576. The Nigerian literature says the same---strikes erode trust and degrade the campaign.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The frequency of airstrike mishaps in Nigeria has raised serious concerns regarding the country's airpower capabilities and operational effectiveness. The successful execution of airstrikes in combat situations demands a high level of technical expertise and precision. While some unintended civilian casualties could be deemed understandable if the intended target is hit, it is a much graver operational failure when an airstrike completely misses its mark and causes indiscriminate harm elsewhere (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5). The loss of civilian lives through failure to take adequate precautions in targeting, or through disproportionate military response is against international laws of armed combat.
Nigeria’s recurring pattern of airstrike mishaps reflects operational deficiencies or ineptitude, particularly in its counterinsurgency efforts. These mishaps not only tarnish the reputation of the Nigerian military but also significantly impact its combat proficiency (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 6, 7). Consequently, they undermine the military's overall effectiveness and pose a major challenge to the country's counterinsurgency endeavours (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 2). There is a need to recognise that accurate intelligence is crucial for the success of airstrikes; it informs target selection, timing, and execution. When intelligence is flawed, airstrikes can miss their intended targets, hitting civilian areas or friendly forces instead. These failures can result from inadequate reconnaissance, faulty data analysis, or communication breakdowns within the military hierarchy. Mutch and Afzal (Citation2023) describe these mishaps as a case of an ‘innocent mistake.’ However, this perspective overlooks the systemic issues within military intelligence operations. Intelligence failures often reflect deeper problems in the planning and execution stages of military operations. For instance, if intelligence reports are based on outdated or incomplete information, the likelihood of an airstrike hitting the wrong target increases. Similarly, if there is a failure in communication between intelligence analysts and military commanders, the airstrike may proceed based on incorrect or misunderstood data. These deficiencies in intelligence, in conjunction with military errors, are significant factors contributing to civilian harm resulting from airstrikes conducted for counterinsurgency operations.
A review of the literature and the analysis in indicate that NAF airstrike mishaps have impacted civilians in the three sub-regions of northern Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (Citation2023a) reported that several civilians were killed by NAF airstrikes intended for bandits or members of the Islamist group Boko Haram but instead hit civilians. SB Morgen Intel (Citation2023) added that since 2017, over 300 people have died in airstrikes by NAF targeting terrorists. shows that in the past decade, at least 450 civilians in 18 communities have been killed by accidental NAF airstrikes. However, casualty numbers vary across sources, suggesting that the actual toll might be higher due to unreported incidents in remote areas (Isamotu, Citation2023). Analysis of the regional distribution of harm to civilians provides additional insight into the incidents spanning from 2014 to 2024.
In the northeast region, six reported incidents affected civilians, along with one accidental strike on a military convoy. On February 28, 2014, a military plane mistakenly bombed the village of Daglun community during an offensive against Boko Haram, resulting in the death of 20 civilians, most of whom were elderly (BBC News, Citation2014). Despite an extensive military ground operations aimed at eradicating Boko Haram, the government aircraft dropped four bombs, killing Daglun civilians while they slept (Ali Ndume, cited in BBC News, Citation2014). According to Human Rights Watch (Citation2023a), a similar military mishap occurred two weeks later in the village of Kayamla, resulting in the deaths of ten civilians. Following the Daglun and Kayamla airstrikes, Human Rights Watch stated that the NAF rarely acknowledges mistakes and does not provide justice or accountability to the families of the victims (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a).
Three years after the Daglun and Kayamla incidents, a NAF airstrike struck an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Rann, resulting in the deaths of at least 53 displaced persons. The death toll may have been as high as 115, with over 100 people injured (Isamotu, Citation2023). Although there was no clearly designated displacement camp in Rann, numerous tents for displaced individuals were spread out among the residential structures at the two locations that were affected. These tents could be seen clearly from the air, leading to inquiries about how such an incident could have taken place (Isamotu, Citation2023). Other reported accidental NAF strikes in the region include those in Gajigana and Kwatar Daban Masara, which led to the deaths of 13 and 20 civilians, respectively. Additionally, 30 soldiers were killed in Mainok by a NAF fighter jet that hit the wrong coordinates while targeting Boko Haram insurgents (SBM Intel, Citation2023). In Buwari village, Yobe State, NAF airstrikes killed nine farmers (Isamotu, Citation2023). The NAF initially denied involvement in the incidents but later acknowledged the possibility of civilian casualties. This pattern of denial in the aftermath of airstrike mishaps is consistent with the NAF's response to previous incidents in the northeast region.
In the northwest region, the military campaign's focus shifted from combating insurgency to banditry. On 25 December 2024, 10 civilians were killed by NAF accidental airstrikes in Gidan Sama and Rumtuwa communities in the Silame local government area of Sokoto state (Punch, Citation2024). Eleven individuals were killed in the Ajia community, Birnin Magaji, due to NAF airstrike accidents (Isamotu, Citation2023). Two civilians were killed, and 13 others were wounded in Kunkunni Village, Safana, Katsina State, by a NAF fighter jet strike (SBM Intel, Citation2023). Also, the Mutunji attack was responsible for 60 deaths (Isamotu, Citation2023) and the Tudun Biri incident resulted in 120 civilian deaths, as well as 66 injuries. Similarly, while Tudun Biri residents were gathered to celebrate Maulud, commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday, a military drone misinterpreted their movements as suspicious during a routine counterterrorism operation, leading to an airstrike on the civilians. Survivors of these attacks, such as 37-year-old Idris Dahiru, describe the loss of as many as 30 family members, highlighting the human toll of these catastrophic incidents (Odeniyi, Citation2023).
