85US--Russia war. Moscow is staging Africa for the confrontation with NATO.
Albanese 25 — Michael Albanese. July 25. Special Projects Lead for Picogrid, based in Kyiv, previously with the Atlantic Council and the Center for European Policy Analysis. Center for European Policy Analysis, “Putin Building African Springboard for War on West,” https://cepa.org/article/putin-building-african-springboard-for-war-on-west/ Clopus
Russian operations in Africa are not just about fomenting instability or profiting from resource extraction, they are also part of a long game to make the continent a front in a global confrontation with the West.
US officials have warned that Russia may soon begin coordinating its war efforts with China in an attempt to open multiple theaters of conflict — forcing the US and its allies to split their attention, stretch resources, and confront crises across the globe.
This concern has been echoed by Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe. He warned the alliance must prepare for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and the Pacific, highlighting the possibility that Moscow and Beijing may coordinate campaigns as early as 2027.
This is why Putin has refused to scale down Russia’s Africa footprint, even as it faces staggering battlefield losses in Ukraine. As the Kremlin prepares for a broader confrontation with NATO, Africa is being readied to serve as a launchpad for asymmetric operations, proxy escalation, and logistical disruption.
From the Sahel to the Mediterranean, Russian proxy forces could attack European interests or pin down NATO assets in the event of open war. It is no accident that the countries now flooded with Russian arms and military advisers sit on maritime chokepoints and energy corridors critical to European stability.
The US and its allies have responded, albeit slowly. Targeted sanctions have hit Wagner-linked companies and officials, but the machinery of Russian influence in Africa remains intact. Without coordinated efforts to sever its links with banks, ships, and middlemen, Moscow will continue to peddle bullets for minerals, and authoritarian stability for strategic leverage.
86The state--proxy line is where nuclear risk concentrates---deniability is the point.
NASEM 24 — National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024. Consensus study report of the National Academies’ Committee on Nuclear Terrorism, chapter 3, “New Dynamics in Nuclear Terrorism Pose New Risks.” The National Academies Press, “Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction,” doi: 10.17226/27215 Clopus
ISIS is an example of a non-state actor that has attempted to hold territory and fulfill most of the functions of a state. Additionally, states continue to use proxy groups to conceal their involvement in domestic and international conflicts. For example, Pakistan’s ISI has played an important role in the creation and support of the Taliban and extremist groups involved in Kashmir. Iran has used Hezbollah to support the Assad regime in Syria and in border disputes with Israel. Iran has also supported Hamas in its conflict with Israel. Both Hezbollah and Hamas also play political roles in Lebanon and Palestine, respectively, complicating their status still further.
A state’s imperfect control of these proxies (terrorist, paramilitary, hacking, or mercenary group) makes it possible to claim that the agents are acting independent of the state. The advantage of this kind of arrangement is that it gives the state at least somewhat plausible deniability when attacks are successfully executed. The disadvantage is that the state may end up losing control of its agent. According to one well-established framework, states typically have three managerial strategies when it comes to proxy groups: (1) tacitly permitting (turning a blind eye), (2) orchestrating (actively funding or supporting a group in return for services), or (3) delegating (establishing command and control over the group). With each step toward “delegating,” the state becomes more involved in the decisions and actions of the proxy group ( Canfil 2022 ; Maurer 2018 ). The motivations of joining such groups vary. For example, in the case of an orchestrated proxy, the state and the proxy group are assumed to have similar interests, whereas, in the case of a mercenary group, the aim of the group is profit ( McFate 2019 ).
Direct state complicity in a terrorist attack can have far-reaching diplomatic and political consequences to include elevating the intensity of a conflict. Accordingly, using a proxy can be attractive because it positions a state to attempt to shift blame, better mold its narrative, and create plausible, or in some cases even implausible, deniability surrounding an attack or mission. This method allows countries to advance their political or economic agenda over time and locations while minimizing the risk of accountability for their efforts and discouraging public attention ( Atwell, Portzer, and McCurdy 2021 ). (That said, for reasons spelled out earlier, the risk of discovery would presumably largely deter states from covert delivery of nuclear weapons via proxies.)
