolster jihadists’ narrative and recruitment .
4521. Nigeria cooperates to placate us---to secure assistance and to avoid sanctions.
Cavanna 26 — Thomas Cavanna. February 26. Former non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Modern Diplomacy, “Washington’s buildup in Nigeria could ensnare the U.S. in a protracted conflict,” https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/26/washingtons-buildup-in-nigeria-could-ensnare-the-u-s-in-a-protracted-conflict/ Clopus
A growing American involvement could create complications. Tensions with Nigeria could worsen. Abuja dismissed the “Christian genocide” claims as a “false, baseless, despicable, and divisive” thesis intended to destabilize the country .
It cooperated to placate Washington, secure assistance , avoid sanctions, avoid appearing anti-Christian domestically, and avoid projecting weakness in the event of unilateral U.S. strikes .
Yet Abuja remains concerned about Washington’s approach to the crisis . Meanwhile, the Trump administration continues to stress that Nigeria “must do more to protect Christians.” If additional attacks occur, Abuja could face stiff tariffs, more stringent immigration restrictions , and severe reductions in U.S. aid .
4532. Empirically---cooperation deepened straight through the worst rupture on record.
Murali 26 — Miruthulani Murali. July 30. Research intern at the Counter Terrorism Centre of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. MP-IDSA, “US–Nigeria Counter-Terror Cooperation,” https://idsa.in/publisher/comments/us-nigeria-counter-terror-cooperation Clopus
Nevertheless, despite Trump’s designation of Nigeria as a ‘country of particular concern’, bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts continued to deepen. In February this year, the US even promised to supply Nigeria with 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft and 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters, in addition to funding to modernise counter-terrorism facilities at Kainji Air Base to support the Tucano planes. [xi]
On 2 July 2026, meanwhile, the US announced the withdrawal of military personnel deployed to Nigeria for a temporary counter-terrorism (CT) mission in the Lake Chad basin. [xii] While Washington stated that its security cooperation and intelligence sharing with the Nigerian government will continue, the Nigerian Defence Headquarters (DHQ) denied a complete US troop withdrawal. DHQ stated that roughly 200 US military advisors have been redeployed to provide enhanced counter-terrorism training, technical support and intelligence sharing. [xiii] Samaila Uba, spokesperson for the Defence Headquarters of Nigeria, recently said the US advisors were in the country for training purposes and will not engage in combat or have a direct operational role. He maintained that Nigerian forces will maintain complete command authority. [xiv]
4541. The preference is already dead letter---a tariff wiped out Nigeria’s duty-free treatment.
CFR 26 — Council on Foreign Relations. Nonpartisan foreign policy think tank and publisher, citing CFR senior fellow on trade Inu Manak. Council on Foreign Relations, “AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program,” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/agoa-us-africa-trade-program Clopus
Congress last renewed AGOA in 2015. The program’s fate, especially given the recent shift towards a high-tariff trade policy, is unclear, experts say.
The Biden administration called on Congress to modernize the existing program, but failed to take any meaningful steps until June 2024, when then USTR Katherine Tai released a report that she touted as “ a starting point ” for discussions to update the program, leaving little time for action in Biden’s remaining months in office. Under Trump, both the administration and Congress have also given AGOA little attention , with current USTR Jamieson Greer calling the preference program “ a giveaway .”
Trump’s reciprocal tariffs have also dampened AGOA’s effectiveness. On April 2, 2025, Trump announced sweeping tariffs, including a baseline 10 percent duty on all U.S. imports, and higher “reciprocal tariffs” on more than ninety countries. South Africa and Nigeria, the top two exporters of AGOA products to the United States, faced tariff rates of 30 percent and 14 percent, respectively, effectively negating AGOA’s duty-free treatment. Lesotho was originally hit with the highest tariff rate, at 50 percent, before being modified in August 2025 to 15 percent. However, the original announcement generated both panic and confusion , leading to layoffs and uncertainty in Lesotho’s apparel sector. Estimating the impact of lapsing AGOA benefits in 2018, the World Bank found that Lesotho would suffer a 1 percent drop in income and a 16 percent drop in exports of apparel and textiles.