The northcentral region has experienced mishaps from NAF airstrikes similar to other regions. In Genu town, Niger State, a bombing by the NAF Alpha jet resulted in the deaths of several wedding guests (SBM Intel, Citation2023). In the Kuregba community of Shiroro Local Government Area, at least six children were killed by a NAF airstrike (SBM Intel, Citation2023). Additionally, 18 individuals, including vigilantes and residents in the Galkogo community, lost their lives following an inadvertent action by a NAF aircraft; 8,000 people were displaced because of the incident. In Kwaki Village, Shiroro L.G.A., a woman was also killed in a NAF airstrike (Isamotu, Citation2023). The Rukubi airstrike incidents that killed 40 individuals, mainly Fulani pastoralists was another tragic incident (SBM Intel, Citation2023). The recurring incidents in Niger State were linked to miscommunication between the NAF and local security forces, highlighting the need for better coordination in such operations.
587. And the US role compounds it---solidarity pulls fighters in from the Sahel.
Onapajo 26 — Hakeem Onapajo. January 26. Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow at the Legislative Center for Security Analysis, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies. Africa at LSE, “US military strikes in Nigeria may escalate the security crisis in the Sahel,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2026/01/26/us-military-strikes-in-nigeria-may-escalate-the-security-crisis-in-the-sahel/ Clopus
Despite observers dismissing the possibility of direct US involvement in Nigeria, following a series of high-level diplomatic engagements between Washington and Abuja, President Trump announced a “Christmas gift” to the terrorists. He claimed the US had conducted successful airstrikes against targeted terrorist cells.
To forestall perceptions of territorial aggression, the Nigerian government immediately released an official statement saying that the operation was a product of military cooperation between Washington and Abuja.
Although seemingly useful, a continued US-led military operation in Nigeria may be counter-productive and open a floodgate of immediate and long-term security threats.
First, the historical religious tension between Christian and Muslim communities has been ignited following the framing of the conflict as a Muslim-targeting-Christian problem. Clearly, the rhetoric of Christian genocide by the US government disregards the Muslim victims of the conflicts. Across the Muslim-dominated northern region, there is a growing perception of a well-coordinated Western agenda to decimate the Muslim population in favour of the Christians for political reasons. If not curtailed, such perception may lead to a large-scale conflict that may derail the fragile unity in Nigeria.
Second, foreign invasion to fight terrorism gives the impression of a weak and incapable Nigerian government, which may play into the hands of ambitious military coup makers aiming to attack a democratic regime. Recent military takeovers in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali were justified by the military as necessary due to the inability of the civilian governments to contain terrorism and counter French influence. The democratic breakdown in Nigeria will not only affect the country but will also greatly destabilise the West African sub-region.
Third, the Sahel is presently classified as the hotbed of terrorism by the Global Terrorism Index , as the deadliest terror groups are located there. Launching a war against their counterparts in Nigeria may occasion the influx of other terror groups into Nigeria to show solidarity, escalating insecurity in the region. On the other hand, the war may also push the terrorists to other areas within and outside the country.
Fourth, Nigeria has the largest population in Africa. A badly executed military operation may lead to a large-scale conflict that would cause a massive humanitarian crisis. Already, the conflict has caused over two million internal displacements and refugees in neighbouring countries. The international community may not be able to handle the possible humanitarian crisis that may follow an extensive military operation in northern Nigeria.
Fifth, a US-led military operation in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria will increase anti-US sentiments in Nigeria, as well as the West African region. West Africa is largely Muslim-dominated, with a strong ethnic solidarity of the Hausa and Fulani in many states across the region. A US-led military operation may expose American people and assets to more attacks around the region.
Nigeria’s insecurity problem could benefit from international collaboration. However, navigating the terrain of insecurity in the West African country is not as simple as it seems. There is a need for a great deal of caution by foreign collaborators, especially the United States, in approaching the security situation. The United States must allow the Nigerian government to continue to take the lead in fighting its domestic terrorism while offering greater military support and oversight to ensure a successful counter-terrorism campaign.
591. Grant it. Four warheads still failed to detonate in populated ground.
Airwars 26 — Airwars. Nonprofit transparency organisation that tracks and assesses civilian harm from airstrikes, running the Open Source Munitions Portal; assessment compiled from Washington Post, BBC, NYT, CNN and HumAngle reporting. Airwars, “USNG251225a: December 25, 2025,” https://airwars.org/incidents/usng251225a-december-25-2025 Clopus
At least four separate locations were affected by the attack. Initial statements mentioned that the missiles “targeted” camps in Sokoto state on the border with Niger, as well as “hideouts in the forests of Tangaza district in Sokoto”. The New York Times later quoted military sources as saying that at least two ISIS-run camps were hit. The FMINO’s statement also said that the attack took place on the Bauni forest axis of Tangaza Local Government Area in Sokoto State. HumAngle Media later confirmed that the strike had occurred in the Bauni village area.
The Washington Post asserted that at least four warheads out of the 16 Tomahawk missiles failed to detonate. At least two missiles landed in the Jabo area, one that exploded and another that did not. The missile that detonated landed a few meters from a local farm, whereas the missile that did not explode crashed in an onion field about one kilometer from the other. According to the BBC, the second unexploded munition hit at least five different structures in Offa, including Offa Central Hotel and residential buildings, while a third struck a field approximately 500 meters from the local Primary Health Center on the outskirts of the city. Finally, the fourth unexploded missile was recovered by Nigerian police in a forest in Zugurma community. In response the Nigerian military issued a statement warning local civilians not to “keep or tamper” with the munitions, with Major General Michael Onoja, director of Defence Media Operations, telling Reuters that “We do not expect civilians to pick up or keep such materials. We can only appeal to them to return all materials that may prove harmful to them.”