According to a 2015 CSIS report on “Gray Zones,” “Today, the toolkit for coercion below the level of direct warfare includes information operations, political coercion, economic coercion, cyber operations, proxy support, and provocation by state-controlled Forces. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, are increasingly turning to these [gray-zone] strategies to overcome U.S. strengths in global diplomacy, law, and commerce” ( Atwell, Portzer, and McCurdy 2021 ; Barno and Bensahel 2015 ).
The Wagner Group is a well-known example of a private group that operates in the grey area between state and non-state. Wagner is a paramilitary organization that has been trained and sponsored by the Russian Federation. Russia has been using the group to promote its foreign policy objectives, gather intelligence, influence political outcomes, and provide foreign militia training. Suspected and confirmed operations have occurred in as many as 30 countries and across four continents, including Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Central African Republic, Mali, and Venezuela ( Katz et al. 2020 ). Notably, the Wagner Group, among other Russian private military groups, was used to destabilize and consolidate Russian power in Crimea and eastern Ukraine leading up to and sup-
87A global catastrophic agent doesn’t need a high kill rate---it needs reach.
Adalja et al. 19 — Amesh A. Adalja, Matthew Watson, Eric S. Toner, Anita Cicero and Thomas V. Inglesby. August 30. Senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, board-certified in infectious disease, critical care and emergency medicine; co-authors are Center senior scholars and its Director. Health Security 17(4), “Characteristics of Microbes Most Likely to Cause Pandemics and Global Catastrophes,” https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7122301/ Clopus
The onset and duration of the period when a person is contagious during an infection also play a major role in spread. Diseases that are contagious during a late stage of infection, when infected people are very sick and therefore have more limited opportunities for spread, may be delimited in their spread. On the other hand, diseases that are contagious prior to symptom development, during the incubation period, or when only mild symptoms are present have greater opportunities for spread as infected individuals are able to conduct their activities of daily living with little or no interruption.
Modeling studies with simulated outbreaks have shown that the presence or absence of this timing of transmission factor can be decisive in whether an outbreak can or cannot be controlled. If a microbe is contagious before a person is seriously ill while the disease is still incubating, then there is higher potential for pandemic spread. Historical examples reinforce this idea, as the only human infectious disease to be vanquished from the planet—smallpox—was one that was not contagious during the incubation period (Fraser et al. 2004 ). By contrast, a microbe such as the influenza virus, which is contagious prior to symptom development and has a wide range of clinical severity, is able to infect widely and is not amenable to control (Brankston et al. 2007 ).
Host Population Factors and Intrinsic Microbial Pathogenicity Characteristics
Microbial pathogenicity cannot, in reality, be separated from host characteristics. As elucidated by Pirofsky and Casadevall’s host damage framework, disease is a complex interplay between a host immune system and a microbe (Pirofski and Casadevall 2008 ). In congruity with this paradigm, host features and microbial pathogenicity are discussed together.
For a microbe to cause a GCBR-level pandemic, it will be necessary for a significant proportion of the human population to be immunologically naïve to the agent so that the microbe would have a high number of susceptible humans to infect. Additionally, large quantities of a sufficiently effective countermeasure (vaccine or antimicrobial agent) would not be available. Immunologic naïveté would be expected with a zoonotic pathogen. The microbe, correspondingly, would have to possess the ability to evade the host immune response through virulence factors, immunological camouflage, or other features that allow a productive infection to ensue.
Additionally, human receptors that are utilized by a pandemic-causing microbe would likely be widespread in the population, facilitating permissive infection in the majority of humans. Receptors may also provide target organ tropism for the agent, allowing severe disease to occur (e.g., lower respiratory tract and central nervous system).
Case fatality rates (CFRs) need not be inordinately high to cause a GCBR-level event, as evidenced by the 2.5% CFR reported for the 1918 influenza pandemic—the event closest to an actual human GCBR in the modern era (Taubenberger and Morens 2006 ). A low but significant CFR adheres to the host density threshold theorem. According to this commonly held theorem, a microbe that kills too many of its hosts will run out of susceptible hosts and be extinguished (Cressler et al. 2016 ). While this may be true of pathogens that are closely linked to one host species, it is not applicable to sapronotic diseases such as amebic encephalitis and cholera (in certain contexts), which can infect and kill without jeopardizing future transmission or survival. Indeed, many extinction-level amphibian infectious diseases are sapronotic in nature, such as the chytrid disease of salamanders and frogs (Fisher 2017 ).