Trump framed these actions as part of an effort to achieve “economic independence,” citing perceived unfair trade practices and persistent U.S. trade deficits. The United States had a $13.2 billion deficit with AGOA countries in 2023—a small part of the overall U.S. trade deficit, which stood at $773.4 billion . However, imbalances with AGOA partners primarily reflect structural differences, leading experts to argue that letting the act expire would do little to fix the trade balance. Furthermore, “since the average GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa is $1,561, it is hard to imagine how those countries can consume more from the United States unless their incomes can grow through additional export opportunities,” Manak said. “Reducing their exports will ultimately lead them to consume less and do little to address the trade deficit.”
The AfCFTA could play a major role in AGOA’s path forward, described by some as “one of the most significant developments to have taken place on the continent since AGOA was last renewed in 2015.” Proponents say the agreement, signed by all of the African Union’s fifty-five member states except Eritrea, will boost regional trade by forming a single market and creating millions of jobs across the continent.
In light of this, some analysts have suggested that Washington should use AfCFTA as the foundation for talks to create a new strategic economic partnership rather than renewing AGOA. Others have called for incremental reforms, such as proposals with bipartisan support in the Senate to adjust AGOA’s rules of origin to include inputs from North African AfCFTA countries, extend AGOA benefits until 2041, streamline the eligibility process, leverage intra-African supply chains, and provide support for enhanced utilization of preferences.
4552. The trade relationship never delivered---exports are back to where they started.
CFR 26 — Council on Foreign Relations. Nonpartisan foreign policy think tank and publisher, citing CFR senior fellow on trade Inu Manak. Council on Foreign Relations, “AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program,” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/agoa-us-africa-trade-program Clopus
However, some experts say U.S.-Africa trade relations remain underdeveloped . After the initial jump in the first decade of the program, peaking at a high of $66 billion in 2008, exports gradually fell close to their 2000 level by the mid-2010s. While exports had only slowly begun to recover, they dipped again in 2024. Diversification has also lagged, both in terms of products and countries. While oil and gas have dominated AGOA exports since 2001, nearly 90 percent of the non-energy U.S. imports from Africa in 2022 came from just five countries: Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, and South Africa. Of these, South Africa contributed the majority of those exports, at more than 56 percent in 2021. Additionally, less than 1 percent of total imports to the United States in 2023 came from sub-Saharan Africa; by comparison, the region made up nearly 4 percent of China’s imports and roughly the same portion of those for the European Union (EU).
The reasons for why U.S.-Africa trade has not grown as much as it was hoped “comes down to challenges with preference utilization among some countries, a lack of national AGOA strategies, and inconsistent application of eligibility requirements,” Inu Manak, CFR senior fellow on trade, told CFR.
Overcoming administrative hurdles to meet AGOA standards is particularly burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises, which make up 95 percent of the continent’s business ecosystem, but often lack the capital, technical expertise, and infrastructure necessary to certify compliance even when exporters and firms are aware of potential AGOA benefits. A lack of awareness of AGOA’s benefits and misalignment between an AGOA country’s top products and AGOA-covered goods also present headaches for African firms.
Utilization rates are correlated with overall country participation in AGOA; countries with utilization rates lower than 40 percent exported less than $1 million worth of covered products to the United States and utilization rates were higher in countries with national AGOA strategies in place.
AGOA was not intended to be permanent, but rather “designed as a stepping stone to a more mature trade relationship.” At its inception, AGOA was widely viewed as a first step toward permanent free-trade agreements (FTAs), which would provide additional certainty for investors by locking in trade benefits.
However, Washington has not concluded any FTAs with sub-Saharan African countries. Although it held negotiations [PDF] with the members of the Southern African Customs Union—Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa—those fell through in 2006, in part due to disagreements over intellectual property rights and foreign investment rules. During President Donald Trump’s first term, the United States began drafting an FTA with Kenya , but that deal was set aside under Biden in favor of the U.S.–Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership in 2022, a narrower framework that aimed to improve several areas of economic collaboration, but without discussing market access. Now, in his second term, Trump has focused on reciprocal tariffs rather than free trade agreements with African nations.
What are the criticisms of the program?
Enthusiasm for AGOA among U.S. policymakers has faltered in recent years. In addition to worries about falling exports, there are concerns about Africa’s continued dependence on low-value-added products and natural resources; few beneficiaries have moved into the value-added manufacturing the legislation hoped to spur.