Images of the four unexploded munition remnants found at the locations of multiple strikes have been assessed by Airwars’ project the Open Source Munitions Portal, identified as cruise missiles from the RGM-/UGM-109 Tomahawk series (see below munitions section for details ).
While the FMINO recognized that “debris from expended munitions fell in Jabo, [..], and in Offa”, it argued that no civilian casualties were recorded. DW noted that “even days after the strikes, authorities remain unable to confirm whether there were any civilian casualties or deaths among the targeted militants.” Tajudeen Alabi, a former special assistant to the governor of Kwara State for security, confirmed to the BBC that “some people were injured”.
Official casualty figures conflict with local testimonies. A researcher quoted in Guardian believes that about 100 ISIS-linked fighters were killed while 200 remained missing. AFRICOM’s initial assessment also referenced “multiple ISIS terrorists were killed in the ISIS camps”. According to community members in Tangaza in Sokoto, the airstrikes did hit their intended camps, killing fighters and forcing others to flee. However, residents of Bauni village said they have seen no sign that any terrorist was hit. Residents of Nukuru, a village about 6 miles from the reported camp, told the BBC that fighters on about 15 motorcycles had fled through the community, riding three to a bike. A local resident told HumAngle Media that “Ten additional motorcycles were moving to Muntsaika, a community in the nearby Niger Republic, in the evening before the strikes happened.” However, others, including Alhaji Bunu, the traditional ruler of the Gwangwano District in Tangaza LGA, told HumAngle that “No terrorist was found dead throughout our communities. We saw nothing like dead bodies, even at the Bauni Mountains where the bomb fell. The same Lakurawas we knew are still here, loitering around our communities. We are still mingling with them.” A village head also told HumAngle that the airstrikes had only resulted in moving terrorists into civilian settlements. As for residents in Jabo, they denied any previous militant activity in the area.
602. Precision is about lethality, not protection---the binding input is intelligence.
Lee 21 — Peter Lee. November 19. Professor of Applied Ethics and Director of Security and Risk Research at the University of Portsmouth; author of Reaper Force, an embedded study of RAF MQ-9 crews. The Conversation, “Modern warfare: ‘precision’ missiles will not stop civilian deaths – here’s why,” https://theconversation.com/modern-warfare-precision-missiles-will-not-stop-civilian-deaths-heres-why-171905 Clopus
The development of more precise missiles and guided bombs does not automatically mean a reduction in civilian deaths. For one thing, “precision” is not about protecting civilians so much as making these weapons “ more lethal ”.
A whole range of factors affect the civilian risk during a “precision” attack. These include the size and explosive yield of the missile or bomb; the training and experience of the aircrew involved; the quality of the military intelligence; and the operational environment in which the attack is made.
Political implications for the countries involved are also a factor. The British government, for example, has faced public scrutiny for civilian deaths in air strikes in a way that, say, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has not.
Much also depends on the rules of engagement – or legal guidance, because they will set out how many civilians a government is prepared, or not, to allow its air force to kill in pursuit of its military campaign objectives.
Law of war
The law of war – which includes the Geneva Conventions – requires civilians to be protected in war and not attacked. But – and this is not commonly understood – the law allows civilians to be legally killed in some circumstances: where the number of deaths is judged by the attacker not to be “excessive in relation to the concrete and [direct military advantage] anticipated”. So if a target is judged to be valuable enough, and the military advantage important enough, civilians can and will be killed.
On August 29 2021, ten Afghan civilians were killed by a Hellfire missile from a US Reaper drone. The precision of the missile did not save them. The crew responsible made the mistake through a combination of human error, miscommunication and the fact that the family’s Toyota Corolla had been wrongly identified as the car of an important ISIS target.
613. The Nigerian-led campaign is where the harm lives---and it didn’t stop.
Guardian 5-12 — The Guardian. May 12. Lagos-based Nigerian national daily, carrying Reuters reporting on Amnesty International’s findings. The Guardian Nigeria, “100 killed in Nigerian airstrike on Zamfara market - Amnesty alleges,” https://guardian.ng/news/100-killed-in-nigerian-airstrike-on-zamfara-market-amnesty-alleges/ Clopus
The airstrike, which hit the remote Tumfa market in Zurmi district on Sunday, was the second to kill scores of people at a crowded market in northern Nigeria in a month.
Dozens of injured people were being treated at hospitals in Zurmi and nearby Shinkafi, Amnesty said, adding that many of those killed were women and girls.
The Nigerian Air Force has yet to issue a statement on the incident.
Citing witnesses, Amnesty said military jets had been spotted hovering around the area at midday and returned about two hours later and struck the crowded market.
In April, around 200 civilians were killed in a similar airstrike on a weekly market in Jilli, in northeastern Nigeria. The military has opened a probe into that incident.
Residents say they are increasingly worried about civilian deaths from military raids and strikes in northern regions.
Nigeria’s military has been battling banditry in the northwest and a 17-year Islamist insurgency in the northeast.
The United States struck what it said were Islamist bases in northwestern Nigeria on Christmas Day last year, after President Donald Trump accused Nigeria of failing to protect Christians.