Additionally, a GCBR-level event may not confer direct mortality. Reproductive effects (i.e., in the manner of rubella or Zika) or carcinogenic effects (e.g., HTLV-1) could, in many ways, be highly detrimental to the future of humanity, as they could lead to significant curtailment of lifespans and diminishing birth rates, which could ultimately result in significant population collapse (Rasmussen et al. 2017 ; Tagaya and Gallo 2017 ).
RNA Viruses Are the Class of Microbe that Could Cause a GCBR, Though Other Microbial Classes Could Evolve or Be Engineered in Ways that Pose These Risks
Given the right context, any microbial organism could evolve or be engineered to be a GCBR. However, the most likely cause of a GCBR presently is a virus, with RNA viruses being the most probable (Woolhouse et al. 2013 ).
88Engineered agents combine what evolution cannot---and the omnicidal actors are non-state.
Millett and Snyder-Beattie 17 — Piers Millett and Andrew Snyder-Beattie. July/August. Senior Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, PhD, former head of the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, MS. Health Security, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity,” https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2017.0028 Clopus
Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths, 1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone. 2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population, 3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time. 4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.
A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens. 5 , 6
While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island. 7 , 8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). 9
In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu, 10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population. 11 , 12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics. 13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective. 18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well. 19-21
Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes. 22 Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology. 23 , 24 While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention. 25 The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI, 26 and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII. 27
Non-state actors may also pose a risk, especially those with explicitly omnicidal aims. While rare, there are examples. The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan sought biological weapons for the express purpose of causing extinction. 28 Environmental groups, such as the Gaia Liberation Front, have argued that “we can ensure Gaia's survival only through the extinction of the Humans as a species … we now have the specific technology for doing the job … several different [genetically engineered] viruses could be released” (quoted in ref. 29 ) . Groups such as R.I.S.E. also sought to protect nature by destroying most of humanity with bioweapons. 30 Fortunately, to date, non-state actors have lacked the capabilities needed to pose a catastrophic bioweapons threat, but this could change in future decades as biotechnology becomes more accessible and the pool of experienced users grows. 31 , 32
What is the appropriate response to these speculative extinction threats? A balanced biosecurity portfolio might include investments that reduce a mix of proven and speculative risks, but striking this balance is still difficult given the massive uncertainties around the low-probability, high-consequence risks. In this article, we examine the traditional spectrum of biosecurity risks (ie, biocrimes, bioterrorism, and biowarfare) to categorize biothreats by likelihood and impact, expanding the historical analysis to consider even lower-probability, higher-consequence events (catastrophic risks and existential risks). In order to produce reasoned estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreats, we bring together relevant data and theory and produce some first-guess estimates of the likelihood of different categories of biothreat, and we use these initial estimates to compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing existential risks with more traditional biosecurity measures. We emphasize that these models are highly uncertain, and their utility lies more in enabling order-of-magnitude comparisons rather than as a precise measure of the true risk. However, even with the most conservative models, we find that reduction of low-probability, high-consequence risks can be more cost-effective, as measured by quality-adjusted life year per dollar, especially when we account for the lives of future generations. This suggests that despite the low probability of such events, society still ought to invest more in preventing the most extreme possible biosecurity catastrophes.
891. THE VOTE IS THE TARGET NOW. Armed men stormed the commission and burned the ballots.
Freedom House 26 — Freedom House. Annual survey of political rights and civil liberties covering 195 countries, scored by in-country analysts and reviewed by external advisers. Freedom in the World 2026, “The Growing Shadow of Autocracy,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2026/growing-shadow-autocracy Clopus
The largest declines in freedom for the calendar year were caused by military coups and efforts by incumbent leaders to crush peaceful dissent or change constitutional rules in their favor. Guinea-Bissau received the year’s single largest score change, losing 8 points on Freedom in the World ’s 100-point scale after the November general elections were disrupted by a coup in which armed men stormed the election commission’s office and destroyed ballots. Military officers also ousted the elected government in Madagascar, bringing the total number of African countries to have experienced a coup since 2019 to nine. In Burkina Faso, which has been under military rule since a 2022 coup, the score declined by 5 points as state security forces and junta-sponsored militias engaged in mass killings and forced displacement of Fulani civilians, while Islamist insurgents attacked people of other faiths and imposed their own religious practices in areas under their control.