International trade experts Witney Schneidman, Kate McNulty, and Natalie Dicharry point to the dominance of a handful of the program’s participants to argue that both the United States and many of its AGOA counterparts have failed to use the program effectively . Only eighteen AGOA participants have crafted national strategies for taking advantage of the program, they say, signaling that the program’s goal of driving African economic development is falling short.
CFR President Michael Froman, who was U.S. trade representative under President Barack Obama, has said that obstacles, including corruption and poor infrastructure, have hindered the competitiveness of African producers and limited the program’s success. Other experts say the program lacks provisions to help U.S. exporters and investors compete with their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere.
Additionally, AGOA does not include fast-growing sectors such as digital and financial services. In recent years, analysts have called on the United States to push for more private-sector investment to take advantage of the region’s economic growth, which was higher than the global average over the fifteen years after AGOA was implemented. However, sub-Saharan Africa’s recovery from multiple global shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, has been sluggish compared to other regions, and growth remains muted .
Critics also note that removing countries for human rights abuses does little to help the communities affected. When Ethiopia , previously one of the biggest AGOA beneficiaries, lost its eligibility status in 2022 over conflict in the country’s north, it lost more than one hundred thousand jobs and did not cease hostilities. Experts say these expulsions could push countries to strengthen trade ties with other powers; some Ethiopian business leaders, for instance, have argued in favor of moving closer to China, given Beijing’s no-strings-attached approach to investment.
Recognizing that the U.S. economic relationship with Africa had fallen behind, in 2016, the U.S. Trade Representative issued a report examining how U.S. policy could move beyond AGOA, and outlined six strategic and structural options for the United States to pursue to deepen U.S.-Africa trade and investment ties. Those included: supporting regional economic integration on the continent; creating more stable, reciprocal arrangements; supporting Africa’s export diversification and value added in production; broadening domestic reforms to help economic growth and poverty alleviation; integrating African countries into the global trading system; and raising standards while acknowledging capacity constraints in some countries.
4562. Deeper involvement is what makes Nigeria a magnet---and it raises the coup risk.
Cavanna 26 — Thomas Cavanna. February 26. Former non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities. Modern Diplomacy, “Washington’s buildup in Nigeria could ensnare the U.S. in a protracted conflict,” https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/02/26/washingtons-buildup-in-nigeria-could-ensnare-the-u-s-in-a-protracted-conflict/ Clopus
Washington’s interference may weaken the legitimacy of Nigeria’s democratic regime, increasing its vulnerability to a military coup, as recently occurred in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and other African countries unable to provide security and contain foreign interference .
Deeper U.S. involvement could turn Nigeria into a magnet for regional terrorist movements , worsening a humanitarian crisis that has produced 2 million refugees and internally displaced people, further destabilizing West Africa and the Sahel .
It would also increase the risk of attacks against American citizens or assets , incentivizing Washington to expand its counterterrorism campaign.
Although supplying intelligence and equipment to Nigeria could help contain local threats, Washington should ensure that such measures do not create pressure for further U.S. military action.
4571. Abuja's own doctrine is to belong to nobody---that survives the plan.
Enikanolaiye 26 — Sola Enikanolaiye. August. Nigerian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, setting out the Ministry’s strategic-autonomy framework in an address delivered in Abuja. Vanguard, “Strategic autonomy: Nigeria’s doctrine for self-determination in a multipolar world,” https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/08/strategic-autonomy-nigerias-doctrine-for-self-determination-in-a-multipolar-world/ Clopus
Engage all major powers without being locked into one camp. In a multipolar world, alignment is a choice made per issue, not per decade. Nigeria maintains a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China on infrastructure and more. It deepens trade and security ties with the US and EU. It expands South-South cooperation with India, Brazil, and the Gulf. It leads on the continent through AfCFTA and AU reform.
This is not non-alignment. It is multi-alignment: engaging all, belonging to none, and extracting maximum value for Nigeria from each relationship. Strategic autonomy is alignment to Nigerian national interests. Nigeria’s 5 Pillars offer more than a foreign policy. They offer a template for mid-sized and emerging powers navigating great power competition. It is a policy of conviction without rigidity. Of partnership without dependence. Of ambition without illusion.
