712. The Sahel model is failing---jihadists are besieging the capitals Moscow underwrote.
ACSS 26 — Africa Center for Strategic Studies. July 8. The U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies, at National Defense University. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Russia’s New Frontier in Africa,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/russias-new-frontier-in-africa/ Clopus
A chilling illustration of this is Moscow’s deceptive recruitment of thousands of Africans to fight in Ukraine. African conscripts are pushed toward frontline positions with little training, poor equipment, and high casualty rates.
Family members of Kenyan nationals tricked into fighting for the Russian army in Ukraine. (Photo: AFP/Simon Maina)
While Russia’s influence is most evident in the Sahel, similar patterns are seen in Libya, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Madagascar, among others. Moreover, with 80 documented information operations targeting two dozen African countries , Russia’s polarizing narratives have advanced anti-democratic messaging across the continent.
An Achilles’ heel of Russia’s strategy of disruption in Africa, however, is that it is not sustainable. While Moscow may have been successful at pushing out Western security partners in the Sahel, by investing little in the stability of these highly fragile countries facing escalating jihadist insurgencies, security is bound to unravel.
This appears to be just what is happening. Jihadist groups are moving ever closer to Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou . The insurgents are mounting sieges on dozens of towns across the three countries and have effectively constricted fuel supplies in Bamako. Insurgent attacks on Bamako and other Malian cities in 2026 killed the Minister of Defense, knocked out the power grid, and exposed the vulnerability of the military regime. The airport in Niamey has been closed twice during the year due to jihadist attacks.
Russian paramilitary forces retreating from Kidal, Mali following insurgent attacks. ( Screen capture )
Rather than rebuild the security coalitions they dismantled, the juntas have further cracked down on citizens. In Mali and Burkina Faso, violence against civilians by the militaries (and their Russian partners) since 2023 has resulted in more civilian fatalities than those caused by the jihadists .
Despite this collapsing house of cards, Russia and its junta allies remain on the offensive with their most potent asymmetric tool: information operations. Audaciously, this is not just directed at shoring up domestic support for the Sahelian juntas but is also targeting neighboring democratically oriented governments in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin. Social media accounts linked to Russia and the juntas extol the fictional development and stability realized under the military regimes. Any jihadist gains are blamed on Western collusion.
Despite this collapsing house of cards, Russia and its junta allies remain on the offensive with their most potent asymmetric tool: information operations.
This messaging is coupled with the same narratives that proved successful in the Sahel—democracy has failed, voting is pointless, the West is the cause of Africa’s challenges, and only a strongman can bring order. While divorced from the realities in the Sahelian countries, this simplistic messaging resonates with some.
West Africa, thus, is in the throes of a pivotal race. Will the relentless negative messaging topple another democratic-leaning government before the fallacy of junta success is exposed? Or will the Sahelian military regimes collapse first, shattering any such illusion?
A column of black smoke rises over Bamako, Mali in the aftermath of the April 25 attacks. (Photo: AFP)
A coup in Nigeria or one of the other major West African countries—with a subsequent realignment to Russia—would be a great prize for Moscow. It would also enable Moscow to pivot from its failing strategy in the Sahel to a much more promising frontier in coastal West Africa. Nigeria’s economy is roughly 10 times that of the three Sahelian countries combined.
723. And US strikes are the accelerant---solidarity brings the Sahel groups here.
Onapajo 26 — Hakeem Onapajo. January 26. Associate Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Fellow at the Legislative Center for Security Analysis, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies. Africa at LSE, “US military strikes in Nigeria may escalate the security crisis in the Sahel,” https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2026/01/26/us-military-strikes-in-nigeria-may-escalate-the-security-crisis-in-the-sahel/ Clopus
Despite observers dismissing the possibility of direct US involvement in Nigeria, following a series of high-level diplomatic engagements between Washington and Abuja, President Trump announced a “Christmas gift” to the terrorists. He claimed the US had conducted successful airstrikes against targeted terrorist cells.