Tanzania registered the second most significant deterioration in rights and liberties in 2025, losing 7 points and sinking further into the Not Free category. The incumbent president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, was declared the winner of an election marred by the exclusion of opposition candidates, restrictions on the media, a campaign of forced disappearances of political opponents, and widespread violence against protesters that resulted in at least 1,000 deaths. El Salvador tied with Madagascar for the third largest decline in the world, losing 5 points. Salvadoran authorities persecuted high-profile academics who were critical of the government, threats against the media drove journalists into exile, and the government seized land without providing compensation. The Legislative Assembly, dominated by President Nayib Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party, passed a constitutional reform that abolished presidential term limits and extended the terms from five to six years, clearing the way for Bukele to seek reelection indefinitely.
902. NIGERIA IS ON THE LIST. Regional analysts put the borderlands among the hot spots for the next attempt.
Brechenmacher and Brown 26 — Saskia Brechenmacher and Frances Z. Brown. January 30. Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. Vice President for Studies at Carnegie; served on the White House National Security Council staff across three administrations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa’s Democratic Kaleidoscope: Trends to Watch in 2026,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/africa-democracy-protest-elections-coups Clopus
Moreover, given public discontent with governance and rising insecurity across Central and West Africa, future coup attempts in the region appear likely . Benin, Niger, and Nigeria’s borderlands have all emerged as hot spots. Benin, for instance, experienced a failed coup attempt in December and is headed for presidential elections in April; it has also suffered increasing violence as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has expanded its operations .
911. THE SAHEL. Violence doubled after the takeovers---and that's the Pentagon's own count.
Turse 24 — Nick Turse. June 6. Investigative journalist and fellow at Type Media Center; author of Tomorrow’s Battlefield: U.S. Proxy Wars and Secret Ops in Africa. Quoting Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. The Intercept, “After Training African Coup Leaders, Pentagon Blames Russia for Coups,” https://theintercept.com/2024/06/06/africa-coups-pentagon-blames-russia/ Clopus
“While the juntas justify their coups — and continued strongman rule — based on the claim that they are uniquely able to restore security, episodes of violence linked to militant Islamist groups have doubled since these militaries have seized power,” wrote Smith and Siegle.
Aside from a single sentence noting that “Western countries had been working closely with democratically elected governments in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali for more than a decade,” the report contains no substantive discussion of the billions in security assistance the U.S. government has pumped into the Sahel, nor the military training provided to many of the leaders of these coups. The failure of U.S. counterterrorism efforts and the far higher spikes in terrorist violence over the span of U.S. involvement also go unmentioned.
Aside from a single sentence, the report contains no substantive discussion of the billions in security assistance the U.S. government has pumped into the Sahel, nor the military training provided to many of the coup leaders.
Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003 , the first years of U.S. counterterrorism assistance in the Sahel. Last year, the number of violent events in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger alone reached 3,716, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a crisis monitoring organization. This represents a jump of more than 41,000 percent.
This has been disastrous for the people of the Sahel. In that same period, the number of fatalities linked to Islamist violence has skyrocketed from the State Department’s count of 23 deaths in 2002 and 2003 to 11,643 in 2023 — a jump of more than 50,000 percent — according to figures provided by the Pentagon’s Africa Center.