Nigeria will continue to deepen partnerships that deliver infrastructure, jobs, and technology, but always on Nigerian terms. In 2026, the measure of sovereignty is not who you oppose. It is what you are able to build. We can no longer afford an economy built only on exporting raw materials to one market and importing finished goods from another. The African Continental Free Trade Area gives us the platform to build regional value chains. At the same time, we must diversify globally.This is why we welcome China’s decision to grant zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, while we simultaneously deepen trade with the EU, the US, the Gulf, and our neighbors in ECOWAS. No single partner can meet all our development needs, and we will not be dependent on any one.
The primary duty of any government is the protection of its citizens. That principle must guide our security partnerships. African-led solutions through the AU and ECOWAS remain our first choice. But we will not outsource our judgment. We greatly appreciate the US but if any country says he can help me to wipe out terrorism in Nigeria in the next two weeks, will I say because I’m friend to the US I will not agree? No,”. The safety of Nigerians comes first. Strategic autonomy means we evaluate every security offer by one metric: does it deliver peace, security and stability for our people?
In a multipolar world, we must talk to everyone and be forced to choose no one. This is not duplicity. It is maturity. We have demonstrated this in recent weeks. We condemned Afrophobic attacks in South Africa because the dignity of Nigerians abroad is non-negotiable. We pushed the agenda at the recent ECOWAS Summit in Freetown Sierra Leone where President Tinubu’s voice was clear and unambiguous. At the same time, we are preserving and strengthening the Nigeria-South Africa strategic partnership because both countries benefit from trade, investment, and regional leadership. That is strategic autonomy in practice.
The 4D Agenda meets a fragmenting World
The global shifts make this doctrine necessary today. Today, we have multipolarity. The unipolar moment has passed. Power is diffused across Washington, Beijing, Brussels, New Delhi, Riyadh, and other capitals. Under President Tinubu’s 4D Foreign Policy Agenda: Demography, Development, Diaspora and Democracy – Nigeria’s diplomacy is calibrated to one question: what does this mean for Nigerian citizens? Ideological blocs are secondary to results.
Africa has 60 per cent of the world’s youngest population. By 2050, one in four people on earth will be African. Nigeria will be the third most populated country in the world by 2050. We cannot allow our future to be scripted by others. We must define our own development model, centered on jobs, skills, and innovation. In this context, some analysts have described our approach as “pragmatism devoid of doctrine.” I disagree.
“I don’t agree with that kind of characterization. Everything foreign policy is about national interest,”. What we are doing is giving that age-old principle a modern name and structure. We are drawing from our own history. As one of my lecturers at the University used to say, ” non-alignment is alignment to your national interest.” That remains true. Doctrine without delivery is rhetoric. For strategic autonomy to produce tangible benefits, Africa must take deliberate steps.
4582. NOT NEW. Beijing has been Africa's largest supplier for decades---and it trains the officers too.
CRS 8-6 — Congressional Research Service. August 6. Nonpartisan research arm of the U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service, “China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy,” R49080, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R49080.html Clopus
Arms Sales. China has sold arms to Africa for decades, and from 2021 to 2024 reportedly was the largest arms supplier to Africa. 148 Among other equipment, some African countries (e.g., DRC, Nigeria, and Sudan) have procured military uncrewed aerial vehicles from China. 149 In some cases, PRC arms, whether exported by China or supplied by third parties, reportedly have been used in armed conflicts in Africa, including in DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan, in some cases counter to UN arms embargoes. 150
Maritime Counterpiracy. Since 2008, the PLA has conducted counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, along major global shipping routes. DOD reported that PLA Naval Escort Task Forces had deployed more than 150 ships and more than 35,000 personnel during 45 escort missions as of early 2024 and continued them throughout the year. 151
United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping. As of April 30, 2026, China was the eighth-largest uniformed personnel contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and the largest such contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As of the same date, China's largest peacekeeping deployment was with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, 866 personnel), when it also had personnel in UN missions in the DRC, the Abyei area between Sudan and South Sudan, Western Sahara, and the Central African Republic. 152 In March 2026, a PLA general was named UNMISS force commander. 153