To forestall perceptions of territorial aggression, the Nigerian government immediately released an official statement saying that the operation was a product of military cooperation between Washington and Abuja.
Although seemingly useful, a continued US-led military operation in Nigeria may be counter-productive and open a floodgate of immediate and long-term security threats.
First, the historical religious tension between Christian and Muslim communities has been ignited following the framing of the conflict as a Muslim-targeting-Christian problem. Clearly, the rhetoric of Christian genocide by the US government disregards the Muslim victims of the conflicts. Across the Muslim-dominated northern region, there is a growing perception of a well-coordinated Western agenda to decimate the Muslim population in favour of the Christians for political reasons. If not curtailed, such perception may lead to a large-scale conflict that may derail the fragile unity in Nigeria.
Second, foreign invasion to fight terrorism gives the impression of a weak and incapable Nigerian government, which may play into the hands of ambitious military coup makers aiming to attack a democratic regime. Recent military takeovers in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali were justified by the military as necessary due to the inability of the civilian governments to contain terrorism and counter French influence. The democratic breakdown in Nigeria will not only affect the country but will also greatly destabilise the West African sub-region.
Third, the Sahel is presently classified as the hotbed of terrorism by the Global Terrorism Index , as the deadliest terror groups are located there. Launching a war against their counterparts in Nigeria may occasion the influx of other terror groups into Nigeria to show solidarity, escalating insecurity in the region. On the other hand, the war may also push the terrorists to other areas within and outside the country.
Fourth, Nigeria has the largest population in Africa. A badly executed military operation may lead to a large-scale conflict that would cause a massive humanitarian crisis. Already, the conflict has caused over two million internal displacements and refugees in neighbouring countries. The international community may not be able to handle the possible humanitarian crisis that may follow an extensive military operation in northern Nigeria.
Fifth, a US-led military operation in Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria will increase anti-US sentiments in Nigeria, as well as the West African region. West Africa is largely Muslim-dominated, with a strong ethnic solidarity of the Hausa and Fulani in many states across the region. A US-led military operation may expose American people and assets to more attacks around the region.
731. It has been on the books over a year and the strikes kept killing.
Isamotu 26 — Idowu Isamotu. April 12. Defence and security correspondent for Daily Trust, Abuja, quoting the Nigerian Air Force spokesman’s written response to the paper’s enquiry. Daily Trust, “NAF launches Civilian Harm Mitigation, Response Action Plan,” https://dailytrust.com/naf-launches-civilian-harm-mitigation-response-action-plan/ Clopus
The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has dispatched a fact-finding team to investigate reports of an accidental airstrike on a weekly market in Jilli, located along the Borno–Yobe border.
The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Sunday Aneke, on Sunday ordered an immediate probe into the incident, stressing that the service treats reports of civilian harm with “utmost seriousness and empathy.”
NAF spokesman, Air Commodore Ehimen Ejodame, disclosed this in a statement issued in response to an enquiry by Daily Trust regarding the reported strike.
Daily Trust reports that at least 56 people, mostly traders, were feared killed, while 14 others were hospitalised following the airstrike on the market.
Ex-PDP Presidential aspirant, Hayatu-Deen, Joins ADC
Kwankwaso opens up on ADC Sharing formula
Responding to the development, Ejodame called for calm and assured that the Air Force would thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident.
“The Nigerian Air Force (NAF) has taken note of reports alleging that an air strike conducted on Saturday, 11 April 2026, may have affected a local market in Jilli, resulting in civilian casualties,” he said.
“The Service treats all reports of possible civilian harm with the utmost seriousness and empathy, as the protection of innocent lives remains central to all NAF operations.
“In line with this commitment, the CAS has directed the immediate activation of the Civilian Harm Accident and Investigation Cell (CHAI-Cell) to proceed to the location on a fact-finding mission.”