“This pattern of human rights violation is increasingly becoming the norm, with villagers at the receiving end of atrocities by both armed groups, bandits and the military,” Amnesty said.
It called the airstrikes unlawful and said they showed disregard for civilian life.
621. The airframes are American, so the whole sustainment tail is too.
US Mission Nigeria 21 — U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Nigeria. August 31. Official release of the United States diplomatic mission to Nigeria, quoting the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa. U.S. Mission Nigeria, “U.S.-made A-29 Super Tucano Aircraft Officially Inducted into Nigerian Air Force,” https://ng.usembassy.gov/u-s-made-a-29-super-tucano-aircraft-officially-inducted-into-nigerian-air-force/ Clopus
Nigeria purchased the A-29s through the Foreign Military Sales program, which follows the Department of Defense’s “Total Package Approach” model and includes spare parts for several years of operation, contract logistics support, munitions, and a multi-year construction project to improve Kainji Air Base infrastructure. The total sale is valued at almost $500 million, making it the largest FMS program in sub-Saharan Africa.
Harrigian and U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Mary Beth Leonard spoke to media about how this platform will help improve Nigerian Air Force capabilities, as well as increase training and integration opportunities between Nigerian and U.S. troops. The A-29 can perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision air-to-ground strikes, strengthening Nigeria’s ability to fight terrorism.
“The A-29 is a prime tool to help Nigeria combat violent extremism and is vital to sustained deterrence,” Harrigian said. “The total package deal—aircrew and maintainer training, precision-guided weapon delivery, and more—highlights our enduring partnership with the Nigerian Air Force and our commitment to enabling their successes where we can.”
A total of 64 pilots and maintainers from the Nigerian Air Force trained to U.S. standards with the U.S. Air Force’s 81st Fighter Squadron at Moody Air Base in Georgia, USA. Training also emphasized the Law of Armed Conflict and civilian casualty mitigation, which are fundamental principles of the Nigerian military’s professional education and training.
As part of the program, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is providing $36.1M in infrastructure support to the A-29s’ home base, Kainji Air Base, including earth-covered magazines and aircraft sunshades, a new airfield hot cargo pad, perimeter and security fencing, airfield lights, and various airfield apron, parking, hangar, and entry control point enhancements.
The infrastructure package also includes a flight annex wing building for simulator training as well as munitions assembly and storage and small arms storage. USACE has also stationed a project engineer at Kainji to provide ongoing maintenance and assistance.
632. Switching suppliers means rebuilding the whole chain---sometimes it’s not possible.
Yousif 23 — Elias Yousif. Research Analyst with the Conventional Defense Program at the Stimson Center, researcher on U.S. arms transfer policy and security cooperation. Stimson Center, “‘If we don’t sell it, someone else will:’ Dependence & Influence in US Arms Transfers,” https://www.stimson.org/2023/if-we-dont-sell-it-someone-else-will-dependence-influence-in-us-arms-transfers/ Clopus
Each of these factors inform important interest-based calculations that can shape the costs of seeking alternative sources of arms.
For example, threats that importers perceive of as needing to be addressed by military means are clearly a necessary condition for dependency; without a need for military equipment and services, severing an arms relationship would come at little meaningful cost to the importer.4Note: Richard A.I. Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems, 1955–2007,” Defense and Peace Economics Volume 31, Issue 7, (May 2019), pg. 853-854, 856-857. But the nature of threat perceptions can also have significant bearing on dependence and the potential leverage of an exporter. A state that perceives physical military threats as likely, imminent, and severe in magnitude is likely to incur a greater cost in security terms from any rupture with a supplier that undercuts readiness. On the other hand, a country for which security threats seem remote and of only marginal severity would likely incur fewer financial, operational, and readiness costs by transitioning to another supplier.
Another factor shaping an importer’s degree of dependency is the availability of alternate sources, both actual or potential, of necessary defense articles and services. This could include the capacity to replace imports with domestic production or the availability of other external suppliers. Here again, certain factors will shape the availability of these choices. Does the state possess the technical, industrial, or human capital to quickly ramp up domestic production? Are the capabilities available from other suppliers? Do those suppliers coordinate their policies? Are substitute capabilities available? Are alternatives financially viable? In many cases, these factors can prove prohibitive or at least costly, helping to explain the decision to import from the original supplier in the first place.
The type of capability under consideration will also impact the likely availability of alternate supplies. Small arms and light weapons, for example, are relatively simple to produce, can be easily made in large quantities, are manufactured all over the globe, and are generally comparable in capabilities.5Note: Suneel Kumar, “Small Arms and Light Weapon: A Global Threat to Human Security and Development,” The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 69. No 4, (Oct 2008), pg. 787-788. Compare that to advanced fighter aircraft or other highly sophisticated systems, and not only does the market become much smaller, but the likelihood that such a system can be produced domestically also shrinks.6Note: Harrison Kass, “Only 3 Countries Have Built 5th-Generation Fighters, but Militaries are Already Working on More Advanced 6th-gen Jets,” Business Insider, September 4th, 2022, accessed November 3, 2022. https://www.businessinsider.com/what-features-and-design-will-a-6th-generation-fighter-have-2022-9#:~:text=Fifth%2Dgeneration%20fighters%20are%20so,interconnectivity%20%E2%80%94%20is%20still%20cutting%20edge. Moreover, these advanced systems are less likely to be interoperable with or functionally comparable to those of competing suppliers.