Military Exercises and Related Activity. The PLA regularly conducts bilateral and multilateral military exercises with African counterparts, at times jointly with other non-African countries. In 2019, China, Russia, and South Africa conducted a trilateral maritime security exercise for the first time; they reprised the exercise in 2023. 154 A third iteration of the exercise was postponed while South Africa hosted the 2025 G20 leadership summit, but in early 2026, South Africa hosted Will for Peace 2026 , a naval exercise for selected BRICS+ countries coordinated by China. The navies of South Africa, China, Russia, the UAE, and Iran participated, the latter in contravention of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa's order that Iranian naval ships not join the exercise nor observe it, drawing U.S. criticism. 155 In 2024, the PLA conducted its first land and naval forces exercise in Africa, with Tanzania and Mozambique. 156 Multiple African coastal states have hosted PLA Navy port calls. 157
Professional Military Education (PME) and Training. PME is a major area of PRC security engagement in Africa. As of 2024, more than 50 African militaries reportedly had participated in PRC PME programs, and African officers comprise a reported 60% of foreign officers admitted to PRC military institutions; five current or former African presidents are graduates of such programs. 158 The PLA set up a military training school in Tanzania in 2018. 159 At the 2024 FOCAC summit, China pledged about $141 million in military aid grants; military training, exercises, and patrols; training for 6,000 African military personnel and 1,000 police/law enforcement personnel; and opportunities for 500 "young African military officers to visit China." 160
4593. Arms don't buy influence---nobody has tested the claim and the data runs backwards.
Cohen and Hoffman 23 — Jordan Cohen and Jon Hoffman. August 11. Policy analyst in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute; research fellow in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute. War on the Rocks, “Many Arms and Little Influence in the Middle East,” https://warontherocks.com/2023/08/many-arms-and-little-influence-in-the-middle-east/ Clopus
The argument that nearly unlimited weapons sales provide Washington with leverage over recipients is premised on the belief that if recipient nations depend on continued American arms sales enough, they will comply with American demands at either the domestic or foreign policy level. Nonetheless, beyond a few small points of conjecture , no scholarly analysis has been conducted to test the validity of this claim.
To explore if these claims of leverage are accurate, scholars at the Cato Institute create a yearly Arms Sales Risk Index — of which one of us is a co-author — and now in its fifth edition have over five years of collected data about the risk in every U.S. arms sale. Each country is then given a risk score between 1-100. Given that it has five years of data, this year’s edition of the Arms Sales Risk Index tests the leverage argument by examining if major recipients of U.S. weapons become less risky over time on four risk vectors. These vectors are a country’s level of corruption, its level of instability, the freedom and security of its people, and its participation in conflict. These vectors correlate with the risk of U.S. weapons being used by actors aiming to harm U.S. interests, dispersion of weapons, and global human rights abuses.
Conflict is the only categorical variable in the dataset as states are either at war or not. Outside of that variable, which is overall stagnant as Kuwait is the only country that has left a war that it was participating in over the course of the five years presented in the dataset, three out of these four vectors show that the top three quintiles of U.S. purchasers got riskier over five years, with the top quintile of countries becoming more than 2 percentage points riskier over that time.
In other words, the United States is not leveraging its weapons sales to make recipients end conflict, become less corrupt and more stable, and become more democratic. Instead, the opposite trend is occurring: Major recipients of U.S. weapons are becoming riskier while abusing human rights at home.
Thus, if anything, other countries are reversing leverage by utilizing Washington’s obsession with balancing to guarantee a free flow of weapons, despite engaging in actions that could harm U.S. security interests.
One way that reverse leverage occurs is when arms sales create a perceived interdependence between the United States and an ally. Weapons transfers do not tend to occur in a vacuum, and frequently come alongside military training, weapons maintenance, and interoperability drills. These security relationships lead to a converging of interests: For the U.S. military to be secure, the recipient’s military needs to be successful. The recipient country can use this convergence to request weapons systems and security cooperation more fruitfully, thereby creating a cycle where more weapons transfers lead to increased interdependence, which in turn leads to more arms sales.
The second way in which reverse leverage occurs is when U.S. recipients use their partnership with a different country — whether adversary or ally — and U.S. concerns over reputation to leverage Washington into sending more weapons. The recipient state’s perceived strategic and geographic significance allows it to convince great-power patrons to acquiesce to policies that they would otherwise oppose.