742. The investigations are the tell---denial, no published report, no compensation.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
The NAF has shown a pattern of denying responsibility and even involvement in mishaps. Similar to the military’s response to the Rann attack, NAF initially denied the air raid in Buwari, Yobe State, stating that, ‘no bomb or missile was even used’ (Jamiu, Citation2022). However, the NAF later acknowledged the attack, admitting that civilian casualties may have occurred. The Rukubi attack is another instance in which NAF denied responsibility. Instead of acknowledging the operational error, the NAF designated the deceased as terrorists planning an attack on the community and required survivors to provide proof of civilian casualties. The NAF maintained that they had conducted surveillance and had verified the presence of terrorists before taking action (Ayodele Famuyiwa, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). Samiala, the surviving victim of the attack described above, remains deeply troubled by the Air Force's refusal to admit to the mistake in the airstrike and upset by the portrayal of his innocent siblings as terrorists. Samiala's emotional distress is palpable as he refutes the NAF’s account: ‘I lost eleven of my siblings in that tragic event; my siblings were inaccurately labeled as terrorists and killed in the airstrike’ (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a). He maintained that they were peaceful herders and that the deaths of his siblings had left an irreplaceable void in his life. Samiala further described the blatant NAF refusal to admit the mistake as the height of injustice.
Apart from the denial of NAF’s accidental airstrikes, as in the case of Rukubi, the failure to make reports of internal investigation public is another critical concern. Despite initiating two probes into the Rann attack, the outcomes have not been made public (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023a). The NAF also initiated an investigation into the death of over 20 soldiers in an airstrike in Mainok, but it remains uncertain whether the military will reveal the report on this incident. Amnesty International (Citation2023) reported that after every erroneous strike, the military established an inquiry board to investigate the incident, but no further details were disclosed, and no punishments were given. The rights group contends that the Nigerian military's failure to take responsibility for past actions has resulted in more mistaken attacks. Further, Human Rights Watch (Citation2023b) notes that Nigerian government inability to hold the NAF accountable is fostering a culture of impunity and posing an increasing threat to the lives of the civilians whom the military should safeguard. As a result, the army has continued to conduct airstrikes that inadvertently result in civilian casualties (Amnesty International, Citation2024).
Isamotu (Citation2023) claims that due to the Nigerian government's lack of cooperation, those seeking legal redress against the military have faced deterrence. For example, after the Tudun Biri incident, Dalhatu Salihu filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government, but he was discouraged by his community leaders (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b). Similarly, despite persistent efforts by Samiala to seek justice following the Rukubi attack, he encountered frustration and disappointment. Samiala stated, ‘We have exhausted every avenue in pursuit of justice … ..’ (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b). The discouragement faced by victims in pursuing legal action is a sad reminder of the challenges that confront civilians in affected areas. Nevertheless, rights groups have consistently advocated the payment of compensation to victims. Abubakar Umar Garba, an intelligence and security expert, stated that timely compensation would ease the suffering and grief of the victims’ relatives and further advised the military high command to act on the compensation issue to prevent problems (Abubakar Garba, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). This lack of compensation underscores the government's failure and the suffering of the affected families. Nigerian security forces have also not adapted to the changing security landscape in the northwest, failing to apply the lessons learned from combating Boko Haram to bandits. Leena Hoffmann, a Fellow at the Chatham House African program, concludes that the Nigerian military is unable to engage in self-reflection, hold itself accountable, and transform into a force that protects civilians (Leena Hoffmann, cited in Isamotu, Citation2023). This underscores the need for robust oversight and transparent investigations to rebuild confidence in the military (Human Rights Watch, Citation2023b).
753. The pattern continued after the board sat---announced probe, then nothing.
HRW 26 — Human Rights Watch. World Report 2026 country chapter on Nigeria; international human rights investigation and monitoring organization. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2026: Nigeria,” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2026/country-chapters/nigeria Clopus
In January, a Nigerian Air Force airstrike hit Tungar Kara village in Maradun LGA of Zamfara State, killing at least 20 people, according to media reports . The victims, including members of the Zamfara Community Protection Guard and residents, were reportedly responding to a bandit raid at the time. The military claimed the strike was targeted at bandits terrorizing villages in the area but announced they were undertaking an investigation following public outcry; however, no information has been provided since.