When it comes to sourcing from alternate external suppliers, factors beyond simple market forces play a role. Arms relationships are commonly seen as indicators of international alliances and partnerships, reflecting an alignment of interests between supplier and importer. In that context, supply networks can be partially dependent on ideology, as was often the case during the Cold War.7Note: Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems,” pg. 853. Increasing multipolarity has changed those dynamics, but alignment still has a notable bearing on the menu of suppliers an importer might be able to select from.
Additionally, for importers that do wish to look elsewhere for a particular capability, simply finding a comparable or alternative source may be just the first challenge. A new platform will likely also require new systemic chains of supply, sustainment, and maintenance, as well as new processes to develop interoperability between the new system and those already in service. In some cases, interoperability between systems sourced from different suppliers is either prohibitively expensive or simply not possible. Accordingly, integration efforts are no small task, especially if doctrines, structures, and sustainment systems reflect those of a state’s historical patrons.8Note: David Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Jan 1998), pg. 8.
Similarly, pivoting to an alternate supplier could risk jeopardizing existing supply relationships that would still be necessary for sustaining systems already in service. If an importer’s transition to another supplier ruptures the relationship with its former patron, it could jeopardize sustainment and maintenance packages that are essential to keeping highly technical capabilities functioning, undercutting readiness.9Note: Government of the United States, Congressional Research Service, “Transfer of Defense Articles: Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities,” Nathan J. Lucas et.al., (Congressional Research Service), pg. 10. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R46337.pdf; Johnson, “Decision-Making in the Arms of a Dependent, Relationship: Explaining Shifts in Importer Acquisition Patterns of Major Weapon Systems,” pg. 854.
643. Nigeria’s fleet is already grounded without foreign parts---that’s the barrier.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
Nigeria’s airpower dates to the establishment of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in 1964, which has historically depended on foreign training and equipment (Ebiye, Citation1992). Although terrorism in Nigeria predates airpower development, aerial capabilities have been pivotal in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in northern Nigeria, leveraging drones and aircraft for real-time data acquisition (Onuoha, Citation2014). Precision airstrikes have targeted insurgents’ strongholds, though issues such as collateral damage and intelligence accuracy have long been problematic (Ewi & Salifu, Citation2017). The NAF has been integral to counterinsurgency efforts, employing airstrikes to neutralise insurgent strongholds, interrupt supply logistics, and target leadership figures. However, it is essential to note that the Army also employs airpower for purposes such as airstrikes, transportation, interception, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5).
Despite the importance of airpower to Nigeria’s counterinsurgency campaign, the NAF faces substantial challenges, including an aging fleet and limited maintenance infrastructure, leaving many aircraft grounded and dependent on foreign spare parts (Aghedo & Osumah, Citation2015). Operational readiness is further undermined by procurement delays and geopolitical obstacles. While pilot training has improved, gaps in technical expertise and maintenance capabilities highlight the need for greater investment in capacity building (Egbewole, Citation2020). Nevertheless, according to John Campbell the acquisition of A-29 Super Tucano combat aircraft from the US in 2021 has enhanced Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations (Campbell, Citation2021). The integration of the newly acquired Tucanos significantly enhanced the aerial capabilities of the NAF. This strategic upgrade not only improved the operational readiness and effectiveness of their fleet but also expanded their ability to conduct a wider range of missions in support of national security objectives, such as aerial cover for ground forces and tactical intelligence. However, Freedom Onuoha maintains that despite the diversification in military partnerships, challenges related to interoperability with Western systems persist (Onuoha, Citation2014). There are still issues with communication and intelligence sharing with partners, especially the Western countries.
651. Grant the kill. The Basin has buried this many commanders before.
HumAngle 26 — HumAngle Media. May 31. Nigerian investigative outlet reporting the Lake Chad conflict from the ground, drawing on sources inside ISWAP and on Nigerian military and intelligence officials. HumAngle, “The Men Lining Up to Replace Al-Minuki,” https://humanglemedia.com/the-men-lining-up-to-replace-al-minuki/ Clopus
The leadership transition unfolding inside ISWAP is taking place within an organisation that has undergone profound internal transformation in recent years. Sources familiar with the group’s operations told HumAngle that the growing presence of foreign fighters from across the Sahel and beyond has reshaped not only the movement’s military tactics but also its internal security culture.
As foreign fighters increasingly settled in the Lake Chad region, ISWAP imposed some of its strictest operational security measures to date. Members were ordered to delete existing photographs and cease documenting activities through images. The use of smartphones was largely prohibited, reflecting mounting concerns about surveillance, geolocation tracking, and intelligence penetration.
The restrictions marked a sharp departure from earlier years when both Boko Haram and ISWAP routinely photographed preaching sessions, training exercises, weapon displays, and daily life in territories under their control. Such imagery formed a central component of the group’s propaganda and recruitment machinery.
According to sources, the new rules were enforced ruthlessly. Several fighters accused of taking photographs or retaining images on their devices were reportedly executed. The killings served as both punishment and deterrence, reinforcing a culture of secrecy that now permeates much of the organisation.
“The message was simple,” one source familiar with the group’s internal directives said. “Any digital trace that could expose fighters, commanders, or locations became a security threat.” The arrival of experienced foreign fighters appears to have accelerated this shift. Many brought with them lessons learned from conflicts across the Sahel, where drone surveillance, signals intelligence, and electronic tracking have increasingly shaped the battlefield.