Reverse Leverage and the Middle East
Reverse leverage encapsulates the current predicament that the United States is experiencing in the Middle East. The United States remains the dominant weapons merchant for the Middle East, and arms sales represent a central component of America’s hegemonic presence in the region.
While initially a product of the Cold War, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the American unipolar era, the Middle East became “ground zero” for the new liberal hegemonic project pursued by Washington. Through two wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003) and the “global war on terror” following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States achieved unparalleled military dominance in the region. Arms sales to partner states in the Middle East then increased exponentially.
Despite the past three U.S. administrations — under Barack Obama , Donald Trump , and Joe Biden — campaigning on promises to reassess America’s presence in the region and stop Washington’s “endless wars,” the flow of weaponry to the Middle East continued unabated, with larger quantities and more advanced technology flowing to regional partners under the assumption that such transfers were in U.S. national interests.
Instead of advancing U.S. interests or providing Washington with leverage, the unwavering provisioning of such weapons and support for these states has undermined American interests and values while implicating the United States in their destabilizing policies. Predicated on the false notion that these weapons sales provide Washington with leverage over recipient countries, these sales have the opposite effect, entrenching an artificial regional order that rests on fierce repression and exclusion, while not benefitting U.S. interests.
Recipients of U.S. arms in the Middle East are among the most repressive states in the world, and the steady stream of weaponry from the United States that is caused by reverse leverage provides the authoritarian regimes with the implements to crush dissent. Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates , Egypt , Jordan , Bahrain , Israel and other recipients of U.S. arms are involved in exclusionary and repressive policies, fueling the domestic grievances that lead to unrest and instability. In the almost 13 years since the 2011 Arab uprisings, America’s regional partners have used U.S. weaponry to crush the democratic aspirations of millions across the Middle East and North Africa.
Many of these states are equally aggressive abroad, which risks dragging the United States directly into their conflicts. Most notably, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continue to use U.S. weapons as part of their military campaign in Yemen that began in 2015 and has since claimed the lives of over 377,000 people and devolved into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis . Some of these weapons were transferred by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to militants linked to al-Qaeda as part of the war effort.
U.S. arms sales to the Middle East have also helped to establish nonphysical methods of coercion, allowing these states to push their repressive and aggressive policies to the transnational level. Arms exports from the United States can include sophisticated surveillance technology. For example, the State Department and National Security Agency approved the contract allowing the U.S. company CyberPoint to work with the Emirati government and provide them with technology to help develop the surveillance powerhouse Project Raven , which is responsible for targeting activists, journalists, and government officials around the world.
Continued arms sales to Middle Eastern countries are now being justified by Washington as essential to combatting Russian and Chinese advances in the region. According to this line of thought, if the United States does not maintain these strong relationships, it would create a strategic vacuum to be filled by Russia or China, resulting in regional actors turning toward Moscow and Beijing as their “great-power guarantors.”
However, taking such arguments at face value neglects regional and international nuances. Neither Russia nor China is capable of assuming a hegemonic position in the Middle East, nor do they desire to. Moscow and Beijing are opportunists in the Middle East, and neither of them is able or willing to build a new political and security order in the region. States within the region are aware of the limitations facing Russia and China as well as the tremendous costs that would accompany attempting to shift wholesale to non-U.S. weapons systems. Therefore, regional actors have sought to manipulate great-power politics in order to best advance their interests in the short and long term.
In the short term, America’s regional partners have cultivated Washington’s anxiety about losing its position relative to Russia or China and are pressing for major policy concessions, such as access to weapons systems and nuclear technology that United States has traditionally been hesitant to provide. Ultimately, they seek to manipulate Washington’s anxiety into entrapping the United States as their continued security guarantor. In the long term, these actors are recognizing multipolarity as a reality and are positioning themselves accordingly to best advance their own interests. This includes, among other things, increasing arms purchases from Russia and China to cultivate a similar, albeit lesser, form of reverse leverage with Moscow and Beijing. Ultimately, Washington should recognize how America’s regional partners are using the return of great-power politics to pressure the United States into doubling down on insecure autocrats while sacrificing its own interests in the process.