Similar airstrikes have killed hundreds in Nigeria , in previous years, during counter-banditry operations without transparent, clear, and meaningful steps towards accountability or reparations.
764. Even the NGO that welcomed it says it needs a framework Nigeria doesn’t have.
CIVIC 25 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. June 3. The NGO that has run civilian-harm-mitigation training for the Nigerian military since 2018, quoting its Africa and MENA Program Director. CIVIC, “CIVIC Welcomes Nigerian Air Force’s New Action Plan to Prevent Civilian Harm,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/press-releases/civic-welcomes-nigerian-air-forces-new-action-plan-to-prevent-civilian-harm/ Clopus
Abuja, NIGERIA, June 3, 2025 – Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) welcomes the Nigerian Air Force’s recent announcement of a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, which marks an important commitment to take tangible steps to minimize harm to civilians from aerial operations.
“We applaud efforts by Nigerian military leaders to protect civilians, especially amid mounting security challenges. This is a promising step to take concrete measures to prevent civilian harm,” said Vianney Bisimwa, Africa and MENA Program Director at CIVIC.
Focusing on preventing civilian harm from airstrikes is a promising step to institutionalize protection of civilians practices in Nigeria’s military. It has become clear that a pattern of airstrikes harming civilians—often due to misidentification and air-to-ground integration challenges—requires a concerted effort to identify practical solutions.
We encourage all security forces in Nigeria to follow the example set by the Air Force. Sustained, consistent progress in the protection of civilians will require a policy framework that builds on the Action Plan and connects it to parallel efforts among other security forces in the country. To that end, CIVIC reiterates its call for a national Protection of Civilians Policy in Nigeria applicable to all security forces. Ongoing reviews of national policy frameworks offer a key opportunity to elevate protection of civilians and coordinate efforts among security forces.
771. Airpower is the substitute for ground troops---soldiers die, so Abuja buys sorties.
Onuoha et al. 23 — Freedom Onuoha, Idris Mohammed, and Oluwole Ojewale. December 13. Senior Lecturer in Political Science and Coordinator of the Security, Violence and Conflict Research Group at the University of Nigeria. Conflict researcher at Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto. ENACT Regional Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator for Central Africa at the Institute for Security Studies. Institute for Security Studies, “Nigeria’s military mistakes cost the country its civilians,” https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-military-mistakes-cost-the-country-its-civilians Clopus
Nigeria has witnessed soaring violence in recent years, primarily caused by the scale and spread of non-state armed groups. With distinct motives, goals, and methods, these groups encompass a range of actors. They include terrorists (Boko Haram) in the northeast; Niger Delta Avengers (rebels) in the south; separatist factions in the south-east; and criminal gangs (bandits) in ungoverned north-western areas.
While violence is the common denominator for these armed groups, their evolution, trajectory, scale, and operations differ. For example, Boko Haram’s insurgency has killed over 35 000 people and displaced at least 1.8 million in Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno states since 2009.
Bandits are a loose collection of different criminal groups involved in kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, cattle rustling, sexual violence, pillage and attacks on traders, farmers, and travellers in ungoverned spaces in Nigeria’s northwest. Illicit profit and ethnic grievances drive banditry rather than any ideological interest. Bandits indiscriminately target communities of various faiths and ethnicities across the region with the same level of brutality.
Survivors of the 5 December accidental bombing say they were struck twice during the incident
There are about 30 000 bandits in northwest Nigeria, spread across scores of groups ranging from 10 to over 1 000 fighters. As of December 2022, bandits had displaced over a million people in rural communities. There were almost 13 500 banditry-related deaths between 2010 and May 2023.
Amid rising insecurity, Nigeria deploys its military forces and assets for multi-domain operations in the conflict hotspots. Eighty per cent of Nigeria’s military is deployed nationwide, mainly for routine police duty, under various code names and yielding mixed results.
Soldiers – especially ground troops – have died at the hands of the militants. This has led to the state investing in aerial combat. The country has expanded its collection of air assets to enhance its air, land, and sea operations. These include tethered and untethered drones, helicopters, and different aircraft types.