922. THE HONEST TEST. Ask whether junta rule delivered---the answer is half of the world's terror deaths.
Brechenmacher and Brown 26 — Saskia Brechenmacher and Frances Z. Brown. January 30. Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. Vice President for Studies at Carnegie; served on the White House National Security Council staff across three administrations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa’s Democratic Kaleidoscope: Trends to Watch in 2026,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/africa-democracy-protest-elections-coups Clopus
The primary open question is the one that has dogged these countries since their military takeovers: If the coups were driven in large part by dissatisfaction with the performance of democratically elected governments and welcomed by some as a reassertion of national sovereignty, are military governments faring better? Are they succeeding in improving citizens’ material conditions and delivering greater security? In the Sahel, on the economic side, the picture so far is inauspicious: Natural resources are fueling GDP growth in Burkina Faso and Niger , yet for most people, the daily reality is one of continued hardship . Insecurity also remains a major challenge. Per the UN , the Sahel now accounts for half of all terrorist deaths globally. Jihadist militant groups escalated their campaigns using both violence and economic warfare, weakening state control and encroaching on larger population centers. New Sahelian security partnerships with Russia have resulted in widespread civilian harm, with little independent monitoring or accountability—in Mali, jihad-related deaths have more than quadrupled since the arrival of Russia-linked forces, compared to the average yearly death toll over the previous decade. Continued military setbacks could erode regime cohesion and ultimately trigger renewed coup pressures.
933. SEVEN TIMES WORSE. Mali's dead are overwhelmingly post-coup---the promise inverted.
Eizenga 26 — Daniel Eizenga. July 14. Research Fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “As Security Deteriorates, Sahelian Juntas Further Stifle Civilians,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/security-sahel-juntas-stifle-civilians/ Clopus
Since Mali’s military coup in 2020, the Sahel has become the deadliest theater of militant Islamist violence in Africa. Fatalities linked to these extremist groups continue to rise, violence has expanded geographically, and insurgent groups are increasingly threatening major population centers, transportation corridors, and economic infrastructure across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The nearly 9,800 reported fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel over the past year account for 41 percent of all such fatalities in Africa.
The deterioration has been particularly striking given that the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger justified their seizures of power on the grounds that elected governments had failed to address growing insecurity. Yet, fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in the Sahel are now roughly seven times higher than they were in 2019. In Mali, more than 80 percent of all fatalities linked to militant Islamist groups have occurred since the 2020 coup .
Mali Protest: In one of the most visible acts of protest since Colonel Assimi Goita came to power, hundreds of Malians gather in Bamako on May 3, 2025, following a call from a broad coalition of political parties fearing dissolution by the military authorities. (Photo: AFP)
The threat, moreover, has become increasingly regional in scope. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), a coalition of militant Islamist groups, now operates across a theater spanning more than 1,200 kilometers and has expanded southward and westward into more densely populated regions of the three Sahelian countries—as well as previously unaffected areas of coastal West Africa.
Coordinated attacks launched across Mali in April and July have exposed the growing threat. Simultaneous operations stretching from Bamako and Kati to Gao, Mopti, and Kidal have demonstrated an unprecedented level of coordination and growing operational reach of insurgent groups that appear increasingly capable of challenging military authority across multiple fronts.
944. THE MECHANISM. After the offensive they arrested the critics, not the gaps---power over protection.
Eizenga 26 — Daniel Eizenga. July 14. Research Fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “As Security Deteriorates, Sahelian Juntas Further Stifle Civilians,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/security-sahel-juntas-stifle-civilians/ Clopus
The response to the April attacks in Mali provides the clearest illustration of the pattern. In the weeks that followed the attacks, authorities launched a series of arrests and detentions targeting political figures, civil society actors, military personnel, journalists, magistrates, and ordinary civilians.
Motorcyclists line up to get fuel at one of the few petrol stations with supply in Bamako months after jihadists blockaded fuel routes. (Photo: AFP)
Among those detained were veteran political leader Mountaga Tall , political analyst Moussa Djiré, and opposition-linked figure Youssouf Daba Diawara. Authorities also arrested military officers and other individuals accused of involvement in plots against the junta. Beyond these high-profile cases, detentions and disappearances were reported in central and northern Mali, particularly among communities long viewed with suspicion because of their perceived links to armed groups. Together with continuing restrictions on political activity and public criticism , these actions reinforced a trend of shrinking tolerance for dissent under military rule.
This crackdown against civilian leaders has occurred even though there is no evident connection between these individuals and the military setbacks that precipitated the crisis. This appears to demonstrate that the junta is more focused on retaining power than protecting citizens or the state.