Lessons for U.S. Arms Policy
U.S. arms sales to the Middle East are predicated on the false notion that such transfers provide Washington with leverage over recipient countries. But the opposite has proven to be true: U.S. arms policy in the Middle East has resulted in a vicious cycle whereby Washington is pressured into actively undermining its own interests through the continued provisioning of weaponry to nefarious regional actors.
Ultimately, such policies reinforce an unstable regional order, endanger the safety of American troops, jeopardize the security of U.S. weapons, and undermine the security of U.S. strategic partners outside of the Middle East, like Taiwan .
4604. Link turn---the strikes are what is costing us the region.
Onapajo 26 — Hakeem Onapajo. January 26. Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow at the Legislative Center for Security Analysis, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies. LSE Africa at LSE, “US military strikes in Nigeria may escalate the security crisis in the Sahel,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2026/01/26/us-military-strikes-in-nigeria-may-escalate-the-security-crisis-in-the-sahel/ Clopus
Although seemingly useful, a continued US-led military operation in Nigeria may be counter-productive and open a floodgate of immediate and long-term security threats.
First, the historical religious tension between Christian and Muslim communities has been ignited following the framing of the conflict as a Muslim-targeting-Christian problem. Clearly, the rhetoric of Christian genocide by the US government disregards the Muslim victims of the conflicts. Across the Muslim-dominated northern region, there is a growing perception of a well-coordinated Western agenda to decimate the Muslim population in favour of the Christians for political reasons. If not curtailed, such perception may lead to a large-scale conflict that may derail the fragile unity in Nigeria.
Second, foreign invasion to fight terrorism gives the impression of a weak and incapable Nigerian government, which may play into the hands of ambitious military coup makers aiming to attack a democratic regime. Recent military takeovers in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali were justified by the military as necessary due to the inability of the civilian governments to contain terrorism and counter French influence. The democratic breakdown in Nigeria will not only affect the country but will also greatly destabilise the West African sub-region.
Third, the Sahel is presently classified as the hotbed of terrorism by the Global Terrorism Index , as the deadliest terror groups are located there. Launching a war against their counterparts in Nigeria may occasion the influx of other terror groups into Nigeria to show solidarity, escalating insecurity in the region. On the other hand, the war may also push the terrorists to other areas within and outside the country.
Fourth, Nigeria has the largest population in Africa. A badly executed military operation may lead to a large-scale conflict that would cause a massive humanitarian crisis. Already, the conflict has caused over two million internal displacements and refugees in neighbouring countries. The international community may not be able to handle the possible humanitarian crisis that may follow an extensive military operation in northern Nigeria.
Fifth, a US-led military operation in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria will increase anti-US sentiments in Nigeria, as well as the West African region. West Africa is largely Muslim-dominated, with a strong ethnic solidarity of the Hausa and Fulani in many states across the region. A US-led military operation may expose American people and assets to more attacks around the region.
461Nigeria buys from everyone and belongs to no one---that's the doctrine.
Enikanolaiye 26 — Sola Enikanolaiye. August. Nigerian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, setting out the Ministry’s strategic-autonomy framework in an address delivered in Abuja. Vanguard, “Strategic autonomy: Nigeria’s doctrine for self-determination in a multipolar world,” https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/08/strategic-autonomy-nigerias-doctrine-for-self-determination-in-a-multipolar-world/ Clopus
Engage all major powers without being locked into one camp. In a multipolar world, alignment is a choice made per issue, not per decade. Nigeria maintains a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China on infrastructure and more. It deepens trade and security ties with the US and EU. It expands South-South cooperation with India, Brazil, and the Gulf. It leads on the continent through AfCFTA and AU reform.
This is not non-alignment. It is multi-alignment: engaging all, belonging to none, and extracting maximum value for Nigeria from each relationship. Strategic autonomy is alignment to Nigerian national interests. Nigeria’s 5 Pillars offer more than a foreign policy. They offer a template for mid-sized and emerging powers navigating great power competition. It is a policy of conviction without rigidity. Of partnership without dependence. Of ambition without illusion.