Many Nigerian soldiers – especially ground troops – have died at the hands of the militants
The deployment of these assets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as bombardments of forests where insurgents, terrorists, or bandits hide, have resulted in the death of some of these criminals. Others have surrendered to state forces.
In April 2022, a Nigerian airstrike reportedly killed over 70 Islamic State-affiliated fighters at Nigeria’s northern border with Niger. In August 2023, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) confirmed the air component of Operation Delta Safe and Operation Hadin Kai carried out successful air interdiction missions on some illegal refining sites and terrorist hideouts in the Niger Delta and North East regions. These are just some examples of many successful operations.
However, similar to last week’s tragedy in Tudun Biri, the military has made several deadly operational errors. On 17 January 2017, an NAF fighter jet accidentally bombed an internally displaced persons camp in Rann, Borno State, killing 112 and injuring 97. The public panel report on the incident set up by the Nigerian Defence Headquarters claimed the cause of the airstrike was a lack of appropriate marking of the area.
782. Air is integral, not marginal---it carries ISR, interdiction and leadership strikes.
Ogbozor 25 — Ernest Ogbozor. April 3. Assistant Professor of Homeland Security at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 20(2), “Counterinsurgency airstrike mishap, intelligence failure and civilian harm in northern Nigeria – 2014 to 2024,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675 Clopus
Nigeria’s airpower dates to the establishment of the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) in 1964, which has historically depended on foreign training and equipment (Ebiye, Citation1992). Although terrorism in Nigeria predates airpower development, aerial capabilities have been pivotal in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in northern Nigeria, leveraging drones and aircraft for real-time data acquisition (Onuoha, Citation2014). Precision airstrikes have targeted insurgents’ strongholds, though issues such as collateral damage and intelligence accuracy have long been problematic (Ewi & Salifu, Citation2017). The NAF has been integral to counterinsurgency efforts, employing airstrikes to neutralise insurgent strongholds, interrupt supply logistics, and target leadership figures. However, it is essential to note that the Army also employs airpower for purposes such as airstrikes, transportation, interception, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (Okoli et al., Citation2024, p. 5).
793. And they say so---the Air Force calls this year’s air war the offensive.
Martin 25 — Guy Martin. August 14. Defence journalist at defenceWeb, a South Africa-based defence and security publication covering African military procurement and operations. defenceWeb, “Nigeria requests $346 million worth of guided and unguided weapons from US,” https://defenceweb.co.za/african-news/nigeria-requests-346-million-worth-of-guided-and-unguided-weapons-from-us/ Clopus
Strengthening the Nigerian Air Force comes amid continued pressure from Islamist terror groups and bandits. Abubakar this month said Nigeria’s military has killed 592 armed militia members in the northeastern sate of Borno in the past eight months, after stepping up air strikes in a region plagued by violence.
Abubakar said the Air Force also destroyed more than 200 technical vehicles and 166 logistics hubs in a sweeping offensive against insurgents in the northeast. “This year, our air war is faster, sharper and more surgical,” Abubakar said. “We are taking out high-value targets, crippling logistics networks and dismantling cells that threaten peace in the northeast.”
He said Nigerian Air Force aircraft flew 798 combat sorties and logged over 1 500 operational flight hours under Operation Hadin Kai, Nigeria’s military’s counterinsurgency operation in the northeast.
801. End-use monitoring is about where the item is, not what it does.
CIVIC 21 — Center for Civilians in Conflict. September. Organization that works with armed actors on civilian harm mitigation and with the U.S. Congress on arms transfer policy. CIVIC, “Demystifying End-Use Monitoring in U.S. Arms Exports,” https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EUM-Brief.pdf Clopus
Although both Blue Lantern and Golden Sentry are meant to satisfy requirements ensuring U.S. arms are “being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement,” neither program is practically geared towards investigating, verifying, or preventing inappropriate use of U.S. arms. The current EUM framework traces its origins to the Cold War, when the United States was deeply preoccupied with its defense technology falling into the hands of the Soviet Union or aligned regimes. EUM today remains fundamentally shaped by that paradigm, resulting in a system that is focused almost exclusively on protecting technology from diversion by confirming the physical location of exported defense articles, ensuring the physical security of those items, and verifying that they remain reasonably under the control of the agreed-upon end-user. What these programs don’t do is monitor the actual use of U.S. weapons and the conduct of forces employing them, including the use of U.S. weapons in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL), and other civilian harm. Essentially, current EUM programs are designed to protect U.S. technology, not people. The word “use” in end-use monitoring is an unfortunate misnomer.