The influence of foreign fighters introduced a greater emphasis on counter-intelligence, operational discipline, compartmentalisation, and the elimination of digital footprints that could expose personnel, camps, supply routes, or command structures. The result is an insurgent organisation that has become considerably more cautious than its predecessors. While leadership losses continue to disrupt, ISWAP’s evolving security architecture suggests a movement increasingly focused on institutional survival rather than on dependence on individual commanders.
The killing of Minuki undoubtedly represents a serious disruption, and the elimination of Ba Shuwa, if confirmed, would considerably deepen that disruption. Yet, military and intelligence officials caution against interpreting the development as a strategic defeat for ISWAP.
“The organisation has experienced similar moments before with the deaths of Mohammed Yusuf, Mamman Nur, Abu Musab al Barnawi, Ba Idrissa, and several other senior commanders, each of which generated predictions of organisational collapse,” said Kyari Mustafa, a conflict researcher in Maiduguri.
Those predictions never materialised. Instead, the group adapted. The pattern has become familiar across the Lake Chad Basin.
HumAngle has documented a pattern where successful military campaigns weaken the insurgency. Communities experience a period of relative calm. The group regroups, reassesses, and eventually resumes attacks. This cycle has repeated itself for more than 15 years. What makes the current moment significant is the possibility that an entire generation of commanders may be disappearing simultaneously. If Minuki and Ba Shuwa are indeed gone, the future of ISWAP may soon be shaped by men who were toddlers when Mohammed Yusuf built the movement.
Whether that transition produces fragmentation, renewal, or further violence remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Lake Chad Basin has witnessed enough leadership decapitations to know that the death of a commander, however important, does not automatically mean the end of the war.
662. The organisation is designed around losses---that’s what separates it from Shekau.
HumAngle 26 — HumAngle Media. June 10. Nigerian investigative outlet reporting the Lake Chad conflict from the ground; analysis of Islamic State’s own Al-Naba editorial output after the raid. HumAngle, “ISWAP Used Theology to Absorb the Shock of its Deadliest Week,” https://humanglemedia.com/iswap-used-theology-to-absorb-the-shock-of-its-deadliest-week/ Clopus
Another frequently mentioned figure is Bana Chingori, long regarded as a close associate of Ba Shuwa and an influential commander in his own right.
However, beneath the movement’s ideological claims lies a complex web of battalion loyalties, personal networks, ethnic affiliations, and historical rivalries. Fighters speak the language of the caliphate, but leadership legitimacy is often negotiated through social structures that long predate the insurgency itself. The question is not merely who is capable of leading, but who can command obedience across the various factions that make up the movement.
This is where the editorial in Al-Naba becomes more interesting. The Islamic State understands that leaders can be replaced. What is more difficult to replace is cohesion.
The editorial’s invocation of Uhud was not simply a sermon about perseverance. It was also an attempt to create continuity at a moment when continuity is under threat. By reminding fighters that early Muslims endured confusion after battlefield losses yet remained united, the editorial implicitly addresses the danger of fragmentation.
For nearly a decade, ISWAP distinguished itself from rival jihadist factions partly through its ability to maintain organisational discipline. While Boko Haram under Abubakar Shekau frequently splintered under pressure, ISWAP developed bureaucratic structures capable of surviving individual losses. The current transition will test those structures more severely than any succession crisis since the death of Abu Musab al-Barnawi and the removal of other senior figures from the Muhammad Yusuf generation.
Beyond the succession question lies another bigger development. ISWAP has announced that the flow of fighters migrating from Iraq and Syria to Nigeria has been effectively paused.
For years, the Islamic State’s call for migration to Africa was one of ISWAP’s most reliable sources of experienced foreign fighters. Foreign fighters who had trained and fought in the central theatre arrived in Lake Chad with tactical knowledge, ideological authority, and direct personal connections to IS central command.
Al-Minuki himself was a product of that ecosystem. The suspension reflects the bigger issue that ISWAP is facing, in which local ISWAP members feel foreigners are given more priority in the insurgency, and they’re being relegated. This, according to some sources, was one of the reasons that opened a loophole that led to the intelligence leading to the killing of Al-Minuki.
671. We don’t need collapse---we need contested territory, and that already exists.
Aboh 25 — Augustine Aboh. October 14. Security and conflict analyst writing on Lake Chad Basin counterinsurgency. Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University, “ISWAP’s Strategic Resurgence in Nigeria Signals Emerging Trends in Insurgents’ Sophistication and Limited Statehood,” https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/14/iswaps-strategic-resurgence-in-nigeria-signals-emerging-trends-in-insurgents-sophistication-and-limited-statehood/ Clopus
We can argue that ISWAP’s internal strategic reorganization and sophistication have accounted for a substantial battlefield advantage over state forces in recent months, but this doesn’t present a complete picture of the insurgents’ strategic leverage. Like most insurgencies that fester on the wings of state fragility, ISWAP’s recent campaign of terror aimed at demoralizing and degrading state forces and critical national security infrastructure underscores the broader challenge of systemic dysfunction and limited statehood . Despite Nigeria’s efforts in the last 25 years of its return to democracy to consolidate its democratic principles and good governance, the country has remain profoundly lacking in the capacity to provide substantial and sustainable public service. It also lacks the capacity to ensure human rights and rule of law, address group grievances and demographic pressures, and protect the vast majority of its citizens or territory or gain extensive state legitimacy. This lack of state capacity, also known as limited statehood, is evident in the country’s ranking of 15 th out of 178 countries, with a fragility score of 96.6 in the Fund for Peace’s 2024 Fragile States Index . Hence, ISWAP is exploiting the multiplex dynamics of the socio-political, economic, demographic, and institutional challenges bedeviling Nigeria for strategic leverage to advance the campaign of terror in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.