Meanwhile, there has been little discussion of the strategic questions raised by the attacks. The offensive exposed potential weaknesses in intelligence collection, force protection, operational coordination, and broader security strategy. There has also not been an effort to rebuild the regional security cooperation agreements with neighboring countries to counter what is increasingly a regional security threat.
951. THE RECORD. Every junta that promised a handover kept power---parties banned, timelines gone.
Brechenmacher and Brown 26 — Saskia Brechenmacher and Frances Z. Brown. January 30. Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. Vice President for Studies at Carnegie; served on the White House National Security Council staff across three administrations. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Africa’s Democratic Kaleidoscope: Trends to Watch in 2026,” https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/01/africa-democracy-protest-elections-coups Clopus
Last year witnessed the tenth and eleventh successful coups in Africa since 2020, as the wave of coups expanded beyond the conflict-afflicted Sahel to other countries with histories of military intervention in politics.
In Madagascar, youth protests over persistent water and power cuts broke out in September and quickly escalated into demands for systemic change. After soldiers sided with the demonstrators, the elite CAPSAT unit seized power , forcing president Andry Rajoelina—who himself came to power unconstitutionally in 2009—to flee. After being sworn in as president, Colonel Michael Randrianirina announced a military-led transitional government lasting eighteen to twenty-four months.
Likewise, in Guinea-Bissau, the military assumed power in November, days after a presidential election in which incumbent president Umaro Sissoco Embaló faced off against Fernando Dias da Costa. The election results were never released; instead, Embaló left the country while the military claimed it had acted to thwart a coup by unnamed politicians and drug traffickers. Opposition figures, civil society groups, and some regional leaders have questioned this account, suggesting that the takeover may have been orchestrated by Embaló himself. General Horta Inta-a Na Man is now serving as president for the duration of a purported one-year transition program (which the Economic Community of West African States has rejected ) with an announced December 2026 election date.
Unsurprisingly, most countries that experienced coups in previous years saw a consolidation of military rule in 2025. The Sahelian coup states in particular saw tightened restrictions on pluralism and dissent: Mali’s junta banned all political parties , and leaders across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced multi-year extensions of power, with electoral timelines now slipping into the absurd. By contrast, elections in Gabon were actually held earlier than the country’s post-coup transition agreement prescribed, though former military leader Brice Oligui Nguema claimed a landslide victory. Critics have attributed his victory to the regime’s consolidation of power through a recent constitutional referendum, a revamped electoral code, and the systematic exclusion of opposition candidates, while others note that Gabon still offers a welcome contrast to the Sahelian states’ trajectories and has met basic democratic transition milestones. Guinea largely followed the Gabon playbook, with junta chief General Mamady Doumbouya winning the December 2025 presidential election, thereby breaking his earlier promise to hand over power to a civilian government.
Unsurprisingly, most countries that experienced coups in previous years saw a consolidation of military rule in 2025.
What to Watch in 2026
The primary open question is the one that has dogged these countries since their military takeovers: If the coups were driven in large part by dissatisfaction with the performance of democratically elected governments and welcomed by some as a reassertion of national sovereignty, are military governments faring better? Are they succeeding in improving citizens’ material conditions and delivering greater security? In the Sahel, on the economic side, the picture so far is inauspicious: Natural resources are fueling GDP growth in Burkina Faso and Niger , yet for most people, the daily reality is one of continued hardship . Insecurity also remains a major challenge. Per the UN , the Sahel now accounts for half of all terrorist deaths globally. Jihadist militant groups escalated their campaigns using both violence and economic warfare, weakening state control and encroaching on larger population centers. New Sahelian security partnerships with Russia have resulted in widespread civilian harm, with little independent monitoring or accountability—in Mali, jihad-related deaths have more than quadrupled since the arrival of Russia-linked forces, compared to the average yearly death toll over the previous decade. Continued military setbacks could erode regime cohesion and ultimately trigger renewed coup pressures.