Contrary to popular belief, the so-called Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to security force units
that have committed gross violations of human rights, do not apply to many arms transfers due to the executive branch’s overly narrow interpretation of “assistance.”
Recommendations: Putting the “Use” Back in End-Use Monitoring
Comprehensive end-use monitoring is essential to mitigate risk, ensure that U.S. weapons do not fuel violations of human rights or the laws of war, and promote accountability when they do. To develop end-use monitoring policies and practices that actually monitor use, the executive branch can:
- Include human rights and IHL in all standard FMS terms and conditions and DCS licensing conditions for all arms transfers to ensure that human rights abuses and IHL violations are considered as end-use violations;
- Develop new end-use monitoring processes that are designed to monitor and assess the use of U.S.-origin equipment, including compliance with international human rights law and IHL, reported cases of civilian harm and harm to civilian objects, and deployment of such equipment in conflict; and
812. Their own notification is silent on the record it is supposed to check.
Ewang 25 — Anietie Ewang. August 19. Researcher in the Africa Division at Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, “US-Nigeria Weapons Sale Requires Rights Safeguards,” https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/19/us-nigeria-weapons-sale-requires-rights-safeguards Clopus
The US State Department approved another potential multi-million-dollar weapons sale to Nigeria on August 14, citing support for the country’s efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. Yet the announcement is conspicuously silent on the Nigerian military’s record of serious human rights abuses and on what safeguards, if any, will be implemented to ensure accountability and prevent further violations.
The proposed sale includes munitions, precision bombs, and precision rockets and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$346 million. It follows another $997 million package approved in 2022, which included 12 AH-1Z attack helicopters. Although the 2022 deal was initially held up in the US Senate due to rights concerns, procurement of the helicopters is reportedly now underway. When considering the new arms deal, Congress should not treat it as a routine security transaction.
Security concerns across Nigeria are real and widespread. In the Northwest, violent raids, killings, and kidnappings for ransom by criminal gangs continue to destabilize communities. In the Northeast, the Islamist armed group Boko Haram and its splinter factions continue their brutal insurgency against the government while terrorizing civilians and committing abuses. In the Southeast, separatist armed groups routinely terrorize and attack communities and kill residents.
However, in responding to these threats, Nigerian security forces have been repeatedly implicated in serious rights violations, including unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and conflict-related abuses. The US State Department documented many of these abuses in its own 2024 Human Rights Report on Nigeria , released just last week. Military airstrikes have also repeatedly resulted in the deaths of people mistakenly identified as threats, without accountability. Despite ongoing calls for justice, meaningful reform remains absent.
Under US law , security assistance is prohibited to foreign forces implicated in gross human rights violations. Before this sale proceeds, US lawmakers should ensure US law is followed. They should require clear, enforceable accountability measures for all military operations, including during the use of airstrikes, alongside concrete safeguards to ensure compliance with international human rights law.