2. Lack of CTCOIN Coordination and Rivalry
Although Nigeria’s 2016 National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) envisions a robust strategic insight into the nation’s efforts, built on multi-stakeholder and intelligence-led CTCOIN operations, it has recorded limited operational and tactical successes. These failures have exposed the state’s vulnerabilities to exploitation by insurgents in a profoundly significant manner. One major reason is attributed to poor coordination of the CTCOIN strategy. The blurry strategic line of sight among the nation’s CTCOIN forces and security agencies undermines the potency of interoperability needed for effective counterterrorism operations.
682. The state can’t hold ground in the periphery---and access contracts as it fails.
Alesin 26 — Philip Alesin. April 27. Policy and advocacy professional writing on the northeast Nigeria response, drawing on interviews with Nigerian government officials and aid agency staff. The New Humanitarian, “To deliver a better humanitarian response, we need to fix Nigeria’s state dysfunction,” https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2026/04/27/deliver-better-humanitarian-response-fix-nigeria-state-dysfunction Clopus
Humanitarian narratives often focus on the conflict, displacement, and funding gaps. But these are symptoms, not causes. The deeper problem is that the northeast is embedded in a dysfunctional state system whose weaknesses predate the insurgency and shape every aspect of the response.
Four pillars of dysfunction – governance, security, infrastructure, and socioeconomic fragility – continue to drive suffering and systematically undermine humanitarian effectiveness.
Governance failures
From the inception of the humanitarian response, weak institutions, blurred mandates, unreliable data and chronic corruption defined the operating environment – undermining the aid system’s effectiveness.
The absence, for example, of a coherent displacement management framework makes coordination difficult, responsibilities overlap, and people fall through the cracks.
As the administrative capacity of the Nigerian state is weak, it pushes humanitarian agencies into basic government roles such as providing primary healthcare. At the same time, bureaucratic delays slow the customs clearance of lifesaving supplies, and fragile supply chains falter.
Meanwhile corruption – the greatest albatross of the Nigerian state – drains resources, erodes trust, and deprives those in need of assistance.
Security failures
The state’s inability to secure territory – in the BAY states and beyond – has created a landscape of constant risk for civilians and relief workers. Aid convoys are vulnerable to ambush, farmers are attacked in their fields, while communities are displaced again and again.
Humanitarian agencies must fund their own protection – armoured vehicles, escorts, hardened compounds (even in Abuja) – which diverts scarce resources away from those in need. As insecurity expands, access contracts, coverage shrinks, response speed slows, putting many more at risk.
Infrastructure deficit
Infrastructure deficits are constraints humanitarian actors cannot work around. Bad roads, destroyed bridges and weak communications make movement slow and predictable, increasing exposure to attack. The destruction of critical infrastructure – in a context where transport systems are limited even in peacetime – continues to shape access and deepen vulnerabilities .
693. Degradation is measurable now---resurgence, mass abduction and no accountability.
HRW 26 — Human Rights Watch. World Report 2026 country chapter on Nigeria; international human rights investigation and monitoring organization. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2026: Nigeria,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/nigeria Clopus
In 2025, insecurity remained prevalent across Nigeria, underscoring the authorities’ failure to protect communities or ensure accountability. Deadly attacks in Borno State, the epicenter of the Boko Haram conflict, signaled a resurgence of the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction of Boko Haram. Killings, kidnappings, and violent raids by criminal groups continued to impact the Northwest region. In response to the violence, Nigerian security forces have been implicated in abuses, including airstrikes which have killed people. Meanwhile, deadly intercommunal violence linked to decades-long farmer-herder tensions in the Northcentral region persisted.
Violence in the Northwest and Northcentral Regions
In the Northwest region, killings, kidnappings for ransom, and violent raids by criminal gangs that emerged from conflict between farming and herding communities, popularly called bandits, persisted while the authorities failed to protect those targeted and hold perpetrators of attacks accountable.
A report by geopolitical research firm SBM Intelligence found that 2,938 people were kidnapped in the Northwest region between July 2024 and June 2025—over 60 percent of reported incidents nationwide. According to the report, Zamfara State, the center of the banditry crisis, recorded the highest number, 1,203 abductions, followed by Kaduna with 629, Katsina with 566, and Sokoto with 358.
On August 19, armed attackers killed 32 people during an attack on worshippers at a mosque in Unguwan Mantau village, Malumfashi Local Government Area (LGA) of Katsina State. The authorities committed to ensuring justice for the killings but have yet to provide any information on efforts to investigate, arrest, and prosecute those responsible.
Protracted intercommunal violence between predominantly Muslim herders and Christian farming communities in north-central Nigeria persisted, resulting in killings and displacement.
In April, suspected herder-allied assailants killed 52 people and displaced nearly 2,000 during attacks on six villages in Bokkos LGA, Plateau State. In June, suspected herder-allied assailants also attacked Yelewata, a farming community in Guma LGA of Benue State, killing 59 people , according to the state government. However, residents provided a list of over 100 people they allege had been killed, to the media.
Authorities announced that they arrested 53 suspects , including 26 linked to the Yelewata attack in Benue State, and recovered weapons with promises of prosecution. However, there are no confirmed arrests or prosecutions for the April killings in Bokkos, and publicly available details on court proceedings or any convictions related to the Yelwata attack remain unclear, highlighting persistent gaps in accountability.