962. AND IT DOESN'T STOP. Parties dissolved, NGOs dissolved---even the junta's own supporters.
Eizenga 26 — Daniel Eizenga. July 14. Research Fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense’s academic institution for African security studies. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “As Security Deteriorates, Sahelian Juntas Further Stifle Civilians,” https://africacenter.org/spotlight/security-sahel-juntas-stifle-civilians/ Clopus
The junta’s campaign has increasingly extended beyond individuals to organizations. In January 2026, the junta dissolved all political parties after nearly three years of suspension. In April, more than 100 nongovernmental organizations and civil society associations were dissolved. Junta leader Ibrahim Traoré punctuated the significance of the action by stating that “People need to forget about the issue of democracy.”
This pattern of repression and violent crackdowns extends beyond traditional critics. The March 2026 death in detention of a prominent member of the pro-junta Wayiyan movement—a nationalist civic organization that has consistently mobilized public support for the junta—and a member of the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie, VDP) raised concerns over the growing use of coercive measures even against constituencies broadly aligned with the junta.
These fears were again on display in May when Imam Mohammad Ishaq Kindo—an influential Sunni religious leader—was arrested after publicly criticizing proposed legislation that would have expanded state regulation of religious practice. Demonstrators who gathered to demand his release were also subsequently detained.
971. THE FORCE WAS NEVER BUILT. The standby unit doesn't exist---and the juntas know it.
PSC Report 26 — Institute for Security Studies Peace and Security Council Report. March 19. The ISS unit that monitors the African Union Peace and Security Council; the piece quotes Paul-Simon Handy, the ISS representative to the AU. ISS PSC Insights, “Leverage crises in APSA interventions: design or coordination flaws?” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/leverage-crises-in-apsa-interventions-design-or-coordination-flaws Clopus
Recent Sahel dynamics further expose the gap between rhetoric and collective action. As Russia consolidates influence regionwide, neither the AU nor ECOWAS has fulfilled longstanding commitments to deploy a specialised African Standby Force unit against violent extremism. Despite its plans, the 2015 AU-led Nouakchott Process has yet to deploy a counter-terrorism force for the Sahel-Saharan region. Because RECs seem to have absolute control over their regional standby forces, the AU cannot deploy these forces to joint missions.
Warring parties and coup states, such as Alliance of Sahel States members are aware of APSA’s waning influence due to years of unimplemented decisions and an unwillingness to impose sanctions on spoilers of peace in conflict countries. While institutional reforms are crucial, the AU should persuade member states to invest their diplomatic, economic and military capital in AU-led initiatives. But how to make that happen is a challenge.
982. ONE MISSION LEFT. AU deployment collapsed---the subregions took over and now they've fragmented.
PSC Report 26 — Institute for Security Studies Peace and Security Council Report. March 19. The ISS unit that monitors the African Union Peace and Security Council; the piece quotes Paul-Simon Handy, the ISS representative to the AU. ISS PSC Insights, “Leverage crises in APSA interventions: design or coordination flaws?” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/leverage-crises-in-apsa-interventions-design-or-coordination-flaws Clopus
Decline and fragmentation in collective response
When the reform was proposed in 2016, the AU was already facing a weakening role in major crises in Africa, compared to its first decade. Then it drove mediation and peace support operations (PSOs) across regions backed by member states’ common interest in pan-African solutions.
AU and RECs PSOs from 2003 to 2014
While establishing PSOs is not the major pathway to peace, the table shows how willing the AU was to support political processes between 2003 and 2014, with the backing of its members and external financial support. Its activities began even before it had key intervention frameworks. This changed from 2013 due to less funding and increasing subregional interest in assuming PSOs without deferring to the AU.
Notably, the United Nations (UN) took over the Mali and Central Africa Republic missions in 2013 and 2014. In 2016, the PSC reversed a decision to deploy a mission in Burundi, inadvertently creating a risk aversion in the Council for approving future missions. The joint AU-UN mission in Darfur was closed in 2020. This left the AU with Somalia as its only active PSO, albeit donor- dependent .
While the number of AU-led interventions declined, there was a rebound in major REC-led peace initiatives from 2013 to 2023, particularly PSOs, signalling REC preference to address their challenges rather than wait for AU-level consensus. This is seen in Lake Chad Basin, The Gambia, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and DRC.