823. Guardrails have been there a decade and the cooperation still hasn’t resolved anything.
Warner and Kochevar 25 — Lesley Anne Warner and Steven J. Kochevar. November 14. Africa security analyst and columnist for World Politics Review; former State Department and NSC official. Just Security, “The Political Theater Behind Trump’s Nigeria Threat,” https://www.justsecurity.org/124725/trump-nigeria-military-threat/ Clopus
In response to the Trump administration’s directive to develop military options, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has proposed a range of approaches, each constrained by distinct diplomatic, strategic, and operational considerations. AFRICOM was originally created as — and largely continues to be — a ‘posture-limited theater,’ with a limited forward military presence and drawing on only 0.3 percent of the Department of Defense’s operating budget, according to the congressional testimony of previous combatant commanders. The command’s annual posture statements identify Nigeria as central to counterterrorism strategy in West Africa, prioritizing the containment and degradation of Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa through an approach intended to let African partners lead, with the United States and allies providing enabling support, rather than the United States engaging directly in combat operations. The backbone of bilateral engagement has been episodic training to build the capacity of the Nigerian military and associated institutions and robust foreign military sales, which has included the delivery of 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft in 2021 and substantial munitions packages, such as a $346 million precision-guided weapons sale approved this August. Regionally, Nigeria has participated in annual multinational exercises such as Flintlock , which is focused on joint special operations, and Obangame Express , which is billed as the “largest multinational maritime exercise in Western and Central Africa.” The U.S. military also provides advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence-sharing, to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a five-nation regional security mechanism comprising forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (until withdrawing earlier this year), and Nigeria.
The first option presented by AFRICOM, deepening “partner-enabled operations” with Nigerian security forces, essentially represents an intensification of the bilateral security cooperation already underway, which has not resolved longstanding conflicts across the country. Moreover, longstanding legal restrictions under the Leahy Law, which prohibits assistance to security forces that have perpetrated human rights abuses, have rightfully put guardrails on the bilateral security relationship for more than a decade. Lastly, the evisceration of the foreign assistance apparatus means that bureaus like the State Department’s Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the former U.S. Agency for International Development, which the Trump administration shut down, are no longer working to address the root causes of insecurity in the country. Those efforts ordinarily would work hand-in-glove with military- and law-enforcement responses.
A second option that AFRICOM floated would involve drone strikes on militant camps and convoys launched from bases in southern Europe (presumably Morón air base in Spain or Sigonella in Italy) or Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, which serves as AFRICOM’s only permanent military installation on the African continent. Operating from any of these locations would require roughly eight hours of transit for an armed MQ-9 Reaper, leaving approximately 10 hours on-station time. While this duration would permit extended surveillance of militant camps and convoys and enable multiple strikes, it would prove insufficient for sustained counterterrorism operations. Furthermore, such operations would require overflight authorizations from multiple countries across the continent; yet, given the Nigerian government’s concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity, unilateral drone strikes from foreign bases would be diplomatically untenable for the region absent their consent. Nigeria’s possession of its own strike-capable aircraft, including the 12 A-29 Super Tucanos delivered in 2021, means Abuja would likely demand operational control over any targeting decisions rather than ceding sovereignty to U.S.-directed strikes from abroad. More importantly, such operations would divert MQ-9 assets already committed to counterterrorism missions against al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia, assessed as higher-priority threats to U.S. national security interests.
The third option AFRICOM presented would be to deploy an aircraft carrier group in the Gulf of Guinea that would enable fighter jets and long-range bombers to conduct airstrikes into northern Nigeria. One immediate limitation of this option is that the United States possesses 11 aircraft carriers, usually allocated between theaters deemed to be national security priorities to the United States – such as U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in the Middle East– with the remainder undergoing scheduled maintenance or training cycles. Additionally, U.S. officials have indicated that the 2025 National Defense Strategy will prioritize homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere, thus implying that operations in other theaters, including counterterrorism in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, will be deprioritized. With the USS Gerald R. Ford rerouted from the Mediterranean to the Caribbean for what the administration describes as counter-narcotics operations , and the other currently-deployed carriers in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, deploying a carrier strike group to the Gulf of Guinea would require the U.S. military to accept risk in the CENTCOM and INDOPACOM areas, leaving the United States more vulnerable to opportunistic challenges from adversarial actors and peer competitors. One way to buy down risk in this scenario could be to deploy submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, which would enable strikes throughout northeastern Nigeria from international waters without diverting carrier groups or requiring forward basing.