Between November 18 and 21, hundreds of schoolchildren were kidnapped by unidentified armed men in Kebbi and Niger states . Twenty-four children abducted on November 18 were released a week later, while 100 of those taken on November 21 were freed on December 8 and another 130 on December 2 1. President Tinubu recognized the efforts of security agencies in securing the releases but did not disclose who was responsible for the kidnappings or whether any investigations, arrests, or prosecutions have followed the releases. Nigerian authorities have failed to apply lessons from previous attacks to take measures that could prevent these atrocities.
701. The borderland already is one theatre---Benin, Niger and Nigeria are a single front.
ACLED 25 — Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project. March 27. The conflict-event dataset used by the UN, the World Bank and the US government; the report draws on the author’s field research for the Clingendael Institute. ACLED, “New frontlines: Jihadist expansion is reshaping the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands,” https://acleddata.com/report/new-frontlines-jihadist-expansion-reshaping-benin-niger-and-nigeria-borderlands Clopus
Between 2023 and 2024, JNIM and ISSP have escalated their operations in the border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria, significantly transforming these areas into a volatile frontline ( see graph below ). This renewed southward expansion through sustained violent campaigns is driven by the persistent pursuit of new manpower and recruitment opportunities as these groups continue to grow and build their insurgent armies, 5 as well as the need for access to resources through smuggling and illicit trade routes essential for their operations. Expansion into these remote and less secure areas further allows both groups to establish new operational bases and expand their logistical networks. This expansion has led to territorial contestation and has profoundly impacted the local communities, who find themselves increasingly caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict.
How JNIM and ISSP expand southward
Violent attacks by JNIM and ISSP have significantly increased in the border areas between the Sahel and the littoral borderlands, each using different tactics. Both groups have expanded out of their traditional areas of operation in the Sahel toward Benin and Nigeria, crossing paths in the southwestern border regions of Niger ( see map below ).
JNIM has used eastern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger as staging grounds to initially expand into Benin in 2021 and in Togo in 2022, and since the beginning of 2024, consolidating its presence in northern Benin and southern Dosso in Niger. In northern Benin and southern Dosso, JNIM has entrenched itself within the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex protected area, including Park W, from where the group has staged its campaign along the Benin-Niger border, which has also facilitated movements toward Nigeria. 6 JNIM has used media and propaganda campaigns to promote its presence, and has claimed several operations in Benin, Niger, and Togo. 7
ISSP, which originates and operates from its strategic bases in northeastern Mali’s Menaka and Niger’s Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, 8 has instead intensified its activities in northern and central Dosso and introduced tactics of economic warfare, in particular through attacks on the Benin-Niger oil pipeline. ISSP’s strategy initially involved primarily nonviolent activities, including collecting zakat (alms or taxes), clandestinely managing supply lines, and moving forces and reinforcements across Dosso’s hinterland into Nigeria. Several routes across Dosso initially constituted a supply corridor for the group before ISSP developed it into a support zone. In early 2024, it transformed into a combat zone as the group began launching attacks on security forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure.
Certain media narratives have misleadingly attributed the surge in violence along the Niger and Nigeria border to a “new terrorist group” known by the moniker “Lakurawa.” 9 Rather than an altogether new group, these militants are also reported to have long entertained relations with ISSP, exploiting the chronic instability in the central Sahel. 10 In fact, attacks attributed to the so-called Lakurawa are long-established ISSP operations in Niger’s Dosso region and Nigeria’s northwestern states of Sokoto and Kebbi. 11 This mislabeling overlooks how groups like JNIM and ISSP operate and adapt to changing circumstances when they infiltrate, contest, and consolidate territory, and also employ hybrid tactics that mix self-defense, insurgency, and banditry — complexities that oftentimes are poorly understood or described in oversimplified or outdated terms in official accounts and the media.
ISSP has maintained a low profile, operating covertly to infiltrate and entrench itself along the Niger-Nigeria border, and is now also expanding its operations toward the Beninese border. 12 The expansion of JNIM and ISSP follows different geographical trajectories but the two groups’ presence overlap in Niger’s Dosso region, and especially in the communes of Gaya and Dioundiou ( see map below ). JNIM and ISSP’s overlapping presence in the same areas creates a complex and volatile situation due to their different operational and violent tactics and objectives.
For example, JNIM has carried out a series of attacks on military and security force positions, 13 including focusing on embedding itself in communities on both sides of the Benin-Niger border through proselytization, community outreach, and involvement in the local economies and illicit trade. Meanwhile, ISSP has carried out similar attacks by engaging in armed confrontations with the military and security forces. What stands out, however, is its more aggressive approach and use of economic warfare, targeting the oil pipeline, in particular the section between Bela and Lido that passes through the Dioundiou commune. 14 Additionally, in a more recent development, the group also began targeting civilians on a larger scale, including by committing mass atrocities, as happened on 22 February 2025, when likely ISSP fighters attacked several villages around Koutoumbou, in Diondiou commune, on the border with Nigeria.
Both JNIM and ISSP operate in Gaya, creating a competitive dynamic as both groups vie for influence and control over the same geographical area. It cannot be ruled out that in these early stages of infiltration and territorial contestation, the two groups could establish a modus vivendi by coexisting or demarcating their respective areas of operation in the process of destabilizing the territory. Either way, considering the enmity, and the protracted and deadly turf wars between JNIM and ISSP elsewhere in the region, this proximity more likely increases the risk of broader competition and confrontation.