Nigeria will continue to deepen partnerships that deliver infrastructure, jobs, and technology, but always on Nigerian terms. In 2026, the measure of sovereignty is not who you oppose. It is what you are able to build. We can no longer afford an economy built only on exporting raw materials to one market and importing finished goods from another. The African Continental Free Trade Area gives us the platform to build regional value chains. At the same time, we must diversify globally.This is why we welcome China’s decision to grant zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries, while we simultaneously deepen trade with the EU, the US, the Gulf, and our neighbors in ECOWAS. No single partner can meet all our development needs, and we will not be dependent on any one.
The primary duty of any government is the protection of its citizens. That principle must guide our security partnerships. African-led solutions through the AU and ECOWAS remain our first choice. But we will not outsource our judgment. We greatly appreciate the US but if any country says he can help me to wipe out terrorism in Nigeria in the next two weeks, will I say because I’m friend to the US I will not agree? No,”. The safety of Nigerians comes first. Strategic autonomy means we evaluate every security offer by one metric: does it deliver peace, security and stability for our people?
In a multipolar world, we must talk to everyone and be forced to choose no one. This is not duplicity. It is maturity. We have demonstrated this in recent weeks. We condemned Afrophobic attacks in South Africa because the dignity of Nigerians abroad is non-negotiable. We pushed the agenda at the recent ECOWAS Summit in Freetown Sierra Leone where President Tinubu’s voice was clear and unambiguous. At the same time, we are preserving and strengthening the Nigeria-South Africa strategic partnership because both countries benefit from trade, investment, and regional leadership. That is strategic autonomy in practice.
462Two decades as Africa's top supplier bought Beijing one logistics base.
CRS 8-6 — Congressional Research Service. August 6. Nonpartisan research arm of the U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service, “China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy,” R49080, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R49080.html Clopus
Arms Sales. China has sold arms to Africa for decades, and from 2021 to 2024 reportedly was the largest arms supplier to Africa. 148 Among other equipment, some African countries (e.g., DRC, Nigeria, and Sudan) have procured military uncrewed aerial vehicles from China. 149 In some cases, PRC arms, whether exported by China or supplied by third parties, reportedly have been used in armed conflicts in Africa, including in DRC, South Sudan, and Sudan, in some cases counter to UN arms embargoes. 150
Maritime Counterpiracy. Since 2008, the PLA has conducted counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa, along major global shipping routes. DOD reported that PLA Naval Escort Task Forces had deployed more than 150 ships and more than 35,000 personnel during 45 escort missions as of early 2024 and continued them throughout the year. 151
United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping. As of April 30, 2026, China was the eighth-largest uniformed personnel contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and the largest such contributor among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. As of the same date, China's largest peacekeeping deployment was with the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, 866 personnel), when it also had personnel in UN missions in the DRC, the Abyei area between Sudan and South Sudan, Western Sahara, and the Central African Republic. 152 In March 2026, a PLA general was named UNMISS force commander. 153
Military Exercises and Related Activity. The PLA regularly conducts bilateral and multilateral military exercises with African counterparts, at times jointly with other non-African countries. In 2019, China, Russia, and South Africa conducted a trilateral maritime security exercise for the first time; they reprised the exercise in 2023. 154 A third iteration of the exercise was postponed while South Africa hosted the 2025 G20 leadership summit, but in early 2026, South Africa hosted Will for Peace 2026 , a naval exercise for selected BRICS+ countries coordinated by China. The navies of South Africa, China, Russia, the UAE, and Iran participated, the latter in contravention of South African President Cyril Ramaphosa's order that Iranian naval ships not join the exercise nor observe it, drawing U.S. criticism. 155 In 2024, the PLA conducted its first land and naval forces exercise in Africa, with Tanzania and Mozambique. 156 Multiple African coastal states have hosted PLA Navy port calls. 157
Professional Military Education (PME) and Training. PME is a major area of PRC security engagement in Africa. As of 2024, more than 50 African militaries reportedly had participated in PRC PME programs, and African officers comprise a reported 60% of foreign officers admitted to PRC military institutions; five current or former African presidents are graduates of such programs. 158 The PLA set up a military training school in Tanzania in 2018. 159 At the 2024 FOCAC summit, China pledged about $141 million in military aid grants; military training, exercises, and patrols; training for 6,000 African military personnel and 1,000 police/law enforcement personnel; and opportunities for 500 "young African military officers to visit China." 160