Beyond the strategic, operational, and tactical constraints of these options is the question of the legal framework that would theoretically enable military action in Nigeria – most likely the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) or the president’s inherent Article II constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief to conduct limited military operations without explicit congressional authorization, as modern presidents have done frequently . In any event, the president’s stated justification for military action in Nigeria stretches the conceptual limits of both authorities, as the protection of Christians is neither counterterrorism nor directly linked to a national security threat to the United States. Nonetheless, the administration’s approach to foreign assistance , immigration enforcement , and tariffs would seem to suggest that it views legal limitations as mere suggestions.
83Nuclear terrorism. The pursuit is decades old and the radiological route has fewer barriers.
NASEM 24 — National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Consensus study report of the National Academies’ Committee on Nuclear Terrorism, chapter 3, “New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks.” The National Academies Press, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction,” doi: 10.17226/27215 Clopus
Terrorist groups have been pursuing nuclear and radiological weapons and devices for decades ( Ferguson et al. 2005 ). A few prominent examples include: (1) Aum Shinrikyo’s unsuccessful, repeated attempts to mine uranium, hire Russian nuclear scientists, and purchase Russian nuclear technology in the 1990s; (2) Al Qaeda’s unsuccessful alleged attempts to purchase nuclear weapons and material from a variety of sources in the 1990s and recruit insiders, as well as attempts to design a nuclear weapon that would have included explosive testing in Afghanistan; and (3) ISIS’s access to a cache of cobalt-60 when it overran Mosul ( Ward 2018 ). In August 2014, an insider at the Doel 4 nuclear power plant in Belgium carried out a successful act of nuclear sabotage. The sabotage did not result in the release of radiological material, but the costs were significant. The saboteur was never identified, but the nuclear regulator added new requirements for defending against insider threats ( Bunn et al. 2016 ).
Although terrorists confront considerable challenges in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device (IND), the enormous consequences of a nuclear detonation call for continued vigilance by the United States and reinvigorated efforts by the international community to reduce the risk. Attacks involving nuclear sabotage or deploying a radiological dispersal device (RDD) have fewer barriers for non-state actors to pursue. These risks reinforce the need for an ongoing international commitment to managing and reducing nuclear terrorism challenges.
Radiological material found in secure nuclear power plants and other facilities can be used to make an RDD (aka “dirty bomb”) or a radiological exposure device (RED) ( Council on Foreign Relations 2006 ). According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, there have been over 80 attacks on nuclear facilities around the globe since 1963, the
84Extinction. The cost curve on advanced bioweapons is falling and the loss is permanent.
Millett and Snyder-Beattie 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. July/August. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, PhD, former head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Clopus
Each of our estimates rely to some extent on guesswork and remain highly uncertain. Technological breakthroughs in areas such as diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics, as well as vastly improved surveillance, or even eventual space colonization, could reduce the chance of disease-related extinction by many orders of magnitude. Other breakthroughs such as highly distributed DNA synthesis or improved understanding of how to construct and modify diseases could increase or decrease the risks. Destabilizing political forces, the breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention, or warfare between major world powers could vastly increase the amount of investment in bioweapons and create the incentives to actively use knowledge and biotechnology in destructive ways. Each of these factors suggests that our wide estimates could still be many orders of magnitude off from the true risk in this century. But uncertainty is not cause for reassurance. In instances where the probability of a catastrophe is thought to be extremely low (eg, human extinction from bioweapons), greater uncertainty around the estimates will typically imply greater risk of the catastrophe, as we have reduced confidence that the risk is actually at a low level. 48
§§§
Given that our conservative models are based on historical data, they fail to account for the primary source of future risk: technological development that could radically democratize the ability to build advanced bioweapons. If the cost and required expertise of developing bioweapons falls far enough, the world might enter a phase where offensive capabilities dominate defensive ones. Some scholars, such as Martin Rees, think that humanity has about a 50% chance of going extinct due in large part to such technologies. 49 However, incorporating these intuitions and technological conjectures would mean relying on qualitative arguments that would be far more contentious than our conservative estimates. We therefore proceed to assess the cost-effectiveness on the basis of our conservative models, until superior models of the risk emerge.